JUDGMENT Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J. Heard Sri S.K.Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant. None present for the respondents. 2. This appeal, at the behest of the U.P.S.R.T.C, challenges the judgment and decree dated 03.05.1997 passed by VI Additional District Judge/Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ghaziabad, passed in M.A.C.P. No. 47 of 1995 whereby the Tribunal has awarded Rs.5,20,000/- as compensation along with interest at the rate of 12%. 3. The brief facts as culled out from the record is that on 21.09.1994, Navin Kumar Garg was going from Hapur towards Pilakhuwa on a scooter bearing no. U.P.14B-1251 along with his friend Sanjai Kumar who was a pillion rider. As soon as the scooter of the deceased reached near village Anwarpur the U.P. Roadways bus bearing no. U.P.G-4767 came from behind in a very high speed, which was being driven rashly and negligently by its driver and dashed the scooter of Navin Kumar Garg, he was brought to Shri Ram Hospital Pilukhuwa where he was declared dead. The accident took place because of the sole negligent driving of the U.P.Roadways bus driver. 4. The tribunal granted a sum of Rs. 5,20,000/- for the death of the sole bread winner who died on 29.01.1994 when the scooter was dashed by the driver of the Road Transport Corporation bus. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the driver of the scooter had contributed to the accident which had taken place. 5. While dealing with submission on issue of negligence raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it would be relevant to discuss the principles for deciding contributory negligence and for that the principles for considering negligence will also have to be looked into. 6. The term negligence means failure to exercise care towards others which a reasonable and prudent person would in a circumstance or taking action which such a reasonable person would not. Negligence can be both intentional or accidental though it is normally accidental. More particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the injured must always prove that the either side is negligent. If the injury rather death is caused by something owned or controlled by the negligent party then he is directly liable otherwise the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" meaning thereby "the things speak for itself" would apply. 7. The principle of contributory negligence has been discussed time and again. If the injury rather death is caused by something owned or controlled by the negligent party then he is directly liable otherwise the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" meaning thereby "the things speak for itself" would apply. 7. The principle of contributory negligence has been discussed time and again. A person who either contributes or is co author of the accident would be liable for his contribution to the accident having taken place and that amount will be deducted from the compensation payable to him if he is injured and to legal representatives if he dies in the accident. 8. The Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 1818 of 2012 ( Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Smt. Renu Singh And Others) decided on 19.7.2016 has held as under : "16. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasoable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in ach case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 18. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 19. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in John Rylands and Jehu Horrocks v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 20. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 20. These provisions (sec.110A and section 110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 21. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well settled and, therefore, court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 0 ACJ(SC) 1840). 22. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part the other side." 9. While going to the facts the issue of negligence has been rightly decided by the tribunal in favour of the claimants. The accident was the result of the sole negligence of the driver of the bus. The bus was being driven rashly and negligently is the finding of fact. Thus the finding of fact as far as negligence is concerned cannot be interfered by this Court. The accident was the result of the sole negligence of the driver of the bus. The bus was being driven rashly and negligently is the finding of fact. Thus the finding of fact as far as negligence is concerned cannot be interfered by this Court. Looking to the factual averments, the principle for deciding negligence has been properly evaluated. The evidence adduced by the appellant did not show that the driver of the bus was driving the bus cautiously. 10. This takes this Court to the compensation part. The claimants were not granted any amount under the head of future loss of income. The widow, it is not proved was gainfully employed. Re-marriage of widow will not disentitle her. The multiplier of 16 cannot be said to be on the higher side. 11. In view of the principle enunciated herein above, this Court holds that the Tribunal has not committed any error in holding the driver of the bus to be negligent. The government has not examined anybody on oath and, therefore also, the finding of fact cannot be interfered with. 12. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed. 13. Stay vacated forthwith. 14. The amount, if yet not deposited, be deposited immediately. The Tribunal to disburse the amount and the amount kept in fixed deposit be encashed to the claimants after ascertaining their identity. 15. The impleadment application and the application to send this matter to Uttarakhand is also rejected.