JUDGMENT : Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J. 1. Heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties. 2. This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 5th May 2023 passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No.296 of 2016 whereby the learned Single Judge of this Court has set aside the order dated 2nd May 2016 passed in Administration Case No.87 of 2004 (Probate Title Suit No.04 of 2005). 3. The learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 5th May 2023 passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No.296 of 2016 has held as under: “41. In the backdrop of the above legal position, from the facts of this case, it would be seen that mere allegation of exclusion cannot be treated to be suspicious circumstance. The testator had made adequate provisions for the respondents and the same was adequate for the other heirs and legal representatives as it is apparent from the evidence of the D.W.4 Neera Singh at paragraphs 19 and 20, wherein, she has stated that outside Keshri Nursing Home, out of 12 Kathas of land, 6 Kathas each of land was purchased in the name of Kumar Ajit Singh and Sonu Amit Singh. Further at paragraph 20 of the evidence D.W.4 it appears that Dr. Ram Bali Sinha had purchased 60 Kathas of land in the name of Rabindra Kumar Singh and Nira Singh at Amrud Bagan, Ratu Road and has also purchased land in the name of his daughter namely Dr. Renu Roy Choudhary at Itki Road. Moreover, 1/3rd of the landed property over which Keshri Nursing Home is constructed belonged to the wife of the testator. 42. Another circumstance, which has been brought to the notice of this Court, is that there was strained relation between the appellant and her husband, as a result of which, the WILL was got prepared. No doubt that there was strained relationship between the appellant and her husband, but the fact that cannot be lost sight of is that the testator used to usher love and affection to the appellant and her minor children. Witnesses have emphatically stated that the testator regularly used to visit the appellant and used to spend time with her and her children. But natural, if there was no love, affection and attachment, the testator would not have regularly visited the appellant, that too when he knew that his other family members were against this. Witnesses have emphatically stated that the testator regularly used to visit the appellant and used to spend time with her and her children. But natural, if there was no love, affection and attachment, the testator would not have regularly visited the appellant, that too when he knew that his other family members were against this. This has also come in evidence that the other family members were not liking and were opposed to these visits. This clearly suggests that even ignoring the opposition and dissatisfaction of the other family members, he used to meet the appellant and her children, which suggests that he was clearly caring for them and wanted their future to be secured. If that be so, then it is natural that he had made this provision in the WILL for them as the testator had also purchased huge properties in the name of other children and grandchildren, except these two grandchildren, who were born from the wedlock of appellant and second son of the testator. 43. It is the case of the defendants that the appellant returned to her matrimonial house after execution of the WILL. This itself cannot be a ground to suggest undue influence because WILL was prepared on 22.04.1993 and the testator died after 11 years. Testator could have easily revoked the WILL or could have prepared another WILL without informing anyone, even the appellant, which would have automatically revoked the earlier WILL. Testator for these 11 years did not take any steps to nullify the WILL dated 22.04.1993, which clearly suggests that there was no undue influence or pressure from the appellant and his intention was clear. 44. Defendant has taken a plea that execution of the WILL was kept secret, which creates doubt about the execution of the WILL. This is not a ground to discard the WILL. There is consistent evidence from the side of the defendants that entire family members did not like the testator meeting the appellant. There was disharmony in the family because of regular meetings of the testator with the appellant. If the mere meetings caused disharmony in their family, what would have been the situation, if the existence of the WILL was disclosed by the testator immediately after execution of the same can well be imagined. Further, non-disclosure of the WILL by the testator cannot be a ground to disbelieve the execution of the said WILL. If the mere meetings caused disharmony in their family, what would have been the situation, if the existence of the WILL was disclosed by the testator immediately after execution of the same can well be imagined. Further, non-disclosure of the WILL by the testator cannot be a ground to disbelieve the execution of the said WILL. 45. The respondents have taken a ground that though there were several doctors as attesting witnesses, none of them have been examined. Law does not provide examining of the attesting witnesses. Examination of one attesting witness is sufficient to prove the WILL. Further, it is not the case of the defendants from the written statement that the deceased was not in a proper mental and physical health at the time of execution of the WILL. If that is not the ground taken in the written statement, then the plaintiff is not duty bound to counter the same by calling the doctors to depose about the mental and physical health of the testator. 46. Thus, from what has been discussed above, I am of the considered view that the ground taken by learned District Judge-Judicial Commissioner XVII, Ranchi, while dismissing the suit by doubting the execution of the WILL does not hold good. 47. As discussed above, I find that there are no circumstances to arrive at a conclusion, that the WILL was executed either by force or by exercising undue influence nor there are any circumstances, which can suggest that the genuineness of the WILL can be doubted. Thus, I find merit in this appeal. The order dated 02.05.2016 passed by learned Judicial Commissioner XVII, Ranchi in Letter of Administration Case No.87 of 2004 (Probate Title Suit No.04 of 2005) is hereby set aside. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed.” 4. The case arises out of Probate Case No.87 of 2004 under section 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 concerning the Will dated 22nd April 1993 executed by Dr. Ram Bali Sinha. The said probate case was converted into a case of Letters of Administration by order dated 14th September 2006. The case of Letters of Administration was contested as a result of which it was converted to Probate Title Suit No.4 of 2005. 5. While dismissing the Probate Title Suit No.4 of 2005 on contest vide order dated 2nd May 2016, the learned Judicial Commissioner-XVII, Ranchi has held as under: “14. The case of Letters of Administration was contested as a result of which it was converted to Probate Title Suit No.4 of 2005. 5. While dismissing the Probate Title Suit No.4 of 2005 on contest vide order dated 2nd May 2016, the learned Judicial Commissioner-XVII, Ranchi has held as under: “14. From careful analysis of the evidences and facts available on record, it appears that in the said Will executed by the deceased Dr. R.B. Sinha. the subscriber of the Will neither examined nor give the reason for non-examination of the subscriber and the same has not been mentioned by the propounder of the Will. In case of 2013 AIR CC 2053, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that conception of the license document writer is well established but in the present case the Will subscriber was not licensed document writer but the propounder of the Will did not examine himself and it is also apparent from the record that there is too many attesting witnesses in the present Will, such as Sri Devi Prasad, Sri Atma Ram Shah, Dr. K. K. Sinha, Dr. Sidhartha Mukherjee and Sri Hari Shankar Singh but out of them only two attesting witnesses examined and the attesting witness Dr. K. K. Sinha may be the best witness to prove the mental condition of the deceased Dr. R. B. Sinha but he has not been examined. 15. It is also apparent from the record that case law cited by the applicant itself 2013 AIR CC 2053 (ORI), AIR 1977 Punjab Hariyana 123 and in many other cases the Hon'ble Apex Court has stated about the free and sound mind of the testator and also stated that the propounder of the Will has to prove that the will was executed with free and sound mind and without any undue influence and coercion and there is no any suspicion circumstance arises for the execution of Will. But in any suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court, before the will could be accepted as genuine. But in any suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court, before the will could be accepted as genuine. Even where there were no such pleas but the circumstances gave rise on doubts, it was for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the court (AIR 1959, 443) the Hon'ble Apex Court clearly stated that if there was clearly suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will in favour of the propounder then it is the duty of the propounder to clear all the doubts and suspicion and onus on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the will could be accepted as genuine. But even where there were no such pleas but the circumstances gave rise to doubt itself for the propounder to satisfy the consensus of the court and the legitimate suspicion should be completely removed before the document was accepted as the last will of the testator. Further propounder himself take pertinent part in the execution of the will which conferred on her substantial benefits with exclusion of other beneficiaries of the property of deceased if these were so it was generally treated as a suspicious circumstances attending the execution of the will and the propounder was required to remove the doubts by the clear and satisfactory evidences. In the instant case the testator had his wife and two sons and it is also apparent from the record that one son (elder son) of the testator died in the life time of the testator and his family was completely depended upon the testator and it is also apparent from the record that testator had fulfilled the requirements of the family of the deceased son, not only this but he played an active and dominant role in the marriage of his granddaughter namely Sonali but in this will the testator completely avoided the family of the deceased son and not only this he also clearly avoided and deprived his wife who completely dependent upon him and lived through out with him till his last will and also deprived to his second son Ajit Singh but he had executed this will in favour of the applicant who is the daughter in law and the wife of the second son of the testator and it is ample clear from the record that the wife of the second son who was not living with the family though for some time she lived outside from the family somewhere in Kanke Road, Ranchi and had strained relation with the family members. But the testator has executed his will in favour of wife of the son who is the applicant now, so it creates strong doubt suspicion about this Will and the circumstances would be suspicious when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person and in my bare perusal it is very much clear that this suspicious circumstance was could not be explained or removed by the applicant in her evidence such as oral as well as documentary and the propounder of the Will has miserably failed to discharge her obligation towards the satisfaction of the suspicious circumstances. 16. It is also apparent from the record that most of the properties are the subject matters of the will are the outside the jurisdiction of this court and as per section 273 of the Indian Succession Act, no L.A can be granted in respect of this properties. 17. It is also apparent from the record that one of the beneficiary is totally outside the family in this respect the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly observed in 1990 (3) SCC 364 that ……. 17. It is also apparent from the record that one of the beneficiary is totally outside the family in this respect the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly observed in 1990 (3) SCC 364 that ……. Although freedom to bequeath one's own property amongst Hindus is absolute both in extent and person, including rank stranger, yet to have testamentary capacity or a disposing state of mind what required of propoundor to establish is not the testator at time ( disposition knew and understood the property he was disposing and persons who were to be beneficiaries of his disposition Prudence, however, requires reason for denying benefit to those who too were entitled to bounty of testator as they had similar claims on him. Absence of it may not invalidate a Will but it shrouds the disposition with suspicion as it does not give any inkling to the mind of testator to enable the court to judge if the disposition was voluntary act. 18. In the present case in spite of all these things it is very much clear from the record that propounder of the Will could not satisfy the court that why and how the testator has deprived the other beneficiaries from his property including his wife, so in my view all these circumstances create cloud of doubts over the execution of Will which is said to be made in free and sound mind without any coercion or undue influence. 19. I further find that the next circumstance which calls for an explanation is the exclusion of the grand children of the testatrix from any substantial legacies under the Will and it is not suggested that the relations between the testatrix and the grand children were not cordial and affectionate and so it would be reasonable to assume that they would have been the objects of his bounties in a more liberal measure in ordinary circumstances. Therefore, I am unable to see how the petitioner/ plaintiff can successfully challenge the broad features of the Will appears to be improbable and unfair and if that be so, the petitioner will have to remove the suspicions arising from these features before she can persuade the court to accept the last will and testament of the testatrix. Therefore, I am unable to see how the petitioner/ plaintiff can successfully challenge the broad features of the Will appears to be improbable and unfair and if that be so, the petitioner will have to remove the suspicions arising from these features before she can persuade the court to accept the last will and testament of the testatrix. Thus the very important, if not the decisive, part played by the petitioner in the execution of the Will can not at all be disputed in the present case by the O.Ps who are also the legal heirs and successors of the deceased Dr. R. B. Sinha. 20. Taking into consideration the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I am not inclined to grant probate title suit in favour of the petitioner/ plaintiff with respect to the Will dated 22.04.1993 execute by Dr. Ram Bali Sinha S/o Late Narayan Sinha. Accordingly, the present probate title suit is hereby dismissed on contest without cost.” 6. Mr. Arpan Mishra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has vehemently opposed the maintainability of the present appeal and has referred to the judgment passed by this Court in the case of “Alok Kumar Mallick v. Janardan Mahadani and others” 2012 SCC OnLine Jhar 2097. The learned counsel has submitted that on account of bar under section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure the present appeal is not maintainable. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Bhaiya Vishwajit Kumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has submitted that the present appeal is maintainable. He has submitted that many contentious points are involved in the present case. He has referred to the judgment in “Subal Paul v. Malina Paul” (2003) 10 SCC 361 to submit that against the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court intra-Court Appeal shall lie. 8. In “Subal Paul” the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to the provisions under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and held that the provisions under section 299 are not akin to section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, having regard to the procedural aspect, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court exercises appellate jurisdiction under the provisions under section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and, therefore, intra-court appeal under the Letters Patent shall lie. 9. However, having regard to the procedural aspect, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court exercises appellate jurisdiction under the provisions under section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and, therefore, intra-court appeal under the Letters Patent shall lie. 9. In LPA No. 208 of 2011, a coordinate Bench of this Court has held that after incorporation of section 100-A, intra-court appeal against the order of a learned Single Judge passed under section 299 of the Indian Succession Act shall not lie and that the judgment in “Subal Paul” shall not apply to the proceedings under section 299 of the Indian Succession Act after the amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. In LPA No. 208 of 2011 this Court has held as under: “This was a case under special statute where the proceeding originated under a special act and appeal was also provided in that wherein no further appeal was provided and objection was that instead of approaching the Supreme Court the party should approach first to the Division Bench of the High Court by preferring an appeal as LPA which objection has been rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for the reason mentioned above which we have narrated indicating that in special statute where appeal is provided by that very statute to the Single Bench of the High Court and the provision of intra court appeal in Letters Patent remains, by virtue of Section 100A C.P.C., the right of appeal under Letters Patent has been taken away. In view of the above legal position, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that only appeals which have been provided by the C.P.C. under the provisions of Section 96, 100 or 43 Rule 1 etc. are the matters where the L.P.A. is not maintainable, has no force. The same view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Geeta Devi & Anr. (Supra) wherein appeal arising out of the Award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under Special Statute, the Motor Vehicles Act Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Division Bench of the High Court rightly dismissed the appeal holding it not maintainable. In the case of Mohd. Saud and Another (Supra) also the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of 100A C.P.C.. In the case of Mohd. Saud and Another (Supra) also the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of 100A C.P.C.. However, that was matter arising out of an order passed under section 43 Rule 1 CPC subject to appeal under order and C.P.C. against which the L.P.A. was preferred and in that situation the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the appeal was barred. However, this judgment is not relevant for our purpose because of the reason that learned counsel for the appellant has not disputed nor this is a controversy involved in this case where any order which is appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure before the High Court then the intra court appeal is not maintainable because of the bar u/s 100A C.P.C. In view of the above reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the appeal preferred by the appellant is not maintainable, hence dismissed.” 11. By the amendment Act 22 of 2002, section 100-A has been incorporated in the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as under: “100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge.” 12. In “Mohd. Saud and Another v. Dr. (Maj.) Shaikh Mahfooz and Others” (2010) 13 SCC 517 wherein section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure has been considered, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “7. The Full Bench by the impugned judgment has held that after the introduction of Section 100-A with effect from 1-7-2002, no letters patent appeal shall lie against the judgment or order passed by a learned Single Judge in an appeal. The Full Bench has held that the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in Birat Chandra Dagra v. Taurian Exim (P) Ltd. [(2006) 11 Ori LR 344 (Ori)] (vide p. 5) does not lay down good law while the decision of the Division Bench in V.N.N. Panicker v. Narayan Patil [ (2006) 102 CLT 479 (Cut): (2006) 2 Ori LR 349 (Ori)] lays down the correct law. The Full Bench has further held that after the amendment of Section 100A w.e.f. 1-7-2002, no LPA shall lie against the order or judgment passed by a learned Single Judge even in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a special Act.” 13. The aforesaid judgment in LPA No. 208 of 2011 is binding on us and our attention has not been drawn to any contra judgment of this Court so as to refer this matter to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement on this question. Moreover, the issue whether or not the present Letters Patent Appeal shall lie is covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Mohd. Saud”. 14. In view of the above, L.P.A No.374 of 2023 is held not maintainable and, accordingly, dismissed as such.