JUDGMENT : VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA, J. Heading Para Nos. within the judgment FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1-8 PROCEDURAL HISTORY IN O.S. No. 117/1994 • Pleadings of the Parties 9 • Issues Framed 10 • Evidence Recorded 11-12 • Findings of the Trial Court 13-14 PROCEDURAL HISTORY IN E.A. No. 144 of 1998 • Pleadings in E.A. No. 144 of 1998 15 • Points framed 16 • Findings of the Court 17 GROUNDS OF APPEAL • In the A.S. 20 • In the C.M.A. 21 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AT THE BAR • By the Appellant’s Counsel 22 • By the Respondent’s Counsel 23 POINTS FOR DETERMINATION • Duty of the Appellate Court 24-27 • Points Framed 28 DETERMINATION BY THE COURT • Previous Rounds of Litigation 29-34 • Doctrine of Res Judicata & Application 38-76 • Adverse Possession & Application 77-85 • Limitation for filing a Suit for Declaration of title 86-89 • Order XXI Rule 64 of the Code & Application 90-99 • Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code & Application 100-106 • Order XXI Rule 89 of the Code & Application 107-111 CONCLUSION 112-116 1. The genesis of this litigation arose out of a money transaction which, happened around sixty-seven (67) years ago. Mathe Kotaiah borrowed an amount of Rs.500/- from Thota Venkayamma in 1956, what followed till date is the relentless hurdles faced by Thota Venkayamma in the execution proceedings. 2. Appellants and respondents in both the matters and the issue relating to the subject property are one and the same and are thus inter-related. Hence, these appeals are being disposed of by this Common Judgment. 3. For easy understanding the parties are referred to in this Judgment as mentioned in the table: PARTY NAME/DATE OF DEATH REFERENCE L.R. ON RECORD AFTER DEATH OF ORIGINAL PARTY Late Mathe Kotaiah (20.10.90) Borrower/Judgment Debtor Mathe Sri Lakshmi, His Wife was brought on record as respondent. Late Thota Venkayamma (10.06.97) Lender/Decree holder/Auction purchaser Lingineni Lakshmi Sundari, her daughter, was brought on record as legal representative and is a respondent in these Appeals. Late Talasila Agravani (24.09.90) Third Party/claimant under agreement of sale After her death, Gaddipati Bullemma filed the suit and petition under appeal and she is Appellant in these appeals. In that view of the matter, this Court will hereinafter refer to the parties through their names or as decree-holder, Judgment debtor and third-party claimants in these appeals. 4. Late Talasila Agravani (24.09.90) Third Party/claimant under agreement of sale After her death, Gaddipati Bullemma filed the suit and petition under appeal and she is Appellant in these appeals. In that view of the matter, this Court will hereinafter refer to the parties through their names or as decree-holder, Judgment debtor and third-party claimants in these appeals. 4. Challenging the Judgment and Decree in O.S. No. 117 of 1994, vide Common Judgment dated 18.08.2000 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Tenali, the unsuccessful plaintiff/Gaddipati Bullemma filed this Appeal Suit. 5. Impugning the Order in E.A. No. 144 of 1998 in E.P. No. 537/1965 in OS No. 68/1962 (E.A. No. 370 of 1991) on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Repalle, transferred to try along with O.S. No. 117 of 1994 on the file of the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tenali, dismissing the application filed under Order-XXI Rule 97, 101 read with 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [in short ‘the Code’] in E.P. No. 537 of 1965 in O.S. No. 68 of 1962, the unsuccessful petitioner/Gaddipati Bullemma preferred the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal. 6. Learned Principal Senior Civil Judge vide Common Judgment 18.08.2000, disposed of O.S. No. 117 of 1994, E.A. No. 144 of 1998, O.S. No. 120 of 1984 and O.S. No. 49 of 1998 in the following terms: CASE NO. FILED BY RELIEF SOUGHT DECISION O.S. No. 120/1984 Thota Venkayamma Suit for recovery of rent and profits and damages for use and occupation of the scheduled premises against Mathe Kotaiah and Thalasila Agravani. Suit was dismissed as not pressed. No appeal preferred. O.S. No. 117/1994 Gaddipati Bullemma Suit filed for declaration of title, injunction and for setting aside sale. Suit was dismissed. A.S. No. 2398/2000 filed herein. E.A. No. 144 of 1998 in E.P. No. 537 of 1965 in O.S. No. 68 of 1962 Gaddipati Bullemma Petition to resist/obstruct the delivery of the schedule property. Petition was dismissed C.M.A. No. 2970/2000 filed herein. O.S. No. 49 of 1998 (original number O.S. No. 107 of 1992 on the file of Principal District Munsif Court, Repalle) tried along with O.S. No. 117/1994 Gaddipati Bullemma Suit filed for permanent injunction (in fact, this relief is covered in O.S. No. 117/1994). Suit was dismissed and no appeal was preferred. 7. The facts which led to the filing of these Appeals, are: 7.1. Suit was dismissed and no appeal was preferred. 7. The facts which led to the filing of these Appeals, are: 7.1. The law was set into motion by filing a suit in O.S. No. 68 of 1962 by Thota Venkayamma on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Repalle. The suit was filed against the Judgment Debtor/Mathe Kotaiah for recovery of due amount of Rs.500/- under promissory note dated 20.10.1956. On 07.09.1962, Suit was decreed in favour of Thota Venkayamma. 7.2. Real difficulties of Thota Venkayamma (Decree-holder) started since then, for realisation of the fruits of the decree. No appeal has been preferred against the Judgment and Decree in O.S. No. 68 of 1962 by Mathe Kotaiah and as such, it has become final. 7.3. Thota Venkayamma (Decree-holder) filed Execution petition E.P. No. 537 of 1965 for attachment and sale of the subject property. Mathe Kotaiah (Judgment-Debtor) purchased the subject property, under a registered sale deed dated 05.10.1958 from one Basavaraju Manikyamma, vide Ex.A3 for a consideration of Rs.1000/-. The property was attached and brought to sale, sale was held and knocked down in favour of Thota Venkayamma who stood as highest bidder. Sale confirmed and sale certificate has been engrossed on the stamp. 7.4. Meantime, before the sale and after the sale, Mathe Kotaiah (Judgment Debtor) filed several applications to stop the execution proceedings. All these applications were dismissed. He got a suit filed through third party and a suit through his mother and brother to stall the execution and such suits were also dismissed. Then, the third-party claimant-Thalasila Agravani entered the picture, claiming that she purchased the subject property from Mathe Kotaiah under an Agreement of Sale on 20.02.1965 for a consideration of Rs.15,000/- and possession was delivered along with link document of title. 7.5. Thalasila Agravani (claimant) filed a claim petition which was dismissed. She has also filed a suit for injunction and another suit for declaration and for specific performance. Those suits were dismissed. She has preferred appeals and lost them too. 7.6. Thalasila Agravani died on 24.09.1990. Then, the present appellant, who is the daughter of Agravani i.e. Gaddipati Bullemma filed O.S. No. 117 of 1994 seeking injunction, declaration of title, adverse possession, and declaration that the sale held in favour of Thota Venkayamma is null and void. Those suits were dismissed. She has preferred appeals and lost them too. 7.6. Thalasila Agravani died on 24.09.1990. Then, the present appellant, who is the daughter of Agravani i.e. Gaddipati Bullemma filed O.S. No. 117 of 1994 seeking injunction, declaration of title, adverse possession, and declaration that the sale held in favour of Thota Venkayamma is null and void. Gaddipati Bullemma also filed E.A No. 370 of 1991 which is renumbered as E.A. No. 144 of 1998 by raising several objections to restrain the delivery of the property. The suit as well as the petition filed by Gaddipati Bullemma (Claimant) were dismissed. That is how, she carried the matters in the above appeals challenging the sustainability of these orders. 8. Before venturing into determination of Appeals presented, it is essential to have a bird’s eye view on the procedural history of both the O.S. and E.A. For this reason, the pleadings, issues and findings as such, and the grounds of Appeal are discussed hereinafter. Procedural History in O.S. No. 117/1994 9. Pleadings of the Parties in O.S. No. 117/1994: 9.1. Gist of the Plaint filed by Gaddipati Bullemma: It was urged by the plaintiff on the following lines: 9.1.1. She purchased the subject property from Mathe Kotaiah, in the name of her mother-Thalasila Agravani, vide an unregistered agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965 for a consideration of Rs.15,000/-. Her mother Thalasila Agravani paid Rs.5,000/- on the date of agreement and the possession was also delivered to her mother. The balance amount of Rs.10,000/- along with interest was paid to Mathe Kotaiah on 01.02.1966. 9.1.2. Gaddipati Bullemma was working as Teacher at Kurnool at the time of agreement and later she was transferred to Cherukupalli in 1969 and she has been living in the scheduled property along with her mother and family since then. She and her mother believed the words of Mathe Kotaiah, who got reputation for his honesty, but could not obtain the registered sale deed. 9.1.3. Her mother died on 24.09.1990. Mathe Kotaiah used to assure her that he would execute the sale deed at his convenience, but he died suddenly on 20.10.1990. 9.1.4. Mathe Sri Lakshmi, who is the wife of Kotaiah, is only his legal representative, since the couple remained issueless. 9.1.3. Her mother died on 24.09.1990. Mathe Kotaiah used to assure her that he would execute the sale deed at his convenience, but he died suddenly on 20.10.1990. 9.1.4. Mathe Sri Lakshmi, who is the wife of Kotaiah, is only his legal representative, since the couple remained issueless. During the life-time of her mother, Thalasila Agravani, they came to know about the litigation between Mathe Kotaiah and Thota Venkayamma, and her mother was impleaded in the execution proceedings and she resisted the delivery of the property. 9.1.5. Mathe Kotaiah with an ulterior motive colluded with Thota Venkayamma to obtain wrongful gain to defeat the rights of Thalasila Agravani. As the property was purchased with the funds of Gaddipati Bullemma, she got absolute title and interest in the property, because her mother has no source of income. She has been in an uninterrupted possession for 25 years by paying house tax and she had perfected her title by way of adverse possession. 9.1.6. Her continuous possession is to the knowledge of Thota Venkayamma (decree-holder) even from the year 1971, when she obstructed the Court Amin for delivery of the property to Thota Venkayamma which was admitted by her in O.S. No. 120 of 1984. 9.1.7. Thota Venkayamma and Mathe Kotaiah colluded and tried to dispossess the plaintiff Gaddipati Bullemma from the scheduled property. To protect her possession, she has filed O.S. No. 107 of 1992 on the file of the Court of District Munsif Court, Repalle and obtained orders of injunction, against which, the CMA is pending. 9.1.8. The sale held in E.P. No. 537 of 1965 in O.S. No. 68 of 1962 dated 25.11.1968 is vitiated by material irregularity, fraud etc., since the decree-holder failed to deposit 1/4th amount on that day. Executing Court on 26.11.1968 conducted the resale without issuing notice and no continuation Batta was paid by the decree-holder. 9.1.9. Thota Venkayamma (Decree-holder) died on 10.06.1997 leaving behind her only daughter, Lingineni Lakshmi Sundari, who was brought on record as her legal representative. 9.1.10. Reliefs claimed in the suit: (a) To declare the plaintiff-Gaddipati Bullemma as absolute owner of the subject property and consequential relief of injunction against Mathe Kotaiah and Thota Venkayamma. (b) To declare the sale knocked down in favour of Thota Venkayamma in E.P. No. 537 of 1965 is null and void under Order-XXI Rule-84 of the Code. 9.2. 9.1.10. Reliefs claimed in the suit: (a) To declare the plaintiff-Gaddipati Bullemma as absolute owner of the subject property and consequential relief of injunction against Mathe Kotaiah and Thota Venkayamma. (b) To declare the sale knocked down in favour of Thota Venkayamma in E.P. No. 537 of 1965 is null and void under Order-XXI Rule-84 of the Code. 9.2. Contention of Thota Venkayamma/Defendant No. 1: 9.2.1. She denied the averments of the plaint except the litigation referred in the plaint between Thota Venkayamma and Mathe Kotaiah, which is born out of the record. 9.2.2. It is averred that late Mathe Kotaiah is known for his notorious behaviour. He abandoned his wife, Mathe Srilakshmi, and stayed with Thalasila Agravani, married woman, while the plaintiff- Bullemma was a child. 9.2.3. She obtained money decree in O.S. No. 68 of 1962 against Mathe Kotaiah. He, during his life-time, made all his efforts to block the execution proceedings by filing several suits more than ten in several Courts. Thota Venkayamma purchased the property in auction being a decree-holder and sale certificate was issued in her name. The value of the property increased abnormally in its market value. 9.2.4. The plaintiff’s mother-Thalasila Agravani till her death was instrumental in the hands of Mathe Kotaiah in causing hurdles to deliver the property to Thota Venkayamma. 9.2.5. After the death of Mathe Kotaiah and Thalasila Agravani, the present plaintiff-Bullemma continued the proceedings to grab the property. 9.2.6. It is further stated that the plaintiff-Bullemma filed a petition E.A. No. 370 of 1994 to resist the delivery of the property, which is pending. While so, she filed the present suit alternatively to scuffle the delivery proceedings. 9.2.7. Plaintiff-Gaddipati Bullemma has no locus standi for declaration of title on the foot of contract of sale which stands in the name of her mother ThalasilaAgravani. 9.2.8. She further stated that the plaintiff’s mother Thalasila Agravani filed E.A. 240 of 1968 claim petition, which was dismissed, then filed a suit O.S. No. 60 of 1971 for permanent injunction which was dismissed. Thalasila Agravani preferred appeal in A.S. No. 64 of 1975 that was also dismissed. Thereafter Agravani filed O.S. No. 100 of 1975 for declaration, injunction for making a claim under 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, which was dismissed. Thalasila Agravani preferred appeal in A.S. No. 64 of 1975 that was also dismissed. Thereafter Agravani filed O.S. No. 100 of 1975 for declaration, injunction for making a claim under 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, which was dismissed. All the proceedings are based on the contract of sale dated 20.02.1965 relating to the subject property Plaintiff-Gaddipati Bullemma is claiming benami rights in the scheduled property, which is prohibited under the provisions of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. 9.3. Written statement of Lingineni Lakshmi Sundari (D.3): 9.3.1. She is the daughter of Thota Venkayamma, who filed the written statement referred above. She has filed the written statement reiterating the contents of the written statement filed by her mother. 9.3.2. The agreement of sale cannot confer any right and title over the scheduled property in the light of the findings given by various courts. It is stated that the appeal preferred by Thalasila Agravani i.e. A.S. No. 47 of 1984 against the Judgment in O.S. No. 100 of 1979 was also dismissed. The alleged contract of sale was held to be not true and not supported by consideration in the earlier suits referred to above. 9.3.3. In O.S. No. 100 of 1979, it was held that the contract of sale was hit by res judicata, as per the findings in O.S. No. 60 of 1971 and O.S. No. 400 of 1974. The plaintiff Gaddipati Bullemma filed another batch of suits on the very same contract of sale in the 5th round of litigation in O.S. No. 107 of 1992 and the present suit. This is vexatious and repetitive litigation resorted by Gaddipati Bullemma. 10. Issues Framed in O.S. No. 117/1994: 10.1. Issues framed by the trial court are extracted hereunder: (1) Whether the contract of sale dated 20.2.1965 is true, valid supported by consideration and binding on the 1st defendant? (2) Whether the plaintiff has got right to file the suit basing upon the contract sale in the name of her mother? (3) Whether the Plaintiff acquired title to the property by adverse possession? (4) Whether the Plaintiff is bound by the earlier court proceedings in respect of the same property and between the same parties? (5) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration of title to the suit property? (3) Whether the Plaintiff acquired title to the property by adverse possession? (4) Whether the Plaintiff is bound by the earlier court proceedings in respect of the same property and between the same parties? (5) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration of title to the suit property? (6) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction in respect of the suit property as prayed for? (7) To what relief? 10.2. Following additional issues are framed for trial on 26.8.98: (1) Whether the Plaintiff has perfected her right to the schedule property by adverse possession? (2) Whether the suit is barred by res judicata? (3) Whether the plaintiff has got cause of action and locus standi to file the suit? 10.3. On 22.6.2000 the following additional issues were framed: (1) Whether the plaintiff got locus standi? (2) Whether the suit is hit by principle of res judicata? (3) Whether the same is valid? Evidence Recorded on behalf of Plaintiff 11. On behalf of Gaddipati Bullemma, PWs. 1 to 5 were the witnesses examined. 11.1. The plaintiff herself examined as PW-1. PW-2 - Munagala Sreeleswara Rao is a witness to identify the signature of his father as first attestor in agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965, marked as Ex.A-2. PW-3 - Kavuri Rattaiah is a relative of plaintiff. PW-4 - Konameni Venkaiah, to whom plaintiff is junior maternal aunt’s daughter is examined. PW-5 - Gaddipatti Ramakotaiah, is a relative of plaintiff. 11.2. Exs.A1 to A4 were the documents marked on behalf of the plaintiff. Ex.A-1 is the payment endorsement on the backside of the contract dated 1.02.1966. Ex.A-2 is the signature of the first attestor on Ex.A1 identified by his son. Ex.A-3 is the link document in favour of Mathe Kotaiah. Ex.A-4 is the certified copy of docket orders in E.P. No. 537/1965. Evidence Recorded on behalf of Defendant 12. On behalf of the decree-holder Thota Venkayamma, her daughter Lingineni Lakshmi Sundari was examined as DW-1 since Thota Venkayamma died. 12.1. Exs.B1 to B4 were the documents marked. Ex.B-1 is the certified copy of the common judgment dated 11.04.75 in O.S. No. 60/71 and O.S. No. 400/74. Ex.B-2 is the certified copy of the common judgment dated 04.07.77 in A.S. Nos. 88/75 and 64/75. 12.1. Exs.B1 to B4 were the documents marked. Ex.B-1 is the certified copy of the common judgment dated 11.04.75 in O.S. No. 60/71 and O.S. No. 400/74. Ex.B-2 is the certified copy of the common judgment dated 04.07.77 in A.S. Nos. 88/75 and 64/75. Ex.B-3 is the certified copy of the judgment dated 23.03.1984 in O.S. No. 100/79, and Ex.B-4 is the certified copy of Decree dated 21.09.89 in A.S. No. 47/1984. 13. Findings of the Trial Court: 13.1. On Issue Nos. 2, 4 and Additional Issue Nos. 2 and 3 dated 26.08.1998 and Additional Issue Nos. 1 to 3 dated 22.06.2000, the findings of the trial court are encapsulated in the following terms. 13.1.1. There is no pleading to the effect that at the time of her marriage, an amount of Rs.15,000/- was given towards pasupukumkuma, which amount was later entrusted to her mother and the said amount spent for purchasing the plaint schedule property. It is introduced for the first time in the evidence and it is clearly an afterthought to suit. 13.1.2. Though admittedly, she filed E.A. No. 370 of 1991, her ignorance about filing of that application stating that her mother obtained her signature is highly unbelievable. It is nothing but a blatant lie. 13.1.3. From the time of initiation of execution proceedings by Thota Venkayamma, the Judgment Debtor Mathe Kotaiah and Thalasila Agravani (Claimant) in one way or other, have put obstacles for executing the decree in O.S. No. 68 of 1962. 13.1.4. No iota of evidence to show that the plaintiff sent Rs.56,000/- for improvement of the house. The plaintiff has not filed any suit for specific performance of contract against the original vendor. Having knowledge about the legal proceedings initiated by her mother, plaintiff kept quite at the earliest point of time and at the time of delivery, she filed the suits for injunction and later the present suit for declaration and for consequential reliefs. 13.1.5. Conduct of the plaintiff undoubtedly goes to show that only to put obstacles in the way of the decree-holder, she filed the suit and it is gross abuse of process of law. 13.1.6. 13.1.5. Conduct of the plaintiff undoubtedly goes to show that only to put obstacles in the way of the decree-holder, she filed the suit and it is gross abuse of process of law. 13.1.6. The present suit is hit by principles of res judicata since in the earlier proceedings initiated by her mother Thalasila Agavala, the agreement was found to be not genuine and also in the subsequent suit filed by Thalasila Agravani, it was held that the said suit was hit by principles of res judicata. 13.1.7. The plaintiff Gaddipati Bullemma cannot have any locus standi to prosecute the suit on the self-same agreement on which her mother earlier fought a long legal battle, which culminated in dismissal of her earlier suits and appeals. 13.2. On Issue Nos. 1,5 and 6, the trial court held the following: 13.2.1. In the light of the findings on the issues referred above, plaintiffs are not entitled to any of the reliefs, in view of earlier decisions rendered in the suits filed by her mother wherein the validity or otherwise of the agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965 was decided and held not valid which operates as res judicata. 13.3. On Issue No. 3 and Additional Issue No. 1 dated 26.08.1998, the trial court held as follows: 13.3.1. Plaintiff cannot be permitted to contend that she also acquired title, by way of adverse possession, when once she traces her right to a lawful authority under an agreement of sale standing in the name of her mother. Thus, these issues are decided against the plaintiff. 14. With the above findings, the suit was decided as against the Plaintiff-Gaddipati Bullemma, by the trial court in O.S. No. 117/1994. Having identified the pleadings and findings therein, it is now essential to chalk out the same in E.A. No. 144 of 1998 filed by Gaddipati Bullemma. Procedural History in E.A. No. 144 of 1998 15. Pleadings in E.A. No. 144 of 1998: 15.1. Contents of the Petition filed by Gaddipati Bullemma 15.1.1. Petitioner/Gaddipati Bullemma, being a third party claimant, urged that Thota Venkayamma (Decree-holder) obtained a decree and brought the subject property to sale, and that she has purchased the scheduled property in the court auction in E.P. No. 537 of 1965 in O.S. No. 68 of 1962. 15.1.2. Contents of the Petition filed by Gaddipati Bullemma 15.1.1. Petitioner/Gaddipati Bullemma, being a third party claimant, urged that Thota Venkayamma (Decree-holder) obtained a decree and brought the subject property to sale, and that she has purchased the scheduled property in the court auction in E.P. No. 537 of 1965 in O.S. No. 68 of 1962. 15.1.2. Mathe Kotaiah (Judgment Holder) is also contesting that the auction sale in favour of the decree-holder is illegal and void and filed an application E.A. No. 90 of 1981 under Section 47 of the Code, which was dismissed. Mathe Kotaiah preferred CMA No. 1658 of 1989 on the file of this Court and obtained stay which was made absolute. 15.1.3. During the pendency of the claim petition, Thota Venkayamma died on 10.06.1997 intestate leaving behind her only daughter Lingineni Lakshmi Sundari, who is a powerful woman, having no regard to law and order. 15.1.4. Mathe Kotaiah originally sold the scheduled property to Thalasila Agravani for Rs.15,000/- under a Contract of sale dated 20.02.1965. The money that was paid for consideration belonged to the petitioner-Gaddipati Bullemma and the property was delivered to her mother Thalasila Agravani. The petitioner was working as Teacher at Kurnool and was later transferred to Cherukupalli in 1965 and eversince, she has been residing in the said property. 15.1.5. Believing the words of Mathe Kotaiah, the petitioner and her mother could not press him for execution of the registered sale deed. She spent large amounts for improvements of the house. Mathe Kotaiah and the petitioner’s mother Thalasila Agravani died. Mathe Srilakshmi W/o.Kotaiah tried to dispossess the petitioner illegally. 15.1.6. The petitioner filed a suit in CFR No. 2471 of 1991 for permanent injunction which was dismissed and then she preferred CRP No. 2165 of 1991, which was admitted and pending on the file of this Court. 15.1.7. The petitioner, who is a third party, did not know the litigation that took place between her mother Thalasila Agravani and Thota Venkayamma-Decree-holder and Mathe Kotaiah Judgmentdebtor and that the same will not bind on her since she was not a party to those proceedings. 15.1.8. Thota Venkayamma-Decree-holder cannot claim any right in the property since it is in the possession of the petitioner since 1965. If she claims any right, she must file a suit for declaration and possession. 15.1.9. 15.1.8. Thota Venkayamma-Decree-holder cannot claim any right in the property since it is in the possession of the petitioner since 1965. If she claims any right, she must file a suit for declaration and possession. 15.1.9. The sale of schedule property held on 25.11.1968 is vitiated by material irregularity and fraud as the auction purchaser failed to deposit 1/4th of the amount. But the Court conducted the sale on the next date without payment of continuation batta and notice to the judgment-debtor or intending purchasers. 15.1.10. Thota Venkayamma/decree-holder obtained order of delivery in the Court by suppressing the material facts in EA No. 328 of 1969 in collusion with the Judgment debtor to dispossess the petitioner from her property. The petitioner has perfected her title by adverse possession and hence property cannot be delivered to Thota Venkayamma/ decree-holder. 15.1.11. Reliefs pleaded in the petition: (a) To record the intention of the petitioner to resist or obstruct the delivery of the schedule property to the auction purchaser. (b) Not to deliver the property, till her application was finally adjudicated, vide Order-XXI Rule-101 CPC. 15.2. Counter filed by Respondent No. 4-Lingineni Lakshmi Sundari D/o. Decree-holder- Thota Venkayamma: 15.2.1. E.A. No. 90 of 1981 filed by Petitioner/Gaddipati Bullemma, challenging the auction, was dismissed. The petitioner has no right to file the petition as she has no right in the property, be it Petitioner or her mother. Petitioner’s mother Thalasila Agravani filed several suits and appeals on the same issues and all those were enquired and dismissed. 15.2.2. The petitioner is a rowdy, having large following of unruly elements. The petitioner obstructed the decree-holder/Thota Venkayamma when she visited the property along with the police aid and by court orders. Only to drag on the matter, the petition has been filed by making false contentions. 15.2.3. It is further stated that her mother Venkayamma could not take possession of the property till her death, despite the court orders and police aid. Now she is also being obstructed from taking possession. 16. Points framed in E.A. No. 144 of 1998: (1) Whether the petitioner is entitled to resist the delivery of EP schedule property to the respondent No. 1/decree-holder? (2) To what relief? 17. Findings of the Court in E.A. No. 144 of 1998: 17.1. Now she is also being obstructed from taking possession. 16. Points framed in E.A. No. 144 of 1998: (1) Whether the petitioner is entitled to resist the delivery of EP schedule property to the respondent No. 1/decree-holder? (2) To what relief? 17. Findings of the Court in E.A. No. 144 of 1998: 17.1. The claim of the petitioner that she is entitled to resist the delivery cannot be allowed to stand in view of the findings given in O.S. No. 117 of 1994 and the petitioner is not entitled to question the same at this belated stage. 17.2. The auction conducted on 26.11.1968, whereas, the petitioner has questioned about the validity of the same in the year 1991 that price was very low. The conduct of the petitioner does not entitle her to question the sale at this belated stage and apart from that, she has no interest in the property. 17.3. The scheduled property is a house property and it is not the case of the petitioner that it can be divided and some portion of the property is sufficient to meet the fruits of the decree. 18. With the above findings, the E.A. was dismissed with costs. GROUNDS OF APPEAL 19. Next, it is essential to deal with the grounds urged for filing of the Appeals, as against the orders passed in O.S. and E.A. Grounds of Appeal Before this Court in A.S. 20. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment in O.S. No. 117 of 1994, A.S. No. 2398 of 2000 is preferred on the following grounds: 20.1. Learned trial Judge in the entire Judgment, got carried away by the earlier orders, of which appellant has no knowledge as it was between her mother and Thota Venkayamma/decree-holder. 20.2. Learned trial Judge ought to have decreed the suit by giving an independent finding on the issue of possession and title, when appellant is not a party to the earlier suits filed by her mother and as such applying principle of res judicata is not correct. 20.3. Learned trial Judge ought to have examined the case in right perspective that the suits filed by her mother were dismissed only on the ground that the original of Ex. A1 is not forthcoming and is not a genuine document as the same is not supported by any link document. 20.3. Learned trial Judge ought to have examined the case in right perspective that the suits filed by her mother were dismissed only on the ground that the original of Ex. A1 is not forthcoming and is not a genuine document as the same is not supported by any link document. Appellant herein filed registered sale deed relating to the subject property vide Ex.A3 which is a link document of title in favour of late Mathe Kotaiah, which clearly establishes the fact that the appellant purchased the property in her mother’s name and in token of that the original sale deed was also given. It establishes the possession of the appellant coupled with document. 20.4. Learned trial Judge failed to observe that in the plaint it is clearly stated that the mother of the appellant was an illiterate and she did not have any other property or income to raise the funds for purchasing the schedule property which is clear from the evidence of PW-5. Appellant’s mother being an illiterate, failed to produce Ex.A3 in the earlier litigation. 20.5. Learned trial Judge ought to have believed the evidence of PW-2, who is the son of attestor on Ex.A1. 20.6. Learned trial Judge failed in appreciating the fact that the subject property was purchased by her mother out of the amounts given as pasupukumkuma at the time of her marriage, which is supported by the evidence of PWs. 3 to 5. 20.7. Learned trial Judge failed to observe that the appellant has been in possession of the property, for three and half decades and even after the death of Mathe Kotaiah, his wife Mathe Srilakshmi did not raise any objection to Appellant’s possession. As such, though the Court disbelieved the agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965, the suit ought to have been decreed, declaring the title of the appellant by adverse possession. 20.8. Learned trial Judge ought to have observed that conducting re-auction is against the procedure prescribed and that the sale conducted is vitiated by material irregularity and fraud and Court ought to have observed that the amount decreed is only Rs.700/- and odd, whereas, the subject property is a big building and it is a part of the house which has to be put to auction, but not the entire property. Grounds of Appeal Before this Court in C.M.A. 21. Grounds of Appeal Before this Court in C.M.A. 21. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment in E.A. No. 144 of 1998, the Appellant preferred C.M.A. No. 2970 of 2000 on the following grounds: 21.1. Learned trial Judge without giving a clear finding in E.A. No. 144 of 1998 dismissed the petition on the premise that he has given a finding in the suit. 21.2. Learned trial Judge failed to observe the original link document of title Ex.A3 was handed over while entering into agreement of sale by their vendor, which establishes that the sale is complete and vendee was put in possession of the schedule property. 21.3. Learned trial Judge ought to have observed that the appellant and her mother are in possession of the property since 1965 i.e. from the date of agreement. Appellant has perfected her title due to her continuous possession to the knowledge of the respondents. 21.4. Learned trial Judge got carried away by various earlier judgments in cases filed by appellant’s mother, wherein the appellant is not a party and failed to observe that Ex.A3 was not filed in earlier suits. 21.5. Learned trial Judge failed to observe that the possession of the appellant over the property is by virtue of agreement coupled with the linked document of title. 21.6. The sale conducted in the execution petition is vitiated as due procedure is not followed as Learned trial Judge failed to see that late Mathe Kotaiah deposited the decretal amount in the court in 1968 which satisfies the decree obtained by Thota Venkayamma. 21.7. Learned Judge failed to discuss anything about Ex.A3 which is vital document which establishes the genuineness of the agreement of sale. 21.8. Learned trial Judge failed to appreciate the stand of the respondent in the counter that late Mathe Kotaiah was living with Thalasila Agravani/mother of the appellant, as such, the earlier suits are collusive and made to defraud the appellant herein in the guise of objecting the execution proceedings as such, the question of res judicata does not arise. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AT THE BAR A.S. No. 2398 of 2000 Heard Sri Satyanarayana Nimmala, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant and Sri K.V. Subrahmanya Narusu, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 3. Though notice was served on Respondent No. 2, none appeared on her behalf. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AT THE BAR A.S. No. 2398 of 2000 Heard Sri Satyanarayana Nimmala, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant and Sri K.V. Subrahmanya Narusu, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 3. Though notice was served on Respondent No. 2, none appeared on her behalf. C.M.A. No. 2970 of 2000 Heard Sri Satyanarayana Nimmala, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant and Sri K.V. Subrahmanya Narusu, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 4. Though notice was served on Respondent No. 3, none appeared on her behalf. 22. By the Appellant’s Counsel: 22.1. Learned counsel for Appellant/Third Party Claimant/Bullemma, in elaboration to what was stated in the Memorandum of Grounds, would submit that Bullemma got purchased the subject property in the name of her mother/Thalaila Agravani for Rs.15,000/- under a contract of sale and paid Rs.5,000/- on the even date of agreement i.e. 20.05.1965 and paid the remaining balance with interest i.e. Rs.10,500/- vide the terms of contract on 01.02.1966. It is also stated that the property was delivered to her mother-Thalasila Agravani, and the original title deed was also handed over to her mother by Mathe Kotaiah. It was thus contended that the petitioner along with her mother have been in possession of the property since 1965 as of her own right and as such, she is entitled for declaration of title. 22.2. Further, learned counsel would submit that the sale was knocked down in favour of the decree holder-Thota Venkayamma for Rs.4,100/- which is a very low price. Learned counsel would then point out that auction purchaser failed to deposit 1/4th amount on the date of sale and again on the next day, without fresh proclamation, the sale was conducted. Therefore, learned counsel urges that the sale conducted in gross utter violation of the procedure contemplated under Order-XXI of the Code. 22.3. Learned counsel would also contend that the executing court must sell only that portion of the property which is necessary to satisfy the decree but not the entire property and on the ground of violation of Order-XXI Rule-64 of the Code, sale has to be set aside. Saying so, it is stated that the entire property was sold away though it is not required. Saying so, it is stated that the entire property was sold away though it is not required. To buttress this contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in Ambati Narsayya v. M. Subbarao, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 693, Mangal Prasad v. Krishna Kumar Maheshwari, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 31, Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi v. Pujari Padmavathamma, 1977 (3) SCC 337 and S.P. Changalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, 1994 (1) SCC 1 . 23. By the Respondent’s Counsel: 23.1. Contrasting the arguments referred supra, learned counsel for the decree-holder would point out that Petitioner’s mother-Thalasila Agravani filed O.S. No. 60 of 1971 for permanent injunction, based on the agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965 which got dismissed vide Ex.B3 and she carried the matter in appeal in A.S. No. 65 of 1975 which was also dismissed on merits. It is further stated by the learned counsel that thereafter, Thalasila Agravani filed another suit O.S. No. 100 of 1979 for declaration of title, specific performance, protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and consequential injunction that was also dismissed. She carried the matter in appeal A.S. No. 47 of 1984, which was dismissed. 23.2. It is further submitted that the petitioner being the daughter of Thalasila Agravani filed the suit for injunction O.S. No. 107 of 1992 and then the present suit in O.S. No. 117 of 1994 which is a comprehensive suit, which is not maintainable and it is hit by res judicata. 23.3. It is urged by the learned counsel that though Gaddipati Bullemma is not a party in earlier rounds of litigations, when she is claiming her right by virtue of the agreement of sale, against which there is a clear finding, agitating on the very same claim in subsequent suits is an abuse of process of law. 23.4. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel that Thalasila Agravani also filed a claim petition, not to conduct the sale and then after the sale, to set aside the sale, which got dismissed. It is stated that she carried the matter in appeal and that was also dismissed and as such, the ignorance pleaded by the petitioner relating to earlier litigation is deliberate. 23.5. It is stated that she carried the matter in appeal and that was also dismissed and as such, the ignorance pleaded by the petitioner relating to earlier litigation is deliberate. 23.5. Learned counsel further submits that to overcome the execution proceedings, late Mathe Kotaiah introduced Thalasila Agravani to stall the proceedings and this is the fifth round of litigation to defeat the interest of the decree-holder. Though the decree-holder purchased the property in the year 1968, she could not enjoy the property and she lost her last breath. 23.6. Learned counsel further submits that the contentions raised by Gaddipati Bullemma relating to the conduct of the sale in the execution petition were answered by the executing Court several times in different applications filed by the Judgment debtor and Thalasila Agravani. 23.7. It is also contended by the learned counsel that the petitioner cannot claim adverse possession since the possession of her mother Thalasila Agravani in the subject property is subject to the litigation all through. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION Duty of the Appellate Court 24. Undoubtedly, a first Appeal is a valuable right of a party to lis and for this reason, the Judgment in such Appeal must reflect conscious application of mind backed by reasons on all the issues and contentions put forth by the parties. Thus, an Appellate Court should have regard to the vital aspects and considerations. This is reflective in the wording of Section 107 (2) of the Code and by the catena of precedents. It is relevant to discuss a few. 25. A Three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 reiterated the settled principle of an appellate court’s duty, by referring to the decision rendered in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 as follows: “6. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 : JT (2001) 2 SC 407 this Court opined: (SCC pp. 188-189, Para 15) “The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. 188-189, Para 15) “The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court......while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it.” (Emphasis supplied) 26. It is beneficial to extract the passage referred in Shasidhar v. Ashwini Uma Mathad, (2015) 11 SCC 269 which referred to the observations made by his Lordship Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer on the duty of an appellate court, which reads thus: “11. As far back in 1969, the learned Judge - V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (as His Lordship then was the Judge of the Kerala High Court) while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 CPC in Kurian Chacko v. Varkey Ouseph, 1968 SCC Online Ker 101 : AIR 1969 Ker 316 , reminded the first appellate court of its duty as to how the first appeal under Section 96 should be decided. In his distinctive style of writing and subtle power of expression, the learned Judge held as under: (SCC Online Ker Paras 1-3) “1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two courts, has come up here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The defendant disputed the plaintiff's title to the property as also his possession and claimed both in himself. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, recorded findings against the plaintiff both on title and possession. But, in appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter glibly and briefly, in a few sentences. 2. An appellate court is the final court of fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled to a full and fair and independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate stage. But, in appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter glibly and briefly, in a few sentences. 2. An appellate court is the final court of fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled to a full and fair and independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate stage. Anything less than this is unjust to him and I have no doubt that in the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen far short of what is expected of him as an appellate court. 3. Although there is furious contest between the counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, they appear to agree with me in this observation.” (Emphasis supplied) 27. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in U. Manjunath Rao v. U. Chandrashekar, (2017) 15 SCC 309 also emphasised on the duty of the first appellate courts exhaustively. The relevant extracts read thus: “7. It is well settled in law that the reason is the life of law. It is that filament that injects soul to the judgment. Absence of analysis not only evinces non-application of mind but mummifies the core spirit of the judgment. A Judge has to constantly remind himself that absence of reason in the process of adjudication makes the ultimate decision pregnable. While dealing with the first appeal preferred under Section 96 CPC, the Court in State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 652 took note of the exception to the judgment passed by the first appellate court by observing that there was no due or proper application of mind or any critical analysis or objective consideration of the matter, despite the same being the first appellate court. *** *** *** 11. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243 , the two-Judge Bench ruled: (SCC p. 244, Para 3) “3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title. The order of the High Court is cryptic and the same is without assigning any reason.” The said principle has been reiterated in SBI v. Emmsons International Ltd. (2011) 12 SCC 174 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 289. Thus, in the first appeal the parties have the right to be heard both on the questions of facts as well as on law and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all the aspects and decide the case by ascribing reasons.” (Emphasis supplied) 28. Keeping in mind the precedential law, having heard submissions on behalf of both the parties and on perusal of the material available on record, the following points would emerge for determination: (I) Whether Appellant has locus standi to file O.S. No. 117 of 1994, when the contract of sale dated 20.02.1965 stands in the name of her mother Thalasila Agravani, who lost litigations based on the very same agreement? (II) Whether the findings in the earlier Judgments and decrees in the suits filed by late Thalasila Agravani are binding on the Appellant, being her daughter, and operate as res judicata, even if she was not a party to such suits? (III) Whether the Appellant/Gaddipati Bullemma entitled to have title based on adverse possession? (IV) Whether the Appellant/Gaddipati Bullemma is entitled for declaration of title that she is absolute owner of the property and consequently, for permanent injunction? (V) Whether the sale which was knocked down in favour of Thota Venkayamma/Decree Holder, dated 26.11.1968 is in contravention of the procedure contemplated under Order XXI of the Code? If so, whether it is null and void? Whether the Appellant can resist the delivery of the schedule property to the auction purchaser? (V) Whether the sale which was knocked down in favour of Thota Venkayamma/Decree Holder, dated 26.11.1968 is in contravention of the procedure contemplated under Order XXI of the Code? If so, whether it is null and void? Whether the Appellant can resist the delivery of the schedule property to the auction purchaser? (VI) Whether the Appellant/Gaddipati Bullemma is entitled to deposit the sale amount with 24% interest on the plea of equity due to long possession over the property? (VII) Whether the impugned common Judgment passed by the trial court is sustainable on facts and on law or any interference is required in these Appeals? DETERMINATION BY THE COURT 29. Before answering the points referred to supra, it is beneficial to refer to the undisputed facts borne-out by the record: 29.1. Schedule property is situated in Guntur District Cherukupalli Sub District and Village gramakantam and is an extent of Ac. 0.10 cents equivalent to 404.69 square meters, house site and terraced building therein bounded by: East: Road South: Visam Ramulu, Pedda Venkata Subba Rao and Others West: Government Bazar North: Movva Venkateswarlu 29.2. Mathe Kotaiah borrowed an amount of Rs.500/- from Thota Venkayamma on 20.10.1956 and executed a promissory note in her favour evidencing the same. 29.3. On 05.10.1958, Mathe Kotaiah purchased the scheduled property from Basavaraju Manikyamma vide Ex.A.3. 29.4. On 19.03.1962, Thota Venkayamma filed O.S. No. 68 of 1962 for recovery of the amount under the promissory note against Mathe Kotaiah and obtained decree on 07.09.1962. 29.5. On 15.02.1963, Thota Venkayamma filed E.P. No. 99 of 1963 for arrest of Mathe Kotaiah, which was dismissed on 14.08.1963 as he was not found. 29.6. On 06.11.1964, Thota Venkayamma filed another E.P. No. 623 of 1964 for attachment of Decree in O.S. No. 230/1963 obtained by Mathe Kotaiah against the third party, which was closed as the J.Dr in O.S. No. 230/1963 filed insolvency petition. 29.7. On 16.08.1965, Thota Venkayamma filed E.P. No. 537 of 1965 seeking attachment and sale of the scheduled property. On 12.09.1965, the attachment of the subject property was effected in the execution proceedings. First round of litigation - Before the Sale 30. In the first round before the sale, Mathe Kotaiah/J.Dr., made the following efforts to stop the sale of the property that was attached by following means: 30.1. On 12.09.1965, the attachment of the subject property was effected in the execution proceedings. First round of litigation - Before the Sale 30. In the first round before the sale, Mathe Kotaiah/J.Dr., made the following efforts to stop the sale of the property that was attached by following means: 30.1. Mathe Kotaiah got filed a suit by third party one D. Krishna Murthy vide O.S. No. 376 of 1966 and obtained stay order in I.A. No. 447 of 1968 and got attached the scheduled property of this case. Ultimately, this suit was dismissed. 30.2. Thalasila Agravani, mother of the Appellant herein, filed E.A. No. 248 of 1966 claiming her right over the property, based on agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965. This application was dismissed on 21.03.1966. 30.3. Mathe Kotaiah filed E.A. No. 249 of 1966 to stop the sale. This Application was dismissed on 21.03.1966. 30.4. Thota Venkayamma decree holder filed a petition in E.A. No. 178 of 1966 under Order XXI Rule-72 of the Code and obtained permission to participate in the auction. Second round of litigation - After the Sale 31. After the sale was knocked down in favour of Thota Venkayamma on 26.11.1968, efforts to stop the D.Hr. from enjoying the fruits of the were decree continued. 32. Sale confirmed on 20.03.1969 and sale certificate was issued on 20.03.1969 and was accordingly engrossed. E.A. No. 328 of 1969 was filed by Thota Venkayamma/ decree-holder/auction purchaser for delivery of property on 10.04.1969. 32.1. E.A No. 645 of 1969 was filed by Mathe Kotaiah to stay the delivery of property, which was dismissed on 01.08.1969. Thereafter, he filed E.A. No. 346 of 1969 to review the order, which was dismissed. On this, preferred C.R.P. Nos. 1245 and 1246 of 1969 and the same were dismissed on 24.09.1970. 32.2. When the Amin went to deliver the property, Mathe Kotaiah/Judgment debtor raised objection and got filed OS No. 60 of 1971 through Thalasila Agravani. 32.3. Vide Ex.B-1, O.S. No. 60 of 1971 [On the file of learned Principal District Munsif, Repalle] was filed by Thalasila Agravani/third party claimant against Mathe Kotaiah/J.Dr and Thota Venkayamma/D.Hr for permanent injunction based on the contract of agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965. Mathe Kotaiah was set ex-parte and Thota Venkayamma/J.Dr contested the suit by filing a written statement. This suit was dismissed on merits with costs on 11.04.1975. 32.4. Mathe Kotaiah was set ex-parte and Thota Venkayamma/J.Dr contested the suit by filing a written statement. This suit was dismissed on merits with costs on 11.04.1975. 32.4. O.S. No. 400/1974 [On the file of learned Principal District Munsif, Repalle] was filed by Thota Venkayamma/D.Hr challenging E.A. No. 376 of 1971 in E.A. No. 328 of 1969, and was tried together with O.S. No. 60 of 1971. It is pertinent to mention that Appellant/Bullemma herein was Defendant No. 2 in O.S. No. 400/1974 and was represented by an Advocate. This suit was decreed in favour of Thota Venkayamma with costs. 32.5. Being aggrieved by the common judgment, Thalasila Agravani preferred A.S. No. 88 of 1975 and A.S. No. 64 of 1975. [On the file of Additional Subordinate Judge, Tenali] Vide, Ex. B-2, these appeals were dismissed on 04.07.1977. Third Round of Litigation - At the time of Delivery 33. Once again, for the third time, attempts were made to obstruct the delivery of property. 33.1. Thota Venkayamma after dismissal of appeal preferred against O.S. No. 400/1974, filed E.A. No. 477 of 1977 for reviving her delivery petition that is E.A. No. 329 of 1969 which was allowed on 05.08.1977 and executing Court ordered delivery on 31.08.1977. 33.2. Mathe Kotaiah again filed E.A. No. 490 of 1977 challenging the order of delivery which was dismissed on 17.01.1978. 33.3. Mathe Kotaiah got filed a suit by his brother and mother in O.S. No. 11 of 1978 and obtained ex-parte injunction in I.A. No. 258 of 1978 which was dismissed after enquiry on 12.09.1978. He preferred C.M.P. No. 12402 of 1978 in C.M.A. No. 1459 of 1978 before the High Court, which was dismissed. Then the executing court entrusted the warrant of delivery along with necessary police help dated 02.08.1978. 33.4. Mathe Kotaiah filed E.A. No. 68 of 1978 to stop the delivery stating that he was obtaining an order from the High Court. But no such order was received and that petition was dismissed. 33.5. Thereafter, Thalasila Agravani filed O.S. No. 100 of 1979 seeking the following reliefs: (a) Declaration that she has a right under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act a) Injunction not to dispossess. (b) Alternative plea of specific performance of contract dated 20.02.1965 to put her in possession. 33.6. 33.5. Thereafter, Thalasila Agravani filed O.S. No. 100 of 1979 seeking the following reliefs: (a) Declaration that she has a right under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act a) Injunction not to dispossess. (b) Alternative plea of specific performance of contract dated 20.02.1965 to put her in possession. 33.6. Once again, in this suit, the question of res judicata was in issue and on 23.02.1984, the said O.S. No. 100/1979 was dismissed with compensatory costs. Thereafter, she preferred A.S. No. 47/1984 [On the file of III Additional District Judge, Guntur] which got dismissed with costs on 21.09.1989. 33.7. Meanwhile, Mathe Kotaiah filed E.A. No. 90 of 1981 [Transferred to III Additional District Judge’s Court, Guntur and renumbered as E.A. No. 40 of 1985] under Section 47 of the Code, This E.A. was dismissed. Thereafter, he preferred C.M.A. No. 1658 of 1989 before this Court, which was dismissed on 23.02.1994. Fourth round of litigation - Subject Matter of the Appeals 34. A series of suits and E.A. followed once again in the fourth level. In this round, not many original parties in the litigation survived, but the lis did. 34.1. After the death of Thalasila Agravani, her daughter Gaddipati Bullemma filed O.S. No. 117 of 1994, which got dismissed vide common judgment. This is impugned in this A.S. No. 2938 of 2000. 34.2. Gaddipati Bullemma also filed O.S. No. 107 of 1992 for permanent injunction, which was transferred and renumbered as O.S. No. 49 of 1998, which is dismissed, vide common judgment and no appeal is preferred. 34.3. O.S. No. 120 of 1984 was filed by Thota Venkayamma for recovery of rents, profits, by way of damages for use and occupation of the property from the date of sale. During the pendency of this suit, Thota Venkayamma died. Her daughter Lakshmi Sundari came on record and thereafter not pressed the suit and it was dismissed by common Judgment. 34.4. E.A. No. 370 of 1991 filed by Gaddipati Bullemma, daughter of Thalasila Agravani, transferred and renumbered as E.A. No. 144 of 1998 seeking to record resistance against delivery of property, got dismissed. Feeling aggrieved thereby, Gaddipati Bullemma brought the matter in C.M.A. No. 2970 of 2000 before the High Court. Point Nos. I & II 35. 34.4. E.A. No. 370 of 1991 filed by Gaddipati Bullemma, daughter of Thalasila Agravani, transferred and renumbered as E.A. No. 144 of 1998 seeking to record resistance against delivery of property, got dismissed. Feeling aggrieved thereby, Gaddipati Bullemma brought the matter in C.M.A. No. 2970 of 2000 before the High Court. Point Nos. I & II 35. In these points, the determination must focus on whether the Appellant had locus standi to file the suit and whether the previous litigations based on agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965 hit the present suit with res judicata. As these points are intertwined, they are dealt together. 36. It is the plea of Gaddipati Bullemma/Appellant that, in the suit, learned trial Judge without examining her case independently, got carried away by the findings in the earlier litigation between Thalasila Agravani, her mother, Mathe Kotaiah/J.Dr. and Thota Venkayamma/D.Hr wherein, she was not a party and as such it is not binding on her. 37. The trial Judge negatived the plea holding that the suit is hit by the principles of res judicata since in the earlier rounds of litigation, the agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965 was found to be not genuine and based on the very same agreement, Appellant could not restart litigation again. Doctrine of Res Judicata and its Application 38. At this juncture, it is essential to deal with the settled principles of law with respect to res judicata and its application in situations like in the instant case. 39. The maxim “Res judicata pro veritateaccipitur” (i.e. a thing adjudged must be taken as truth) over the time got to be referred as Doctrine of Res Judicata. The primary objective of the doctrine of Res Judicata is to uphold the rule of conclusiveness of a judgment, as on the points raised and decided, be it on law or fact, or a mix of both, in every subsequent civil proceeding between the same parties. The doctrine is crystallised based on maxims “Interest reipublicaeut sit finislitium” (i.e. in the interest of state, there be an end to law suits) and “Nemo debet bis vexari pro una at eadam causa” (i.e. no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause). 40. The doctrine is crystallised based on maxims “Interest reipublicaeut sit finislitium” (i.e. in the interest of state, there be an end to law suits) and “Nemo debet bis vexari pro una at eadam causa” (i.e. no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause). 40. In M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 408 the Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to highlight the historic relevance and pertinence of the doctrine of res judicata and it is as follows: “13. That principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might result under the colour and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitive suits and actions. This may compel the weaker party to relinquish his right. The doctrine of res judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived that the plea of res judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation. This principle seeks to promote honesty and a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse in the matter of accessing court for agitating on issues which have become final between the parties. 14. Tek Chand, J. delivering the unanimous Full Bench decision in Lachhmi v. Bhulli, ILR (1927) 8 Lah 384 traced the history of this doctrine both in Hindu and Mohammedan jurisprudence as follows: (ILR pp. 391-392) “In the Mitakshra (Book II, Chapter I, Section V, verse 5) one of the four kinds of effective answers to a suit is ‘a plea by former judgment’ and in verse 10, Katyayana is quoted as laying down that ‘one against whom a judgment had formerly been given, if he brings forward the matter again, must be answered by a plea of purvanyaya or former judgment’ (Macnaughten and Colebrooke's translation, p. 22). The doctrine, however, seems to have been recognised much earlier in Hindu jurisprudence, judging from the fact that both Smriti Chandrika (Mysore Edn. pp. 97-98) and Virmitrodaya (Vidya-Sagar Edn. The doctrine, however, seems to have been recognised much earlier in Hindu jurisprudence, judging from the fact that both Smriti Chandrika (Mysore Edn. pp. 97-98) and Virmitrodaya (Vidya-Sagar Edn. p. 77) base the defence of prang nyaya (former decision) on the following text of the ancient law-giver Harita, who is believed by some Orientalists to have flourished in the 9th century BC and whose Smriti is now extant only in fragments: “The plaintiff should be non-suited if the defendant avers: “in this very affair, there was litigation between him and myself previously” and it is found that the plaintiff had lost his case.” There are texts of Prasara (Bengal Asiatic Society Edn. p. 56) and of Mayukha (Kane's Edn. p. 15) to the same effect. Among Muhammadan law-givers similar effect was given to the plea of ‘Niza-i-munfasla’ or ‘Amar Mania taqrirmukhalif’. Under Roman Law, as administered by the Proetors' courts, a defendant could repel the plaintiff's claim by means of exceptio rei judicatoe or plea of former judgment. The subject received considerable attention at the hands of Roman jurists and as stated in Roby's Roman Private Law (Vol. II, p. 338) the general principle recognised was that ‘one suit and one decision was enough for any single dispute’ and that a matter once brought to trial should not be tried except, of course, by way of appeal.” (Emphasis supplied) 41. Section 11 of the Code embodies this doctrine as follows: Section 11 - Res Judicata No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation I - The expression “former suit” shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto. Explanation II - For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court. Explanation II - For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court. Explanation III - The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other. Explanation IV - Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. Explanation V - Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused. Explanation VI - Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. Explanation VII - The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and references in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to a proceeding for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree. Explanation VIII - An issue heard and finally decided by a court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised. 42. A bare reading of Section 11 of the Code would imply the following to be its ingredients: (a) Matter in issue in the subsequent suit must be directly and substantially in issue, either actually (Explanation III) or constructively (Explanation IV) in the former suit. (b) The former suit must have been between the same parties or parties under whom they or any of them claim. (Explanation VI is to be read with this condition) (c) Parties thereon must have litigated under the same title. (b) The former suit must have been between the same parties or parties under whom they or any of them claim. (Explanation VI is to be read with this condition) (c) Parties thereon must have litigated under the same title. (d) The Court which decided the former suit, must be competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised. (Explanation II is to be read with this condition) (e) Matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the court in the former suit. (Explanation V is to be read with this condition) 43. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Jamia Masjid v. K.V. Rudrappa, (2022) 9 SCC 225 devised the following tests to determine on the conclusive decision in a previous suit, as follows: “48. In view of the authorities cited above, the twin test that is used for the identification of whether an issue has been conclusively decided in the previous suit is: (A) Whether the adjudication of the issue was “necessary” for deciding on the principal issue (“the necessity test”). (B) Whether the judgment in the suit is based upon the decision on that issue (“the essentiality test”).” (Emphasis supplied) 44. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yadaiah v. State of Telangana, (2023) 10 SCC 755 observed as follows on when a determination operates as a res judicata: “52. By now it is a globally settled principle of common law jurisprudence that only determinations which are fundamental would result in the application of the doctrine of res judicata. [Justice K.R. Handley, Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley :The Doctrine of Res judicata (3rd Edn. Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 1996), pp. 103-107] Only those findings, without which the court cannot adjudicate a dispute and also form the vital cog in the reasoning of a definite conclusion on an issue on merits, constitute res judicata between the same set of parties in subsequent proceedings. However, in the process of arriving at a final conclusion, if the court makes any incidental, supplemental or non-essential observations which are not foundational to the final determination, the same would not tie down the hands of courts in future.” (Emphasis supplied) 45. However, in the process of arriving at a final conclusion, if the court makes any incidental, supplemental or non-essential observations which are not foundational to the final determination, the same would not tie down the hands of courts in future.” (Emphasis supplied) 45. It is beneficial to refer to a Division Bench decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in The Bangalore Development Authority and another v. The Principal Secretary and others, W.A. No. 4121 of 2017, High Court of Karnataka dated 24.05.2022 wherein it was held that a son is bound by the judicial proceedings initiated by his father with regard to the same subject property in an earlier litigation. The relevant portion at Para 11 reads thus: “11. It is trite law that principles of constructive res judicata and res judicata apply to writ proceeding. [See: Daryao vs. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1457 , Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. vs. Government of Madras, AIR 1968 SC 1196 , Shankar Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. V.M. Prabhakar and Others, (2011) 5 SCC 607 and State of Karnataka vs. All India Manufacturer’s Organisation, AIR 2006 SC 1846 ]. In the instant case, admittedly, the father of theoriginal petitioner had filed the writ petition challenging the validity of preliminary and final notification dated 21.03.1977 and 14.05.1980 which was dismissed by learned Single Judge by an order dated 06.08.1986. Thus, the original petitioner who claims title in respect of property in question through his father is bound by the decision of previous writ petition and cannot be permitted to agitate the validity of the impugned notifications dated 21.03.1977 and 14.05.1980 again on the principle of res judicata. Thus, the challenge to the aforesaid notification is barred by principles of res judicata” (Emphasis supplied) 46. Further, in Chandrakant Narayan Salvi v. Chandrakant Krushna Kumbhar and Ors. 2022 Live Law (Bom) 395 a learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court in a Second Appeal upheld the findings of the courts therein, to the effect that the plaintiff/Appellant filed the suit, claiming through his mother, who already filed an earlier suit, and therefore such plaintiff’s suit is hit by res judicata. 47. 2022 Live Law (Bom) 395 a learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court in a Second Appeal upheld the findings of the courts therein, to the effect that the plaintiff/Appellant filed the suit, claiming through his mother, who already filed an earlier suit, and therefore such plaintiff’s suit is hit by res judicata. 47. From the above two decisions, it is a clear view that if a son/daughter files a subsequent suit, even after his parent filed a previous suit with the very same contention, the Doctrine of res judicata comes into operation and the subsequent suit would run foul to Section 11 of C.P.C. subject to satisfaction of the other conditions stipulated. 48. To investigate as to whether the instant suit filed by the Appellant for declaration of title, injunction and setting aside of sale is hit by the doctrine of res judicata or not, it is essential to see if the present case satisfies the ingredients and the precedents discussed supra. 49. In Jamia Masjid (referred supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court devised the ‘Necessity test’ and ‘essentiality test’ to check if an issue has been conclusively decided in the previous suit or not. Therefore, it has to be seen whether the decisions in the previous suits have in fact, touched upon the agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965 and if the decision therein was based on the validity of the same. 50. O.S. No. 60/1971 [Discussed in second round of litigation supra] is a suit filed for permanent injunction based on the contract of agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965. It is the plea of Plaintiff/Thalasila Agravani (mother of the Appellant) that she purchased the property through agreement dated 20.02.1965 from J.Dr./Mathe Kotaiah. Thota Venkayamma/D.Hr. also was impleaded as second defendant. Thalasila Agravani claimed that she has been in possession and enjoyment of property as absolute owner. It is elicited that the said property was purchased pursuant to sale of a few properties, which fetched Rs.40,000/-. In this suit, it is also her plea that D.Hr. has obtained money decree against J.Dr., brought the property to the sale and purchased it as if it belonged to J.Dr and that all the proceedings are subsequent to her purchase and are not binding on her. It was also stated that in pursuance to the court sale, D.Hr. is trying to take possession of the property. 51. has obtained money decree against J.Dr., brought the property to the sale and purchased it as if it belonged to J.Dr and that all the proceedings are subsequent to her purchase and are not binding on her. It was also stated that in pursuance to the court sale, D.Hr. is trying to take possession of the property. 51. It is necessary to refer to one of the issues framed in this suit O.S. No. 60 of 1971 i.e. whether the alleged suit contract is true supported by consideration and valid under law. The trial court on an exhaustive appreciation of evidence on record, held that Ex.A-18 i.e. agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965 “is not true and supported by consideration and so not valid under law.” The Appeal preferred against the said judgment was also dismissed on 04.07.1977, marked as Ex.B-2 in the instant suit. 52. By virtue of Ex.B-1, it is pertinent to mention that in O.S. No. 60 of 1971, Thalasila Agravani deposed as PW-2 and Thota Venkayamma/J.Dr deposed as DW-3. Some of the documents marked herein were also part of the record in O.S. No. 60/1971. Ex.A1/payment endorsement was marked as Ex.A-19 in O.S. No. 60 of 1971; the contract of sale dated 20.02.1965 was marked as Ex.A-18 and Ex.A-3/link document of title was marked as Ex-A27 in O.S. No. 60 of 1971. 53. It is also interesting to recollect that O.S. No. 400 of 1974, filed by Thota Venkayamma was also tried along with O.S. No. 60 of 1971, in which Gaddipati Bullemma was also a party as Defendant No. 2. Therefore, taking plea that she was not a party of the earlier rounds of litigation and decisions in suits involved her mother and not her, and they do not attract res judicata, is untenable. 54. Next, it is relevant to chalk out the findings given in O.S. No. 100 of 1979, vide Ex.B-3. O.S. No. 100 of 1979 is comprehensive suit [Discussed in third round of litigation] filed by Thalasila Agravani against Mathe Kotaiah/J.Dr. and Thota Venkayamma/D.Hr. as well. The issues framed in this suit clinch the issue in the present suit. Though Gaddipati Bullemma was not a party to the said suit, it was dismissed by awarding compensatory costs to Thota Venkayamma. 55. and Thota Venkayamma/D.Hr. as well. The issues framed in this suit clinch the issue in the present suit. Though Gaddipati Bullemma was not a party to the said suit, it was dismissed by awarding compensatory costs to Thota Venkayamma. 55. Once again, the first and foremost issue in O.S. No. 100 of 1979 was whether the agreement dated 20.02.1965 is true, supported by consideration and binds on the decree-holder or not. The trial Court therein discussed issues relating to protection of possession under Section 53-A of the T.P. Act, Specific Performance, Declaration of Title to hold that O.S. No. 100/1979 was hit by the application of res judicata by virtue of the common judgment passed in O.S. Nos. 60/71 and 400/1974. It was also observed by the trial court that though the plaintiff/Agravani was not in possession, O.S. No. 100/1974 was filed to create hurdles to the auction purchaser. It is pertinent to mention that the Appeal filed against the said judgment was also dismissed. 56. A common finding in both the above referred suits i.e. O.S. No. 60/1971 and O.S. No. 100 of 1979 filed by the mother of the Appellant herein, is to the effect that the agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965 is not true and supported by consideration. The necessity and essentiality tests as referred supra, also stand satisfied as the issue was decided on the very same agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965. In that view, the plea of the Appellant seeking declaration of title on the very same agreement is not tenable. 57. It is apposite to say that the principle of res judicata is not applicable in case of raising of a fresh cause of action. In that view, it is apt to analyse if the instant suit falls under this proposition. It is the plaintiff’s averment in the plaint of the present suit that she purchased the subject property in the name of her mother Thalasila Agravani, vide the agreement dated 20.02.1965, and that at the time of agreement, she was working as a teacher in Kurnool and she came down to Cherukupalli in 1969 and has been residing in the scheduled property. Admittedly, her pleadings in the suit do not disclose as to how she raised the funds and when such funds were given to her mother. 58. Admittedly, her pleadings in the suit do not disclose as to how she raised the funds and when such funds were given to her mother. 58. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff/Gaddipati Bullemma. The evidence of Gaddipati Bullemma as PW-1 is to the effect that her marriage took place on 31.05.1956 and at the time of marriage, her mother gave Rs.15,000/- which she gave to her mother for improvement and with that money, her mother purchased the said property. In the crossexamination, PW-1 stated that at the time of the endorsement of the remaining amount of sale consideration, her mother informed her that her money is being used in that way. 59. It is her evidence that when Amin came for attachment of the property in O.S. No. 68 of 1982 in E.P. No. 537 of 1965, she came to know that one Thota Venkayamma-decree holder filed a suit. She knew that her mother filed a suit for permanent injunction against Thota Venkayamma but does not remember the suit. She has admitted her knowledge about her mother prosecuting the matters in the Court. There is no documentary evidence to show that her mother purchased the property with her money. 60. Gaddipati Bullemma went to an extent to plead ignorance as to filing of E.A. No. 370 of 1991 saying that her mother obtained her signature. She, as PW-1, stated that basing on the contract, the present suit is filed, but not as legal representative of her mother. She further admits that they have raised obstruction in E.A. No. 324 of 1969 in the E.P. She, herself, filed a claim petition in the E.P. No. 567/1965 raising a claim which was dismissed. Her evidence on this point to the effect that her mother obtained her signature and she is not aware of the contents, cannot be accepted as truth. This is due to her own contention that her mother is an illiterate, whereas she is a teacher. 61. As seen from the execution proceedings, several times since 1971 delivery warrant has been entrusted the Amin and in turn, he could not execute the warrant even with the police aid. This is due to her own contention that her mother is an illiterate, whereas she is a teacher. 61. As seen from the execution proceedings, several times since 1971 delivery warrant has been entrusted the Amin and in turn, he could not execute the warrant even with the police aid. That being so, Gaddipati Bullemma and her ignorance about the earlier litigation holds no water since much water flown under the bridge from the date of the alleged agreement till the date of filing of the suit. 62. It is pertinent to note that after cross examination Gaddipati Bullemma was recalled for further chief examination and then, she deposed that after filing of O.S. No. 107 of 1992, she came to know about the litigation of her mother and the worth of the property was Rs.2,00,000/- Mathe Kotaiah got some other property. Then it was elicited in her cross-examination that she has no document to show that she spent any amount for carrying out repairs and also to show the value of the property as Rs.2,00,000/- on the date of sale. 63. Gaddipati Bullemma/PW-1 was recalled again for further chief examination and she stated that the auction conducted in E.P. is not valid and she is also claiming her rights, by way of adverse possession apart from the right under agreement of sale. Then, she again pleaded ignorance as to whether her objections in the E.P. were overruled in the claim petition. The contrasting evidence of Gaddipati Bullemma would construe that she is not a reliable witness and her only intention was to stall the execution proceedings by hook or crook. 64. PW-2 is the son of one of the attestor of agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965. The evidence of PW-2 is that he identified the signature of his father. This alone cannot be a ground to believe the story of the plaintiff that agreement is supported by consideration and is a genuine one. Because the duty of the attestor is to attest on the document evidencing the signature of the executant. It does not indicate that he has first-hand information about the contents of the document to decide its veracity. 65. PW-3 is a relative to the plaintiff. According to him, parents of Gaddipati Bullemma gave Rs.15,000/- to her father-in-law towards pasupukumkuma, in turn he gave it to her mother/Thalasila Agravani for improvement. It does not indicate that he has first-hand information about the contents of the document to decide its veracity. 65. PW-3 is a relative to the plaintiff. According to him, parents of Gaddipati Bullemma gave Rs.15,000/- to her father-in-law towards pasupukumkuma, in turn he gave it to her mother/Thalasila Agravani for improvement. In cross-examination, he stated that it was the amount, which was paid towards dowry to the father-in-law. 66. PW-4 is another relative to Gaddipati Bullemma. He further developed the case saying that parents of Gaddipati Bullemma gave Rs.15,000/- to the father-in-law of Gaddipati Bullemma through Purohit and later he returned the same to her parents asking them to improve the same. 67. PW-5 is also a relative to Gaddipati Bullemma. According to him, Thalasila Agravani used to give him loans on executing promissory notes. She told him that the property belongs to her daughter Gaddipati Bullemma. In cross-examination, it was elicited that no one was present at the time of taking the money or at the time of repayment of the money and no document is there evidencing the borrowing from Thalasila Agravani. 68. Coming to the evidence on behalf of defendant, Lingineni Lakshmi Sundari/daughter of Thota Venkayamma (Decree-holder) deposed as DW-1. She testified that she is the only daughter of Thota Venkayamma and she stated about the suit filed by her mother against Mathe Kotaiah, which was decreed and also stated that her mother purchased the scheduled property, but, could not get the delivery of the scheduled property. Through DW-1, Exs.B1 to B4 were the documents marked, which were discussed supra. 69. Coming to the cross-examination of DW-1, it is stated that on her personal assessment, she had stated the rental value of the scheduled property. It was suggested to her that the scheduled property will not fetch rental value of more than Rs.100/- or Rs.150/- per month, to which she flatly denied. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination of DW-1 to discredit her testimony. 70. It is apt to mention here that the plaintiff took a diametrically opposite stand in the evidence before the Court that at the time of her marriage, her parents presented Rs.15,000/- and with that money, she got purchased the property through her mother. Her evidence is further exaggerated by PWs. 70. It is apt to mention here that the plaintiff took a diametrically opposite stand in the evidence before the Court that at the time of her marriage, her parents presented Rs.15,000/- and with that money, she got purchased the property through her mother. Her evidence is further exaggerated by PWs. 3 and 4 who deposed that in her marriage Rs.15,000/- was given to her and she entrusted that amount to her father-in-law, who in turn, handed over the said amount to Thalasila Agravani for improvements. Admittedly, this evidence is a developed version without there being any pleading to that effect. 71. It is a settled proposition of the Code of Civil Procedure that no amount of evidence can be looked into, upon a plea, which was not put forth in pleadings. The purpose of providing exhaustive provisions within the Code on pleadings and issues, is to give a clear definition to the journey of the trial to avoid deviations. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Biraji v. Surya Pratap, (2020) 10 SCC 729 also reiterated the settled position that in the absence of pleading, no amount of evidence will help the party. It is also beneficial to refer to the decision rendered in V. Prabhakara v. Basavaraj K. and others, (2022) 1 SCC 115 wherein, extensive emphasis was made on this point as follows: “21. A relief can only be on the basis of the pleadings alone. Evidence is also to be based on such pleadings. The only exception would be when the parties know each other's case very well and such a pleading is implicit in an issue. Additionally, a court can take judicial note of a fact when it is so apparent on the face of the record. A useful reference can be made to the following passage in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, (2008) 17 SCC 491 (SCC pp. 497 & 500, paras 15 & 23) “15. Additionally, a court can take judicial note of a fact when it is so apparent on the face of the record. A useful reference can be made to the following passage in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, (2008) 17 SCC 491 (SCC pp. 497 & 500, paras 15 & 23) “15. The relevant principle relating to circumstances in which the deficiency in, or absence of, pleadings could be ignored, was stated by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735 : (AIR p. 738, Para 10) “10..........If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely, in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is: did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to rely upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the court cannot do injustice to another.” *** *** *** 23. [Ed.: Para 23 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./89/2009 dated 17-7-2009] It is fundamental that in a civil suit, relief to be granted can be only with reference to the prayers made in the pleadings. [Ed.: Para 23 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./89/2009 dated 17-7-2009] It is fundamental that in a civil suit, relief to be granted can be only with reference to the prayers made in the pleadings. That apart, in civil suits, grant of relief is circumscribed by various factors like court fee, limitation, parties to the suits, as also grounds barring relief, like res judicata, estoppel, acquiescence, non-joinder of causes of action or parties, etc. which require pleading and proof. Therefore, it would be hazardous to hold that in a civil suit whatever be the relief that is prayed, the court can on examination of facts grant any relief as it thinks fit. In a suit for recovery of rupees one lakh, the court cannot grant a decree for rupees ten lakhs. In a suit for recovery possession of property “A” court cannot grant possession of property “B.” In a suit praying for permanent injunction, court cannot grant a relief of declaration or possession. The jurisdiction to grant relief in a civil suit necessarily depends on the pleadings, prayer, court fee paid, evidence let in, etc.” (Emphasis supplied) 72. Thus, any amount of evidence without a pleading is of no avail. More so, the present suit is for declaration of title wherein, the burden is heavily cast upon the plaintiff to prove her title irrespective of the defence and the defects in the case of the defendants. Therefore, the introduction of a new plea in the evidence by Gaddipati Bullemma has no value in the eye of law. 73. As discussed earlier, the findings of the trial courts in the earlier proceedings relating to the agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965 is to the effect that the agreement is not supported by consideration and is not a valid document, but has been created to overcome the sale in the execution. It is relevant to mention that nothing prevented Thalasila Agravani from stating that the property purchased by her daughter in her name, nowhere in the earlier suits, the plea that Gaddipati Bullemma purchased the subject property in the name of her mother is taken. It is apt to say that the signature of Gaddipati Bullemma is not required on the agreement of sale and it is only Mathe Kothaiah, who signed on the agreement of sale. It is apt to say that the signature of Gaddipati Bullemma is not required on the agreement of sale and it is only Mathe Kothaiah, who signed on the agreement of sale. That being so, when Thalasila Agravani intends to purchase the property she can as well purchase in the name of her daughter because there is no hurdle in doing so. 74. Gaddipati Bullemma by filing Ex.A3-original link document of title of Mathe Kotaiah would indicate and probabalize the version of the decree-holder that because of the close intimacy with Thalasila Agravani, late Mathe Kotaiah created the agreement of sale and also kept the original document with Thalasila Agravani to overcome the sale proceedings in the execution petition. In fact, the act of Mathe Kotaiah alienating the property after passing of the decree against him in O.S. No. 68 of 1962 and after filing of two execution petitions by the decree-holder, itself demonstrates the intention of Mathe Kotaiah to protect his property and to evade the decree debt, this agreement of sale has been created. No doubt, late Mathe Kotaiah/judgement-debtor, who is vendor, never raised any dispute regarding the agreement of sale. The reason is obvious because he wanted to stall the execution proceedings initiated against him. 75. The intention of Mathe Kotaiah is clear since the decree-holder filed two execution petitions and could not realise a pie from the judgment debtor and then the present execution petition is filed for attachment and sale of the property. To avoid the execution, the agreement dated 20.02.1965 has been created in the name of Thalasila Agravani with whom he got close acquaintance as admitted by the plaintiff Gaddipati Bullemma in her pleadings itself. In that view, Mathe Kotaiah never objected Thalasila Agravani and her daughter to stay in that house. 76. The plaintiff being daughter of Thalasila Agravani claiming under the very same agreement which was examined by the Court several times, by introducing a new story that she purchased the property in the name of her mother after several decades, cannot be entertained. There must be some end to the litigation and the parties cannot take different pleas in different spells by filing suit after suit at different times, inviting the findings of the Court afresh, at their convenience. POINT No. III Adverse possession & Its Application 77. Adverse possession needs to be pleaded in clear terms with certainty. There must be some end to the litigation and the parties cannot take different pleas in different spells by filing suit after suit at different times, inviting the findings of the Court afresh, at their convenience. POINT No. III Adverse possession & Its Application 77. Adverse possession needs to be pleaded in clear terms with certainty. It is the case of the plaintiff that her possession over the property is out of a right that arose under an agreement of sale dated 20.02.1965 and that she is also claiming her rights, by way of adverse possession apart from the right under agreement of sale for residing in the subject property for the last 25 years. 78. It is a settled proposition of law that a party who is claiming adverse possession, must demonstrate and prove that his possession is “nec vi, nec clam, necprecario” i.e. peaceful, open and continuous. A five-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Siddiq (D) through LRs. v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors. (2020) 1 SCC 1 explained this settled principle as follows: “748. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous - possession which meets the requirement of being ‘nec vi nec claim and necprecario’. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 79. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Government of Kerala & Anr. v. Joseph and others, 2023 INSC 693 summarised the law governing adverse possession at Para 21. Relevant portion reads as under: “21.2 The person claiming adverse possession must show clear and cogent evidence substantiate such claim: This Court in Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, (1994) 6 SCC 591 (two-Judge Bench) held that: “5. A possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession.” 21.4....... A possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession.” 21.4....... (d) It was also held in the case of Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, (2010) 14 SCC 316 (two-Judge Bench): “15. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. Mere possession does not ripen into possessory title until the possessor holds the property adverse to the title of the true owner for the said purpose. The person who claims adverse possession is required to establish the date on which he came in possession, nature of possession, the factum of possession, knowledge to the true owner, duration of possession and that possession was open and undisturbed.....” (Emphasis supplied) 80. Therefore, to successfully claim adverse possession, it is necessary to show (a) the date on which the claimant came into possession; (b) nature of his possession; (c) knowledge of the factum of possession to the other party; (d) how long the possession has continued and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. 81. Though the agreement of sale turned to be a created one and not supported by any consideration, which is invalid in the eye of law, the plaintiff’s claim under the said agreement, disentitles her to claim her title under adverse possession. In Achal Reddy v. Ramakrishna Reddiar, 1991 (1) ALT (SC) 17 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that in the case of executory contract of sale where the transferee is put in possession of the property in pursuance of the agreement of sale and where the parties contemplate the execution of a regular registered sale deed, the purchaser’s possession is of a derivative character and is a clear recognition and acknowledgement of the possession of the vendor. As such, the possession of the purchaser in such a case is permissive in character and it does not amount to adverse possession. 82. Adverse possession implies that it commenced in wrong and is maintained against right. A party leading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. As such, the possession of the purchaser in such a case is permissive in character and it does not amount to adverse possession. 82. Adverse possession implies that it commenced in wrong and is maintained against right. A party leading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to prove his adverse possession. 83. Thota Venkayamma/D.Hr. has filed execution petition and got attached the property in the year 1965. It is the evidence of PW-1 that she knew about the litigation when the Amin came to the house to attach the property. Even otherwise, the pleadings would construe that since 1969, Appellant has been residing in the said house. That being so, her possession however long may be, during the pendency of the litigation pending before the Courts, by virtue of the litigation unfurled one after the other, either by Mathe Kotaiah or by Thalasila Agravani or through others caused hurdles for delivery of the property to the decree-holder and by no stretch of imagination, the claim of adverse possession, can be entertained. Appellant’s very claim of adverse possession is tainted with mala fides. 84. Thota Venkayamma, never kept quiet and she had been fighting for decades to realise the fruits of the decree but at last, she could not, till her last breath in 1997. On the other hand, the plaintiff-Gaddipati Bullemma and her mother took advantage of the litigation before the Court by obtaining orders before various Courts, dragging the issue for more than six decades. Possession of Gaddipati Bullemma over the property can never be treated as hostile to the real owner and since from the date of the sale i.e. 26.11.1968, Thota Venkayamma became the owner of the property having purchased it in a public auction. Though the sale certificate was issued after confirmation of the sale but the rights of the auction purchaser date backs to the date of the sale. In that view, the claim of adverse possession is not maintainable. 85. Accordingly, Point Answered. POINT No. IV 86. In view of the findings arrived supra at Point Nos. I to III, Appellant/Gaddipati Bullemma is not entitled for declaration of title that she is absolute owner of the property and consequently, for permanent injunction. In that view, the claim of adverse possession is not maintainable. 85. Accordingly, Point Answered. POINT No. IV 86. In view of the findings arrived supra at Point Nos. I to III, Appellant/Gaddipati Bullemma is not entitled for declaration of title that she is absolute owner of the property and consequently, for permanent injunction. Limitation for filing a Suit for Declaration of title 87. It is a very well settled proposition of law that in a suit for declaration of title and possession, the plaintiff could succeed only on the strength of his/her own title and that must be done through production of proper and cogent evidence. Thus, burden is on the plaintiff to make out and establish his case. 88. Suit for declaration of title relating to the subject property, in the instant case, is hopelessly barred by time. Needless to say, irrespective of the defence, the Court has to examine the point of limitation to entertain any matter. In Bharat Barrel and Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. ESI Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860 while discussing the object of Limitation Act, the Court observed that: “....The law of limitation appertains to remedies because the rule is that claims in respect of rights cannot be entertained if not commenced within the time prescribed by the statute in respect of that right. Apart from Legislative action prescribing the time, there is no period of limitation recognised under the general law and therefore any time fixed by the statute is necessarily to be arbitrary. A statute prescribing limitation however does not confer a right of action nor speaking generally does not confer on a person a right to relief which has been barred by efflux of time prescribed by the law. The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asseting them in a court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims While this is so there are two aspects of the statutes of limitation the one concerns the extinguishment of the right if a claim or action is not commenced with a particular time and the other merely bare the claim without affecting the right which either remains merely as a moral obligation or can be availed of to furnish the consideration for a fresh enforceable obligation. Where a statute, prescribing the limitation extinguishes the right, it affects substantive rights while that which purely pertains to the commencement of action without touching the right is said to be procedural....” (Emphasis supplied) 89. Admittedly, from the pleadings and evidence, and the appreciation made supra, it is apparent that the plaintiff had knowledge about the litigation surrounding the property. In such a scenario, filing a suit after several decades claiming declaration of title cannot be entertained being time barred. POINT No. V Order XXI Rule 64 of the Code & its Application 90. Further, an objection was raised as against the sale conducted, contending that it is contrary to Order XXI Rule-64 of the Code, and therefore, a relief was sought to declare the sale as null and void. 91. It is the contention of the Gaddipati Bullemma that the sale conducted in the present E.P. is in violation of Order-XXI Rule 64 of the Code, since the amount due under the decree is about Rs.1,100/- whereas, the property was sold for Rs.4,000/-. 92. It is contended that the Court must auction the property, which suffices to realise the decree amount, but not the entire property. To buttress the contentions so made, learned counsel for the Appellant placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Ambati Narsayya’s case (supra), Mangal Prasad’s case (supra), Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi’s case (supra) and S.P. Changalvaraya Naidu’s case (supra). 93. In Mangal Prasad’s case (referred supra), to realise decretal amount of Rs.29,000/- the property was sold for Rs.1,00,000/- and odd. To buttress the contentions so made, learned counsel for the Appellant placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Ambati Narsayya’s case (supra), Mangal Prasad’s case (supra), Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi’s case (supra) and S.P. Changalvaraya Naidu’s case (supra). 93. In Mangal Prasad’s case (referred supra), to realise decretal amount of Rs.29,000/- the property was sold for Rs.1,00,000/- and odd. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that it is a case of excessive execution and thereby, set aside the sale and directed the Court to return the sale amount to the auction purchaser with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. 94. In Ambati Narasayya’s case (referred supra), the decretal amount was around Rs.2,000/- and costs, for which Ac.10.00 of land was brought to sale, subject to the discharge of the mortgage debt of Rs.2,000/-. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the executing Court under Order XXI Rule-64 of the Code to sell only such property or a portion thereof, as may be necessary to satisfy the decree, and the mandate of the legislature cannot be ignored. 95. Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi (referred supra), is a case where for realisation of the decretal debts relating to two decrees, the properties, which are situated in two different villages, were brought to sale. The property in ‘D’ village was sold for Rs.16,880/- which sufficed the decretal amount, but the court went on to sell the property situated in ‘G’ village for Rs.12,000/-. The Hon’ble Court held that the sale was not in accordance with the Code. 96. The ratios laid down in all the above judgments relied on by the learned Counsel, undoubtedly, manifest a settled principle of law and particularly, Order XXI Rule 64 of the Code casts a duty on the Court to sell only such portion of the property as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree. At this juncture, decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dipali Biswas and others v. Nirmalendu Mukherjee and others, 2021 SCC Online SC 869 : 2021 (6) ALT 90 (SC) is very relevant, as reference of the citations referred supra, is made and like the instant case, Dipali Biswas (referred supra) is also a litigation that started half a century ago, with different rounds of litigation, pursuant to a money suit. 97. 97. Their Lordships in Dipali Biswas, (referred supra) held that the judgment-debtor cannot be permitted to raise objections as to the method of execution in instalments, and when once the judgment-debtor failed to raise objection as to the violation of Order 21 Rule 64 of the Code, when an order was passed under Order 21 Rule 54 of the Code, he cannot subsequently raise it. The relevant paras read as follows: “19. The only mantra, by the recitation of which, the appellants hope to succeed in this half-a-century old litigation, is Order XXI. Rule 64 of the Code. This provision enables an executing court to order “that any property attached by it and liable to sale or such portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy the decree, shall be sold and that the proceeds of such sale or a sufficient portion thereof shall be paid to the party entitled under the decree to receive the same *** *** *** Conclusion 37. The appellants cannot be allowed to raise the issue relating to the breach of Order XXI, Rule 64 for the following reasons: (i) A judgment-debtor cannot be allowed to raise objections as to the method of execution in instalments. After having failed to raise the issue in four earlier rounds of litigation, the appellants cannot be permitted to raise it now. (ii) As we have pointed out elsewhere, the original judgment- debtor himself filed a petition under Section 47. Way back on 02.09.1975. What is on hand is a second petition under Section 47 and, hence, it is barred by res judicata. It must be pointed out at this stage that before Act 104 of 1976 came into force, there was one view that the provisions of Section 11 of the Code had no application to execution proceedings. But under Act 104 of 1976 Explanation VII was inserted under Section 11 and it says that the provisions of this Section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and reference in this Section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references to a proceeding for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree. (iii) Even in the 5th round, the appellants have not pointed out the lay of the property, its dimensions on all sides and the possibility of dividing the same into two or more places, with a view to sell one or more of those pieces for the realisation of the decree debt. (iv) The observations in paragraph 4 of the order of the High Court dated 20.12.1990 in C.O. No. 2487 of 1987 that “none of the parties shall have any claim whatsoever as against the applicant in respect of the purchased property which shall be deemed to be his absolute property on and from the expiry of 15th December, 1980” has attained finality. (v) Section 65 of the Code says that, “where immovable property is sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time when the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute.” The sale of a property becomes absolute under Order XXI, Rule 92 (1) after an application made under Rule 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91 is disallowed and the court passes an order confirming the same. After the sale of an immovable property becomes absolute in terms of Order XXI, Rule 92(1), the Court has to grant a certificate under Rule 94. The certificate has to bear the date and the day on which the sale became absolute. Thus a conjoint reading of Section 65. Order XXI, Rule 92 and Order XXI, Rule 94 would show that it passes through three important stages (other than certain intervening stages). They are: (i) conduct of sale; (ii) sale becoming absolute and (iii) issue of sale certificate. After all these three stages are crossed, the 4th stage of delivery of possession comes under Rule 95 of Order XXI. It is at this 4th stage that the appellants have raised the objection relating to Order XXI, Rule 64. It is not as if the appellants were not aware of the fact that the property in entirety was included in the proclamation of sale. Therefore, the claim on the basis of Order XXI, Rule 64 was rightly rejected by the High Court.” (Emphasis supplied) 98. It is not as if the appellants were not aware of the fact that the property in entirety was included in the proclamation of sale. Therefore, the claim on the basis of Order XXI, Rule 64 was rightly rejected by the High Court.” (Emphasis supplied) 98. The Hon’ble Apex Court in this matter, while holding so, held that appellants therein cannot compare themselves to the Judgment Debtors in Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi (referred supra) and Ambati Narasayya (referred supra), since notice of attachment under Order XXI Rule 54 of the Code was ordered on 10.01.1975, proclamation under Order XXI Rule 66 of the Code was made on 16.07.1975, first petition under Section 47 of the Code was made on 02.09.1975 and thereafter, on 10.02.2006, a petition was moved contending that Order XXI Rule 64 of the Code was not complied with. It was observed that after exhausting gunpowder available, as a fifth round of litigation, such plea was made at the end and as such, it cannot be permitted. 99. Similarly, the claim of Gaddipati Bullemma to declare the sale as null and void for being contrary to Order XXI Rule 64 of the Code holds no water. The said objection was taken by the J.Dr. in the petition filed in the year 1991, whereas, sale was held on 26.11.1968. It is not out of context to mention here that several applications have been filed by the J.Dr./Mathe Kotaiah, Thalasila Agravani/mother of Bullemma, to stall the execution proceedings before the sale, after the sale and even after the matter reached at the stage of delivery, as referred supra. Therefore, following the ratio laid down in Dipali Biswas, (referred supra), Appellant herein cannot be permitted to take objections in instalments to stall the execution proceedings, by taking pleas that were not previously taken or by re-introducing pleas already decided, due to the operation of res judicata, which is as much applicable in execution proceedings as in suits. Fraud - Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code & its Application 100. Further, it is the contention of Gaddipati Bullemma that though the Decree-Holder/Thota Venkayamma failed to deposit 1/4th amount, vide Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code, without proclamation of a fresh sale, a resale was conducted and hence, this is a fraud played by the D.Hr. which vitiates the proceedings. 101. Further, it is the contention of Gaddipati Bullemma that though the Decree-Holder/Thota Venkayamma failed to deposit 1/4th amount, vide Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code, without proclamation of a fresh sale, a resale was conducted and hence, this is a fraud played by the D.Hr. which vitiates the proceedings. 101. It is apposite to refer to the relevant provision of the Code, which reads as under: Order XXI - Rule 84. Deposit by purchaser and re-sale on default: (1) On every sale of immovable property the person declared to be the purchaser shall pay immediately after such declaration a deposit of twenty-five per cent on the amount of his purchase-money to the officer or other person conducting the sale, and in default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be re-sold. (2) Where the decree-holder is the purchaser and is entitled to set-off the purchase-money under Rule 72, the Court may dispense with the requirements of this rule. 102. Order XXI Rule 84 (1) of the Code stipulates deposit of 25% of the purchase money, immediately after the person is declared to be the purchaser. In the case of default, the property shall have to re-sold forthwith. Whereas Rule 84 (2) of the Code, carves out an exception if the purchaser is the decree-holder, entitled to seek setoff. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Manilal Mohanlal Shah v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad, AIR 1954 SC 349 encapsulated this principle as follows: “The moment a person is declared to be the purchaser, he is bound to deposit 25 per cent of the purchase-money unless he happens to be the decree-holder, in which case the Court may not require him to do so. The provision regarding the deposit of 25 per cent. by the purchaser other than the decree-holder is mandatory as the language of the rule suggests. The full amount of the purchase-money must be paid within fifteen days from the date of the sale but the decree-holder is entitled to the advantage of a set-off.” (Emphasis supplied) 103. Next, it is essential to draw a parallel between the Report of Amin, vide Ex. A-4 and the docket proceedings dated 07.12.1968. 103.1. The full amount of the purchase-money must be paid within fifteen days from the date of the sale but the decree-holder is entitled to the advantage of a set-off.” (Emphasis supplied) 103. Next, it is essential to draw a parallel between the Report of Amin, vide Ex. A-4 and the docket proceedings dated 07.12.1968. 103.1. The relevant extracts from the auction proceedings by Amin relating to sale warrant are as follows: 25.11.1968 Upset price Rs.4,000/- Thota Venkayamma - Rs.4,025/- Gogineni Panakalu - Rs.4,050/- Thota Venkayamma - Rs.4,075/- Sale is knocked down in favour of Thota Venkayamma for Rs.4,075/- 25.11.1968 T. Venkayamma is not turned up till 5.00.p.m. Amount not paid. Sd/- Dy. Nazar 26.11.1968 - Parties not turned up. Amount not paid to the Amin. *** Submitted Amin As the amount was not paid, sale is set aside. Sd/- *** PDM 26.11.1968 Under Rule 84 of Order 21 C.P.C. when the auction purchaser has not deposited the necessary purchase money, the property has to be sold fourth with. Hence the prior order made to day setting aside the sale is an error and hence it is set aside in the ends of justice under Section 151 C.P.C. The property is put to sale again. Upset price fixed by Court Rs.4,000/- Tummala Subbaih Rs.4.050/- Thota Venkayamma Rs.4,100/- Sale is knocked down in favour of Thota Venkayamma Rs.4,100/- 103.2. Further, the relevant proceedings in E.P. No. 537 of 1965 on the date of further hearing, after the sale, is extracted hereunder: “7-12-68: Sale knocked down for Rs.4075/- in favour of Thota Venkayamma D.H.R. being the highest bidder on 25-11-68. As she was not turned up till 5.00 PM. on that day and as the amount was not paid sale is set aside on 26.11.68 and ordered to be resale again on 26.11.68 sale knocked down for Rs.4100/- in favour of Thota Venkayama DHR being the highest bidder. As she was allowed for set off and as the bid amount is more than the warrant amount, a set off receipt for Rs.1482-62 has been taken from the DHR and the 1/4 of the balance amount of Rs.655-00 also collected from the DHR. The amount of Rs.487-00 was deposited after deducting of Rs.168-00 towards Poundage were affixed to the sale list, For confirmation of sale 3.1.69. Sd/- PDM 7.12.1968.” 104. The amount of Rs.487-00 was deposited after deducting of Rs.168-00 towards Poundage were affixed to the sale list, For confirmation of sale 3.1.69. Sd/- PDM 7.12.1968.” 104. As seen from the proceedings in the E.P. when it came to the notice of the learned Judge, that the auction purchaser failed to deposit 1/4th amount as stipulated under Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code, immediately sale was conducted. Hence, the question of fresh proclamation does not arise. 105. Even otherwise, E.P. amount is Rs.1100/- Thota Venkayamma, decree holder, filed E.A. No. 178 of 1966 under Order XXI Rule-72 of the Code and obtained permission to participate in the auction. In that view, with the operation of Rule 84 (2) of the Code, the requirements under Rule 84 (1) of the Code may be dispensed with by the Court. Hence, there is no force in the argument that sale held in violation of Rule 84 of the Code. 106. In S.P. Changalvaraya Naidu (referred supra), it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the “fraud” vitiates every solemn act and it doesn’t dwell together with justice. There cannot be any dispute about the said proposition of law, however, in the instant case, by a glance of the docket proceedings referred supra, it is vivid that the Court has duly followed the procedure contemplated under law. Hence, the argument that the sale is hit by fraud is of no strength in the absence of cogent/no proof in support of such allegation. POINT No. VI Order XXI Rule 89 of the Code & its Application 107. Learned Counsel for the Appellant would submit that opportunity may be given to the appellant/Gaddipati Bullemma to deposit the decretal amount with 24% interest under Order-XXI Rule-89 of the Code. Whereas, learned Counsel for the Respondent, in oppugnation, argued that permission cannot be given to the petitioner to deposit amount under Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code at this stage after lapse of so many decades, as it may cause serious prejudice and hardship to the decree-holder and her family. 108. In the instant case, when the matter is pending before the Courts for delivery of the subject property since 1969 and after issuing the sale certificate by confirming the sale, at this juncture, permitting the claimant to avail the benefit of Order XXI Rule-89 of the Code can safely be ruled out. 109. 108. In the instant case, when the matter is pending before the Courts for delivery of the subject property since 1969 and after issuing the sale certificate by confirming the sale, at this juncture, permitting the claimant to avail the benefit of Order XXI Rule-89 of the Code can safely be ruled out. 109. Rule 89 of the Code postulates setting aside of a duly carried out sale, on the ground of material irregularity taken in Rule 90 of the Code. To maintain an application under Rule 89 of the Code, two primary conditions relating to deposit have to be met i.e. (i) of 5% of the purchase money to be paid to the auction-purchaser and (ii) of the amount specified in the proclamation of sale less any amount received by the decree-holder since the date of such a proclamation. 110. The opportunity provided under Order XXI Rule 89 of the Code is in the nature of a concession offered by the Code to any person claiming an interest in the property sold and hence, strict compliance is necessary. In this regard, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Karan Gupta v. J.S. Exim Ltd. & Ors. AIR 2013 SC 24 held as under: “22..........Deposit of the requisite amount in the Court is a condition precedent or a sine qua non to an application for setting aside the execution of sale and such amount must be paid within a period specified in the rule and if the deposit is made after the time limit, the application must be dismissed. The deposit made under Rule 89 of Order 21 CPC should be unconditional and unqualified and the decree holder or the auction purchaser should be able to get the amount at once.” (Emphasis supplied) 111. In that view of the matter, the prayer sought by the learned counsel for the Appellant cannot be entertained. Accordingly, Point Answered. POINT No. VII - CONCLUSION 112. In the light of the findings arrived and the law discussed supra, there are absolutely no grounds warranting interference of this Court in the impugned judgments. Accordingly, Point Answered. 113. In fact, the battle in the present case started when the Decree Holder lent Rs.500/- to the Judgment Debtor under a promissory note on 20.10.1956. In the light of the findings arrived and the law discussed supra, there are absolutely no grounds warranting interference of this Court in the impugned judgments. Accordingly, Point Answered. 113. In fact, the battle in the present case started when the Decree Holder lent Rs.500/- to the Judgment Debtor under a promissory note on 20.10.1956. On one hand, such instances of long battle hurl a threat to the common public by shaking their confidence on the institution to address their grievances. On the other side, it also reflects the trust reposed by the public in the institution of judiciary waiting for years and years in the hope of justice. 114. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi and others, (2021) 6 SCC 418 observed that execution which is a remedy provided in the Code for preventing injustice is being misused to cause injustice by hurdling timely implementation of the decrees. The case on hand, is the reality of this observation. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had issued mandatory directions to be followed for timely and expeditious execution of decrees at Para 42. 115. It is the duty of the executing court to see that the fruits of the decree are enjoyed by the decree-holder. Unfortunately, the recent trend shows that after the determination of the suit, the decree-holder is not lasting, till the decree gets executed. Generations after generations are awaiting the fruits of a decree. The only solution to this scenario is to see that the Executing Courts should scrupulously perform their functions vide the provisions of the Code and the directions vide precedents. In this case, the third-party claimant resorted to all forms and means to obstruct the delivery, again and again, on the strength of the very same agreement of sale, by filing different suits and applications in the execution proceedings, though its validity was nullified long ago. Misadventures in the courts have to be dealt with sternly. This is also a reminder to have a re-look on the compensatory costs, vide Section 35-A of the Code, 1908 which is a paltry sum in the present day and age. 116. In the light of the discussion and the factual matrix, these appeals are dismissed with costs. 117. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, shall also stand closed.