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2023 DIGILAW 1518 (ALL)

Thakur Prasad v. State of U. P.

2023-05-31

ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA, VINOD DIWAKAR

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri A. K. Sachan, Sri Saurabh Sachan and Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, learned counsels for the petitioners and Sri Ajeet Kumar Singh, learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by Sri Ishan Mehta, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State and Sri Ashish Mohan Srivastava, Sri Ravi Prakash Pandey and Sri Sudhanshu Srivastava, learned counsels for the Varanasi Development Authority, Varanasi. 2. These two writ petitions are directed against the same acquisition proceedings and have been heard together. They are thus being disposed of by this common judgment. Writ Petition No.61219 of 2011 (Thakur Prasad and others vs. State of U.P. and others) is taken as the lead case. 3. For the planned development of Transport Nagar at District Varanasi by the Varanasi Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as ‘authority’) a notification came to be issued on 18.12.2000 under section 4(1)/17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1984’). Enquiry contemplated under section 5A of the Act of 1984 was dispensed with by invoking section 17. A declaration followed under section 6/17(1) whereby 86.299 hectares land was acquired in four villages, namely, Karnadandi, Milki Chak, Sarai Mohan and Bairwan in Pargana Kaswar Sarkari/Raja, Tehsil and District Varanasi. Notice under section 9 of the Act of 1984 was issued to the tenure-holders on 25.06.2001, inviting objections. Possession of the acquired land was allegedly taken by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Varanasi and transferred to the authority on 17.04.2003. Steps were taken for declaring award in respect of the land acquired in accordance with U.P. Land Acquisition (determination of compensation and declaration of award by agreement) Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules of 1997’). A meeting was held on 27.04.2011 under the Chairmanship of District Magistrate, Varanasi, wherein tenure-holders also participated. In such meeting it was resolved that compensation of acquired land be fixed at Rs.1.50 lac per biswa for parcel of land extending upto 30 meters from road and for the remaining acquired land, beyond 30 meters, at the rate of Rs.1 lac per biswa. The rate of land worked out to Rs.1186/-per sq. meter in the parcel of land upto 30 meters of road and Rs.790/-per sq. meter for the land situated after it. The rate of land worked out to Rs.1186/-per sq. meter in the parcel of land upto 30 meters of road and Rs.790/-per sq. meter for the land situated after it. In accordance with the rates determined in the meeting of 27.04.2011 agreements were executed by the tenure-holders for the declaration of award under section 11(2) of the Act of 1894. As per respondents a sum of Rs.31,24,07,238/-has been paid to the land owners for an area of 38.7213 hectares. Agreements were also entered into in respect of additional area of 6.5276 hectares land belonging to 201 land owners and the compensation of Rs.5,46,38648/-has been deposited in the treasury as the land owners allegedly have not accepted the compensation. It is also asserted that 39 land owners have been paid amount of Rs.2,56,30,363/-for an area measuring 3.1355 hectares, though award in respect of such land has not been made so far. Cumulatively, for area of 48.3844 hectares land an amount of Rs.39,26,76,250/-has been paid or deposited. In respect of village Karnadadi an award consequently has been made on 27.09.2012 in respect of 20.919 hectares land. For village Birwan an award is made on 20.09.2012 for an area measuring 23.469 hectares and in respect of village Milki Chak an award is made on 21.08.2012 for 0.317 hectares land whereas for village Sarai Mohan award is made in respect of 0.544 hectares land on 21.08.2012. Award accordingly has been made under section 11(2) of the Act 1894 in respect of 45.249 hectares land out of total area acquired of 86.219 hectares. No award has yet been made in respect of remaining acquired land admeasuring 37.572 hectares land. 4. Records reveal that 50 tenure-holders challenged the acquisition notification issued under section 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894 by filing Writ Petition No.15586 of 2001 on various grounds including the dispensation of enquiry under section 5A. This writ petition came to be dismissed vide following orders passed by the Division Bench on 04.10.2002:- “This writ petition has been filed praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned notification under section 4 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act Annexure 1 to the writ petition and for a mandamus directing the respondents not to dispossess the petitioners from the land in dispute. It has also been prayed that a mandamus be issued to the respondents to decide the objections of the petitioner against the proposed amendment of the master plan in Varanasi. Heard learned counsel for the parties. A notification dated 18.12.2000 Annexure-I to the petition was issued under section 4 read with section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. A perusal of the said notification shows that it was proposed to acquire the land in question for building a Transport Nagar by the Varanasi Development Authority respondent no.5. The same notification was also published in the newspaper 'Dainik Jagran' on 31.3.2001 vide Annexure-2 to the writ petition. In paragraph 3 of the petition it is stated that in the Newspaper "Aaj dated 4.5.98 there was a publication of a notice under section 13(3) of the U.P.Urban Planning And Development Act 1973 as amended for amending the master plan of Varanasi, and objections were invited. A true copy of the notification dated 4.5.98 is Annexure-3 to the petition. The proposed amendment was for using the agricultural land of four villages in district Varanasi. In paragraph 4 and 5 of the writ petition it is mentioned that two of the petitioners filed objections vide Anenxure-4 and 5 to the petition stating that they had land, building and grove on the said land. However, thereafter the notification under section 6 was issued. The petitioner no. 5 submitted an objection before the respondent no.6 requesting that the Transport Nagar should not be built on the land in dispute as it is agricultural land consisting of trees residential houses etc. A true copy of the objection is Annexure-9 to the petition Similar other objections were also filed vide Annexures-10 and 11 to the petition. It is alleged in paragraph 18 of the petition that no notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act has been issued. It is alleged in paragraph 19 that there was no material for holding that there was urgency in the acquisition and hence section 17was wrongly invoked. The petitioner has also filed an amendment application and it is admitted, that in paragraph 3 of the same there is a notification under section 6, which was issued on 9.5.2001, vide Annexure-SA-1 to the application. A counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent no.5. It is stated in paragraph 4 of the same that the acquisition is for a public purpose. A counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent no.5. It is stated in paragraph 4 of the same that the acquisition is for a public purpose. In paragraph 7 of the same it is stated that the averments in the petitioners objection are false and the land in question is lying vacant. In paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit it is stated that no representation has been made by the petitioner no.31. In paragraph 18 of the same it is stated that the land in question is lying vacant. In paragraph 20 of the same it is stated that the acquisition was done only with respect to the land which was vacant, while the land where there are existing structures have been left out. In paragraph 23 of the counter affidavit it is stated that the possession of the land is with the respondents. We have also perused the rejoinder affidavit. In our opinion there is no merit in this petition. Acquisition of the land for a Transport Nagar is clearly in the public interest. In our opinion the matter is urgent because there are many transportation problems in all cities due to congestion of traffic and danger of accidents etc. Hence building a Transport Nagar is clearly in the public interest and is urgent. In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 1971 SC 1033 it was held by the Supreme Court that unless it is shown that there was colourable exercise of power the Court cannot go behind the declaration of the Government and find out in a particular case whether the purpose for which the land was needed was a public purpose or not. In State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi and others (1986) 4 Supreme Court Cases 251 the Supreme Court held that even if there are some superstructures standing on the land they cannot be left out from the acquisition. In Ajay Krishan Shinghal and others v. Union Of India and Others (1996) 10 SCC 721 it was held that acquisition for planned development is a public purpose. In Bal Krishan Gulati v. State of U.P. and others 1991 AWC 1210 it was held that where the is a recital of urgency the Court should not ordinarily interfere. In Ajay Krishan Shinghal and others v. Union Of India and Others (1996) 10 SCC 721 it was held that acquisition for planned development is a public purpose. In Bal Krishan Gulati v. State of U.P. and others 1991 AWC 1210 it was held that where the is a recital of urgency the Court should not ordinarily interfere. In M/s Garg Farms and others v. State of U.P. and others 1989 AWC 1137 this Court held that if the Government formed the opinion that the matter was one of urgency under section 17 (2) and it had some material for this opnion the Court should not interfere. In Kunwar Lal and others v. State of U.P. ed others (1989) 1 UPLBEC 772 it was held that dispensation of enquiry under scenicy 5-A depends on subjective satisfaction of the State Government. It was also held that where the declaration has been made by the State Government under section 6 (3) that a particular land is needed for a public purpose, the said declaration shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that it is so needed. The same view has been taken by this Court in Ram Narain Rai v. State of U.P. (1991) AWC 341. It may be pointed out that section 3 (a) of the Land Acquisition Act (a) the expression "land" includes benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth." The above definition shows that even building and trees will be deemed, the by a legal fiction, to be land for the purpose of the Land Acquisition Act as they are attached to or permanently fastened to the earth vide Chaturbhuj Pande v. Collector, AIR 1969 SC 255 (paras 8 and 9), S.P.Gupta v. State of U.P., 1980 ACJ 583, etc. Hence it cannot be said that when land is being sought to be acquired the building or trees standing thereon have to be exempted. No doubt compensation has to be given for the building and trees also, but it does not mean that exemption from acquisition must be granted to the building or trees or the land on which the building stands. The allegations of the petitioner that they had a residential structure on the land in dispute have been denied by the respondents. No doubt compensation has to be given for the building and trees also, but it does not mean that exemption from acquisition must be granted to the building or trees or the land on which the building stands. The allegations of the petitioner that they had a residential structure on the land in dispute have been denied by the respondents. Since this is a disputed question of fact it is not possible for us to decide it in this writ petition. In the counter affidavit it has been stated that the lands where the constructed structures have been existing have been left out. However, even if they had not been left out we could not have interfered because, as already mentioned above, the definition of 'land' in Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act includes buildings and trees also. The petition is therefore, dismissed. However, if, petitioners make a representation to the authority concerned for exempting any land on which there are existing residential structures, the same will be decided by the authority concerned in accordance with law at an early date.” 5. Second round of litigation in respect of same acquisition proceedings commenced in a writ petition filed by Krishna Dev Sharma @ Heera and others being Writ Petition No.29419 of 2008. The writ petition was filed seeking benefit of section 11A of the Act of 1894 on the premise that awards have not been made and the acquisition itself has lapsed. This contention of the tenure-holders also came to be rejected by a detailed judgment of a Coordinate Bench on 29.07.2008, which is reproduced hereinafter:- “The petitioners, 52 in numbers, have challenged the notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") dated 18.12.2000 and a notification under Section 6 of the Act dated 09.04.2001 and have also prayed for a mandamus restraining the respondents from taking possession and for deciding their representation dated 30.03.2008. The petitioners' case is that after the aforesaid notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act the award of compensation has not yet been made and possession of the land has also not yet been taken over by the respondents and consequently the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act is applicable to the case and the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of that provision. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of Development Authority in which the Development Authority has taken the stand that the possession of disputed land was taken over on 17.04.2003. Copy of the possession memo indicating that the possession of the land was delivered by the Special Land Acquisition Officer to the state has been annexed. It is also stated that the name of the State has been mutated over the disputed land and consequently the plea that the proceedings have lapsed under Section 11-A of the Act is not available to the petitioners. The petitioners in the rejoinder affidavit denied the fact that the possession has been taken over from them. It is also submitted by Sri Vijay Kumar Rai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that even if the possession of the land may have been taken over yet the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act would be attracted as the compensation has not yet been paid. In support of his contention he placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Pyare Lal and others Vs. State of U.P. through Collector, Allahabad and others, 2008(71) ALR 627. On the other hand Sri Naveen Sinha, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Atul Mehra, learned counsel appearing for the Development Authority submitted that once the possession is taken over and even though no compensation may have been paid the provisions of Section 11-A are not attracted. In support of his contention he placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Abdul Salam Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (70) ALR 228. He also placed reliance on two Apex Court's decisions in Satendra Prasad Jain and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1993 SC 2517 and Awadh Bihari Yadav and others Vs. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1996 SC 122 . No doubt, the facts of the Division Bench decision in Pyare Lal (Supra) appears to indicate that that case helps the petitioners but we find that the question has not been decided nor the Apex Court's decisions in Satendra Prasad Jain (Supra) and Awadh Bihari Yadav (Supra) have been considered. It was held in Pyare Lal's case that the possession was taken over by the respondents more than two years after the earlier writ petition in which a stay order was granted was dismissed. It was held in Pyare Lal's case that the possession was taken over by the respondents more than two years after the earlier writ petition in which a stay order was granted was dismissed. In these circumstances the Court held that there was no urgency as required under Section 17. It was found that no award was made and as such under the provisions of Section 11-A the acquisition proceedings had lapsed. On an analysis of the provisions of the Act, it is clear that once the possession has been taken over the land vests in the State by virtue of Section 17(1) of the Act. The Apex Court in the decisions, referred above, has held that once the possession is taken over there would be no divesting right over the land. The point in issue is, therefore, squarely covered by the aforesaid decisions of Apex Court and the Division Bench decision in Abdul Salam (Supra). We are, therefore, not inclined to accept this submission of counsel for the petitioners. It was then submitted that the possession has not actually been taken over and mere symbolic possession has been taken over and, therefore, provisions of Section 16 and 17 of the Act are not attracted. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on Apex Court's decision in Balwant Narayan Bhagde Vs. M.D. Bhagwat and others, AIR 1975 SC 1767 and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2008(2) AWC 1832 . On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the observations in Bhagde's case made by two learned Judges, i.e., P.N. Bhawati, J. and A.C. Gupta, J., which is in respect of the manner in which the possession is required to be taken. Reliance is also placed upon P.K. Kalburqi Vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2005) 12 SCC 489 (para 6) in which the decision in Balwant Narayan Bhagde (Supra) has been explained and it was held that the mode of taking possession would depend upon the nature of the land and there can be no hard and fast rule. In that case the land of which the possession was sought to be taken were unoccupied. In such a case the Apex Court held that symbolic possession could be taken and such possession would amount to vesting of land in the Government. In that case the land of which the possession was sought to be taken were unoccupied. In such a case the Apex Court held that symbolic possession could be taken and such possession would amount to vesting of land in the Government. In this case we find that the total area of the land acquired under notification is 86.29 hectare. The respondents have filed the possession memo which shows that the possession of the land was transferred by the Special Land Acquisition Officer to the State. In consequence of such transfer name of Varanasi Development Authority has also been entered in the revenue records. It also appears that out of total number of 1292 tenure holders whose land was acquired only the 52 petitioners have come to the Court. In the circumstances and on the facts of this case and on consideration of the decisions cited above, it appears to us that there is sufficient evidence of possession having been taken. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that in the earlier Writ Petition No. 11586 of 2001 filed by some other tenure holders the counter affidavit was filed on behalf of Development Authority in which it was stated that the possession has been taken over and possession lies with the respondents. The said affidavit was sworn on 18.08.2001 and counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the counter affidavit filed in the present writ petition the case of the respondents is that possession was taken over on 17.04.2003 and there being inconsistent versions about the date of taking over of possession, the stand of the respondents that possession has been taken over is false. Sri Naveen Sinha, Senior Advocate, referred to the averments made by the petitioners themselves in the representation dated 30.03.2008 in which it has been stated that the proceedings for taking over possession had been initiated and the petitioners had protested against it and had also filed Writ Petition No. 15581 of 2001. Sri Naveen Sinha submitted that this stand of the petitioners is an admission of the fact that proceedings for taking over possession had already started in 2001 against which the petitioners had protested and had filed the writ petition in 2001 and the earlier counter affidavit may have been filed under impression that possession had been taken. However, it is stated that actual possession has been taken over in the year 2003. However, it is stated that actual possession has been taken over in the year 2003. The stand of the respondents that possession was taken on 17.04.2003 is now supported by documentary evidence being the possession memo. We are, therefore, of the view that possession was taken on 17.04.2003. As to the manner in which possession is to be taken and whether a possession memo is sufficient evidence, we find that the matter has been elaborately considered by a Division Bench of which one of us Sudhir Agarwal, J. was a member in Writ Petition No. 2881 of 2008, Jagdish and others Vs. State of U.P. and others decided on 24.04.2008. In this case the earlier decisions of the Apex Court have also been considered. Paragraphs no. 18 to 23 of the said judgment are being extracted: "18. Moreover, we find that almost a similar situation and similar facts were available before the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. A. Viswam, 1996 (8) SCC 259 wherein also a dispute of actual possession was raised. The Court relying on the memorandum and Panchnama prepared by the LAO for taking possession of the acquired land and also the letter written by respondent wherein he admitted the title of the respondent but sought for allotment of an alternative site, held that there was no question of requesting for alternative site if according to the respondents the title still vested in him and has not been vested in the State by taking possession. It would be appropriate to refer the following observations: "9. It is settled law by series of judgment of this Court that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum or Panchanama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not co-operate in taking possession of the land. 10. It is seen that in a letter written by the respondent himself, admitting the title of the Board to the land in the said survey number, he sought for allotment of alternative site. It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not co-operate in taking possession of the land. 10. It is seen that in a letter written by the respondent himself, admitting the title of the Board to the land in the said survey number, he sought for allotment of alternative site. In other words, unless possession is taken and he is divested of the title and the same is vested in the appellant, he cannot make request to the appellant for providing him alternative site. It is not his case that at that stage he was still continuing to have title to the land in dispute. The admission is inconsistent with and incongruous to his interest. He was also aware that award was made and the possession obviously should have been taken thereunder....…" 19. It is true that the Apex Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde (Supra) in majority decision, with respect to the question of possession observed as under: "There can be no question of taking 'symbolical' possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of deter-mining what part was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was done by the Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities,as that would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it." 20. The said judgment however thereafter came to be considered subsequently in A. Viswam (Supra) and after referring to the above passage the Apex Court in para 9 of the judgment said that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum or Panchnama by LAO in the presence of witnesses which would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. 21. Again both the aforesaid judgments i.e. Balwant Narayan Bhagde (Supra) and A. Viswam (Supra) came to be considered by Apex Court in Larsen and Toubro Ltd. Vs. State of Gujrat and others, 1998 (4) SCC 387 and there also the Court referring to Panchnama of the Deputy Collector having been prepared showing that the possession was taken, found it sufficient to hold that the possession of the land in question in that case under the Act is taken. For the purpose of mode of possession the Apex court in Mahalakshmi Ammal (Supra) also held as under: "Possession of the acquired land would be taken only by way of a memorandum, Panchnama, which is a legally accepted norm. It would no be possible to take any physical possession. Therefore, subsequent continuation, if any, had by the erstwhile owner is only illegal or unlawful possession which does not bind the Government nor vested under Section 16 divested in the illegal occupant......" 22. Similarly in General Manager, Telecommunication (Supra) also the Apex Court in para 3 of the judgment said: "...It is common knowledge that possession would always be taken under a memo and handling over also would be under a memo. Similarly in General Manager, Telecommunication (Supra) also the Apex Court in para 3 of the judgment said: "...It is common knowledge that possession would always be taken under a memo and handling over also would be under a memo. It is a recognised usual practice in all the acquisition proceedings. By operation of Section 17(1) even before award could be made, the Land Acquisition Officer is entitled to take possession of the land. He did so....." 23. Balwant Narayan Bhagde (Supra) judgment has also been considered recently in P.K. Kalburqi Vs. State of Karnataka and others, 2005 (12) SCC 489 . There it appears that Minister passed an order of de-notification observing that a symbolic possession did not amount to actual possession and so long as actual possession is not taken, the power to withdraw from acquisition could be exercised under Section 48 of the Act. The Apex Court held that the aforesaid understanding of the Hon'ble Minister was contrary to the majority decision of the Apex Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde (Supra) and said that how such possession would be taken would depend on the nature of the land. There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. In the said case the land which was taken possession was unoccupied, there was no proper structure standing thereon. The Court held that symbolic possession could be taken and that was sufficient and would amount to vesting the land in the Government." In the circumstances we also find that the manner of taking over possession vide possession memo cannot be faulted with. Counsel for the petitioners relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Kailash and another Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2005(99) RD 726 (para 7) in which it has been held that mere mutation is not sufficient to establish possession. In this case the evidence furnished by the respondents does not consist of mere mutation. For the reasons given above, we find no merit in this petition and it is, accordingly, dismissed.” 6. The present writ petitioners have now filed the writ petitions in the year 2011 after the meeting was convened for determining the rates of compensation in respect of the acquired land. For the reasons given above, we find no merit in this petition and it is, accordingly, dismissed.” 6. The present writ petitioners have now filed the writ petitions in the year 2011 after the meeting was convened for determining the rates of compensation in respect of the acquired land. Petitioners in the writ petition have admitted in para 24 that name of the authority was mutated in the revenue records in respect of entire acquired land. Para 24 of the writ petition is extracted hereinafter:- “24. That it appears that behind the back of the petitioner, Varanasi Development Authority has illegally got mutation behind the back of the petitioners without given any notice to the petitioners, only on the basis of letter dated 21.05.2003 issued by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in respect of all the plots of village Bairwan, Karna Dadi, Sarai Mohan and Milki Chak. The true copy of the Khatauni of 1408F to 1413 Fasli of one petitioner is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No.12 to this writ petition.” 7. The two writ petitions have been filed primarily on the ground that possession of acquired land since has not been taken, as such the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of section 11A of the Act of 1984. Invocation of urgency clause by the State is also challenged. Prayer accordingly is made to quash the notification issued under section 4(1)/17(1) of the Act of 1894, dated 18.12.2000, and the declaration under section 6 made on 09.04.2001. A further prayer is made to command the respondents not to dispossess the petitioners from their plots shown in the list annexed as Annexure-5. Further prayer made is to command the respondents to de-notify the proceedings of land acquisition or to pay compensation at the current rate. Prayer clause in the leading writ petition is extracted hereinafter:- “I. Issue Writ order directions in the nature of certiorari to quash the land Acquisition proceedings arises in pursuance of the notification no. 3921/9-Aa-3-2000-57 L.A./93 Locknow dated 18.12.2000 under section 4(1) read with section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and the Notification No. 156879-Aa-3-2001-57 L.A. 9 dated 9.4.2001 under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (Annexure No. 3 and Annexure No. 4 to the Writ Petition). II. 3921/9-Aa-3-2000-57 L.A./93 Locknow dated 18.12.2000 under section 4(1) read with section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and the Notification No. 156879-Aa-3-2001-57 L.A. 9 dated 9.4.2001 under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (Annexure No. 3 and Annexure No. 4 to the Writ Petition). II. Issue writ order directions in the nature of interim Mandamus to not dispossess the petitioners from their plots as shown in the list (Annexed as Annexure no. 5) to the writ petition as petitioners are regularly cultivating agricultural crops from land and disputes and also in actual possession over the land and dispute. III. Issue writ order directions in the nature of mandamus to direct the respondents to do notify the proceedings of Land Acquisition or to pay the compensation with the current rate.” 8. A counter affidavit has been filed by the authority relying upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.15586 of 2001 as well as judgment rendered in Writ Petition No.29419 of 2008, which are already extracted above. Respondents have also relied upon the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.23226 of 2001, whereby a similar writ petition came to be dismissed on 03.08.2010. In the counter affidavit of the authority it is specifically asserted that invocation of urgency clause is valid; land acquisition proceedings in respect of four villages in question have attained finality; planned development of Transport Nagar is a matter of utmost public interest; name of respondent authority is mutated over entire acquired land; possession of land has already been taken in the year 2003 and, therefore, vesting of land is complete in authority and; compensation to the tune of Rs.24.61 crores has been disbursed to 432 tenure-holders and 223 additional tenure-holders have given their consent for receiving compensation. Following amounts allegedly have been deposited by the authority with Special Land Acquisition Officer, totalling a sum of Rs.9.91 crores prior to taking of possession:- Date Amount (Cr.) 03.11.2000 1.27 24.06.2002 0.86 13.02.2003 5.97 02.04.2003 1.81 Total 9.91 9. An objection is also taken to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of laches by the respondent authority. 10. Rejoinder affidavit has been filed to the counter affidavit by the authority asserting therein that petitioners are still in possession over their acquired land. An objection is also taken to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of laches by the respondent authority. 10. Rejoinder affidavit has been filed to the counter affidavit by the authority asserting therein that petitioners are still in possession over their acquired land. The procedure stipulated for taking possession has not been followed and authority is engaged in profiteering as it is selling land on much higher rates. Affidavit of 40 persons have also been annexed alongwith rejoinder affidavit objecting to the agreement executed by them and the State for acquisition of their land. 11. In Writ Petition No.38527 of 2011 also prayer is made to quash the notification dated 18.12.2000 read with corrigendum dated 15.03.2001 and declaration under section 6 of the Act of 1894 dated 09.04.2001. A further prayer is made to command the respondents not to interfere in peaceful possession of the petitioners over the land in question and from taking possession of their land. Relief claimed by the petitioners is in respect of Arazai Nos.521 area 0.162 hectare, 530 area 0.275 hectare, 536 area 0.144 hectare, 537 area 0.156 hectare and 539 area 0.233 hectare. 12. Counter affidavit has been filed by the State authorities with similar stand as was the stand taken in leading writ petition to which a rejoinder affidavit has been filed today by the petitioners. 13. The writ petitions were heard and the State was directed to file an affidavit disclosing the stand of the State in respect of acquisition in question. 14. In the affidavit filed, an objection is taken to the writ petitions on the ground of laches relying upon the judgments of Supreme Court in Swarn Lata and others vs. State of Haryana and others, (2010) 4 SCC 532 ; Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. and another vs. State of Rajasthan and others, (2008) 4 SCC 695 and; Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited vs. Chinthmaneni Narasimha Rao and others, (2012) 12 SCC 797 . It is stated that a total sum of Rs.9.91 crores has been deposited in the treasury prior to taking possession which is more than 95% of the amount required to be deposited by virtue of section 17(3A) of the Act of 1894. It is submitted that only thereafter possession has been taken of the acquired land on 17.04.2003. It is stated that a total sum of Rs.9.91 crores has been deposited in the treasury prior to taking possession which is more than 95% of the amount required to be deposited by virtue of section 17(3A) of the Act of 1894. It is submitted that only thereafter possession has been taken of the acquired land on 17.04.2003. Possession was taken over an area of 82.219 hectares which is claimed to have been transferred to the authority. It is also contended that Writ Petition No.63339 of 2012 and 3256 of 2013 have been entertained at the instance of other petitioners wherein petitioners’ dispossession has been stayed. In para 15 and 16 of the affidavit sworn by Special Land Acquisition Officer following assertions are made:- “15. That land acquisition awards have been passed for a total area of 45.249 hectares out of the total area of 86.219 hectares of the land acquired. Possession for the entire land is in the lawful possession of the Varanasi Development Authority. 16. That for the remaining 37.572 hectares of land, for which the award has not yet been passed, the award will be made in accordance with law. For this an letter dated 29.05.2023 has been issued by the Varanasi Development Authority as well, a copy of which is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No.9 to this affidavit.” 15. A counter affidavit to the affidavit of Special Land Acquisition Officer has been filed stating that 80% estimated compensation under section 17(3A) of the Act of 1894 has not been paid to the petitioners for nearly ten years and a notice was sent for the meeting to be convened on 27.04.2011 for determining the rate of compensation for the land in question. It is asserted that signatures of petitioners were obtained on blank agreement and the sanctity of proceedings are in doubt. It is asserted that 80% compensation since has not been paid the authorities cannot take physical possession of the land. It is also submitted that as lawful proceedings have not been drawn, therefore, the cause of action continues to subsist and there is no laches in filing of the writ petitions. In para 3(c) petitioners have asserted that out of 1194 interested persons whose land measuring 86.299 hectares is acquired only 427 persons received award passed on agreement for an area 38.7213 hectares. In para 3(c) petitioners have asserted that out of 1194 interested persons whose land measuring 86.299 hectares is acquired only 427 persons received award passed on agreement for an area 38.7213 hectares. However, no award has been made regarding 767 remaining persons. It is also submitted that deposit of amount in treasury does not amount to compliance of section 17(3)A of the Act of 1894. It is also contended that taking of paper possession does not constitute vesting and several judgments in that regard have been relied upon. 16. It is urged that on 16.05.2023 the respondents came on spot with police force and attempted dispossession of petitioners’ family which caused injuries to several petitioners. It is further contended that only 50 persons had participated in the meeting for determination of the rate of compensation on 27.04.2011. It is lastly contended in para 9 that award of petitioners’ acquired land has not been prepared till now and compensation will have to be paid to petitioners in accordance with Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as Act of 2013’). 17. It is in the above factual background that this Court is required to adjudicate the legality of land acquisition proceedings. 18. At the very outset, it is worth noticing that the first Writ Petition No.15586 of 2001 filed before this Court questioning the dispensation of enquiry under section 5-A of the Act of 1894 by invoking urgency clause has already been rejected way back on 04.10.2002. The Division Bench judgment rendered in Writ Petition No.15586 of 2001 has attained finality. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings having failed with dismissal of writ petition filed by 50 tenure-holders on 04.10.2002, we would not be justified in taking a different view with regard to acquisition of land by invoking urgency clause. This is more so as the present writ petitions have been filed after ten years and it has been held by the Supreme Court in series of judgments that such belated challenge to acquisition need not be entertained. This is more so as the present writ petitions have been filed after ten years and it has been held by the Supreme Court in series of judgments that such belated challenge to acquisition need not be entertained. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Swarn Lata and others (supra) and Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. And another (supra) clearly holds the field and in that view of the matter we decline the challenge made to the acquisition proceedings on the ground of dispensation of enquiry under section 5-A of the Act of 1894 by invoking urgency clause. 19. So far as the challenge to acquisition proceedings on the ground of non-making of award by virtue of section 11-A of the Act of 1894 is concerned, this issue has also been settled by the Coordinate Bench while deciding the Writ Petition No.29419 of 2008. This court has taken note of the fact that possession of land was taken by the State on 17.04.2003 after referring to a series of judgments on the issue. This Court has conclusively held that manner of taking over possession vide possession memo cannot be faulted. Thus, the writ petition filed previously by the tenure-holders claiming benefit of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act has also failed. The Division Bench has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad Jain and others vs. State of U.P. and others AIR 1993 SC 2517 and Awadh Bihari and others vs. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1996 SC 122 for dismissal of the earlier writ petition. 20. Learned counsels for the petitioners have strenuously urged that the previous judgment of this Court in Krishna Dev Sharma @ Heera (supra) is not binding on this Court in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. State of U.P. and another 2022 SCC Online SC 1408. The judgment of Supreme Court in Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has been delivered on a reference on account of conflicting views expressed by two Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court on 18.08.2011 with regard to the import of non-compliance of Section 17(3A) of the Act of 1894 in view of section 11A of the Act of 1894. In para 8 of the judgment the Court framed following questions for its consideration:- “8. In para 8 of the judgment the Court framed following questions for its consideration:- “8. In the light of the contentions urged, the following questions arise for our consideration. a. Is the requirement to tender payment of 80% of the estimated compensation as contemplated under sub-section (3A) to Section 17 of Act, 1894, mandatory to ensure absolute vesting of the notified land. b. Whether the requirement to pass the award within the time frame contemplated under Section 11A applicable to the acquisition notified under Section 17 of Act, 1894. c. Can the case in Satendra Prasad jain (supra) be considered as a decision laying down ratio decideni on the above questions?” 21. In para 12, the Court relied upon a previous judgment of the Supreme Court in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nandoliya vs. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531 to observe that the acquiring authority will be entitled to take possession without taking recourse to the procedure which is otherwise provided under Section 16 of the Act of 1894 wherein it contemplates the passing of an award before taking possession. But under Section 17 of the Act of 1894 possession is permitted to be taken even before the award is passed. However by virtue of amendment introduced on 24.09.1984 inserting sub-section 3A in Section 17, it became necessary to tender and pay 80% estimated compensation to the person interested in the land before taking possession. The Court, therefore, has specified following sequence for vesting of land in the State:- (i) payment of 80% compensation (ii) taking over possession thereafter, and (iii) vesting of land in the government. 22. In para 15 to 18 of the judgment in Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Court held as under:- “15. However, on a careful composite perusal of all the provisions noted above, it is evident that the requirement to tender and pay 80% of the estimated compensation before taking possession assumes significance so as to carve out an exception for non-applicability of ‘lapsing’ as contemplated under Section 11A of Act, 1894. This is so, since the terms “vesting absolutely” and “lapsing” cannot co-exist and cannot go hand in hand. Post amendment w.e.f 24.09.1984, two elements have been inserted in Section 17 for the land to vest absolutely in the Government for public purpose even before the award is passed. One, is that possession should be taken. This is so, since the terms “vesting absolutely” and “lapsing” cannot co-exist and cannot go hand in hand. Post amendment w.e.f 24.09.1984, two elements have been inserted in Section 17 for the land to vest absolutely in the Government for public purpose even before the award is passed. One, is that possession should be taken. The other is, by inserting sub-section (3A) it has been made mandatory to tender payment of 80% of estimated compensation before taking possession. Therefore, 80% of the estimated compensation, the payment of which only if tendered and paid, the vesting would become absolute and in such event the consequence of lapsing in respect of absolutely vested land cannot occur and as such, in that circumstance alone Section 11A though applicable will not take effect. The right of the land loser would be to enforce passing of award which will include the balance 20% of compensation even if it is beyond two years and get adequately compensated in terms of Section 23 and 34 of Act, 1894 for the delay if any. 16. But it is a different matter altogether, when Section 17(1) is invoked but the requirement thereunder which is a pre-requisite condition is not complied. As noted, sub-section (3A) has been inserted w.e.f. 24.09.1984, whereunder it is made mandatory to tender and pay 80% of the estimated compensation before taking possession. Therefore, even if possession is taken, such possession cannot be considered as legal so as to vest the land absolutely if the pre-requisite condition for payment of 80% before taking possession is not complied. In such circumstance, by legal fiction it looses its character as an acquisition under Section 17 and since the absolute vesting does not take place, it will lapse if the further process is not complied and the award is not passed within two years from the date of declaration. However, even when the pre-condition is not complied, if the land loser does not challenge the acquisition and/or taking of possession as illegal, but concedes to the position, the possession taken does not become per-se illegal and the vesting will be absolute and in such event it cannot be considered to have lapsed until the land loser exercises the right. However, even when the pre-condition is not complied, if the land loser does not challenge the acquisition and/or taking of possession as illegal, but concedes to the position, the possession taken does not become per-se illegal and the vesting will be absolute and in such event it cannot be considered to have lapsed until the land loser exercises the right. We consider it so, since, both Section 11A and sub-section (3A) to Section 17 of Act, 1894 were inserted in Act, 1894 to enable the land losers to exercise their right conferred on them. As such, the said right is to be exercised by the land loser and none other, not even the acquiring authority or beneficiary nor would the said provision become automatically applicable unless it is triggered by the land loser. 17. Therefore, we are of the considered view that Section 11A though applicable to the cases of acquisition initiated under Section 17(1) of Act, 1894 the consequence of it will not affect the case where the land has absolutely vested on compliance of sub-section (3A) to Section 17 of Act, 1894 and 80% of estimated compensation is tendered and paid. Hence, when there is a challenge by the land loser, each case will have to be considered on its own merits to determine whether the prerequisite condition to tender and pay as contemplated under sub-section (3A) is made before possession is taken. If in the case concerned the mandatory prerequisite is not complied, such acquisition will loose its character as being under Section 17 and if the award is not passed within two years from the date of the declaration, it will lapse and not otherwise. The benefit of said provision is available only to be invoked by the land loser and cannot be invoked by the acquiring authority to claim lapse by pointing to non-compliance since the ‘vice’ of non-compliance cannot be permitted to be converted into a ‘virtue’. 18. The benefit of said provision is available only to be invoked by the land loser and cannot be invoked by the acquiring authority to claim lapse by pointing to non-compliance since the ‘vice’ of non-compliance cannot be permitted to be converted into a ‘virtue’. 18. Though the learned counsel for the beneficiary-Respondent No. 2 placed reliance on the decision in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (2020) 8 SCC 129 rendered by the Constitution Bench to contend that it has been held therein that “paid” as contained in Section 24(2) of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 does not include deposit of compensation in Court, we are of the considered opinion that the same will not be applicable to the question under consideration before us in this case. In the instant case, the requirement to tender and pay 80% of the estimated compensation and the consequent lapsing as considered above is in the context of exercise of urgency provision which permits a deviation from the normal process of acquisition and the payment envisaged is to take benefit of the said provision. In contradistinction, the consideration in the cited case is about the effect of Section 24 (2) of Act, 2013 in the circumstance contemplated therein.” 23. The Supreme Court also placed reliance upon its previous judgment in Laxmi Devi vs. State of Bihar 2015 10 SCC 241 wherein taking of possession without providing necessary money to the Special Land Acquisition Officer for compliance of section 17(3A) of the Act of 1894 was disapproved. The Court also referred to the facts of the case in Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra) in para 22 and 23 of the judgment which are reproduced hereinafter:- “22. In the above background it is noted that in the instant acquisition from which this case arises, an extent in all measuring 63.540 acres (101-15-17, 5/6 Bighas) was acquired through the declaration under Section 6 of Act, 1894 for which a sum of Rs. 7,48,67,857.73 being 80% is stated to have been deposited by Respondent No. 2 -Beneficiary, with Respondent No. 1 and the balance amount is also deposited on 21.12.2002 so as to enable the collector to enter into an agreement with the landowners and pay compensation. 7,48,67,857.73 being 80% is stated to have been deposited by Respondent No. 2 -Beneficiary, with Respondent No. 1 and the balance amount is also deposited on 21.12.2002 so as to enable the collector to enter into an agreement with the landowners and pay compensation. Insofar as the extent of land belonging to the appellant, it is stated by Respondent No. 1 that a letter dated 01.01.2003 was issued calling upon the appellant to come forward and execute an agreement. Thereafter there is no effort to tender and pay 80% of the estimated compensation or to pass an award, which prompted the appellant to file the writ petition before the High Court. 23. From the sequence of events, it is clear that the other land losers have entered into an agreement and received compensation. The appellant on the other hand was neither tendered nor paid 80% of the estimated compensation as required under sub-section (3A) to Section 17 before taking possession nor was an award passed and compensation paid within two years from the date of declaration under Section 6 of Act, 1894.” 24. After noticing the facts of the case, the Court determined the course to be followed in the facts of the case which is relevant for the present controversy also. In such circumstances, we deem it appropriate to refer to the observations of the Court made in para 24 to 27 of the judgment which are reproduced hereinafter:- “24. In the normal circumstance, the acquisition would lapse insofar as the appellant's land in view of our conclusion on the legal aspect. However, in the fact situation, the relief is required to be moulded. This is for the reason that the land belonging to the appellant is not a stand-alone extent. As noted, the acquisition was for a planned industrial layout and the total extent acquired and possession taken was 101-15-17, 5/6 bighas of which, the land belonging to the appellant is only 2-06-1/3-0 bighas. In the planned layout, the land has been utilized for various purposes and amenities. A ‘Mandi’ has been constructed over a larger extent of land of which the smaller extent of land belonging to the appellant also forms a part. Hence reversion of the land does not arise. In the planned layout, the land has been utilized for various purposes and amenities. A ‘Mandi’ has been constructed over a larger extent of land of which the smaller extent of land belonging to the appellant also forms a part. Hence reversion of the land does not arise. Further, the course as suggested in Laxmi Devi (supra) to issue a fresh notification also would not be appropriate, since the very scheme of acquisition and determination of compensation under the old regime has undergone a sea change. As such it would be unjust not only to the state exchequer but also the other land losers under the same notification if the present prevailing process is applied in determining the compensation. Further, though after being nudged by the High Court, the award in any event was passed on 09.06.2008 under the old regime which is now to be substituted with adequate compensation. 25. On weighing all aspects of the matter, we deem it appropriate that it will serve the ends of justice to direct the respondents to determine the market value insofar as the appellant's land is concerned by reckoning the relevant date as 09.06.2008 (i.e. the date on which the award was ultimately passed), by applying the yardstick under Act, 1894. It is made clear that only the market value be determined as on that date but for awarding the statutory benefits, it shall be calculated from the date of the original notification since admittedly the appellant has been dispossessed on 04.02.2003 pursuant to the notification dated 17.04.2002. Further, from the date on which the fresh award is passed pursuant to this judgment, the appellant would get the cause of action for seeking reference if dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded. It is made clear that the determination of compensation, in this case, shall not give rise to any right in favour of any other land loser whose land was acquired under the same notification, to seek for re-determination of compensation where the same has already attained finality. 26. The decision in this case based on the principle of law settled herein, if it arises for consideration in any other case under Act, 1894 or any other enactment relating to land acquisition containing pari materia provisions shall be applied only prospectively and cases which have attained finality shall not be reopened. 27. 26. The decision in this case based on the principle of law settled herein, if it arises for consideration in any other case under Act, 1894 or any other enactment relating to land acquisition containing pari materia provisions shall be applied only prospectively and cases which have attained finality shall not be reopened. 27. In the result, we pass the following order: (i) The provision contained in Section 11A of Act, 1894 shall be applicable to cases in which the acquiring authority has not complied with the requirement of sub-section (3A) to Section 17 of Act, 1894 by tendering and paying eighty per centum of the estimated compensation before taking possession since possession in such cases cannot be considered to be taken in accordance with law and the vesting is not absolute. (ii) If the requirement is complied and possession is taken after tendering and paying eighty per centum, though there is need to pass an award and pay the balance compensation within a reasonable time, the rigour of Section 11A of Act, 1894 will not apply so as to render the entire proceedings for acquisition to lapse in the context of absolute vesting. The right of land loser in such case is to enforce passing of the award and recover the compensation. (iii) In the instant case though Section 11A of Act, 1894 has become applicable, in the changed circumstance we deem it proper to mould the relief instead of holding the acquisition to have lapsed. Hence for the reasons stated above, we direct as follows: (a) The respondents shall construe 09.06.2008 as the relevant date and determine the market value prevailing as on that date applying the yardstick under Act, 1894 in respect of the acquired land. (b) To calculate the statutory benefits on such amount including interest, the same shall be determined by taking into consideration the date of the Section 4 notification dated 17.04.2002 since the appellant was dispossessed on 04.02.2003 pursuant to the same. (c) The date on which the fresh award is passed pursuant to this judgment and communicated shall be the date of cause of action for seeking enhancement of compensation if the appellant is dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation offered. (c) The date on which the fresh award is passed pursuant to this judgment and communicated shall be the date of cause of action for seeking enhancement of compensation if the appellant is dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation offered. (d) The compensation determined in this case shall not give the cause of action to any other land loser whose land is acquired under the same notification to seek re-determination of compensation. (e) The appellant shall be entitled to the cost incurred in these proceedings.” 25. In the facts of the present case, it remains undisputed that the land came to be acquired for planned construction of Transport Nagar Scheme by the authority way back in the year 2000. The notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 18.12.2000. A corrigendum was later issued on 15.03.2001 which was followed with a declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 09.04.2001. Challenge laid to the aforesaid notification by 50 tenure-holders was rejected by this Court in Writ Petition No. 15586 of 2001. Subsequent writ petitions filed by another set of persons challenging the acquisition proceedings have also failed on the ground that the acquisition has lapsed under Section 11A of the Act of 1894. We have already observed that taking of a different view would not be desirable by us particularly when the writ petition itself has been filed after expiry of more than ten years of the issuance of notification. What is relevant to note at this juncture is that none of the petitioners raised any challenge for over ten years. It also transpires that after taking of possession of acquired land on 17.04.2003 the name of the development authority has been mutated in respect of entire acquired land. Even at that stage no challenge was laid to the acquisition proceedings. It is only at the stage of determination of rate of compensation for which meeting was called that the petitioners have rushed to file the present writ petitions. 26. From the perusal of records we find that the entire acquired land can be classified in two parts. The first part relates to such land in respect of which the tenure-holders have already entered into agreement with the State by virtue of the Rules of 1997 pursuant to which award has been made in respect of the 45.249 hectares of land out of the total acquired land of 86.219 hectares. The first part relates to such land in respect of which the tenure-holders have already entered into agreement with the State by virtue of the Rules of 1997 pursuant to which award has been made in respect of the 45.249 hectares of land out of the total acquired land of 86.219 hectares. In respect of such land the petitioners have not only entered into agreement but a consequential award has been made on the basis of settlement under Section 11(2) of the Act of 1894. Petitioners have admitted in their affidavit filed today that nearly 427 tenure-holders have received the award on the basis of agreement. These awards are not under challenge. Such acquired land for which award is made and substantial portion of tenure-holders have received compensation form a class in themselves. 27. The second part of acquired land consists of those persons in respect of whom no award has been made under the Act of 1894. Such tenure-holders form a distinct class in themselves and, therefore, their cases are required to be considered separately. 28. Adverting to the tenure-holders falling in the first category we find that the notification acquiring their land on 09.04.2001 has not been challenged by them for more than ten years. Possession in respect of such land has been taken by the State and transferred to the development authority on 17.04.2003. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Writ Petition Nos. 15587 of 2001 and 29491 of 2008 have already rejected the challenge laid to the acquisition notification on the ground of invocation of urgency clause and also on the ground of acquisition having lapsed under Section 11-A of the Act of 1894. This is not where the matter rests. These petitioners have subsequently entered into agreement with the State for receiving compensation under the agreement Rules of 1997. An award has also been made in respect of such acquired land way back in the year 2012. Compensation amount has also been deposited with the SLAO and sizeable chunk of tenure-holders (admitted to be 417 by the petitioners) have received the compensation amount. The question at their instance is as to whether the acquisition proceedings are required to be interfered with on the ground that 80% estimated compensation was not paid to them before alleged taking of possession on 17.04.2003 based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd.(supra). 29. The question at their instance is as to whether the acquisition proceedings are required to be interfered with on the ground that 80% estimated compensation was not paid to them before alleged taking of possession on 17.04.2003 based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd.(supra). 29. Supreme Court in Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd.(supra) has authoritatively settled the question relating to applicability of Section 11-A of the Act of 1894 as well as legality of the taking of possession without following the provisions contained under Section 17(3A) of the Act of 1894. While doing so, the Supreme Court has clearly observed in para 26 that the principle of law settled therein shall be applied prospectively and cases which have attained finality shall not be reopened. In the facts of the present case, we find that much water has flown since taking of possession by State from petitioners on 17.04.2003. We have noticed that not only name of authority was mutated in revenue records but the tenure holders entered into agreement with the State and consequential awards have been made in the year 2012. Sizeable tenure holders have received compensation. Entire compensation otherwise has been deposited prior to 2012. At this late stage, we are, therefore, not inclined to interfere in the writ petitions so far as tenure-holders of the first part are concerned. The acquired land for which award has been made way back in the year 2012 has clearly vested in the State free from all encumbrances. There is otherwise no challenge to the award made under Section 11(2) of the Act. In the absence of any challenge to the award there is no occasion for this Court to interfere with the acquisition of land included in the first part. 30. It would also be appropriate to refer para 22 of the counter affidavit filed by the authority on 18.04.2012 in the leading petition, which is reproduced hereinafter:- “22. That the contents of paragraph no. 25 of the writ petition are false and denied. The acquisition is being made after mutual settlement as per the Karar Niyamawali 1997, in pursuance of which the compensation is being paid to the tenure holders by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Varanasi. That the contents of paragraph no. 25 of the writ petition are false and denied. The acquisition is being made after mutual settlement as per the Karar Niyamawali 1997, in pursuance of which the compensation is being paid to the tenure holders by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Varanasi. The compensation to the tune of Rs 23 crores has already been distributed amongst 492 tenure holders and more than 423 Tenure holders have also given their consent letters for receiving the compensation. The averments to the contrary are false and denied. The list of tenure holders who have received the compensation as per the karar Niyamawali 2007 is being filed. herewith as Annexure no. C.A.-4 to this counter affidavit.” 31. Para 22 of the counter affidavit has been replied in para 18 of the rejoinder affidavit which is reproduced hereinafter:- “18. That the contents of paragraph nos. 22 of counter affidavit are not admitted as stated, the figure and list of tenure holders field as Annexure C.A.4 is itself incorrect, various names of the tenure holders have repeated again and again and a joint compromise has also shown by the different persons of a family thus the respondents have increased the numbers of persons to show this Hon'ble Court that most of persons have accepted the nominal compensation as such the petitioners who has also been accepted less compensation of their valuable land the Varanasi Development Authority is doing the business and they are purchasing the land at the rate of nominal price per Bigha and selling the land by earning more price thus the development authority V.D.A. is doing the business by acquiring the land. A true copy of the brochure published by V.D.A. is being filed herewith and same is marked as Annexure No. R.A.2 to this affidavit.” 32. Affidavits of 40 petitioners are also annexed with the rejoinder affidavit which mentions in para 2 that compensation is being distributed to farmers pursuant to the agreement entered into between the tenure-holders and the State. Para 3 of the affidavit records that consent for receiving compensation was given without realizing the implication or consulting his counsel. In para 4 of the affidavit, it is stated that the tenure holder has been advised by his counsel that the agreement is not in his interest. Para 3 of the affidavit records that consent for receiving compensation was given without realizing the implication or consulting his counsel. In para 4 of the affidavit, it is stated that the tenure holder has been advised by his counsel that the agreement is not in his interest. It is then asserted that an appeal has been made against acquisition and, therefore, the agreement be disallowed. 33. Admittedly, no challenge has been made to the award or the agreement signed by the petitioners pursuant to which award has been made. Merely stating that counsel has advised that agreement is not in his interest would not amount to a challenged either to the agreement or to the award. This is particularly so as more than 400 tenure-holders have already accepted the awarded amount. In such circumstances, we are inclined to reject the petitioners’ challenge to the acquisition proceedings to the extent that tenure-holders have entered into agreement and consequential award has been made. Substantial chunk of tenure-holders have also received compensation. We are thus of the view that para 26 of the judgment in Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. (surpa) would apply with full force and, therefore, acquisition proceeding to the extent of first part of acquired land which have attained finality with declaration of award based upon agreement need not be interfered with on the basis of principle of law laid down by the Court in Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Challenge laid to the acquisition proceedings in respect of land for which award has been made based upon the Rules of 1997 fails and is dismissed. The respondents shall be at liberty to proceed with developmental work on such acquired land. 34. We hasten to add that in the event tenure-holders have not received compensation so far, despite making of award and deposit of compensation shall be at liberty to receive it and the State authorities shall ensure that such payment is disbursed to them, forthwith. We further clarify that tenure-holders, who have not accepted compensation so far shall furnish details of their accounts to the Special Land Acquisition Officer alongwith supporting material within two weeks from today and the compensation amount lying in deposit shall be released to them within two weeks thereafter. We further clarify that tenure-holders, who have not accepted compensation so far shall furnish details of their accounts to the Special Land Acquisition Officer alongwith supporting material within two weeks from today and the compensation amount lying in deposit shall be released to them within two weeks thereafter. Subject to the above observation, writ petitions to the extent of land covered by the first part (where award is made of acquired land) are dismissed. 35. 39 tenure holders, who have received compensation in respect of 3.1355 hectares of land, in respect of which award has not been made so far but compensation amount is paid to the tenure-holders the required award shall be made within four weeks from today, and if any part of compensation amount remains unpaid to them the same shall be released to them within two weeks thereafter. 36. Turning to the second part of tenure holders, who have neither entered into any agreement with the State for receiving compensation nor any award has been made, the respondents shall have no right over such acquired land till an appropriate award is made in accordance with law. 37. Our attention has also been invited to the counter affidavit filed by petitioner nos. 89 and 134 in the leading writ petition to the affidavit of State, wherein a letter of District Magistrate, Varanasi dated 26.07.2021 is annexed as per which acquisition notification is proposed to be de-notified where award has not been made. There is nothing on record to show that any decision has been taken by the State on such communication. Sri A.K. Singh, learned Additional Advocate General states that such proposal of District Magistrate has not been accepted by the State. Once that be so, it shall be open for the State to take an appropriate decision in respect of remaining land for which award has not been made so far. An appropriate decision would be taken whether to proceed with the acquisition in respect of land of second part within six weeks from today. In case a decision is taken to retain the acquired land an appropriate award in accordance with law would have to be made keeping in view the law laid down by Supreme Court in Delhi Airtech Sevices Ptv. Ltd (supra) as well as Aligarh Development Authority vs. Megh Singh and others (2016) SCC 504. In case a decision is taken to retain the acquired land an appropriate award in accordance with law would have to be made keeping in view the law laid down by Supreme Court in Delhi Airtech Sevices Ptv. Ltd (supra) as well as Aligarh Development Authority vs. Megh Singh and others (2016) SCC 504. Till such a decision is taken the State shall not assert/claim any right over such land for which award is not made or payment of compensation is not received by the tenure-holders. 38. In view of the deliberations and discussions held above, both the writ petitions are decided on following terms:- (i) Challenge laid to the acquisition notification fails in respect of tenure-holders, who have entered into agreement with State under the Rules of 1997 and consequential award has been made and to such extent the writ petitions are dismissed. Challenge also fails to the acquisition notification at the instance of tenure-holders, who have received compensation for the acquired land in question. (ii) In respect of remaining land for which neither award is made nor compensation amount is paid to tenure-holders, the petitioners’ right over such land shall continue to remain protected and no right shall be claimed by the respondents over such land unless the respondents make an award in accordance with law and pay compensation to the tenure-holders. 39. No order is passed as to costs.