Kirti Nath Tiwari v. Directorate of Enforcement Govt. of India, Assi. Dir. (PMLA) Somnath Choudhary Allahabad
2023-07-03
SUBHASH VIDYARTHI
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Subhash Vidyarthi, J. Heard Sri S. P. Mishra, the learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Kuldeep Srivastava, the learned counsel for the respondent - Directorate of Enforcement (E.D.) and perused the record. 2. By means of the instant application filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the applicant has challenged validity of the summoning / cognizance order dated 02.04.2018 passed by the Sessions Judge, Allahabad in Complaint No. 02/2018. The case has subsequently been transferred to the Court of Special Judge, C.B.I. - 6, Lucknow and the applicant has approached this Court when the trial Court has passed an order dated 19.04.2023 issuing non-bailable warrant against the applicant. 3. Briefly stated, facts of the case are that on 29.05.2000, the Regional Manager, Ballia Gramin Bank, Ballia had sent a complaint against one Chandra Prakash Singh, Branch Manager, Ballia, Gramin Bank and some unknown persons, stating that when Chandra Prakash Singh was posted as Branch Manager during the period December 2008 to December 2009, he had embezzled public money for his personal gain and had misappropriated an amount of 1.60 Crores (approximately) and had thereby caused financial loss to the bank. In furtherance of the aforesaid complaint, a First Information Report bearing number RC 0062010A0017 under Sections 120-B, 409, 420 I.P.C. read with Sections 13 (2) and 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was filed on 11.06.2010 against Chandra Prakash Singh and other unknown persons. The matter was investigated by CBI/ACB and on 30.06.2011, a charge-sheet was forwarded alleging commission of offences under Sections 120 B, 409, 477-A of the Indian Panel Code read with Section 13 (2) and 13 (1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and substantive offence under Sections 409 and 477A IPC and Sections 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against several persons, including the applicant, alleging that Chandra Prakash Singh had caused wrongful loss of 56,47,592/- to the bank in criminal conspiracy with the applicant and certain other persons. The charge-sheet was submitted on 04.07.2011 4. Subsequently on 06.01.2012 the E.D. registered ECIR No.0/VSI.2012, investigated the matter, recorded statements of several persons, including the applicant, and filed a complaint against five persons, including the applicant, on 16.09.2017 in the Court of Special Judge, PMLA, Allahabad, which has subsequently been transferred to Lucknow.
The charge-sheet was submitted on 04.07.2011 4. Subsequently on 06.01.2012 the E.D. registered ECIR No.0/VSI.2012, investigated the matter, recorded statements of several persons, including the applicant, and filed a complaint against five persons, including the applicant, on 16.09.2017 in the Court of Special Judge, PMLA, Allahabad, which has subsequently been transferred to Lucknow. Regarding the applicant, it is stated in the complaint that he had posted the manifold in respect of loan account Nos. 839, 841, 842 and 843, that these manifolds had been issued from Dataha and were used to close the loan account Nos. 839, 841, 842 and 843 on 04.12.2008. No account opening forms and no KYC documents were available in respect of the aforesaid loan accounts. The complaint states that the applicant knowingly assisted co-accused Chandra Prakash Singh in his wrongdoings and allowed him to use his ID and password for fraudulent transactions of banking funds and thereby committed offence under section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'PMLA'). 5. The trial court took cognizance of the case and summoned the accused persons by means of an order dated 02.04.2018. 6. There is absolutely no mention in the affidavit filed in support of the application regarding the conduct of the applicant after passing of the summoning order dated 02.04.2018. A copy of the order dated 19.04.2023 annexed with the affidavit filed in support of the application indicates that an application was filed on behalf of the applicant, through Advocate, stating that he was not having good health, but the application was not supported by any medical certificate. Moreover, nobody was present to press the application. The Court observed that the applicant had not presented himself before the Court and obtained his release on bail. Keeping in view these facts, the application was rejected and a Non-bailable warrant was issued for ensuring attendance of the applicant. The applicant has filed the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging validity of the order dated 02.04.2018 after passing of the order dated 19.04.2023 but he has not challenged the validity of the order dated 19.04.2023. 7.
Keeping in view these facts, the application was rejected and a Non-bailable warrant was issued for ensuring attendance of the applicant. The applicant has filed the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging validity of the order dated 02.04.2018 after passing of the order dated 19.04.2023 but he has not challenged the validity of the order dated 19.04.2023. 7. The aforesaid conduct of the applicant in avoiding the process of law and im not co-operating with the proceedings of trial and filing the application after expiry of a period of more than 5 years since passing of the summoning order disentitles him from claiming any discretionary relief. 8. It has been stated in the affidavit filed in support of the application that no credible evidence or material has been produced by the investigating officer for certifying the culpable intention of the petitioner behind commission of the alleged offence. It has been admitted in the affidavit that the applicant was responsible for posting and passing of transfer vouchers and cheques and the manifold in question had been posted by the applicant. It has been contended on behalf of the applicant that computers had been installed in the branch in question a short while before the occurrence and the applicant was a trainee and he had complied with the orders of his superiors under bona fide belief about its correctness and he was not aware that his superior authority, namely co-accused Chandra Prakash Singh had deceived him. The affidavit asserts that the applicant had acted in a bona fide manner under subordination of co-accused Chandra Prakash Singh and, therefore, he is entitled to get benefit of Section 81 of the Indian Penal Code. 9. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the applicant on judgment in the cases of Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 , State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 , Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala, (2000) 8 SCC 590 and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 . 10. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court took note of the precedents on the point and held as follows: - "25.
Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 . 10. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court took note of the precedents on the point and held as follows: - "25. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. DPP [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)] Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in DPP v. Humphrys [ 1977 AC 1 : (1976) 2 WLR 857 : (1976) 2 All ER 497 [HL (E)]] stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved. * * * 46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained." (Emphasis supplied) 11.
Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained." (Emphasis supplied) 11. There is no allegation in the present case that the criminal prosecution is being used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurize the applicant, as was there in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami (Supra) and, therefore, the aforesaid judgment does not apply to the facts of the present case. 12. The next judgment relied by the applicant is State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court illustrated some contingencies wherein the Court could exercise its power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. The relevant passage of the judgment is being reproduced below: - "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 13. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court added a note of caution in the immediate following paragraphs by stating that: - "103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." 14.
Although the judgment in the case of Bhajan Lal (Supra) has been mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of the application, the learned Counsel for the applicant could not specify as to which of the conditions mentioned in para 102 of the judgment is attracted in the present case. The complaint has been filed by the E.D. after lodging of a First Information Report in respect of a Scheduled Offence and submission of charge-sheet in furtherance thereof, which prima facie indicates that the applicant had assisted the co-accused Chandra Prakash Singh in commission of the scheduled offence and after carrying out an investigation in the matter and recording statements of witnesses, including the applicant and, therefore, it does not appear that the present case falls in any of the conditions mentioned in para 102 of the judgment in the case of Bhajan Lal (Supra) and, in any case, the present case does not fall within the category of 'rarest of rare' cases mentioned by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 103 of the judgment. 15. In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 , the Hon'be Supreme Court held that: - "132. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles." 16. In Roy V. D. v. State of Kerala, (2000) 8 SCC 590 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that: - "18. It is well settled that the power under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
In Roy V. D. v. State of Kerala, (2000) 8 SCC 590 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that: - "18. It is well settled that the power under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where criminal proceedings are initiated based on illicit material collected on search and arrest which are per se illegal and vitiate not only a conviction and sentence based on such material but also the trial itself, the proceedings cannot be allowed to go on as it cannot but amount to abuse of the process of the court; in such a case not quashing the proceedings would perpetuate abuse of the process of the court resulting in great hardship and injustice to the accused. In our opinion, exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings in a case like the one on hand, would indeed secure the ends of justice." 17. In the present case, there is no allegation that the criminal proceedings have been initiated on the basis of any illicit material collected on search and arrest which are per se illegal and, therefore, the aforesaid judgment in the case of Roy V. D. is also of no benefit to the applicant. 18. In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court once again emphasized that: - "8. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise.
It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto." 19.
When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto." 19. However, nothing has been placed before the Court to indicate that the summoning order violates any order under the Code or that the continuance of the proceedings would be an abuse of the process of court or quashing of the proceedings is otherwise necessary to secure the ends of justice. 20. So far as the question of applicability of Section 81 I.P.C. is concerned, it provides as follows: - "81. Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent other harm.-Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property. Explanation.-It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm." There is absolutely no averment that the offending acts were committed by the applicant "in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property" which is an essential condition for taking out the act within the purview of the general exception provided in Section 81 of the Penal Code. Therefore, the plea of the applicant being entitled to the benefit of Section 81 I.P.C. is also without force and the same is rejected. 21. It has also been stated in the affidavit that the applicant has been falsely implicated and there is no sufficient evidence against him. Truth or otherwise of the allegations and sufficiency of evidence are questions to be dealt with by the trial Court after taking into consideration the evidence led before it and the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed on these grounds. 22. Sri.
Truth or otherwise of the allegations and sufficiency of evidence are questions to be dealt with by the trial Court after taking into consideration the evidence led before it and the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed on these grounds. 22. Sri. Kuldeep Srivastava, the learned Counsel for the respondent - E.D. has placed reliance upon the judgments in the cases of Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U. P. 2022 SCC Online SC 484 and Directorate of Enforcement v. Padmanabhan Kishore AIR Online 2022 SC 786. 23. In Ramveer Upadhyay (Supra), after taking into considerations various precedents n the point, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: - "38. Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is spent on hearing appeals rather than entertaining petitions under Section 482 at an interlocutory stage which might ultimately result in miscarriage of justice as held in Hamida v. Rashid @ Rasheed (2008) 1 SCC 474 . 39. In our considered opinion criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier criminal case cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute offence under the Attrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue, would have to be decided in the trial. In exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C." 24.
The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C." 24. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Padmanabhan Kishore (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: - "Section 3 states, inter alia, that whoever knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering * * * 17. On a bare perusal of the complaint made by the Enforcement Directorate, it is quite clear that the Respondent was prima facie involved in the activity connected with the proceeds of crime." 25. The police has already filed a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. against the applicant in furtherance of First Information Report number RC 0062010A0017 under sections 120-B, 409, 420 I.P.C. read with Sections 13 (2) and 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which are Scheduled Offences, alleging that Chandra Prakash Singh had caused wrongful loss of 56,47,592/- to the bank in criminal conspiracy with the applicant and certain other persons. The E.D. had registered ECIR No.0/VSI.2012, investigated the matter, recorded statements of several persons, including the applicant, and filed a complaint against five persons, including the applicant, stating that the applicant had posted the manifold in respect of loan account Nos. 839, 841, 842 and 843, which were used to close the loan account Nos. 839, 841, 842 and 843. No account opening forms and no KYC documents were available in respect of the aforesaid loan accounts. The complaint states that the applicant knowingly assisted co-accused Chandra Prakash Singh in his wrongdoings and allowed him to use his ID and password for fraudulent transactions of banking funds and thereby committed offence under Section 3 of PMLA. 26. The aforesaid facts clearly make out a case for trial of the applicant for the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA and there appears to be no illegality in the order dated 02.04.2018 passed by the trial court taking cognizance of the case and summoning the accused persons. 27.
26. The aforesaid facts clearly make out a case for trial of the applicant for the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA and there appears to be no illegality in the order dated 02.04.2018 passed by the trial court taking cognizance of the case and summoning the accused persons. 27. The conduct of the applicant in avoiding the process of law since passing of the summoning order on 02.04.2018 and not co-operating with the proceedings of trial and filing the application after expiry of a period of more than 5 years since passing of the summoning order also disentitled him for claiming any discretionary relief. 28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered view that the application lacks merit and the same is, accordingly, rejected. However, there will be no order as to costs.