JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred claiming the following reliefs: “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed on behalf of the petitioner that the writ petition may kindly be allowed and by an appropriate writ, order or direction:- I. The order dated 20.12.2021 (Ann.6) may kindly be quashed and set aside. II. Any order (if passed) engaging another advocate in place of the petitioner may kindly be quashed. III. Any other appropriate order or direction, which this Hon’ble Court considers just and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case, may kindly be passed in favour of the Petitioner. IV. Costs of the writ petition may kindly be awarded to the Petitioner.” 2. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by learned counsel for the petitioner, are that the petitioner is a practicing Advocate at Udaipur (Rajasthan). The respondent-Department vide order dated 09.07.2019 has engaged the petitioner as an Additional Public Prosecutor and Government Counsel at Udaipur. The respondent vide letters dated 26.08.2021 and 09.09.2021 issued to the petitioner called for a detailed clarification (alongwith certain documents) from him in relation to the petitioner’s annual performance, as Additional Public Prosecutor and Government Counsel; the same was replied by the petitioner. Yet vide another letter dated 20.10.2021, the petitioner was called upon to furnish the clarification. 2.1 The petitioner submitted a detailed clarification with regard to his performance on 08.11.2021, whereafter, the respondent vide the impugned order dated 20.12.2021, while cancelling the petitioners engagement, relieved him from the duty. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a representation before the Secretary, Law and Legal Affairs Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur; but since, as per the petitioner, his grievance was still subsisting, therefore, the present petition has been preferred, claiming the afore-quoted reliefs. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per Rule 19 (2) of the Law and Legal Affairs Department Manual, 1999, “the Government may at any time and without assigning any reason dispense with services of a Public Prosecutor after giving him one month’s notice or one month’s remuneration in lieu thereof.”. Therefore, as per learned counsel, the impugned action of the respondent is highly illegal and arbitrary. 3.1. Therefore, as per learned counsel, the impugned action of the respondent is highly illegal and arbitrary. 3.1. Learned counsel further submitted that not a single complaint was made against the petitioner during his tenure as Additional Public Prosecutor, and on that count also, the impugned order passed by the respondent is not justified in law. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Sandeep Shah, learned Senior Counsel & Additional General Advocate assisted by Ms. Akshiti Singhvi appearing on behalf of the respondent, while opposing the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the respondent issued letters dated 26.08.2021, 09.09.2021 and 20.10.2021 to the petitioner seeking the necessary clarification, and after duly consideration the reply submitted by the petitioner, the impugned order has been passed by the respondent-Department, which is justified in law. 4.1. It was further submitted that as per the orders dated 22.03.2016 and 17.05.2016 passed by the respondent, whereby upon due evaluation of the performance of all the Public Prosecutors in the State of Rajasthan, it was found that the performance and services of the petitioner did not merit the yardstick of requirement of 25% of cases decided in favour of the State, and therefore the impugned order was rightly passed by the respondent. 4.2. It was also submitted that as per the Rule 19 (2) of the Law and Legal Affairs Department Manual, 1999, where the term of appointment has expired or where the term is extended till further orders, in such cases, no notice shall be necessary, and therefore, the petitioner term since expired on 30.07.2021, therefore, the terms was further extended only upto the date of his relieving.. 4.3. It was further submitted that the petitioner has fallen short of the yardsticks as prescribed by the respondent in the aforesaid orders, and therefore the respondent did deem it appropriate to extend the tenure of the petitioner and accordingly relieved him from his office, vide the impugned order. It was also submitted that no Advocate has an indefeasible right to get continuance in the engagement of his client, whether a private individual or the State. 4.4. In support of such submissions, reliance was placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Rakesh kumar Keshari & Anr. (2011) 5 SCC 341 ; relevant portion whereof is reproduced as hereunder:- “16. 4.4. In support of such submissions, reliance was placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Rakesh kumar Keshari & Anr. (2011) 5 SCC 341 ; relevant portion whereof is reproduced as hereunder:- “16. The vital issue raised in the appeal relates to the right of the State Government to engage, disengage and renew the terms of its counsel and Law Officers in keeping with the need to best safeguard the public interest, monetary consideration, suitability of the incumbent and the interest of the Government as the client. It may be mentioned that the entire gamut of this exercise is governed by the Legal Remembrancer's Manual which is governing the conduct of legal affairs of the State of Uttar Pradesh since last several decades, in matters relating to the engagement, disengagement and renewal of the Government Counsel and Law Officers for the State Government. 19. At this stage it would be relevant to notice certain facts emerging from the reply-affidavit filed by the appellants before the High Court. The reply inter alia mentions that though the District Magistrate had recommended renewal of tenure of the respondents, he had furnished information regarding the work done by the respondents in Form 4 perusal of which indicated that Respondent 1, Mr. Rakesh Kumar Keshari had appeared in 25 cases in all and that in all those 25 cases the accused were acquitted, whereas Respondent 2, Mr. Kripa Shankar Rai had appeared in 28 cases out of which in 26 cases the accused were acquitted. 20. The reply stated that the percentage of success in cases handled by Mr. Keshari was nil whereas in the case of Mr. Rai the percentage was only 17 and, therefore, when the matter of renewal of their tenure was considered by the Government, the Government had decided not to extend the terms of those Government Counsel whose success rate was very low. It was stated in the reply that on the basis of this decision the terms of the respondents were not extended and after expiry of their term they had ceased to work on their respective posts. 22. It was stated in the reply that on the basis of this decision the terms of the respondents were not extended and after expiry of their term they had ceased to work on their respective posts. 22. In view of the provisions quoted from the L.R. Manual above as well as in view of the poor performance of the respondents as ADGC (Criminal) in Ghazipur District, this Court is of the opinion that the right of the State Government to engage, disengage and renew the terms of its counsel and Law Officers in keeping with the need to best safeguard the public interest and monetary considerations, suitability of the incumbent and the interest of the Government as the client, will have to be upheld. 31. This Court in the said case has further ruled that so long as in appointing a counsel, the procedure laid down in the L.R. Manual is followed and a reasonable or fair procedure is adopted, the court would normally not interfere with the decision. What is emphasised by this Court is that the nature of the office held by a lawyer vis-à-vis the State being in the nature of professional engagement, the courts are normally chary to overturn any decision unless an exceptional case is made out. According to this Court the question as to whether the State is satisfied with the performance of its counsel or not is primarily a matter between it and the counsel and the extension of tenure of the Public Prosecutor or the District Counsel should not be compared with the right of renewal under a licence or permit granted under a statute. What is laid down as firm proposition of law is that an incumbent has no legally enforceable right as such and the action of the State in not renewing the tenure can be subjected to judicial scrutiny inter alia only on the ground that the same was arbitrary. What is laid down as firm proposition of law is that an incumbent has no legally enforceable right as such and the action of the State in not renewing the tenure can be subjected to judicial scrutiny inter alia only on the ground that the same was arbitrary. It is also held that the court normally would not delve into the records with a view to ascertain as to what impelled the State not to renew the tenure of the Public Prosecutor or a District Counsel and the jurisdiction of the courts in a case of this nature would be to invoke the doctrine of “Wednesbury unreasonableness” [Ed.: The doctrine enunciated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)]. 36. Thus it was not open to the respondents to file writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for compelling the appellants to utilise their services as advocates irrespective of choice of the State. It was for the State to select its own counsel. In view of the poor performance of the respondents in handling/conducting criminal cases, this Court is of the opinion that the High Court committed a grave error in giving direction to the District Magistrate to forward better particulars of 10 candidates whose names were included in the two panels prepared pursuant to the advertisement dated 16-1-2004 and in setting aside the order dated 7-9-2004 of the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister, U.P. calling upon the District Magistrate to send another panel/list for appointment to the two posts of ADGC (Criminal)”. 4.5. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Johri Mal (2004) 4 SCC 714 ; relevant portion whereof is also reproduced as hereunder:- “37. The Legal Remembrancer's Manual clearly states that appointment of a Public Prosecutor or a District Counsel would be professional in nature. It is beyond any cavil and rightly conceded at the Bar that the holder of the office of the Public Prosecutor does not hold a civil post. By holding a post of District Counsel or the Public Prosecutor, neither a status is conferred on the incumbent. 40. It is beyond any cavil and rightly conceded at the Bar that the holder of the office of the Public Prosecutor does not hold a civil post. By holding a post of District Counsel or the Public Prosecutor, neither a status is conferred on the incumbent. 40. So long as in appointing a counsel the procedures laid down under the Code of Criminal Procedure are followed and a reasonable or fair procedure is adopted, the court will normally not interfere with the decision. The nature of the office held by a lawyer vis-à-vis the State being in the nature of professional engagements, the courts are normally chary to overturn any decision unless an exceptional case is made out. The question as to whether the State is satisfied with the performance of its counsel or not is primarily a matter between it and the counsel. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not speak of renewal or extension of tenure. The extension of tenure of Public Prosecutor or the District Counsel should not be compared with the right of renewal under a licence or permit granted under a statute. The incumbent has no legal enforceable right as such. The action of the State in not renewing the tenure can be subjected to judicial scrutiny inter alia on the ground that the same is arbitrary. The courts normally would not delve into the records with a view to ascertain as to what impelled the State not to renew the tenure of a Public Prosecutor or a District Counsel. The jurisdiction of the courts in a case of this nature would be to invoke the doctrine of “Wednesbury unreasonableness” as developed in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. [(1947) 2 All ER 680 : (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)]. 42. It may be true that the Legal Remembrancer's Manual provides for renewal but it contains executive instructions which even do not meet the requirements of clause (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution. The Legal Remembrancer's Manual is not a law within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution of India. (See Union of India v. Naveen Jindal [ (2004) 2 SCC 510 : JT (2004) 2 SC 1].) 60. The Legal Remembrancer's Manual is not a law within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution of India. (See Union of India v. Naveen Jindal [ (2004) 2 SCC 510 : JT (2004) 2 SC 1].) 60. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi [ (1991) 1 SCC 212 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 742], the Court sought to draw a distinction between the powers of public authorities vis-à-vis the private authorities referring to Wade's Administrative Law, 6th Edn., p. 401 to the following effect and stating: (SCC p. 238, para 25) “For the same reasons there should in principle be no such thing as unreviewable administrative discretion, which should be just as much a contradiction in terms as unfettered discretion. The question which has to be asked is what is the scope of judicial review, and in a few special cases the scope for the review of discretionary decisions may be minimal. It remains axiomatic that all discretion is capable of abuse, and that legal limits to every power are to be found somewhere.” (emphasis in original) 61. We have our own reservations about the aforementioned principles of law, but for the purpose of this case, it is not necessary to advert thereto.” 5. In his rejoinder arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in similar matters, the respondent-Department vide various orders has extended the tenure of the other Public Prosecutor by issuing warning, and therefore, the orders dated 22.03.2016 & 17.05.2016 as relied on behalf of the respondent are not carrying a binding force, so as to discontinue the engagement of the petitioner, more particularly, when the present petitioner was not meted out the same treatment, as done in the case of the similarly situated Public Prosecutors. Therefore, on that count also, the impugned order passed by the respondent is not sustainable in the eye of law. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case alongwith the judgments cited at the Bar. 7. This Court observes that the petitioner was appointed/engaged as Additional Public Prosecutor by the respondent-Department. Thereafter, the respondent issued the aforementioned letters to the petitioner seeking certain clarifications in regard to cases wherein he represented the State, as well as other details; the petitioner filed reply to the said letters. 7. This Court observes that the petitioner was appointed/engaged as Additional Public Prosecutor by the respondent-Department. Thereafter, the respondent issued the aforementioned letters to the petitioner seeking certain clarifications in regard to cases wherein he represented the State, as well as other details; the petitioner filed reply to the said letters. Subsequently, as narrated hereinabove, the respondent passed the impugned order relieving the petitioner from his office, as the petitioner could not meet the necessary criteria as laid down by the respondent for the continuance of an incumbent in the said office. 8. This Court further observes that the respondent vide orders dated 22.03.2016 and 17.05.2016 made an evaluation of the performance of the Public Prosecutors in the entire State of Rajasthan. This Court also observes that as per point no.8 of the order dated 22.03.2016, if percentage of the cases decided in the favour of the State were less than 25% of the total decided cases, in the last one year, in which the Public Prosecutor(s) has appeared for the State, then the engagement of such Public Prosecutor(s) can be cancelled. In the present case, the petitioner could not meet the said criteria, as mentioned in the order dated 22.03.2016, and thus, his engagement was discontinued by the respondent. Relevant portion of the said order dated 22.03.2016 is reproduced as hereunder:- ^^%% vkKk %% ,rn~ }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd jkT; dh vksj ls iSjoh gsrq fu;qDr fd;s x;s lHkh jktdh; vf/koDrk@vfrfjDr jktdh; vf/koDrk@mi jktdh; vf/koDrk@lgk;d jktdh; vf/koDrk@yksd vfHk;kstd@vij yksd vfHk;kstd@fof'k"B yksd vfHk;kstd dks ,rfLeu i'pkr~ of.kZr dkj.kksa esa ls fdlh Hkh dkj.k ds vk/kkj ij fcuk fdlh iwoZ lwpuk ds lacaf/kr mRrjnk;h jktdh; vf/koDrk@vfrfjDr jktdh; vf/koDrk@mi jktdh; vf/koDrk@lgk;d jktdh; vf/koDrk@yksd vfHk;kstd@vij yksd vfHk;kstd@fof'k"B yksd vfHk;kstd dh lsok;sa lekIr dh nh tkosaxh %& 1----------- 2----------- 3----------- 4------------ 5------------ 6------------- 7-------------- 8- fof/k foHkkx }kjk fu;qfDr frfFk ls i'pkrorhZ izR;sd =Sekl esa lacaf/kr U;k;ky; }kjk xq.kkoxq.k ij fuf.kZr gq;s izdj.kksa dk ewY;kadu fd;k tkosxk ,oa ,d o"kZ dh vof/k esa jkT; ds i{k esa fn;s x;s fu.kZ;ksa dh lQyrk dh nj 25 izfr'kr ls de ik;s tkus ijA** 9. This Court further observes that as per the afore-quoted portion of the judgment rendered in the case of State of U.P. & Anr Vs. This Court further observes that as per the afore-quoted portion of the judgment rendered in the case of State of U.P. & Anr Vs. Johri Mal (Supra), “The nature of the office held by a lawyer vis-à-vis the State being in the nature of professional engagements, the courts are normally chary to overturn any decision unless an exceptional case is made out. The question as to whether the State is satisfied with the performance of its counsel or not is primarily a matter between it and the counsel. The courts normally would not delve into the records with a view to ascertain as to what impelled the State not to renew the tenure of a Public Prosecutor or a District Counsel”. 9.1 This Court also observes that as per the judgment rendered in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Rakesh kumar Keshari (Supra), “this Court is of the opinion that the right of the State Government to engage, disengage and renew the terms of its counsel and Law Officers in keeping with the need to best safeguard the public interest and monetary considerations, suitability of the incumbent and the interest of the Government as the client, will have to be upheld. 10. This Court further observes that in the present case, the petitioner was relieved from his office by the respondent on the ground of performance in last one year; the appointment, renewal and extension of the Public Prosecutor and Additional Public Prosecutor in his/her office is solely a prerogative of the State, obviously, as per the conditions prescribed, and thus, only in exceptional cases, the Court make any interference in such matters. 10.1. The present case does not fall under any such exception, because the respondent-Department always has right to review the performance of the Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors, and thereafter, if their performance is not found satisfactory, as per the rules or conditions, the State has a right to discontinue their engagement in the office. 11. This Court further observes that the petitioner also did not duly meet the criteria laid down by the State, pertaining to performance in the last two years, from the date of assessment, and therefore, on that count also, the impugned order passed by the respondent is perfectly justified in law. 12. 11. This Court further observes that the petitioner also did not duly meet the criteria laid down by the State, pertaining to performance in the last two years, from the date of assessment, and therefore, on that count also, the impugned order passed by the respondent is perfectly justified in law. 12. This Court observes that prior to passing of the impugned order, while taking a prima facie view of the matter, the respondent issued the letters dated 26.08.2021, 09.09.2021 and 20.10.2021 to the petitioner calling upon him to furnish the necessary clarifications regarding details of the case(s), wherein he represented the State; the said letters clearly reveal a warning as well. Subsequently, after making due consideration of the response submitted by the petitioner vis-a-vis the prescribed success criteria for the period, it was found that the petitioner did not meet such prescribed success criteria, resulting into passing of the impugned order. 12.1. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, adequate opportunity was given to the petitioner prior to passing of the impugned order. 13. This Court also observes that the State Government has the authority to file and contest the cases pertaining to the State, and for that purpose, a lawful mechanism of appointing the Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors, from amongst the practicing Advocates, is in place. The State is exercising such lawful authority in a fair, transparent and impartial manner, and the present case is no exception. 14. In light of the aforesaid observations and in view of the aforementioned precedent laws as well as looking into the factual matrix of the present case, this Court does not find it a fit case so as to grant any relief to the petitioner in the present petition. 15. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed. However, it is made clear no observation made in the present judgment, shall have adverse affect on the future prospects of the present petitioner, in relation to other professional engagements. All pending applications stand disposed of.