JUDGMENT : This Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short ‘the C.P.C.’], is filed by the Appellants/plaintiffs challenging the Decree and Judgment, dated 14.06.2004, in O.S. No.117 of 1995 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Anantapur [for short ‘the trial Court’]. The Respondents herein are the defendants in the said Suit. 2. The Plaintiffs filed the above said suit for relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale, dated 14.08.1991, executed by the 1st defendant and his mother in favour of the plaintiffs for Rs.8,90,000/- after receiving the balance of consideration in respect of suit schedule property and direct delivery of possession. 3. Both the parties in the Appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court. 4. The brief averments of the plaint, in O.S. No.117 of 1995, are as under: i) The suit was originally filed against the first defendant. On his death, during the pendency of the suit, his legal heirs are added as defendants 2 to 5. ii) The first defendant and his mother were the absolute owners of the plaint schedule property and the mother of first defendant died and her share was devolved upon the first defendant as he being the sole legal heir of his mother. First defendant and his mother agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiffs for Rs.8,90,000/- and that the plaintiffs paid Rs.1,00,000/- to the first defendant on 14.08.1991 towards advance and the first defendant and his mother executed an agreement of sale. As per the terms and conditions of the said agreement, the plaintiffs have to pay the balance of sale consideration within ten months from the date of agreement. Though time is stipulated in the agreement for the performance of contract, it was never treated as essence of the contract and the parties never intended to make time as one of the essential conditions of the agreement. Plaintiffs are always ready and willing to perform their part of contract and they paid Rs.90,000/- to first defendant and his mother on 22.12.1991 and that the said payment is endorsed on the back of the agreement. Plaintiffs are always ready and willing to perform their part of contract and they paid Rs.90,000/- to first defendant and his mother on 22.12.1991 and that the said payment is endorsed on the back of the agreement. It is further stated that the first defendant should vacate the premises and handover vacant possession of the property and he is also liable to clear all the debts in respect of suit property before asking for the performance on the part of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are always ready and willing to take sale deed from the first defendant and his mother. But the first defendant and his mother without performing their obligation under the agreement, issued a notice dated 17.08.1992 stating that the agreement would stand cancelled if the plaintiffs do not take the sale deed by August, 1992. For that the plaintiffs sent a reply dated 31.08.1992. After receiving the reply, first defendant and his mother kept quiet and in the meanwhile the mother of first defendant died and first defendant did not take any steps for the performance of the agreement. The conduct of first defendant in keeping quiet for a long time clearly shows that time is not treated as essence of the contract. The first defendant again sent another notice dated 18.11.1994 with false allegations and the plaintiffs sent reply on 18.12.1994. The first defendant is evading the performance of contract on one pretext or other, hence the plaintiffs constrained to file the suit. 5. The first defendant filed a written statement by denying the averments mentioned in the plaint and further contended as under : - i) The first defendant while admitting the execution of agreement of sale dated 14.08.1991 and also admitting the receipt of Rs.1,00,000/- on the date of agreement and another sum of Rs.90,000/- on 22.12.1991, pleaded that 10 months’ time was fixed for performance of contract and that they agreed to sell the property to enable them to perform the marriages of two daughters of first defendant and to use the remaining balance for the purpose of setting up of a business for the benefit of the son of first defendant. ii) It is further stated that first defendant was always ready and willing to deliver possession of property immediately after the sale and that the property was free from liabilities. ii) It is further stated that first defendant was always ready and willing to deliver possession of property immediately after the sale and that the property was free from liabilities. It is further stated that the plaintiffs insisted for Income Tax clearance certificate and that the first defendant requested the plaintiffs to deposit the balance sale consideration in any bank and to send a draft sale deed to enable the first defendant to get the necessary clearance certificate. The plaintiffs, who have no capacity to raise funds, have been finding lame excuses in not performing their part of contract. The draft sale deed must have been prepared by both parties and that it is not a one-sided act. It is further contended that by the notice dated 18.11.1994, time was made the essence of the contract by requiring the plaintiffs to perform their part of contract on or before 26.12.1994 and in view of the failure of the plaintiffs, the contract stood cancelled and that the plaintiffs have no right to claim specific performance and that the conduct of the plaintiffs also shows that they are not entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance and prayed the Court to dismiss the suit. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for specific performance of contract? (ii) Whether time was the essence of contract? (iii) Whether the defendant committed breach of contract? (iv) To What relief? 7. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the Plaintiffs, PW1 was examined and Ex.A1 to Ex.A10 were marked. On behalf of the Defendants DW1 was examined and Ex.B1 to Ex.B9 were marked. 8. After completion of the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court Dismissed the Suit with costs vide its judgment, dated 14.06.2004, against which the present appeal is preferred by the appellants/plaintiffs in the Suit questioning the Decree and Judgment passed by the trial Court. 9. Heard Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned senior counsel for appellants/plaintiffs and Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel for respondents/defendants. 10. Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned senior counsel for the appellants would contend that in the case on hand, the time is not an essence of contract. 9. Heard Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned senior counsel for appellants/plaintiffs and Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel for respondents/defendants. 10. Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned senior counsel for the appellants would contend that in the case on hand, the time is not an essence of contract. He would further contend that in the instant case once the time is extended, the time is not an essence of contract. He would further contend that there are no wilful laches on the part of the appellants/plaintiffs in obtaining regular registered sale deed and the plaintiffs are always ready and willing to perform their part of contract. He would further contend that the judgment passed by the trial Court is not in accordance with law and the appeal may be allowed. 11. Per contra, Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel for the respondents would contend that the time is an essence of contract and in view of non performance of contract by the plaintiffs, the defendants faced so-many financial problems and they suffered several problems and the defendants are always ready and willing to perform their part of contract, but the plaintiffs never came forward to perform their obligations. He would further contend that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the trial Court rightly dismissed the suit with costs and there is no need to interfere with the finding given by the Trial Court. 12. Having regard to the pleadings in the Suit and the findings recorded by the trial Court and in the light of rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this court, the following points would arise for determination: I. Whether the time is an essence of contract? II. Whether the appellants/ plaintiffs are entitled the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale dated 14.08.1991? III. Whether the trial Court is justified in rejecting the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale? IV. Whether the decree and judgment passed by the trial court needs any interference? 13. Point No.1: Whether the time is an essence of contract? The suit is based on Ex.A1 agreement of sale said to have been executed by first defendant and his mother. The plaintiffs herein claimed the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale dated 14.08.1991. Alternative relief of refund of advance amount is not sought by the plaintiffs. 13. Point No.1: Whether the time is an essence of contract? The suit is based on Ex.A1 agreement of sale said to have been executed by first defendant and his mother. The plaintiffs herein claimed the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale dated 14.08.1991. Alternative relief of refund of advance amount is not sought by the plaintiffs. Ex.A1 recitals goes to show that the first defendant and his mother agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiffs for Rs.8,90,000/- and the plaintiffs paid an advance amount of Rs.1,00,000/- on the date of agreement itself and first defendant and his mother executed an agreement of sale in favour of plaintiffs on the same day. A specific condition was incorporated in the Ex.A1 agreement in between both the parties that “10 months time was fixed for performance of contract”. The contention of the first defendant is that the first defendant and his mother agreed to sell the property to perform the marriages of two daughters of first defendant and to use the remaining balance for the purpose of setting up a business for the benefit of son of the first defendant as the son of first defendant had no other income yielding property. The main contention incorporated in Ex.A1 agreement is “the plaintiffs have to pay the remaining balance amount of Rs.7,90,000/- within 10 months” and they have to obtain regular registered sale deed, if they failed to do so, the advance amount paid is forfeited. The legal position, in this regard is no more res-integra. The law is well settled that, grant of decree of specific performance of agreement of sale is not an automatic and it is a discretionary relief, the same is required to be exercised judiciously, sound and reasonably. 14. As stated supra, Ex.A1 is a crucial document, based on which the suit is filed. The execution of Ex.A1 agreement by the first defendant and his mother is not at all in dispute. It is not in dispute that subsequent to Ex.A1 agreement of sale, the mother of first defendant died and her share was devolved upon the first defendant, he being the sole legal heir of his mother. As stated supra, 10 months time is fixed to the plaintiffs to perform their part of contract. It is not in dispute that subsequent to Ex.A1 agreement of sale, the mother of first defendant died and her share was devolved upon the first defendant, he being the sole legal heir of his mother. As stated supra, 10 months time is fixed to the plaintiffs to perform their part of contract. It is the case of the plaintiffs that even though 10 months time is fixed to perform the part of the contract, the time was never essence of contract. The law is very clear that the question whether the time is essence of contract cannot be decided mainly on the basis of agreement deciding the fixation of time limit. The Court should bear in mind that when the parties prescribed certain time limit for taking steps by one or other party, it must have some significance and the said time limit cannot be ignored altogether. But contrary to the condition incorporated in Ex.A1, the plaintiffs pleaded that the time was not an essence of contract. It has to be seen even when the time is not an essence of contract, the plaintiffs must perform their part of the contract within a reasonable time. Admittedly, total sale consideration in Ex.A1 is Rs.8,90,000/-, from out of approximately 12% amount i.e., Rs.1,00,000/- is paid by the plaintiffs and subsequently after 3 months an amount of Rs.90,000/- was paid by the plaintiffs and obtained endorsement on Ex.A1 agreement. 15. In a case between Gaddipati Divija and another vs. Pathuri Samrajyam and others 2023 SCC online SC 442, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: Before parting with the judgment, we would like to clarify another aspect, i.e., with regard to whether time is of the essence in the sale agreement in the present case or not. In Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd., this Court was dealing with a similar question with respect to a sale agreement for an immovable property, while referring to an earlier judgment in Chand Rani Vs. Kamal Rani, it was reiterated that in sale of immovable property there is no presumption that time is the essence of the contract, however, the Court may infer performance in a reasonable time if the conditions are evident from the express terms of the contract, from the nature of the property and from the surrounding circumstances. Kamal Rani, it was reiterated that in sale of immovable property there is no presumption that time is the essence of the contract, however, the Court may infer performance in a reasonable time if the conditions are evident from the express terms of the contract, from the nature of the property and from the surrounding circumstances. In a case between Shenbagam and others v. KK Rathinavel, 2022 SCC online SC 71, the Apex Court held as follows: True enough, generally speaking, time is not of the essence in an agreement for the sale of immovable property. In deciding whether to grant the remedy of specific performance, specifically in suits relating to sale of immovable property, the courts must be cognizant of the conduct of the parties, the escalation of the price of the suit property and whether one party will unfairly benefit from the decree. The remedy provided must not cause injustice to a party, specifically when they are not at fault. In the case on hand, the sale agreement is dated 14.08.1991. The defendants are not having any other property except the suit schedule property, the agreed sale consideration is Rs.8,90,000/-, which is a substantial amount in those days i.e., in the year 1992. The reason to alienate the plaint schedule property by the first defendant is the marriage of eldest daughter of first defendant has to be performed in the month of December, 1991 and he incurred debts, after 4 months of Ex.A1 agreement, the marriage of first daughter of the first defendant is fixed, the same is pleaded by the first defendant in the written statement itself. It is evident that the son and mother in-law of DW1 were sick and that they were being taken to corporate hospital, Bangalore for treatment and his son died in the month of February, 1993 and his mother-in-law died in the month of August 1993. The evidence of DW1 further reveals that marriage of second daughter of first defendant was performed on 17.12.1993. The main reason for entering into the agreement for plaint schedule property by the defendant No.1 on 14.08.1991 was he has to perform his elder daughter’s marriage. Admittedly, the son of first defendant has no avocation except giving tuitions to the children and first defendant needed money for the marriage of his elder daughter. The main reason for entering into the agreement for plaint schedule property by the defendant No.1 on 14.08.1991 was he has to perform his elder daughter’s marriage. Admittedly, the son of first defendant has no avocation except giving tuitions to the children and first defendant needed money for the marriage of his elder daughter. The evidence of DW1 goes to show that they intend to alienate the schedule property to perform the marriage of his elder daughter. Admittedly, the first defendant is not having any other property except the suit schedule property. The above circumstances clearly reveals that the first defendant wants to alienate the plaint schedule property for his urgent needs with a specific object that the sale has to be concluded within 10 months period. The material on record reveals that due to the conduct of plaintiffs, the defendant No.1 incurred debts to perform the marriage of his 2nd daughter. 16. The learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the time originally fixed in Ex.A1 contract has been extended by the first defendant, once the time was extended the time is not an essence of contract and it will lose its significance. It is true the time originally fixed in Ex.A1 contract is, the parties have to perform their part of the contract by 14.06.1992. It is not in dispute that on 22.12.1991 the plaintiffs made a part payment of Rs.90,000/- under Ex.A2 endorsement. After expiry of period of contract immediately after 2 months the first defendant issued a legal notice under Ex.A3 with a plea that the time is essence of contract and they are ready and willing to perform their part of contract. It was specifically recited in Ex.A3 notice that “at the request of the plaintiffs, the time is extended till August, 1992 on the ground that the plaintiffs could not mobilize funds”. It goes to show that to prove his readiness, initially the first defendant issued a legal notice on 17.08.1992 to the plaintiffs with a specific demand to come forward to get regular registered sale deed after payment of remaining balance sale consideration of Rs.7,00,000/-. In Ex.A3 notice, the first defendant has demanded the plaintiffs to perform their part of contract before the end of August, 1992, otherwise the agreement shall stand cancelled and the advance amount will be forfeited. In Ex.A3 notice, the first defendant has demanded the plaintiffs to perform their part of contract before the end of August, 1992, otherwise the agreement shall stand cancelled and the advance amount will be forfeited. The plaintiffs got issued Ex.A4 reply notice to the first defendant’s counsel in response to the Ex.A3 legal notice. In the said notice, the plaintiffs pleaded that the first defendant has to perform certain further acts before effective registration of document could be done and have to get vacated and deliver the vacant possession. Admittedly the aforesaid conditions are not incorporated in Ex.A1 agreement of sale. 17. The only condition incorporated in Ex.A1 is the first defendant has to discharge his debts incurred on the suit schedule property by the date of registration. Ex.B1 goes to show that the first defendant discharged his mortgage debt in the year 1992 itself. Thereafter also the plaintiffs never came forward to pay the remaining balance sale consideration of Rs.7,00,000/- and to obtain a regular registered sale deed. Finally the first defendant issued another notice dated 18.11.1994, Ex.A5, with a specific demand that the contract should be performed by 26.12.1994. It is specifically averred in Ex.A5 that the defendants will be waited from 10.00 a.m. onwards on 26.12.1994 at Sub-Registrar Office and the defendants demanded the plaintiffs to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.7,00,000/- by way of demand draft and to obtain the regular registered sale deed, otherwise the contract will be cancelled and the advance amount will be forfeited. Ex.A6 is reply issued by the plaintiffs by mentioning false averments. It was pleaded by the plaintiffs in Ex.A6 that the delivery of possession of property is a condition of the agreement. It is quite absurd to say that the property has to be delivered before the date of registration of the sale deed by the vendor to the vendee. Admittedly the property will be delivered on the date of registration only. It was also pleaded by the plaintiffs in Ex.A6 that the first defendant has not cleared the debt on the property. As stated supra, Ex.B1 clearly goes to show that the first defendant discharged the mortgaged debt on Ex.A1 property in the year 1992 itself. Therefore, the initial time limit fixed by the parties is extended at the request of the plaintiffs only. As stated supra, Ex.B1 clearly goes to show that the first defendant discharged the mortgaged debt on Ex.A1 property in the year 1992 itself. Therefore, the initial time limit fixed by the parties is extended at the request of the plaintiffs only. There is a consistent remainder by the first defendant that the contract should be performed within a particular time. There was a time stipulation by fixing the certain time limit that the contract shall be performed within a particular time. As stated supra, for non-performance of contract by the plaintiffs viz. non-payment of balance of sale consideration of Rs.7,00,000/-, the defendants faced so-many problems and due to the conduct of plaintiffs, the defendant No.1 incurred debts to perform his second daughter’s marriage. 18. The learned counsel for appellants placed a reliance in between Beemaneni Maha Lakshmi v. Gangumalla Appa Rao, (2019) 6 SCC 233 , in the said case, Apex Court held as follows: The vendor sought to raise the plea of hardship for the first time before this Court and this Court did not permit the vendor to raise such a plea of hardship by observing that as no plea as to hardship if relief for specific performance is granted was raised by the defendant vendor in written statement nor any issue was framed that the plaintiff purchaser could be compensated in terms of the money in lieu of decree for specific performance, such plea cannot be entertained for the first time in appeal by way of SLP, more so, when there are concurrent findings that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract has been recorded by the lower courts. In the case on hand, the case of the defendants is that the reason to alienate the suit schedule property is to perform the marriage of daughter of first defendant and the plaintiffs did not come forward to discharge their part of contract and they did not move their little finger to perform their obligation and that the first defendant faced so-many problems and the mother-in-law of the first defendant was sick and she was being taken to corporate hospital, Bangalore for treatment and his son died in the month of February, 1993, his mother-in-law died in the month of August, 1993. The first defendant further pleaded that the reason to alienate the suit schedule property is to perform his daughters’ marriage and he is not having any other property except the suit schedule property and for their urgent needs with a specific object, the first defendant entered into an agreement of sale and the sale has to be concluded within a period of 10 months from the date of agreement of sale. The same is pleaded in the written statement itself. Another important point is balance amount is not at all deposited by the plaintiffs till so far. The legal position in this regard is no more res integra and the same has been well settled by Apex Court in the case of K.S.Vidyanadam and others vs. Vairavan, (1997) 3 SCC 1 , that the Court should also bear in mind that when the parties prescribe certain time limit(s) for taking steps by one or other party, it must have some significance and that the time limit(s) cannot be ignored altogether on the ground that time has not made the essence of the contract relating to immovable properties. The reasons offered by the plaintiffs for the delay or omission on the part of the plaintiffs to take any steps in the matter are obviously untrue and it is clear that they were throwing the blame on the defendants and finding out some reason or other to explain the delay or omission to take any sale deed. Fact remains from the date of final notice issued by the defendants dated 18.11.1994 till the date of filing of the suit the plaintiffs have not taken any steps in the matter, the time is expired by 26.12.1994. The plaintiffs did not do anything on their part to implement the agreement of sale and the defendants waited till 26.12.1994 from the date of Ex.A1 agreement of sale dated 14.08.1991, therefore, by virtue of time stipulation in Ex.A1 coupled with Ex.A5 notice the time is an essence of contract. As stated supra it is undoubtedly clear that in the present case, the time is an essence of contract. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the time has always been the essence of contract. As stated supra, there are so-many laches on the part of the plaintiffs for performing their part of contract. Accordingly, I answered this point against the appellants. 19. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the time has always been the essence of contract. As stated supra, there are so-many laches on the part of the plaintiffs for performing their part of contract. Accordingly, I answered this point against the appellants. 19. Point No.2:- Whether the appellants/ plaintiffs are entitled the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale dated 14.08.1991? As stated supra the execution of Ex.A1 agreement of sale by the first defendant and his mother is not at all disputed and subsequent to the agreement of sale, the mother of the first defendant died and her entire share devolved upon the first defendant as he being the sole legal heir to his mother. As regards suit for specific performance, the law is very clear that the plaintiffs must prove their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract all through right from the date of contract till the date of hearing of suit. The case of the plaintiffs is that they are always ready and willing to perform their part of contract, but in order to prove the same except the first plaintiff no other evidence is adduced by the plaintiffs. As stated supra, there are so-many laches on the part of the plaintiffs. The date of agreement is 14.08.1991, the suit is filed by the plaintiffs in the year 1995. Admittedly, at initial point of time, the first defendant issued a legal notice to the plaintiffs with a specific demand to come forward to pay the balance sale consideration and obtain regular registered sale deed. As stated supra, for non-performance of their part of contract by the plaintiffs, the defendants faced so-many problems. The law can be taken as well settled that a suit for specific performance has to be complied requirements prescribed in Section 16 (C) of Specific Relief Act. Absolutely, no evidence is produced by the plaintiffs to prove their readiness and willingness on the part of their contract. 20. In the case between Shenbagam and others v. KK Rathinavel (supra), the Apex Court held as follows: Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act provides certain bars to the relief of specific performance. Absolutely, no evidence is produced by the plaintiffs to prove their readiness and willingness on the part of their contract. 20. In the case between Shenbagam and others v. KK Rathinavel (supra), the Apex Court held as follows: Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act provides certain bars to the relief of specific performance. These include, inter alia, a person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ‘ready and willing’ to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented and waived by the defendant. In JP Builders v. A.Ramadas Rao, a two-judge Bench of this Court observed that Section 16(c) mandates ‘readiness and willingness’ of the plaintiff and is a condition precedent to obtain the relief of specific performance. The Court held: 25. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates “readiness and willingness” on the part of the plaintiff and it is a condition precedent for obtaining relief of grant of specific performance. It is also clear that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must allege and prove a continuous “readiness and willingness” to perform the contract on his part from the date of the contract. The onus is on the plaintiff. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non-compliance with this statutory mandate, the Court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. “Readiness and willingness” to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties.” In a case between K.S.Vidyanadam and others vs. Vairavan, (4th supra) the Apex Court held as follows: Sri Sivasubramanium cited the decision of the Madras High Court in S.V. Sankaralinga Nadar v. P.T.S.Ratnaswamy Nadar holding that mere rise in prices is no ground for denying the specific performance. With great respect, we are unable to agree if the said decision is understood as saying that the said factor is not at all to be taken into account while exercising the discretion vested in the court by law. We cannot be oblivious to the reality-and the reality is constant and continuous rise in the values of urban properties-fuelled by larger-scale migration of people from rural areas to urban centres and by inflation. Take this very case. The plaintiff had agreed to pay the balance consideration, purchase the stamp papers and ask for the execution of sale deed and delivery of possession within six months. He did nothing of the sort. The agreement expressly provides that if the plaintiff fails in performing his part of the contract, the defendants are entitled to forfeit the earnest money of Rs.5,000/- and that if the defendants fail to perform their part of the contract, they are liable to pay double the said amount. In the case on hand, the plaintiffs undoubtedly failed to perform their part of the contract. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform the part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the parties. The facts of the present case particularly the conduct of plaintiffs would amply demonstrate that the plaintiffs were not ready nor have the intention to perform their part of the contract. 21. It was settled that in deciding whether to grant remedy of specific performance, specifically in a suit relating to sale of immovable property, the Court must be cognizant of the conduct of the parties. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance the plaintiffs have to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the plaintiffs to prove their readiness and willingness by adducing evidence, this crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in the plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice. Admittedly in this case, the plaintiffs failed to discharge their duty to prove their readiness as well as willingness to perform their part of the contract by adducing cogent evidence. Admittedly in this case, the plaintiffs failed to discharge their duty to prove their readiness as well as willingness to perform their part of the contract by adducing cogent evidence. Acceptable evidence has not placed on record to prove their readiness and willingness to perform their part of contract. The remedy provided must not cause injustice to a party specifically when they are not at fault. In the case on hand, the plaintiffs failed to prove right from the date of the contract i.e., from 14.08.1991, they are always ready to perform their part of the contract, but the defendants have not came forward to discharge their part of the contract. As stated supra, there are so-many laches on the part of the plaintiffs in performing their part of contract and the defendants are not at fault. Therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale. In the present case, the plaintiffs have not sought the alternative relief of refund of advance amount. Therefore, the trial Court rightly rejected the decree of specific performance of contract of sale dated 14.08.1991. Accordingly, the point No.2 is answered. 22. Point Nos.3 and 4:- Whether the trial Court is justified in rejecting the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale? Whether the decree and judgment passed by the trial court needs any interference? In view of my aforesaid discussion on points 1 and 2, the trial Court is justified in rejecting the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale. The decree and judgment passed by the trial Court is perfectly sustainable under law and it requires no interference. 23. In the result, the Appeal Suit is dismissed confirming the decree and Judgment dated 14.06.2004, in O.S.No.117 of 1995 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Anantapur. No order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.