JUDGMENT : T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J. 1. Aggrieved by the order dated 03.08.2005 in M.V.O.P. No. 546 of 2003 passed by the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-Prl. District Judge, Kurnool, (for short “the tribunal”) Respondent No. 2-M/s. United India Insurance Company Limited preferred this appeal, questioning the correctness of the award passed by the Tribunal. 2. For convenience's sake, the parties will be referred to as arrayed in the M.V.O.P. 3. The 1st petitioner is the wife, petitioners 2 and 3 are minor children, petitioners 4 and 5 are parents of one Jambunaboyina Venkateswarlu (hereinafter referred to as ‘deceased’) 4. The claimant’s case is that on 14.04.2002 between 09.00 PM and 10.30 PM on NH5 road between Govindapalli and Kanalapalle Villages while the deceased was proceeding on a Hero Honda Motorcycle from Nandyal to his native place Peruru Village, at about 21.30 hours the driver of the jeep bearing No. AP-21-C-5756 (hereinafter referred to as ‘offending vehicle’) proceeded in a rash and negligent manner and dashed the Hero Honda Motorcycle. The deceased fell on the road, received grievous, serious, bleeding injuries to the face and head and fell unconscious. While undergoing treatment in Government General Hospital, Nandyal, the deceased died on 16.04.2002 at 11.30 AM. 5. The 1st respondent remained ex-parte. 6. The 2nd respondent filed its written statement and contended that the said jeep never hit the Hero Honda Motorcycle of the deceased, and the same was implicated falsely. The offending vehicle's driver did not have a valid and subsisting driving license to drive it; the claimants have to establish the manner of the accident and the involvement of the jeep in the accident. 7. Based on the pleadings, the Tribunal framed relevant issues. To substantiate the claim, on behalf of the claimants, PWs. 1 and 2 got examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.7. On behalf of the 2nd respondent, none were examined and Ex.B1 policy was marked. 8. After considering the evidence on record, the Tribunal held that the accident occurred due to Mahindra Jeep's driver's rash and negligent driving. The Tribunal awarded the compensation of Rs. 2,41,000/- with proportionate costs and interest at 7.5% p.a. against the respondents jointly and severally. 9. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and respondents and perused the record. 10. The Tribunal awarded the compensation of Rs. 2,41,000/- with proportionate costs and interest at 7.5% p.a. against the respondents jointly and severally. 9. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and respondents and perused the record. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/second respondent contends that the Tribunal ought to have dismissed the claim and erred in law and facts in fastening the liability on the insurance company. The offending vehicle is wrongly implicated in the case; the Tribunal awarded an exorbitant amount towards compensation. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents supported the findings and observations of the Tribunal. 12. Now the points for determination are: (I) Whether the Tribunal is justified in holding that the accident occurred due to the involvement of the offending vehicle, i.e. Mahindra Jeep bearing No. AP-21-C-5756? (II) Whether the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal is just and reasonable? POINTS: 13. The main contention of the 2nd respondent is that even according to Ex.A.1-certified copy of F.I.R. it is a hit-and-run case. As per the contents of F.I.R. the opposite vehicle dashed against the Hero Honda Motorcycle. As rightly pointed out by the appellant's counsel, the particulars of the offending vehicle were not given in the F.I.R. The Tribunal has found that the deceased died due to injuries sustained in the accident. Though the appellant/insurance has disputed the involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident, it has not disputed the deceased's death due to injuries sustained in the accident. It is also evident from Ex.A2 CC of the charge sheet, Ex.A3 CC of the Inquest report, and Ex.A4 CC of the Postmortem report. The 1st petitioner was examined as PW-1; in the cross-examination, she stated that she did not see the accident. She does not know who reported to the concerned police about the accident. 14. PW-2 B. Srinivasulu stated in his evidence that on 14.04.2002, he was present on NH18 road; he witnessed the coming of deceased on a Hero Honda Motorcycle from Nandyal side in between Govindapalli - Kanala village on NH5 road. According to his evidence, Mahindra Jeep bearing No. AP-21-C-5756, driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner, dashed the Hero Honda Motorcycle in which the deceased was coming, and as a result, he fell and received injuries to his head and face and became unconscious. According to his evidence, Mahindra Jeep bearing No. AP-21-C-5756, driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner, dashed the Hero Honda Motorcycle in which the deceased was coming, and as a result, he fell and received injuries to his head and face and became unconscious. In the cross-examination he stated that they had torch light; there were no other lights at the place of the accident; he did not report to the police about the accident. 15. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that the respondent/insurance company did not take steps to examine the driver of the offending vehicle to show its non-involvement in the accident. It is not the case of the respondent/insurance company that the driver and owner of the offending vehicle colluded with the claimants. The insurance company has not chosen to examine witnesses to explain its stand that the offending vehicle was implicated in the accident. It is not the case of the insurance company that its staff or employees witnessed the accident. It has not placed the source of information to contend that the offending vehicle was implicated in the accident. The insurance company contends that the evidence of PW-2 is highly doubtful regarding noting the registration number of the offending vehicle with the help of torchlight during the night time. It is relevant to note that PW-2 is cited as a witness in the charge sheet filed against the driver of the offending vehicle. Nothing is elicited in the cross-examination to discredit the evidence of PW-2. 16. Though the claimants have not taken such steps to examine the witnesses cited in the charge sheet, Ex.A2 charge sheet establishes the involvement of the offending vehicle. This Court finds no reason for the investigation officer implicating the offending vehicle in the accident case. Suppose that is so; the owner of the offending vehicle could have contested the matter. But he remained ex-parte. He has not disputed the involvement of the vehicle. There is nothing on record even to remotely suggest that there was collusion between the claimants, owner, driver of the offending vehicle and the investigation officer. Even it is not indicated to PW-1 in cross-examination that there was such collusion. Nothing on record shows such collusion to implicate the vehicle in the accident. 17. There is nothing on record even to remotely suggest that there was collusion between the claimants, owner, driver of the offending vehicle and the investigation officer. Even it is not indicated to PW-1 in cross-examination that there was such collusion. Nothing on record shows such collusion to implicate the vehicle in the accident. 17. When the investigation officer, after completion of the investigation, laid the charge sheet against the offending vehicle's driver; based on the contents of the Ex.A1 report. Because Ex.A1 report did not give the vehicle's particulars, the petitioners' claim cannot be thrown out. It is not the law that in hit-and-run cases, the accident claim cannot be entertained. 18. The purpose of lodging the F.I.R. in such cases is primarily to intimate the police to initiate an investigation of criminal offences. Lodging of F.I.R. certainly proves the factum of the accident so that the victim can lodge a compensation case. This Court views the F.I.R. as not a be - and end - of the matter. A First Information Report is not meant to be encyclopedic. One of the important factors which may weigh with the Court is whether there was a possibility of false implication of the vehicle. 19. It is not universal that once F.I.R. does not reflect the particulars of the offending vehicle, the whole case of the complainant, as a rule, has to be thrown. F.I.R. would have the effect of throwing out the entire case of the petitioners if accepted; then, there would be no necessity to lead any evidence. Such can never be the law. 20. In Nagappa vs. Guru Dayal Singh and Others, AIR 2003 SC 674 at paragraph 3, the Apex Court held that the claims Tribunal, in an appropriate case, could treat the report forwarded to it as an application for compensation even though no such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed. For the above reasons, the contents of F.I.R. can be considered. Because the contents of F.I.R. can be considered, it does not mean that the contents of the charge sheet cannot be considered. The respondent places no evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet are incorrect. For the above reasons, the contents of F.I.R. can be considered. Because the contents of F.I.R. can be considered, it does not mean that the contents of the charge sheet cannot be considered. The respondent places no evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet are incorrect. In K. Rajani vs. M. Satyanarayana Goud and Others, 2015 ACJ 797 this Court observed that: “When the insurance company came to know that the police investigation is false, they must also challenge the charge sheet in appropriate proceedings. If at all the findings of the police are found to be incorrect, it is for the insurance company to produce some evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet are false.” 21. Nothing on record suggests that the Investigating Officer filed a charge sheet against the offending vehicle’s driver without conducting a proper investigation. It is also difficult to hold that the Police Officer fabricated a case. In a proceeding under the M.V. Act, where the procedure is a summary procedure, there is no need to go by strict rules of pleading or evidence. The document having some probative value, the genuineness of which is not in doubt, can be looked into by the Tribunal for getting preponderance of probable versions. The preponderance of probabilities is the touchstone for concluding rashness and negligence, as well as the accident's mode and manner of happening. As such, it is now well settled that even F.I.R. or Police Papers, when made part of a claim petition, can be looked into for giving a finding in respect of the happening of the accident. 22. The Tribunal has accepted the claimant's case regarding the manner of the accident and also took the observations made by the Investigating Officer in the charge sheet making the offending vehicle's driver responsible for the accident. As observed, the charge sheet contents also support the claimants' case regarding the manner of the accident. The reading of the documents placed before the Tribunal clearly shows that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle's driver. When the appellant contends that the accident was caused by a different vehicle, it is to place necessary evidence before the Tribunal based on which the Tribunal expected to give its conclusion. 23. The reading of the documents placed before the Tribunal clearly shows that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle's driver. When the appellant contends that the accident was caused by a different vehicle, it is to place necessary evidence before the Tribunal based on which the Tribunal expected to give its conclusion. 23. Upon careful reading of the material on record, this Court views that the Tribunal has correctly appreciated the evidence on record and the finding of the Tribunal that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle holds good. In this regard, in a judgment of the Apex Court in Ravi vs. Badrinarayan and Others, 2011 ACJ 911 wherein it is held that non-mentioning the vehicle number in the F.I.R. itself is not a ground to reject for claiming compensation. 24. The other contention raised by the appellant/insurance company is that the owner of the offending vehicle is not shown as a party to the proceedings; in the case of the petitioners, the 1st respondent is the owner of the offending vehicle. In Ex.A2 charge sheet, it is mentioned that LW-9 M. Saralamma, owner of the vehicle, came to P.S. along with the offending vehicle and produced concerned records of the vehicle and the details of the accused. It is not in dispute that the 2nd respondent/insurance company insured the offending vehicle, and it produced Ex.B1 policy. It is shown in Ex.B1 that Sri. J. Ramudu/the 1st respondent, is the owner of the offending vehicle. The 2nd respondent/insurance company collected the premium from the 1st respondent covering the risk from 26.10.2001 to 25.10.2002. Even according to the 2nd respondent/insurance company, the insurance policy relating to the offending vehicle was in force as of the date of the accident. The document relied on by it clearly shows that 1st respondent is the owner of the offending vehicle. It is not the version of the insurance company that it need not verify the ownership of the vehicles at the time of issuing the insurance policy. Having shown in the insurance policy, the 1st respondent as the owner of the offending vehicle, it is not open to the insurance company to contend the 1st respondent is not the owner of the offending vehicle. Having shown in the insurance policy, the 1st respondent as the owner of the offending vehicle, it is not open to the insurance company to contend the 1st respondent is not the owner of the offending vehicle. Having relied on Ex.B1 policy, it is not open to the insurance company to dispute the correctness of the contents of the said document. As such, this Court is not inclined to accept the submissions in this regard. Even the 1st respondent has not disputed his ownership of the offending vehicle. Suppose the insurance company has doubts about the ownership of the offending vehicle; it should have been clarified by taking steps to examine the 1st respondent, whose name is shown as the owner of the offending in the insurance policy. 25. Regarding the quantum of the compensation amount, the Tribunal has taken the annual income of the deceased as Rs. 24,000/-. Considering the deceased's age, the Tribunal applied the multiplier ‘13’ awarded the conventional heads and fixed the compensation amount as Rs. 2,41,000/-. After careful reading of the award passed by the Tribunal, this Court views that the Tribunal has awarded just and reasonable compensation. The claimants have also not disputed the quantum of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal. 26. Given the aforementioned discussion in the appeal, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order in the present appeal. Accordingly, the appeal, devoid of merits, is hereby dismissed without costs confirming the order passed by the Tribunal in M.V.O.P. No. 546 of 2003. 27. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this appeal shall stand closed.