ORDER : 1. This Habeas Corpus petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for release of his mother Smt. Sankuranthri Ramanjamma @ Anjamma, W/o China Brahmaiah (Late), Age 66 years, R/o Adigoppala (V), Durgi (M), Palnadu District who was detained as per the Detention Order in Proc. No. 65/2023-C1, dated 21.06.2023 passed by 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) and (2) r/w 2(f) of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (1 of 1986) [for short, ‘the Act 1 of 1986’] and later confirmed by the 1st respondent as per the proceedings in G.O.Rt.No. 1296, General Administration (SC.I) Department, dated 02.07.2023. 2. The detention order dated 21.06.2023 was passed by 2nd respondent on the ground that the detenu was involved in following 3 cases and thus she is a ‘Drug Offender’ within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act 1 of 1986 and her activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and public order: 1 Cr.No. 04/2023, dated 25.03.2023 U/s. 8(b) r/w (a)(i) and 8(b) r/w 25 and 8(c) r/w 20(b)(ii) (B) NDPS Act 1985 of Gurazala SEB Police Station. 2 Cr.No. 33/2023, dated 27.02.2023 U/s. 8(c) r/w 20(b)(ii) NDPS Act 1985 of Nakerekallu Police Station. 3 Cr.No. 149/2022, dated 11.09.2022 U/s. 20(B)(ii) NDPS Act 1985 of Durgi Police Station. 3. The detention order is challenged in this writ petition on the grounds that the detenu was on bail in all the crimes which fact was not taken into consideration while detaining her and further, those cases can be effectively dealt with under the general law and his activities are not prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and public order. It is further contended that there was no proximity or nexus between the 3 cases to order detention. 4. The 2nd respondent filed counter and opposed the writ petition. 5. Heard arguments of Sri A. Venkata Durga Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner and Special Government Pleader representing learned Advocate General for respondents. 6. It is further contended that there was no proximity or nexus between the 3 cases to order detention. 4. The 2nd respondent filed counter and opposed the writ petition. 5. Heard arguments of Sri A. Venkata Durga Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner and Special Government Pleader representing learned Advocate General for respondents. 6. While severely fulminating the detention order, learned counsel for the petitioner Sri A. Venkata Durga Rao, firstly argued that in all the 3 crimes which were taken as a ground for detention, she was granted bail even prior to the detention order, which indicates that the jurisdictional Court on a prima facie opinion that the detenu did not commit offence, granted her bail in all the cases. In that view, duty is cast on the Sponsoring Authority to place before the 2nd respondent not only the material relating to the aforesaid 3 crimes but also the bail applications and bail orders for the consideration and satisfaction of the Detaining Authority to the effect that while at large on bail, there is a likelihood of detenu’s repeating similar offences and acting prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Learned counsel would strenuously argue that on such satisfaction only the Detaining Authority shall pass detention order by giving cogent reasons. However no such reasons, muchless, cogent reasons were given by Detaining Authority. Due to such violation, the learned counsel would emphasize, the detention order became illegal. 7. Secondly, he argued that the crimes in which the detenu was involved and which were taken as a ground for detention are all not grievous offences and they can be dealt with under the general laws. Further there is no nexus or proximity among the 3 cases relied upon by the Detaining Authority to order detention. Therefore, the activities of the detenu cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and as such the detention order is illegal and unjust. He would argue that when general laws are sufficient to deal with the offences, the preventive detention shall not be resorted to by the State. 8. Thirdly, learned counsel argued that the copies bail applications and bail orders were neither placed before the Detaining Authority nore furnished to the Detenu so as to enable her to make an effective representation to the Government and Advisory Board. Due to such violation also the detention is vitiated. 9. 8. Thirdly, learned counsel argued that the copies bail applications and bail orders were neither placed before the Detaining Authority nore furnished to the Detenu so as to enable her to make an effective representation to the Government and Advisory Board. Due to such violation also the detention is vitiated. 9. Per contra, learned Special Government Pleader while supporting the impugned detention order would argue that Section-3 of Act 1 of 1986 speaks of ‘satisfaction’ of the Detaining Authority to pass a detention order. When the statute left an action dependent upon the opinion of the authority concerned by using the expression as ‘is satisfied’ or ‘is of the opinion’ or ‘if it has reason to believe’ or ‘if it consider necessary’, then the opinion of such authority is conclusive, provided the procedure prescribed by the Act or Rules for formation of the opinion was duly followed and the authority acted bonafide and the authority himself formed the opinion. In such case the judicial review will be constricted primarily to know whether procedural fairness was scrupulously followed. He placed reliance on Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar, 1984 AIR 1334. He would submit that in this case the procedure was meticulously followed and basing on the materials placed, the 2nd respondent formed the opinion. Hence the detention order is sustainable: (a) Nextly he argued that merely a person is on bail is not a ground to claim immunity from the preventive detention. Conversely, the possibility of misusing the freedom granted under bail will be more in the case of habitual offenders. Therefore, in this case having regard to the past history of the detenu in involving in the repeated crimes of similar nature, the Detaining Authority made a logical prognosis of her future behaviour. Therefore, that the detenu was on bail in the above cases is of no consequence. He argued that bail orders were furnished to the detenu. Therefore, in this case having regard to the past history of the detenu in involving in the repeated crimes of similar nature, the Detaining Authority made a logical prognosis of her future behaviour. Therefore, that the detenu was on bail in the above cases is of no consequence. He argued that bail orders were furnished to the detenu. (b) Nextly he argued that the activities of the detenu are very much prejudicial to the maintenance of public order because in all the above 3 crimes, the detenu has been indulging in illegal activities in contravention of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and the rules, notifications and orders made under the Act again and again for her monitory gain by targeting the general public particularly the youth and students, the most venerable section of the society by committing the drug offences habitually. The detenu is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. When the activities of detenu create grave or widespread danger to life or public health, it can be construed that she acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and preventive detention can be ordered. He thus prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 10. The point for consideration is whether there are merits in the writ petition to allow? 11. Point: We gave our anxious consideration to above pleadings and arguments. The first argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is about the procedural violation. Learned counsel for the petitioner mainly argued that the petitioner is 66 years old lady and she was unnecessarily implicated in drug offending cases and considering the same, in all thee cases which were taken into consideration for ordering detention, the regular Courts have granted bail and in that view, the Detaining Authority ought not to have ordered her detention as ordinary law is sufficient to deal with the crimes pending against her. No clear reasons are given by the Detaining Authority as to why the said Authority has come the satisfaction that the preventive detention is essential in this case. He thus prayed to allow the Habeas Corpus Writ Petition. 12. No clear reasons are given by the Detaining Authority as to why the said Authority has come the satisfaction that the preventive detention is essential in this case. He thus prayed to allow the Habeas Corpus Writ Petition. 12. Per contra, learned Special Government Pleader while admitting that the detenu was granted bail in all the three cases which were taken into consideration for ordering detention, however, would submit that in spite of getting bail, the detenu did not stop her illegal activities and on the other hand she was involved in one after another cases after getting bail in each case and thus she is a habitual offender and therefore considering that the drug offending activities of the detenu will cause prejudice to the maintenance of public order and that the general law is deficient to effectively curb her activities from repeating the same, the Detaining Authority has rightly ordered the preventive detention. As rightly argued by learned Special Government Pleader, a person on bail is neither immuned nor insulated from preventive detention. The Detaining Authority upon considering the materials and other facts can still form an opinion that there is a likelihood of misuse of the bail by such person to repeat similar offences and order for preventive detention. In Vijay Narain Singh’s case (supra) relied upon by Special Government Pleader, the Apex Court considering its various other decisions enumerated the principles in those decisions as follows: “34. Before leaving this case, I should state that a number of decisions were cited before us in which it had been held that an order of detention based on a criminal charge which is still to be tried may not be invalid and that an order granting bail by a criminal court cannot be a bar to the passing of an order of detention. But I have not found it necessary to deal with them here as they would have become relevant only if I had been satisfied that the petitioner was an anti-social element. Moreover the orders of detention questioned in those cases were governed by the provisions of the statutes under which they had been issued.” 13. There is no demur about the discretionary power of the Detaining Authority in this regard. Moreover the orders of detention questioned in those cases were governed by the provisions of the statutes under which they had been issued.” 13. There is no demur about the discretionary power of the Detaining Authority in this regard. However, the crux of the argument of the petitioner is not about the lack of power of Detaining Authority to order preventive detention against a person who is on bail. On the other hand, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner firstly is that the detenu was granted bail in all the three crimes in prior to the detention order and this aspect has not been properly considered by the Detaining Authority. Since the regular Court considered that the detenu prima facie did not commit offence and thus deserved bail, the Detaining Authority considering the same ought not to have ordered preventive detention. On perusal of the detention order, we are unable to accept this argument. Merely because the detenu was granted bail in the cases which are taken up for consideration to order detention, that alone cannot be a ground to desist the Authority from ordering preventive detention. However, the Detaining Authority considering the factum of detenu being under bail, should carefully evaluate other circumstances and decide whether preventive detention is compulsory. This aspect has been dealt with Hon’ble Apex Court in Vijay Narain Singh’s case (supra) and observed thus: “32. xxxx. It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.” 14. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.” 14. In the light of above decision when the detention order is perused, the Detaining Authority has observed thus: “Thus you are indulging in the Drug Offences from 11.09.2022 to 25.03.2022 (during the period of 6 months) unabated for monitory gain. The Drug illegal acts committed by you do fall under definition of section 2(f) of Act No. 1 of Andhra Pradesh Prevention of dangerous activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act 1 of 86). The Drug Offender activities are being carried by you in Nakarikallu, Gurazala SEB Station and Durgi Police Station jurisdictional areas and there is a scope of affecting the public health adversely since you are a Drug Offender being found in possession of Ganja, Cannabis (Hemp) and selling to the general public particularly the youth and students, the most vulnerable section of the society being affected adversely at larger extent. Whereas the following grounds and material in support of detention on record in respect of the cases registered by the Police & Special Enforcement Bureau against you shows that you are frequently indulging in the Drug Offences unabatedly and you are arrested and sent to judicial custody, but in every case, you are being enlarged on bail in a short while by taking the advantage of the legal provisions for grant of bail as a matter of right and the conditions governing the grant of bail by the Hon’ble Courts time being applicable and thus the provisions of NDPs Act, 1985 is deficient to prevent you from indulging in dangerous Drug offences which adversely affecting public health at large.” 15. The above would show that the Detaining Authority having considered that the detenu is involved in drug offending activities in different places and her activities are giving scope of effecting public health adversely as she was found in possession of Ganja, Cannabis (Hemp) and selling to the general public, particularly the youth and students, the most vulnerable section of the society being affected adversely at larger extent and also having considered that though she was arrested and sent to judicial custody, however in every case she was enlarged on bail on taking advantage of legal provisions governing the bail and thus the provisions of NDPS Act, 1985 are deficient to prevent her from indulging in dangerous drug offences which adversely effect the public health at large, has ultimately ordered her detention. In our considered view, the Detaining Authority has punctiliously considered and analyzed the circumstances weighing against her, particularly her unabatedly indulging in drug effecting offences and getting bail and again indulging in the similar activities, ordered her detention. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the authority has not scrupulously exercised his discretion to arrive at the subjective satisfaction is incorrect. 16. The other contention of the petitioner that the Sponsoring Authority has not furnished the copies of bail petitions and orders to the Detaining Authority and also to the detenu has no much force, inasmuch as, the bail orders were furnished to the Detaining Authority and the same has been reiterated in the grounds of detention and detention order. In fact, having considered that the detenu after securing bail in the concerned cases again indulging in the drug offences, the authority has ordered her detention. So far as the contention that the bail orders were not furnished to the detenu is concerned, it must be said, the said contention was not taken in the grounds of writ petition. Therefore, the said plea now cannot be entertained. 17. Lastly, we are not oblivious of the facts that the detenu is a woman and aged about 67 years. However, the drug offences she involved are also equally grave and it is alleged that she has been committing the offences in different places targeting youth and students. Therefore, her sex and age cannot be taken as a ground to set aside the detention order, particularly when the Act 1 of 1986 has not provided any concession or exception in that regard. Therefore, her sex and age cannot be taken as a ground to set aside the detention order, particularly when the Act 1 of 1986 has not provided any concession or exception in that regard. 18. Thus on a conspectus of facts and law, we find no merits in the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. 19. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.