JUDGMENT : DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, J. 1. The present appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been preferred against the judgment and order, dated 07.12.2022, passed in W.P. No. 7650 of 2009 whereby the writ petition was allowed and the Award No. 11, dated 14.02.2002 was set aside so far as it related to the land of the petitioner measuring three acres and thirty one cents primarily on the ground that the respondents had failed to serve a notice upon the petitioner under Section (9) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 2. Briefly stated, the material facts are that land measuring three acres and twelve cents situate in Sy.No. 497, Kothapalli Village was purchased by the petitioner, K.Rama Subba Reddy in the year 1974. The said land was sought to be acquired for purposes of expansion of an industrial estate and to that effect, a notification under Section 4(1) under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (in short, “the Act, 1894”) was issued on 16.07.1999 and a declaration under Section 6(1) under the 1894 Act was issued on 15.01.2002. Finally, an Award was passed on 14.02.2002. A writ petition came to be filed by the petitioner in the year 2009, wherein the acquisition proceedings as also the Award No. 11, dated 14.02.2002, was challenged primarily on the ground that notice in terms of Section 9 of the 1894 Act had not been served. 3. The petitioner in paragraph No. 10 of the writ petition specifically claimed that he had all along been in possession of the property in question notwithstanding the fact that the Award was passed by the respondent No. 2. In the writ petition, it was stated that respondent Nos.4 & 5, i.e., the Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation, had never tried to interfere with his possession and enjoyment over the subject land notwithstanding the fact that they claimed that the possession had been handed over to them in the year 2009 itself. 3.1. Cause of action was claimed by the petitioner to have accrued in the month of January, 2009, when respondent Nos.4 & 5 are stated to have interfered with the rights of the petitioner over the land in question on the premise that they had already been given possession of the same by respondent No. 2 i.e. the Land Acquisition Officer and Revenue Divisional Officer, Jammalamadugu, Kadapa District. It is then the petitioner claims that he got knowledge that the entire acquisition proceedings had been initiated in the names of C.Subbaramaiah, T.Subbarayudu, K.Konda Reddy and K.Maabhoomia and passed an Award on their names, even though, the petitioner was the absolute owner and in possession of the land in question. 4. In reply to paragraph No. 10, the official respondents stated that the possession of the land was taken and given to the Requisitioning Department i.e., the APIIC Limited on 14.03.2002, after passing of the Award and further that the Requisitioning Department had not taken up any works on the acquired lands due to the pendency of several cases on account of the same Award before the High Court. With regard to the factum of payment, the reply affidavit stated that payments had not been made to anybody, as the Awardees had not appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer during the Award enquiry proceedings and that the compensation amount of Rs.18,47,061/- had been deposited in the Government account vide Challan No. 151, dated 11.05.2002. 5. The reply affidavit and in particular the reply to paragraph No. 4 of the petition stated that after taking ‘possession’ of the land by the Requisitioning Department, they had developed the land for formation of roads for expansion of the Industrial Estate and that the land in question was no longer with the petitioner. 6. The learned single Judge, upon a perusal of the relevant record including the copies of the notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the 1894 Act and the declaration under Section 6 (1) of the 1894 Act, found that in the notification under Section 4 (1) published in Andhra Prabha on 24.06.1999, for land in Sy.No. 479/1B, the pattadar reflected was K.Konda Reddy and the person in enjoyment of the said property was reflected as K.Ramsubba Reddy (the writ petitioner). The Gazette notification also reflected the name of the person in enjoyment as K.Ramsubba Reddy, while the subsequent notices under Sections 9 & 10 of the Act referred to the name as K.Konda Reddy only. 7. It was in the aforementioned backdrop, the learned single Judge held that the notice under Section 9 (1) of the Act, having not been served on the petitioner, was fatal to the acquisition proceedings. 7. It was in the aforementioned backdrop, the learned single Judge held that the notice under Section 9 (1) of the Act, having not been served on the petitioner, was fatal to the acquisition proceedings. A finding was also recorded that the petitioner’s assertion of being in possession even in 2009, had not been denied in the counter-affidavit. 8. Reference was also made to the Award dated 14.02.2002, in which the name of K.Konda Reddy figures, however, learned single Judge recorded the submissions of the respondents that since the requisition was urgent, it was decided to proceed as per the names of pattadars in the records and that in future the payment would be made either to the pattadars, their legal heirs/successors or the rightful owners after a thorough check of the title and eligibility. Finally, the learned single Judge proceeded to quash the Award No. 11, dated 14.02.2002, insofar as the land belonging to the petitioner admeasuring three acres and thirty one cents in Sy.No. 497/1B, while granting liberty to the official respondents to pass a fresh Award if they still needed the land, by following the provisions of the New Land Acquisition Act, 2013. A further direction was issued restraining the respondents from disturbing the possession of the petitioner over the land in question. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the view expressed by the learned Single Judge by placing overwhelming reliance upon provisions of Section 9(1) of the 1894 Act as mandatory, was totally misplaced. Reliance, in this regard, was placed upon May George vs. Special Tahsildar and Others, (2010) 13 SCC 98 wherein, it held: “14. Section 9 of the Act provides for an opportunity to the "person interested" to file a claim petition with documentary evidence for determining the market value of the land and in case a person does not file a claim under Section 9 even after receiving the notice, he still has a right to make an application for making a reference under Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, the scheme of the Act is such that it does not cause any prejudicial consequence in case the notice under Section 9(3) is not served upon the person interested. 28. In fact, the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances when possession is taken under Section 16 of the Act. Therefore, the scheme of the Act is such that it does not cause any prejudicial consequence in case the notice under Section 9(3) is not served upon the person interested. 28. In fact, the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances when possession is taken under Section 16 of the Act. Once land is vested in the State, it cannot be divested even if there has been some irregularity in the acquisition proceedings. In spite of the fact that Section 9 notice had not been served upon the person interested, he could still claim the compensation and ask for making the reference under Section 18 of the Act. There is nothing in the Act to show that non-compliance therewith will be fatal or visit any penalty.” 10. In view of the clear position of law as enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgment, we are of the opinion that failure of the official respondents to serve a notice under Section 9 of the Act, 1894, would not at all be fatal to the land acquisition proceedings and therefore did not warrant the setting aside of such proceedings or the Award, dated 14.02.2002, by the learned Single Judge on that ground. 10.1 Be that as it may, although no reference had been made to Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short, “the 2013 Act”) by the writ Court in the Judgment and Order impugned, yet considering the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that not only were they still retaining the possession till date but further that even the compensation had not been paid not only to the petitioners but all other land holders as per the Award passed, directions were issued to the respondents on 28.08.2023 to file an affidavit reflecting the manner in which the possession was taken by the authorities. They were also directed to file the requisite documents along with the affidavit. The affidavit was further required to state as to whether the Awarded compensation was paid to the petitioners or for that matter whether payment was made to any of the Awardees whose names were figuring in that Award. 11. They were also directed to file the requisite documents along with the affidavit. The affidavit was further required to state as to whether the Awarded compensation was paid to the petitioners or for that matter whether payment was made to any of the Awardees whose names were figuring in that Award. 11. It is pertinent to mention that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act inter alia envisages that in case land acquisition proceedings had been initiated under the 1894 Act, where an Award under the said Section 11 has been made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid, the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the State Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. 12. The provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act were lucidly explained by the Apex Court in the case of Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129 wherein the Constitution Bench held that there would be no lapse of the acquisition proceedings if one of the conditions envisaged under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act remain unfulfilled. In paragraph 366.3, it was held: “…….In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken, then there is no lapse.” 12.1 Insofar as the expression “paid” in the main part of the Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is concerned, it was clearly held: “366.4. The expression "paid" in the main part of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. ……..” “366.5. ……..” “366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.” 13. An affidavit then was filed by the Revenue Divisional Officer of Kadapa District dealing with the issues of both taking over of the possession as also payment of compensation. What is stated in the affidavit is as reflected hereunder: “I humbly submit the Land Acquisition proceedings was initiated for expansion of Industrial Estate, to an extent of Ac.27.69cts and to that effect 4(1) Notification was issued on 16.07.1999 and 6(1) Declaration was also issued on 17.07.1999, thereafter 9(1) 9(3) notices were also issued on 15.01.2002 and Award was passed on 14.02.2002. The land was already handed over to the Assistant General Manager, APIIC Ltd., Kadapa on 27.02.2002 immediately after passing the Award under Land Acquisition Act, 1894. I further submit that, on 11.05.2002 the amount of compensation also deposited into treasury.” “Hence, I therefore submit that before filing the writ petition itself the possession was already taken and handed over to the Requisition body APIIC and inturn alienated to the 3rd parties who are now under the control and possession of the same with the respective Industries. Regarding compensation is concern as per the Judgment of the Indore Development Authority (Point 366.9) payment of compensation which has been deposited in the Treasury is also a valid, and if any such deposit will not vitiate the Land Acquisition Proceedings under 1894 Act. But the Hon'ble Learned Judge did not consider the same and no reason has been assigned regarding applicability of Section 24(2) of Act 30 of 2013.” 14. On a perusal of the affidavit filed by the official respondents, it can thus be seen that apart from stating that the entire Awarded amount had been deposited in the Government Treasury, it has nowhere been asserted that the amount had been tendered for payment to the petitioner or majority of claimants under the Award. 15. On a perusal of the affidavit filed by the official respondents, it can thus be seen that apart from stating that the entire Awarded amount had been deposited in the Government Treasury, it has nowhere been asserted that the amount had been tendered for payment to the petitioner or majority of claimants under the Award. 15. The payment would be deemed to have been paid in terms of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 only if the payment had been tendered in terms of Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act to the land owners including the petitioner, in which eventuality alone, the petitioner could have been prevented from claiming that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act as has been held in paragraph No. 366.5 of the judgment reproduced hereinabove. It can thus be held that the deposit of the compensation in the Government Treasury would not amount to payment of compensation in the spirit of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. 16. The second aspect that requires to be considered is whether the petitioners are in possession and if not, whether the mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act, as contemplated under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, was by drawing of inquest reports/memorandum or not. Inasmuch as once an Award has been passed and possession taken over, land vests in the State and there cannot be any divesting of land as envisaged under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Once possession has been taken, then there is no lapse under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act as has been held in paragraph No. 366.7 of the Indore Development Authority case (supra), which states thus: “The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/ memorandum. Once Award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).” 17. However, learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board vs. A. Viswam, (1996) 8 SCC 259 . However, learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board vs. A. Viswam, (1996) 8 SCC 259 . This was a case where a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 was issued for purposes of acquiring a large extent of 339 acres of land for purposes of land development of the said area and an Award was passed and while the case of the appellant/the Tamil Nadu Housing Board was that the possession had been taken by the Land Acquisition Officer and the possession delivered to the appellant/Tamil Nadu Housing Board, the case of the respondent, who was an owner of the land measuring one acre and thirty two cents claimed that the possession was still retained by him. 17.1 The question before the Apex Court was whether the possession of the land was taken from the respondent or not. The Land Acquisition Officer, however, had not been impleaded as a party to the proceedings. But there were documents to show that the Land Acquisition Officer had delivered possession to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. The Apex Court noticed the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde vs. M.D. Bhagwat, (1976) 1 SCC 700 . What was stated therein is as under: “8. .... There can be no question of taking 'symbolical' possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining what part was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was done by the Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities, as that would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it.” 18. It was in the backdrop of the aforementioned judgment that the Court noticed from the record that a letter had been written by the respondent himself admitting the title of the Board to the land in the said survey number and sought allotment of an alternate site. It was presumed that unless possession was taken and the respondent divested of the title, he could not have made a request to the appellant for providing him alternate site. It was also held that it was not the respondents’ case that he was still continuing to have title to the land in dispute. It was in those circumstances held that the possession must have been taken for the land consisting of 339 acres including 1.33 acres claimed by the said respondent. It was also held that it was not the respondents’ case that he was still continuing to have title to the land in dispute. It was in those circumstances held that the possession must have been taken for the land consisting of 339 acres including 1.33 acres claimed by the said respondent. What weighed with the Court was also the fact that when land was acquired for land development of a city and a large chunk of buildings had already been built up, it could not be possible for the Housing Board, without delivery of possession to the Housing Board to construct such massive constructions and leave out only that part of the land which belonged to the respondent in the said appeal and that making of a plan would follow only after the land was taken possession of and that it would be erroneous to believe that possession still remained with the respondent. 19. Learned counsel for the appellants sought to emphasize that even in the present case, there was no reason as to why an exception would be made in regard to the land belonging to the petitioner, when possession of other contiguous lands was taken and handed over to the Requisitioning Authority. 20. However, in our opinion, the facts of the case before the Court were quite different from the one which we are confronted with in the present Letters Patent Appeal. In the case supra, the Land Acquisition Officer was not a party to the proceedings before the Apex Court and a presumption was drawn based upon the communication addressed by the Land Acquisition Authority handing over possession to the Housing Board that actual possession would have been taken, coupled with the fact that construction would be possible only after possession was taken and plans were prepared for the planned development of a city. 21. However, in the present case, the Land Acquisition Officer is also a party respondent before us, who has filed an affidavit pursuant to the orders passed on 28.08.2023. In the affidavit, nothing is stated in regard to manner of taking possession except a general statement that possession had already been taken and handed over to the requisitioning body i.e. APIIC, who in turn, had alienated the land to third parties, who are now under control and possession of the same. In the affidavit, nothing is stated in regard to manner of taking possession except a general statement that possession had already been taken and handed over to the requisitioning body i.e. APIIC, who in turn, had alienated the land to third parties, who are now under control and possession of the same. It is, therefore, clear that the averment made in the affidavit is vague and general. Apart from this, the respondents have not placed on record any document which would show that there was any memorandum or Panchanama prepared by Land Acquisition Officer in the presence of witnesses which would constitute in law, the taking over of the possession of the land in question. 22. Having considered the matter, in our opinion, the appellants have neither proved the actual taking over of the possession of the land belonging to the respondent nor have they been in a position to prove that the compensation was ever tendered for payment to the petitioner/respondent herein. 23. Be that as it may, we hold that the acquisition proceedings initiated pursuant to notification dated 16.07.1999 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act leading to the passing of the Award No. 11, dated 14.02.2002 had lapsed to the extent of the land measuring three acres and thirty one cents situate in Sy.No. 497/13, Kothapalli Village, Proddatur Town, Kadapa District, and was rightly set aside by the learned Single Judge. We, however, grant liberty to the appellants to initiate the process of acquisition afresh under the provisions of the 2013 Act, if need be. 24. For the reasons aforementioned, the present appeal is found to be without merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs. 25. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.