JUDGMENT : U.DURGA PRASAD RAO, J This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following relief : “to issue writ order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of Habeas Corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India directing the 4th respondent to produce Pangi Bhaskarao, who is now detained in Central Prison, Visakhapatnam District, before this Hon'ble Court and he may be ordered to be released forthwith after declaring his detention vide proceedings REV02-MGSTOLWOD 82023-MAG-CCLA, dt.25.04.2023, passed by the 2nd respondent which was confirmed by the 1st respondent, vide G.O.Rt.No.1155, General Administration (SC.I) Dept., dt.12.06.2023 as illegal and un constitutional and for a consequential direction.” 2. The facts succinctly are thus : (a) The 2nd respondent by his order in REV02-MGSTOLWOD 82023-MAG-CCLA, dt.25.04.2023, ordered detention of one Pangi Bhaskararao, So.Prahalad, under Section 3(1) & 3(2) of A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Gondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (for short, Act No.1 of 1986) on the ground that the detenu was involved in the following cases : S.No. Cr.No. & Sec. of Law Date of offence 1 Cr.No.29 of 2022, U/s.20(b)(ii)(c), 25 r/w 8(c) of NDPS Act, 1985 of G.Madugula Police Station. 30.07.2022 2 Cr.No.37 of 2022, U/s.20(b)(ii)(c), 25 r/w 8(c) of NDPS Act, 1985 of G.Madugula Police Station. 20.09.2022 3 Cr.No.37 of 2022, U/s.20(b)(ii)(c), 25 r/w 8(c) Cr.No.37 of 2022, U/s.20(b)(ii)(c), 25 r/w 8(c) Station. 24.07.2022 In the detention order it is also stated that he is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. (b) Subsequently, on the recommendation of the Advisory Board, his detention was confirmed by virtue of G.O.Rt.No.1155, General Administration (SC.I) Dept., dt.12.06.2023. Hence, the writ petition. 3. Learned Special Government Pleader representing the office of the learned Additional Advocate General filed counter and opposed the writ petition. 4. Heard learned counsel for petitioner, Sri D.Purna Chandra Reddy and learned Special Government Pleader representing the office of the learned Additional Advocate General. 5. (a) Learned counsel for petitioner assails the detention order on two main grounds. 3. Learned Special Government Pleader representing the office of the learned Additional Advocate General filed counter and opposed the writ petition. 4. Heard learned counsel for petitioner, Sri D.Purna Chandra Reddy and learned Special Government Pleader representing the office of the learned Additional Advocate General. 5. (a) Learned counsel for petitioner assails the detention order on two main grounds. Firstly that, out of three crimes which have been taken into consideration for ordering detention order, in Crime No.37 of 2022, the detenu was granted bail in Crl.M.P. No.726 of 2023, dated 01.04.2023, by the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam and the said fact was admitted in Para 10 of the counter of the respondents. Learned counsel would further submit that in remaining two cases i.e., Cr.No.29 of 2022 and Cr.No.34 of 2022, bail was not granted and the detenu is in judicial custody. He would further submit that the sponsoring authority has not placed the material relating to the granting of bail in Cr.No.37 of 2022 before the Detaining Authority and consequently, no discussion was made by Detaining Authority with regard to the consequences of the granting of bail in Cr.No.37 of 2022. He would further submit that bail order in Cr.No.37 of 2022 was not furnished to the detenu so as to make an effective representation before the State Government Advisory Board. For this grave procedural violation, he would argue, the detention per se became illegal. On this aspect, he placed reliance on the order of a Division Bench of this Court in W.P. No.17210 of 2022. (b) Learned counsel would argue that as admittedly detenu was in judicial custody by the date of detention order and in that view, there was no possibility of his committing any further crimes and this aspect has not been discussed and considered by the Detaining Authority in its order. Learned counsel would admit that merely because a detenu was in judicial custody that itself is not an obstruction for passing detention order. Learned counsel would admit that merely because a detenu was in judicial custody that itself is not an obstruction for passing detention order. Still the Detaining Authority has to take the said fact into consideration and mention in its order that there is every likelihood of the detenu getting bail in the cases in which he is in judicial custody and that there is a possibility of his repeating the similar crimes causing prejudice to the maintenance of public order and unless such an analysis is made in its order, he cannot arrive at a subjective satisfaction. He would submit that, however, in the instant case, the Detaining Authority has not made any attempt in its order in this regard and therefore, the detention order fails on that ground also. In this context, he placed reliance on the order of a Division Bench of this Court in W.P. No.1803 of 2021. Learned counsel thus prayed to set aside the impugned detention order. 6. In oppugnation, learned Special Government Pleader, while supporting the detention order, vehemently argued that the Detaining Authority has taken into consideration the bail granted to the detenu in one case and his continuation in judicial custody in respect of the remaining two cases and having been satisfied that he is likely to get bail in those two cases also and perpetrate the offences which may be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and then, ordered preventive detention and therefore, his order does not suffer from any procedural irregularities. He, thus prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 7. The point for consideration is whether the order of the 2nd respondent suffers from any legal infirmities and if so, the detention order dated 25.04.2023 is liable to be set aside ? 8. We have given anxious consideration to the above respective arguments. As can be seen from the detention order dated 25.04.2023 and the grounds of detention, admittedly, the detaining authority has taken into consideration three cases viz., (i) Cr. No.29 of 2022, (ii) Cr.No.37 of 2022 and (iii) Cr.No.34 of 2022, for ordering detention. 8. We have given anxious consideration to the above respective arguments. As can be seen from the detention order dated 25.04.2023 and the grounds of detention, admittedly, the detaining authority has taken into consideration three cases viz., (i) Cr. No.29 of 2022, (ii) Cr.No.37 of 2022 and (iii) Cr.No.34 of 2022, for ordering detention. Then, a perusal of the counter filed by the 2nd respondent would show that in Para 10, the bail status of the three crimes has been mentioned as follows : (i) In Crime No.37 of 2022, the detenu was arrested on 20.09.2022 and granted bail in Crl.M.P. No.726 of 2023, dated 01.04.2023, by the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge – cum - Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, FAC. Metropolitan Sessions Judge – cum – Special Judge for trial of offences under NDPS Act, Visakhapatnam; (ii) In Crime No.29 of 2022, the detenu was arrested by connecting PT warrant on 29.10.2022 and granted bail vide Crl.M.P. No.1011 of 2023, dated 26.04.2023, by the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge – cum - Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, FAC. Metropolitan Sessions Judge – cum – Special Judge for trial of offences under NDPS Act, Visakhapatnam, i.e., subsequent to the detention order; and (iii) In Crime No.34 of 2022, the detenu was granted bail in Crl.M.P.978 of 2023, dated 01.05.2023, by the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge – cum – Special Judge for trial of offences under NDPS Act, Visakhapatnam, i.e., subsequent to the detention order. Thus, from the counter it is evident that the detenu was granted bail in Cr.No.37 of 2022 prior to the date of detention and in remaining two cases, he got bail subsequent to the detention order. 9. Now, with this factual ground, we examined the first argument of learned counsel for petitioner to the effect that the Sponsoring Authority have not placed the copies of the bail applications and bail orders before the Detaining Authority and the Detaining Authority has not discussed about the affect of the bail and also the contention that the copies of the bail application and bail order in Cr.No.37 of 2022 was not furnished to the detenu for making effective representation to the Advisory Board. A perusal of the detention order shows that the Detaining Authority has only mentioned that the detenu was arrested on 20.09.2022 vide Cr.No.37 of 2022 and was sent to the judicial remand and so far he was not enlarged on bail. Except that, the Detaining Authority has not specifically mentioned about the detenu obtaining bail in Cr.No.37 of 2022 on 01.04.2023. This indicates that the Sponsoring Authority has not placed before him the copies of the bail application and bail order in Cr.No.37 of 2022. Then, we perused the material papers filed along with the counter by the 2nd respondent. In those material papers, the copy of the bail order in Cr.No.37 of 2022 is not found place. It also indicates that copy of the bail order was not furnished to the detenu as mandated by the procedure. 10. In W.P. No.17210 of 2022, a Division Bench of this Court has observed as follows with regard to the consequence of non-furnishing of the bail orders to the Detaining Authority and non-furnishing the same to the Detenu : “8. x x x x x One of such procedural safeguards is that if the detenu was already granted conditional bails in the crimes which were taken as a ground for ordering preventive detention, it will be the solemn duty of the Sponsoring Authority to bring the said fact to the notice of the Detaining Authority by placing before it the bail applications and bail orders for its consideration. Failure on the part of the Sponsoring Authority to do so and also the failure on the part of the Detaining Authority to consider aforesaid material on being placed before it, render the detention per se illegal. The law on this aspect is no more res integra. In Vasanthu Sumalatha, 2015 SCC Online Hyd 790 = (2016) 1 ALT 738 (DB) (2 supra), a Division Bench of the common High Court of Andhra Pradesh has observed thus : “43. If the bail order, which is a vital material, is not considered, the satisfaction of the detaining authority itself would be impaired. (V. Muragesh v. Collector and District Magistrate, Chittoor (2013 Crl.L.J. 585); Durgam Subramanyam v. Government of A.P. ( 2013 (4) ALT 243 (D.B); State of U.P v. Kamal Kishore Saini ( (1988) 1 SCC 287 ; M. Ahamedkutty vs Union Of India 1990 SCR (1) 209, 1990 SCC (2) 1. (V. Muragesh v. Collector and District Magistrate, Chittoor (2013 Crl.L.J. 585); Durgam Subramanyam v. Government of A.P. ( 2013 (4) ALT 243 (D.B); State of U.P v. Kamal Kishore Saini ( (1988) 1 SCC 287 ; M. Ahamedkutty vs Union Of India 1990 SCR (1) 209, 1990 SCC (2) 1. Nonplacing and non-consideration of material, as vital as the bail order, vitiates the subjective decision of the detaining authority, and the Court cannot attempt to assess in what manner, and to what extent, consideration of the order granting bail to the detenu would have effected the satisfaction of the detaining authority. (Rushikesh Tanaji Bhoite v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 72 ). Failure of the sponsoring authority to place the conditional orders, granting anticipatory bailbail, before the detaining authority is fatal as it is a vital material which would have weighed with the detaining authority at the time of passing the detention order. [Durgam Subramanyam?s case (supra). 54. Neither the order nor the grounds of detention refer either to the conditional or the unconditional orders of bail granted in favour of the detenus. As noted hereinabove failure of the detaining authority to consider the orders granting conditional bail would vitiate the orders of detention. ..xxx…” 9. It should be noted that in the above decision, the judgment in Sunila Jain’s case (1st supra) relied upon by the learned Special Government Pleader was distinguished on facts. In Sunila Jain, copy of the order granting bail and order of remand has been furnished to the detenu. In that context, it was observed by the Hon?ble Apex Court that non-furnishing of a copy of the application of bail cannot be said to be a ground and that all the documents placed before the detaining authority are not required to be supplied and only relevant and vital documents are required to be supplied. The said judgment was distinguished in Vasanthu Sumalatha case (2 supra) as follows “53. Unlike in Sunila Jain (supra) where a copy of bail application, for an offence which was bailable, was not furnished and a copy of the order granting bail and the order of the remand were furnished to the detenu, in the present case the orders granting conditional bail were neither considered by the detaining authority nor were copies thereof furnished to the detenu. The conditional orders of bail restricted the movement of the detenus and required them to appear before the officer concerned periodically. If these conditional orders of bail had been brought to his notice, it may well have resulted in the detaining authority arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the detention of the detenus were unnecessary. Reliance placed by the Learned Advocate-General on Sunila Jain (supra) is, therefore, misplaced.” In Gattu Kavitha case (1 supra), another Division Bench of the common High Court of Telangana & A.P. expressed similar view as follows : “14. From the ratio in the decision, it is clear that non-supply of conditional bail orders by the sponsoring authority to the detaining authority and failure to refer to the same in the order of detention and grounds of detention, and non- consideration of such vital and relevant material, invalidates the detention order. The law laid down in Vasanthu Sumalatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2016 (2) ALD (Crl.) 156, which was recently affirmed by us in W.P.No.48052016 to the effect that failure to supply documents relied upon by the detaining authority would result in denying an opportunity to make an effective representation as guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, would squarely apply to the instant case.” Division Bench of this Court further observed as follows : “Thus, in essence, the conditional bail orders were neither considered nor furnished to the detenu, meaning thereby, the detention became illegal and unsustainable. On this ground alone, the detention order is liable to be set aside.” 11. The above decision in our view squarely applies to the case on hand as in the instant case also the bail order was neither placed before the Detaining Authority nor furnished to the detenu to enable him to make an effective representation before the Advisory Board. On this ground alone, the detention order is liable to be set aside. 12. So far as the second ground is concerned, the submission of the petitioner is that the Detaining Authority has not specifically mentioned that in the remaining two cases, the detenu is likely to get bail and thereby, the possibility of his repeating the similar type of offences cannot be obviated and therefore, the preventive detention alone is the effective remedy. So far as the second ground is concerned, the submission of the petitioner is that the Detaining Authority has not specifically mentioned that in the remaining two cases, the detenu is likely to get bail and thereby, the possibility of his repeating the similar type of offences cannot be obviated and therefore, the preventive detention alone is the effective remedy. It is argued that without arriving at such subjective satisfaction, the Detaining Authority has mechanically ordered the preventive detention and therefore, the said order is unjust and illegal. In this context, we perused the grounds of detention wherein the Detaining Authority has stated as follows : “Thus, the undersigned is satisfied from the material placed before me by the Superintendent of Police, ASR District, that you fall under the category of “Drug offender” as defined in Sec 2(f) of “The Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986” and you are a fit person to be detained USec 3(2) of the said Act and accordingly, I issue orders with a view to prevent you from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order.” 13. From the above, it is clear that as rightly argued by learned counsel for petitioner, except mentioning that from the material placed before him, the Detaining Authority was satisfied to order preventive detention, there was no discussion about the detenu’s languishing in judicial custody in the remaining two crimes and the possibility of his obtaining bail and repeating the similar type of crimes. There is no proper analysis of the facts to arrive at subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. 14. In W.P. No.1803 of 2021, a Division Bench of this Court has observed as follows : “9. On a reading of the above, does not, in our view, show that there was any apprehension or any possibility of the detenu being released on bail. 14. In W.P. No.1803 of 2021, a Division Bench of this Court has observed as follows : “9. On a reading of the above, does not, in our view, show that there was any apprehension or any possibility of the detenu being released on bail. As observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kamarunnisa's v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 even in a case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. From a reading of the above, it is very much evident, the detaining authority was aware the detenu was in custody as on the date of passing of the order, but, there is no material placed before him to show that there is every likelihood of he being released on bail. Merely saying that there is every likelihood of detenu being granted released on bail, as he was released in other cases may not satisfy the test as laid down in Champion R. Sangma's case, (2015) 16 SCC 253 and Kamarunnisa's case (2 supra). Though the petitioner has been released in 7 out of 10 cases, no material has been placed on record to show that he has made any application seeking release on bail in the following three cases : (i) Crime No.55 of 2020 of T.Sundupalli P.S.; (ii) Crime No. 150 of 2020 of Sidhout P.S.; and (iii) Crime No.122 of 2020 of Vontimitta P.S.” 15. From the above decision, it is clear that when a detenu is already under judicial custody in connection with some or all other cases, the Detaining Authority has to take note of the factum of his judicial custody and record its satisfaction that there is likelihood of his being released on bail so as to buttress the preventive detention order. In the instance case, there is no such discussion in the impugned detention order. On this ground also, the preventive detention fails. 16. In the instance case, there is no such discussion in the impugned detention order. On this ground also, the preventive detention fails. 16. On a conspectus of the facts and law as narrated supra, this writ petition is allowed and the detention order in REV02-MGSTOLWOD 82023-MAG-CCLA, dt.25.04.2023, passed by the 2nd respondent – District Collector, Alluri Sitharama Raju District, is hereby set aside and the detenu namely Pangi Bhaskararao, so.Prahalad, is directed to be released forthwith by the respondents if the detenu is not required in any other cases. No costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, in this case shall stand closed.