JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment dated 18.08.2018 passed in Original Suit No. 632 of 2016 by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi, whereby and whereunder, the suit filed for dissolution of marriage by the wife against the husband under Section 13(1)(ia), (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1955 has been dismissed. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made by the petitioner in an application filed under Section 13(1)(ia), (ib) and (1A) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1955, reads as under: It is the case of the appellant that her marriage was solemnized with respondent on 24.05.2013 according to Hindu rites and customs, at Bokaro. At the time of marriage an amount of Rs. 7.5 lakh was transferred to the Bank account of respondent as well as household article and Jewelries worth Rs. 8 lakhs were given. But from the first day of marriage the respondent/husband and his family members stared torturing her mentally for bringing less dowry. The elder sister of respondent also captured her ornaments and respondent and his family members asked her to bring 50 tola gold and Rs. 2 lakhs as dowry but due to intervention of the family members of petitioner the matter was resolved. Thereafter, the respondent took the petitioner to his working place at Delhi and after one week the elder sister of the respondent also reached Delhi and started living with them. 3. It is the specific case of the petitioner that one day the petitioner saw her husband and his sister-Nirmala Devi in objectionable position. They in order to conceal their illicit relation started assaulting the petitioner and confined her in a room. They also kicked her out from the house on 01.11.2014 and after taking loan from neighbor she came to Ranchi and since then she is living at her parental house. The family members and well-wishers tried to resolve the dispute, but it went in vain. 4. It is also the case of the petitioner that she is unemployed having no source of income to maintain herself and is fully dependent upon her mother and younger brother, as her father is no more. The family members and well-wishers tried to resolve the dispute, but it went in vain. 4. It is also the case of the petitioner that she is unemployed having no source of income to maintain herself and is fully dependent upon her mother and younger brother, as her father is no more. The petitioner also tried to resolve the dispute before Mediation Centre, Ranchi in ABP No. 326/2016, but it also went in vain. The cause of action arose on 01.11.2014 when respondent ousted the petitioner from his house. 5. The learned family judge has called upon the respondent-husband and after framing altogether five issues has dismissed the suit on contest on the ground that the ground seeking divorce has not been found to be established after going through the testimony of the parties. 6. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned counsel for the appellant-wife has taken the ground that while dismissing the suit, the learned family judge has not appreciated the evidence in right perspective and from its perusal it is evident that the charges of having illicit immoral relationship, cruelty and desertion has found corroboration, but the same has not been considered merely on the ground that the issue of cruelty and desertion cannot be said to be proved on the basis of testimony since the same has been considered to be a general nature of allegation. Since the allegation of cruelty is based upon the allegation regarding demand of dowry, as such, the same has been considered to be not conclusively been proved. 7. It has further been submitted that even the allegation of desertion has not been found to be proved by the learned family judge due to wrong appreciation of the testimony of the witnesses wherein the specific testimony has come regarding the desertion by the husband who has ousted the appellant from her matrimonial house but the same has also been considered to be bald statement since the said allegation has not found to be established by taking into consideration the testimony which has come in the cross-examination of the appellant. 8. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant, in the aforesaid backdrop, has submitted that the impugned judgment suffers from material irregularity due to non-consideration of the testimony of the witness which establishes all the three grounds, that is, the ground of having illicit immoral relationship with his elder sister, cruelty and desertion, therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 9. Per contra, Mr. Ramawatar Chamaria, learned counsel for the respondent-husband has submitted by defending the impugned judgment that the ground which has been taken by the appellant for grant of decree of divorce for dissolution of marriage is required to be proved conclusively but as would appear from the testimony of the witnesses produced on behalf of the appellant, the same has been found to be bald allegation having not been substantiated either it is the allegation of having illicit relationship of husband with his elder sister or; cruelty or; desertion. 10. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the learned family judge after taking into consideration the testimony of the witnesses and also on consideration of the fact to prove the allegation of cruelty and desertion as also of illicit relationship has not found any substance after giving thoughtful consideration to the testimony of the witnesses which led to dismissal of the suit, therefore, the same cannot be said to suffer from error. 11. Learned counsel in the backdrop of the aforesaid submission has submitted that the instant appeal is fit to be dismissed. 12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned family judge. 13. It is evident from the material available on record that an application under Section 13(1)(ia)(ib) of the Act, 1955 has been filed by taking three grounds, first, husband is having illicit immoral relationship with his elder sister; second of cruelty and; third of desertion. 14. The learned family court has formulated the following five issues: I. Whether respondent (husband) has committed cruelty upon petitioner after solemnization of marriage between the parties? II. Whether the respondent has illicit immoral relation with his own sister Nirmala Devi? III. Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner for more than two years before presentation of this petition? IV. Whether the petitioner is entitled for decree of divorce on the basis of desertion and cruelty? II. Whether the respondent has illicit immoral relation with his own sister Nirmala Devi? III. Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner for more than two years before presentation of this petition? IV. Whether the petitioner is entitled for decree of divorce on the basis of desertion and cruelty? V. Whether the petitioner is entitled to any other equitable relief available as per settled matrimonial legal position and/or under the provision of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955? 15. It appears from the material available on record that two witnesses have been examined on behalf of the petitioner, the appellant-wife herself as P.W. 1 and uncle of the appellant-wife as P.W. 2. 16. She has deposed that her marriage with the respondent took place on 24.05.2013. She joined her matrimonial home but was subjected to cruelty and demand of 50 tola gold and cash was made by the respondent and his family members. It has been stated that the matter was disclosed to the parents and they impressed upon the respondent not to harass and treat the petitioner with cruelty. It has also been stated that she was subjected to mental and physical torture while she was living in Delhi along with her husband where there was interference of the elder sister of the respondent in the routine life since she used to instruct her husband over telephone. 17. She has also stated that immediately after reaching to Delhi within a week the elder sister of the respondent, namely, Nirmala Devi had also reached to Delhi and started living with them. She has stated that she had seen her husband and Nirmala Devi, the elder sister of respondent, in objectionable position. It has been stated that the husband and his elder sister after seeing that their illicit relationship has been known to her, as such, in order to conceal the same, had started abusing her and the mobile phone has also been snatched and she had been locked in a room. It has also been stated that thereafter the said Nirmala Devi had called her husband to Delhi and she has been kept in a room for three days without providing food and water as also she was brutally assaulted and was forcefully ousted from house. 18. It has also been stated that thereafter the said Nirmala Devi had called her husband to Delhi and she has been kept in a room for three days without providing food and water as also she was brutally assaulted and was forcefully ousted from house. 18. It has also been stated that the appellant has returned to her parental house after taking some money from a neighbor in the morning of 02.11.2014. It has been stated that the appellant after reaching to her parental house has informed about the occurrence to her family members upon which the family members had tried to convince the husband to leave of these things and keep her with him but the husband has not acceded to such suggestion and was not ready to keep her with him. 19. It has further been stated that she is an unemployed lady and for last two years, she is living alone and is totally dependent for her livelihood upon her widow mother and the younger brother and as such, the case for maintenance had been filed being Maintenance Case No. M-165/2016 which was pending at the time when the testimony of the appellant was being recorded. 20. It has also been stated that she is living separately for two years and there is no likelihood of restoration of conjugal life, as such, application has been filed for decree of divorce. 21. She has been cross-examined wherein it has been stated that she could not snap any photograph of the objectionable position between her husband and his own elder sister. She has further stated that she could state the name of the person from whom she had borrowed money and returned to Ranchi. 22. One Ramesh Kumar, uncle of the appellant has been examined as P.W. 2 and has stated almost the same fact as has been stated by the appellant in her evidence except specific allegation of illicit relationship between the husband and his own elder sister. 23. He has been cross-examined and from its perusal it is evident that he has not seen the applicant being tortured. 24. It appears from the material available on record that no evidence has been led by the husband-respondent in the case. 25. 23. He has been cross-examined and from its perusal it is evident that he has not seen the applicant being tortured. 24. It appears from the material available on record that no evidence has been led by the husband-respondent in the case. 25. It is evident from going through the testimony of the P.W. 1, the appellant-petitioner that she in order to substantiate the allegation of illicit relationship in between the husband and his own elder sister, could not be able to establish the same since no photograph of objectionable position has been produced for its corroboration. 26. It further appears from her testimony about the allegation of cruelty, it is nowhere stated in the petition or no evidence has been laid by giving any specific incidence of such cruelty rather a general nature of allegation has been levelled. 27. Further for proving the desertion, the ground has been taken that she was ousted from her husband's house at Delhi on 01.11.2014 and borrowed money from the neighbour and returned to Ranchi. But, it would appear from her testimony which she has given in cross-examination that she had not stated the name and details of that neighbour from whom she had borrowed money for returning to Ranchi. 28. This Court in view of the aforesaid discussion is now proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment. 29. So far as the allegation of illicit immoral relationship is concerned, it appears from the testimony of P.W. 1 wherein she has stated that she had seen her husband in objectionable position with his elder sister but when we have considered the testimony of P.W. 2, who is her own uncle, has not corroborated about such allegation rather he has deposed that there was some illicit relationship with another lady but who was the lady, he has failed to disclose the name. 30. This Court on the basis of the aforesaid material having on record gathered from the testimony of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2, is of the view that so far as the allegation of illicit relationship is concerned, the same is required to be established by leading evidence and if the same is not being established, then in that circumstances, it will be said to be a cruelty meted out by the person who is making such allegation against the another. 31. 31. The Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with a matrimonial dispute in Alpaben Ambalal Patel v. Ashokkumar Chandulal Patel, (2022) Supreme (Guj) 926, has been pleased to hold that false accusation against the spouse of having an illicit relationship is cruelty, and “the feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, agony and frustration of the husband would be obvious”. 32. It is, thus, evident that the allegation of illicit relationship if not established by leading cogent evidence, then the same will be a false allegation and the same will amount to be cruelty committed by the person who is making allegation against another person of having illicit relationship. 33. Here, in the given facts of the case, the learned trial court after considering the testimony of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 has given a conclusive finding that the allegation of such illicit relationship cannot be said to be established after taking together the testimony of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2. This Court, therefore, is of the view after taking into consideration the testimony of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 as referred hereinabove, that the finding to that effect as recorded by the learned family court cannot be said to suffer from error. 34. So far as the allegation of cruelty is concerned, it requires to refer herein the definition of cruelty. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326 has been laid down that the Court has to enquire, as to whether, the conduct charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. 35. This Court, in order to scrutinize the legality and propriety of the aforesaid finding, deems it fit and proper to take into consideration the meaning of ‘cruelty’ as has been held in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105 wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon'ble Apex Court emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition. 36. According to the Hon'ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the “conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial obligations”. It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or unintentional. The Hon'ble Apex Court emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition. 36. According to the Hon'ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the “conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial obligations”. It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a question of fact and degree.” 37. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty it is important for the court to not search for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case. What must be considered include the kind of life the parties are used to, “their economic and social conditions”, and the “culture and human values to which they attach importance.” 38. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations against the spouse in the written statement filed before the court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute cruelty. 39. In V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994) 1 SCC 337 , the wife alleged in her written statement that her husband was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid disorder”. The wife's lawyer also levelled allegations of “lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family while he was conducting a cross-examination. The Hon'ble Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to constitute “cruelty”. 40. In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003) 6 SCC 334 the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed by taking into consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute “cruelty” itself. 41. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute “cruelty” itself. 41. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742 , has been pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce. 42. It appears from the testimony of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 that on the basis of the allegation of illicit relationship and the physical torture meted to the appellant for demand of dowry, she has taken the ground that she has been subjected to cruelty. But, when we have considered the testimony of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 there is no any specific allegation made to that effect for considering the said testimony to be a cogent evidence to prove the allegation of cruelty. 43. The definition of cruelty as referred hereinabove based upon its consideration in the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court, the cogent evident is to be there to prove the allegation of cruelty making the same as a ground for divorce. This Court has not found, after going through the testimony of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 together, any specific allegation of physical torture or assault mentioned therein. 44. The third ground is of allegation of desertion, as such, the definition of desertion is required to be referred herein as defined under Section 2(b) which means, “desert means to desert without reasonable cause and without the consent of and against the will of the spouse. 45. 44. The third ground is of allegation of desertion, as such, the definition of desertion is required to be referred herein as defined under Section 2(b) which means, “desert means to desert without reasonable cause and without the consent of and against the will of the spouse. 45. Rayden on Divorce which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.) has summarised the case-law on the subject in these terms: “Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party.” 46. The legal position has been admirably summarised in paras-453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words: “In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases. 47. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, ‘the home’. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion. 48. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or, where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. 48. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or, where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence. 49. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end. 50. Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned : (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. In such a situation, the party who is filing for divorce will have the burden of proving those elements. 51. Recently also, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli v. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the definition of ‘desertion’ on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. The law consistently laid down by this Court is that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. The view taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court has been incorporated in the Explanation added to sub-section (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The said Explanation reads thus: “13. Divorce.-(1) … Explanation.-In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.” 52. The Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with the facts of the case of Debananda Tamuli v. Kakumoni Kataky (supra) has observed therein that the respondent's evidence does not disclose any effort made by her to resume the matrimonial relationship. She has not filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. It has further been observed from the evidence that the appellant is carrying on business at Tezpur. The respondent is working as a Lecturer in University Law College at Gauhati. There is no dispute that from 01.07.2009 till date, they are staying separately. 53. The ground has been taken that on 02.11.2014 she borrowed money from neighbor to reach to Ranchi but when we have considered her testimony, it appears that she has failed to disclose the name of the neighbor from whom she has taken the money to come to Ranchi, as such, the same cannot be said to be a substantive piece of evident to prove the desertion in order to prove that it is the husband who has forcefully ousted her from his house, which is the main ingredient to prove the allegation of desertion. 54. 54. The learned family judge has considered the ground of cruelty and desertion after taking into consideration the testimony of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 and found such allegation is based upon the bald and general allegation and as such, has refused to consider it a ground for divorce. 55. This Court after considering the testimony of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 as also taking into consideration that no specific evidence has been put forth on behalf of the appellant and in absence thereof, if the learned family judge has discarded the aforesaid ground to be a reason to grant divorce, according to the considered view of this Court, cannot be said to suffer from error. 56. This Court, after having discussed the factual aspect with the legal position, is required to refer herein that under which circumstances, the judgment can be interfered with. The position of law is well settled that the judgment can be interfered with if the judgment suffers from perversity and a perverse finding is one, if it is arrived at without any material or if it is arrived at or inference is made on material, which would not have been accepted or relied upon by a reasonable person convergent with the law. 57. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 wherein it has been held that “a broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse”. 58. This Court, therefore, is of the view as per the discussion made hereinabove that no ground of perversity has been shown rather the learned family court after taking into consideration the testimony of the witnesses has passed the impugned judgment, as such, basing upon the reasoning hereinabove, the same requires no interference. 59. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.