JUDGMENT : Harish Tandon, J. 1. The appellant raises a seminal point on the scope of Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in relation to an interpretation of a contract entered into between the parties. 2. A prelude to the dispute between the parties are succinctly jotted down in order to the determine the question raised in the instant appeal more particularly the nature of a contract. Indubitably, the appellant took a conscious decision to develop the Baratang Jetty and a detailed project report was prepared containing various components viz., dredging of sea bed in the channel at the mouth of Middle Strait Creek, Construction of 12 nos. Navigational Aids founded on RCC bored case in the situ piles, Construction of RCC Jetty on pile foundation connecting the shore with RCC piled approach, etc. 3. Pursuant to the Detailed Project Report (DPR) a Notice Inviting Tender was published and advertised together with a Request For Qualification (RFQ) on 3rd December, 2014 for the aforesaid purposes. The intending purchasers were further directed to submit their bid in accordance with Request for Proposal (RPF) and Draft Concessional Agreement in format attached thereto. The respondent submitted the bid as contained in the Notice Inviting Tender in the requisite format and was found the lowest bidder and a Letter of Acceptance was issued on 31st January, 2016 followed with an agreement signed by the parties on 10th March, 2016. 4. It is also not in dispute that the project was completed but the respondent claimed right under the concession agreement, which was denied by the appellant treating such agreement under the EPC project which raises a dispute to be resolved through the Arbitral Tribunal. For the purpose of record, prior to taking recourse to determination of dispute through an Arbitral Tribunal, the parties have to pass through the Dispute Resolution Mechanism which in fact was exhausted and ultimately, the Arbitral Tribunal was constituted consisting of three members in terms of the arbitration clause. 5. The claims are jotted down as under:- Claim No.1 To declare that this Agreement dated 10th March, 2016 is in the nature of a concession agreement and consequently direct the respondent to hand over the project site for creating facilities and collect user fee/toll. Claim No.1A: To direct the respondent to pay a sum of Rs.10,68,62,175/- towards difference in cost of project and grant provided. Claim No.1A: To direct the respondent to pay a sum of Rs.10,68,62,175/- towards difference in cost of project and grant provided. Claim No.2: Claim towards compensation for the loss of revenue from the date of completion to the date of handing over of the site. Claim No.3: Claim towards additional expenses incurred due to re-design in live load from 1T per Sq.Mt to 2T per Sq.mt. Claim No.4: Claim towards interest on delay in release of Security Deposit collected against contract conditions. Claim No.5: Claim towards damage to Pile by DSS vehicle ferry. Claim No.6: Claim towards service tax and GST unpaid. Claim No.7: Claim towards interest for the claims upto pre-reference period i.e., from 20.2.2018 to 15.2.2019. Claim No.8: Claim towards interest for the period pending litigation and post award till realization of amount. 6. The appellant made counter claims in the following: Claim No.1: Cost of Arbitration (a) Arbitrator hearing (b) Cost of Learned Counsel (c) Travelling charges of the Department Officials, Counsel, Venue charges etc. (d) Manpower (4 Officers, 2 Clerks, Cost of Typing, Stationery, Photostat, Binding) Claim No.2: Interest on cost of materials issued to the claimant (R153). Claim No.3: Payment made to the claimant due to oversight. Claim No.4: Extra amount paid to the claimant due to change of depth of fascia beam and top level of jetty at approach. 7. Out of three members constituting the Arbitral Tribunal, two of its member jointly published the award whereas the third Arbitrator dissented with the view taken by the majority. The majority view of Arbitral Tribunal would reveal that the counter claim filed by the appellant was rejected in toto whereas the first claim of the respondent was answered in its favour holding that the agreement dated 10th March, 2016 is a concession agreement and, therefore, the respondent is entitled to get the project site to collect the user fees/toll and create the passenger amenity facilities and the appellant is bound to hand over the project site to the respondents within a reasonable time frame arrived by the mutual consent. 8. The majority view in relation to Claim 1A as discerned from the record that the respondent is entitled to a sum of Rs.6,30,61,170/- as compensation with interest at the rate of 8 per cent from the date of the award till the realization of payment. 8. The majority view in relation to Claim 1A as discerned from the record that the respondent is entitled to a sum of Rs.6,30,61,170/- as compensation with interest at the rate of 8 per cent from the date of the award till the realization of payment. The claim 2 of the respondent was further allowed to the tune of Rs.1,34,53,048/- with interest at the rate of 8 per cent from the date of the award till the payment. However, the majority view rejected the claim nos.3 & 4 of respondent and disposed of the claim no.5 by directing the appellant to make payment only if they receive the payment from the Directorate of Shipping Services. 9. The claim no.6 of the respondent was further disposed of directing the appellant to reimburse the service tax from the date of withdrawal or exemption of service tax from Andaman Lakshadweep Harbour Works (ALHW) to the date of implementation of GST and GST after this period as applicable after following the procedure in vogue. 10. The majority view disposed of claim nos.7 and 8 on the score that since the interest has already been awarded in terms of section 31.7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 no interest shall be awarded separately. So far as the claim no.9 is concerned, the majority view awarded a sum of Rs.21,74,632/- together with an interest at the rate of 8 per cent from the date of the award till actual payment. 11. The said award is assailed under section 34 of the said Act primarily on the ground that the majority view of the Tribunal in relation to a nature of an agreement dated 10th March, 2016 is perverse and therefore, the same is required to be set aside. 12. Obviously the moment the section 34 Court accepts the view of the appellant, the consequential reliefs granted by the Arbitral Tribunal has to fall out and therefore the parties have squeezed their argument on the said pivotal issue. 13. An argument was advanced before section 34 Court that the RFQ, RFP and the draft agreement were the pre-bid documents which does not find place in the said agreement dated 10th March, 2016 and therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot import such documents as an integral part of the agreement dated 10th March, 2016. 14. 13. An argument was advanced before section 34 Court that the RFQ, RFP and the draft agreement were the pre-bid documents which does not find place in the said agreement dated 10th March, 2016 and therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot import such documents as an integral part of the agreement dated 10th March, 2016. 14. It is further argued that in a concession agreement, certain stipulations with regard to opening of the Escrow Account and the deposit of the money therein by the appellant is a major condition and having not done so, the Arbitral Tribunal has wrongly interpreted the nature of the said agreement dated 10th March, 2016 as concession agreement. 15. The Court found that the Notice Inviting Tender, RFQ, RFP and the agreement dated 10th March, 2016 would reveal that the whole process of tender was divided into two stages, namely qualification stage and bid stage and the terms and conditions embodied in RFQ would reveal that the selected bidder is to execute a long term concession agreement with ALHW and precisely for such reason, the agreement dated 10th March, 2016 referred the respondent herein as concessionaire. It is further held that the moment the Tribunal has interpreted the agreement and held the same to be a concession agreement such being a possible view does not invite section 34 Court to interfere with such award. 16. Precisely the said argument is repeated before us by Mr.V.D.Sivablan, learned advocate appearing for the appellant. According to him, the section 34 Court ought to have considered the findings return by a dissenting Arbitrator and should not go by the ipse dixit of the majority view. It is further submitted that the Arbitral Tribunal has wrongly interpreted the agreement dated 10th March, 2016 as concession agreement, which requires an opening of Escrow Account which, in fact, has not been done in the instant case. 17. Mr. Sivabalan further submits that the entire amount was paid in the account of the respondent and not in the Escrow Account and, therefore, both the Arbitral Tribunal and the Court below have wrongly held that the said agreement dated 10th March, 2016 is a concession agreement. However, another point is taken by Mr. 17. Mr. Sivabalan further submits that the entire amount was paid in the account of the respondent and not in the Escrow Account and, therefore, both the Arbitral Tribunal and the Court below have wrongly held that the said agreement dated 10th March, 2016 is a concession agreement. However, another point is taken by Mr. Sivabalan, which does not appear to us to have taken either before the Arbitral Tribunal or before the Section 34 Court that the agreement dated 10th March, 2016 does not contain the requisite stamp duty and therefore the Tribunal or the Court ought not to have been acted upon the same and placed reliance upon a recent judgement of the Larger Bench rendered in the case of N.N.Global Mercantile Private Limited vs. M/s Indo Unique Flame Limited and others reported in (2023) 7 SCC 1 . Mr. Sivabalan thus concludes that majority view of the Arbitrators needs interference and the Court below ought to have set aside the said dissent award by allowing the application under section 34 of the said Act. 18. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondent vociferously submits that the Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three members have held that the agreement dated 10th March, 2016 is a concession agreement by majority and therefore, it is not obligatory on the part of the Court to take the view of the dissenting arbitrator as a matter of course and interfere with the majority award. 19. It is further contended that the Arbitrator is within its competent to interpret the contract and in the event a reasonable and possible view has been taken, it does not invite interference under section 34 of the said Act, even if the Court finds that the other view is possible. 20. It is arduously submitted that the scope of interference with the Arbitral award is limited and must confirm to the conditions laid down in section 34 of the said Act. As such, court does not act as court of appeal. It is further submitted that the majority view in relation to a construction of the contract cannot be impinged solely on the ground that the pre-bid documents having no reference in the said agreement dated 10th March, 2016 as there is no fetter in ascertaining the nature of the documents and the reference of the pre-bid documents by necessary implication. 21. 21. It is thus submitted that there is no patent illegality nor perversity in the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal and the only point taken with regard to the nature of the agreement that no Escrow Account was opened, has been elaborately dealt with by the Arbitral Tribunal taking into account the evidence adduced by the parties. On the point of insufficiency of the stamp duty put on the agreement dated 10th March, 2016, it is submitted that the aforesaid plea was never taken before the Arbitral Tribunal nor section 34 Court and therefore, cannot be permitted to be taken for the first time in appeal under section 37 of the said Act. 22. On the conspectus of the aforesaid facts and the submissions advanced by the respective counsel, the seminal point involved in the instant appeal is whether the majority view of the Arbitral Tribunal needs interference on the ground enumerated under section 34 of the said Act. 23. Before we proceed to embark our journey on the circumference of the aforesaid point, it would be profitable to recapitulate the scope and the jurisdiction exercised by the Court under section 34 of the said Act. Ancillary thereto it is also important to understand the jurisdiction exercised by the Appellate Court under section 37 of the said Act. Section 34 of the said Act has succinctly and elaborately jotted down the grounds, if proved, to set aside the arbitral award. Sub-section 2 of section 34 of the Act exhaustively contained the ground of challenge to an arbitral award and interference by the Court. 24. The tenet of the argument advanced by the appellant would manifest that the challenge is founded upon the ground that the arbitral award made by the majority is in conflict with the public policy of India as explained therein. The trend of the argument can also be seen that the appellant intended to take aid of sub-section 2A of Section 34 providing that the award may be vitiated by patently illegality appearing on the face of the award. 25. It has been consistently held in a plethora judgment rendered by the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction exercised by the Court under section 34 of the said Act is not akin to an appellate jurisdiction where ordinarily the Court may interfere with the judgment on re-appreciation of fact. 26. 25. It has been consistently held in a plethora judgment rendered by the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction exercised by the Court under section 34 of the said Act is not akin to an appellate jurisdiction where ordinarily the Court may interfere with the judgment on re-appreciation of fact. 26. The Apex Court in case of Konkan Railway Corporation Limited vs. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking reported in (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1020 held that the Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under section 34 of the Act, should not interfere with the arbitral award in a casual and cavalier manner. It is further held that the interference is warranted provided the Court arrived at the conclusion that the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal is perverse striking at the root of the matter. Equally the appellate jurisdiction under section 37 of the Act is also limited and must travel on the peripheral of the grounds enumerated under section 34 of the Act and not to be exercised as being exercised as a normal appellate jurisdiction. 27. Though section 37 of the Act provides a remedy by way of an appeal against specified nature of the order passed under the said Act neither jurisdiction cannot be assumed, not to be exercised beyond the provisions of the said Act which limits the jurisdiction of the first court, i.e., section 34 Court. The impetus can be made from the judgement of the Apex Court in MMTC Ltd vs. M/s Vedanta Limited reported in (2019) 4 SCC 163 . It is apparent from the law as enunciated in the MMTC Limited that the Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award but confines its consideration on the ground as to whether the court exercising jurisdiction under section 34 of the said Act has exceeded such jurisdiction or not. 28. It is thus not open to the court exercising appellate jurisdiction under section 37 of the Act to make roving enquiry and reopen the entire issue or re-appreciate the evidence adduced by the parties before the Arbitral Tribunal. The enlightening observation of the Apex Court in Konkan Railway Corporation Limited (supra) can be pressed in service in the following: “29. It is thus not open to the court exercising appellate jurisdiction under section 37 of the Act to make roving enquiry and reopen the entire issue or re-appreciate the evidence adduced by the parties before the Arbitral Tribunal. The enlightening observation of the Apex Court in Konkan Railway Corporation Limited (supra) can be pressed in service in the following: “29. The principle of interpretation of contracts adopted by the Division Bench of the High Court that when two constructions are possible, then courts must prefer the one which gives effect and voice to all clauses, does not have absolute application. The said interpretation is subject to the jurisdiction which a court is called upon to exercise. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act, the Court is concerned about the jurisdiction that the Section 34 Court exercised while considering the challenge to the Arbitral Award. The jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act is exercised only to see if the Arbitral Tribunal’s view is perverse or manifestly arbitrary. Accordingly, the question of reinterpreting the contract on an alternative view does not arise. If this is the principle applicable to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, a Division Bench exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act cannot reverse an Award, much less the decision of a Single Judge, on the ground that they have not given effect and voice to all clauses of the contract. This is where the Division Bench of the High Court committed an error, in re-interpreting a contractual clause while exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act.” 29. The main thrust of an argument advanced by the appellant is that the interpretation of the contract by the Arbitral Tribunal is against the public policy of India or Indian laws and, therefore, the Court below ought not to have interfered with the arbitral award. The Apex Court in Associate Builders vs. Delhi Development Authority reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 held that an award can be impinged and/or interfered with on the ground of the policy of India in the following circumstances:- (i) When an award is, on its face, in patent violation of statutory provisions. (ii) When the arbitrator/arbitral award has failed to adopt a judicial approach in deciding the dispute. (iii) When an award is in violation of principles of natural justice. (iv) When an award is unreasonable or perverse. (ii) When the arbitrator/arbitral award has failed to adopt a judicial approach in deciding the dispute. (iii) When an award is in violation of principles of natural justice. (iv) When an award is unreasonable or perverse. (v) When an award is patently illegal which would include an award in patent contravention of any substantive law of India or in patent breach of 1996 Act. (vi) When an award is contrary to the interest of India, or against justice or morality in the sense it shocks the conscience of this Court. (vii) When the award on the face of it is patently illegal. 30. So far as the patent illegality concept is concerned, the Apex Court in the above noted judgement held that – “Patent Illegality 40. We now come to the fourth head of public policy namely, patent illegality. It must be remembered that under the explanation to Section 34 (2)(b), an award is said to be in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption. This ground is perhaps the earliest ground on which courts in England set aside awards under English law. Added to this ground (in 1802) is the ground that an arbitral award would be set aside if there were an error of law by the arbitrator. This is explained by Denning, L.J. in R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex p.Shaw. “Leaving now the statutory tribunals, I turn to the awards of the arbitrators. The Court of King's Bench never interfered by certiorari with the award of an arbitrator, because it was a private tribunal and not subject to the prerogative writs. If the award was not made a rule of court, the only course available to an aggrieved party was to resist an action on the award or to file a bill in equity. If the award was made a rule of court, a motion could be made to the court to set it aside for misconduct of the arbitrator on the ground that it was procured by corruption or other undue means (see the statute 9 and 10 Will. III, C. 15). If the award was made a rule of court, a motion could be made to the court to set it aside for misconduct of the arbitrator on the ground that it was procured by corruption or other undue means (see the statute 9 and 10 Will. III, C. 15). At one time an award could not be upset on the ground of error of law by the arbitrator because that could not be said to be misconduct or undue means, but ultimately it was held in Kent v. Elstob, that an award could be set aside for error of law on the face of it. This was regretted by Williams, J., in Hodgkinson v. Fernie, but is now well established.” 41. This, in turn, led to the famous principle laid down in Champsey Bhara Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spg. and Weg. Co. Ltd., where the Privy Council referred to Hodgkinson and then laid down: “The law on the subject has never been more clearly stated than by Williams, J. in Hodgkinson v. Fernie. ‘The law has for many years been settled, and remains so at this day, that, where a cause or matters in difference are referred to an arbitrator a lawyer or a layman, he is constituted the sole and final judge of all questions both of law and of fact. …… The only exceptions to that rule are cases where the award is the result of corruption or fraud, and one other, which though it is to be regretted, is now, I think firmly established viz., where the question of law necessarily arises on the face of the award or upon some paper accompanying and forming part of the award. Though the propriety of this latter may very well be doubted, I think it may be considered as established.’ * * * Now the regret expressed by Williams, J. in Hodgkinson v. Fernie has been repeated by more than one learned Judge, and it is certainly not to be desired that the exception should be in any way extended. Though the propriety of this latter may very well be doubted, I think it may be considered as established.’ * * * Now the regret expressed by Williams, J. in Hodgkinson v. Fernie has been repeated by more than one learned Judge, and it is certainly not to be desired that the exception should be in any way extended. An error in law on the face of the award means, in their Lordships’ view, that you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous. It does not mean that if in a narrative a reference is made to a contention of one party that opens the door to seeing first what that contention is, and then going to the contract on which the parties’ rights depend to see if that contention is sound. Here it is impossible to say, from what is shown on the face of the award, what mistake the arbitrators made. The only way that the learned judges have arrived at finding what the mistake was is by saying: ‘Inasmuch as the Arbitrators awarded so and so, and inasmuch as the letter shows that the buyer rejected the cotton, the arbitrators can only have arrived at that result by totally misinterpreting Rule 52’. But they were entitled to give their own interpretation to Rule 52 or any other article, and the award will stand unless, on the face of it they have tied themselves down to some special legal proposition which then, when examined, appears to be unsound. Upon this point, therefore, their Lordships think that the judgment of Pratt, J was right and the conclusion of the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal erroneous.” This judgment has been consistently followed in India to test awards under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. 42. In the 1996 Act, this principle is substituted by the “patent illegality” principle which, in turn, contains three sub heads - 42.1 (a) A contravention of the substantive law of India would result in the death knell of an arbitral award. 42. In the 1996 Act, this principle is substituted by the “patent illegality” principle which, in turn, contains three sub heads - 42.1 (a) A contravention of the substantive law of India would result in the death knell of an arbitral award. This must be understood in the sense that such illegality must go to the root of the matter and cannot be of a trivial nature. This again is a really a contravention of Section 28(1)(a) of the Act, which reads as under: “28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute.—(1) Where the place of arbitration is situated in India,— (a) in an arbitration other than an international commercial arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to arbitration in accordance with the substantive law for the time being in force in India;” 42.2 (b) A contravention of the Arbitration Act itself would be regarded as a patent illegality- for example if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award in contravention of section 31(3) of the Act, such award will be liable to be set aside. 42.3 (c) Equally, the third sub-head of patent illegality is really a contravention of Section 28 (3) of the Arbitration Act, which reads as under: “28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute.— (1)- (2) * * * (3) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.” This last contravention must be understood with a caveat. An arbitral tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be set aside on this ground. Construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide unless the arbitrator construes the contract in such a way that it could be said to be something that no fair minded or reasonable person could do. 43. In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., this Court held as under: “112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the matter of construction of a contract. 43. In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., this Court held as under: “112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and they cannot be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the award by taking into consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law. (See Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission and D.D. Sharma v. Union of India). 113. Once, thus, it is held that the arbitrator had the jurisdiction, no further question shall be raised and the court will not exercise its jurisdiction unless it is found that there exists any bar on the face of the award.” 44. In MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, the Court held: “17. If the arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the contract, that is an error within his jurisdiction. But if he wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits a jurisdictional error. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in such cases because the dispute is not something which arises under or in relation to the contract or dependent on the construction of the contract or to be determined within the award. The ambiguity of the award can, in such cases, be resolved by admitting extrinsic evidence. The rationale of this rule is that the nature of the dispute is something which has to be determined outside and independent of what appears in the award. Such a jurisdictional error needs to be proved by evidence extrinsic to the award. (See Gobardhan Das v. Lachhmi Ram, Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India, Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta & Bros. Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth v. Chintamanrao Balaji and Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. ).” 45. Such a jurisdictional error needs to be proved by evidence extrinsic to the award. (See Gobardhan Das v. Lachhmi Ram, Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India, Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta & Bros. Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth v. Chintamanrao Balaji and Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. ).” 45. In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran, the Court held: “43. In any case, assuming that Clause 9.3 was capable of two interpretations, the view taken by the arbitrator was clearly a possible if not a plausible one. It is not possible to say that the arbitrator had travelled outside his jurisdiction, or that the view taken by him was against the terms of contract. That being the position, the High Court had no reason to interfere with the award and substitute its view in place of the interpretation accepted by the arbitrator. 44. The legal position in this behalf has been summarised in para 18 of the judgment of this Court in SAIL v. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd. and which has been referred to above. Similar view has been taken later in Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd. to which one of us (Gokhale, J.) was a party. The observations in para 43 thereof are instructive in this behalf. 45. This para 43 reads as follows: (Sumitomo case) ‘43. … The umpire has considered the fact situation and placed a construction on the clauses of the agreement which according to him was the correct one. One may at the highest say that one would have preferred another construction of Clause 17.3 but that cannot make the award in any way perverse. Nor can one substitute one's own view in such a situation, in place of the one taken by the umpire, which would amount to sitting in appeal. As held by this Court in Kwality Mfg. Corpn. v. Central Warehousing Corpn., the Court while considering challenge to arbitral award does not sit in appeal over the findings and decision of the arbitrator, which is what the High Court has practically done in this matter. The umpire is legitimately entitled to take the view which he holds to be the correct one after considering the material before him and after interpreting the provisions of the agreement. The umpire is legitimately entitled to take the view which he holds to be the correct one after considering the material before him and after interpreting the provisions of the agreement. If he does so, the decision of the umpire has to be accepted as final and binding.” 31. It is no longer res integra the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal is party centric chosen by them for determination of a dispute encompassing the contract. Etymologically, the Arbitral Tribunal derived its jurisdiction through a contract. A fortiori, the interpretation of the contract is within the scope and jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal and it is no longer res integra that the words of the Arbitral Tribunal in this regard is final subject however to, such interpretation is reasonable and a plausible view and does not shock the conscience of the Court. 32. The Arbitral Tribunal cannot travel beyond the terms of the contract but there is no fetter on the part of the Arbitral Tribunal in interpreting the contract with the surrounding circumstances and discerning the intention of the parties. The business efficacy test can also be pressed in service in interpreting the contract from the expressed terms and ascertaining the meaning of the words or the phrases incorporated therein. 33. The aforesaid proposition of law can be fortified from the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited and others vs. GMR Vemagiri Power Generation Limited and others reported in (2018) 8 SCC 716. “19. In Khardah Co. Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India) (P) Ltd. on interpretation of a contract it was observed as follows: “30. … We agree that when a contract has been reduced to writing we must look only to that writing for ascertaining the terms of the agreement between the parties but it does not follow from this that it is only what is set out expressly and in so many words in the document that can constitute a term of the contract between the parties. If on a reading of the document as a whole, it can fairly be deduced from the words actually used therein that the parties had agreed on a particular term, there is nothing in law which prevents them from setting up that term. The terms of a contract can be expressed or implied from what has been expressed. If on a reading of the document as a whole, it can fairly be deduced from the words actually used therein that the parties had agreed on a particular term, there is nothing in law which prevents them from setting up that term. The terms of a contract can be expressed or implied from what has been expressed. It is in the ultimate analysis a question of construction of the contract. And again it is well established that in construing a contract it would be legitimate to take into account surrounding circumstances.” 20. It will not be a safe method to interpret a contract by picking out one clause of the same defining “fuel”, apply a technical scientific meaning to it as observed in Truetuf Safety Glass Industries and then conclude that being a form of natural gas, RLNG was intended to be impliedly included in the definition of “fuel”. The terms of a contract have to be given their plain meaning with regard to the intendment of the parties as to what was intended to be included and what was not intended to be included, as distinct from an express exclusion. The commercial parlance test will also have to be applied as to whether those in the business consider the two forms of gas as synonymous and interchangeable. Quite obviously the answer has to be in the negative considering the importation of RLNG, additional processes involved and the consequent higher costs involved. 21. In the event of any ambiguity arising, the terms of the contract will have to be interpreted by taking into consideration all surrounding facts and circumstances, including correspondence exchanged, to arrive at the real intendment of the parties, and not what one of the parties may contend subsequently to have been the intendment or to say as included afterwards, as observed in Bank of India v. K. Mohandas. “28. The true construction of a contract must depend upon the import of the words used and not upon what the parties choose to say afterwards. Nor does subsequent conduct of the parties in the performance of the contract affect the true effect of the clear and unambiguous words used in the contract. The intention of the parties must be ascertained from the language they have used, considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the object of the contract. Nor does subsequent conduct of the parties in the performance of the contract affect the true effect of the clear and unambiguous words used in the contract. The intention of the parties must be ascertained from the language they have used, considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the object of the contract. The nature and purpose of the contract is an important guide in ascertaining the intention of the parties.” 34. The law emerged from the aforesaid ratio culled out from the aforementioned decision is that the scope of interference with the Arbitral award is within the limited compass, more precisely, within the four corners of the grounds enumerated under section 34 of the said Act. It is not permissible to take any other aid or a ground not incorporated in section 34 of the said Act for the purpose of interference. Equally, the interpretation of a contract is within the scope and jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal and the interference is only warranted when the Arbitral Tribunal has travelled beyond the terms of the contract or interpretation is such which shocks the conscience of the Court. The Court shall not interfere with the Arbitral award under section 34 of the Act, if the view is taken by the Arbitral Tribunal is possible, even if the court is of the view that the other interpretation is plausible. The Appellate Court under section 37 of the Act has to confine its consideration within the four corners of the section 34 of the Act and not as normal Appellate Court. 35. Reverting to the facts of the instant case, the Arbitral Tribunal held that the agreement dated 10th March, 2016 is a concession agreement and the pre-bid documents are the integral part of the said agreement on the basis of the evidence adduced by the appellant before it. 36. The Arbitral Tribunal has extensively recorded the answers given by the witnesses deposed on behalf of the appellant which unequivocally lead to a conclusion that the RFQ and the other pre-bid documents and the conditions incorporated therein are to be observed and adhered by the respondents herein and arrived at the conclusion that it becomes an integral part of the agreement dated 10th March, 2016 and therefore, the said agreement is a concession agreement and not an EPC contract. Such finding based on the plausible reason having assigned therein does not require any interference and, therefore we do not find any infirmity and/or illegality in the judgment impugned in the instant appeal. 37. Furthermore, a plea of insufficient stamp taken by Mr. Sivabalan in course of the hearing is not tenable. Firstly such point was never taken before the Arbitral Tribunal nor in an application under section 34 of the said Act; secondly, no argument is advanced in support of the aforesaid contention that such agreement requires any stamp duty leviable thereupon. 38. In absence of above, such point cannot be permitted to be taken in the instant appeal unless the aforesaid factors are eminent and evident from the records. 39. The appeal fails. No order as to costs. 40. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, may be supplied to the parties upon compliance of usual formalities. I agree. Rai Chattopadhaya, J.