Chief Executive Officer, Uttar Pradesh Khadi And Village Industries Board, Lko. v. Controlling Authority Under Payment Of Gratuity Act/Asst. Labour Commissioner, Lko.
2023-07-04
ALOK MATHUR
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : (Alok Mathur, J.) 1. Heard Sri Pankaj Patel, learned counsel for petitioners as well as learned Standing Counsel for respondents. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 15.03.2021 passed by the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 thereby allowing the claim preferred by respondent and granting gratuity of Rs. 216753/- for a period the husband of the claimant has worked with the petitioner. 3. The brief facts necessary for adjudication of the present case are that the husband of respondent No. 2 late Rama was initially appointed on the post of Master Potter in the Pottery Section in the petitioner's organization by means of order dated 03.12.1982 on consolidated salary of Rs. 325/-per month. It has been stated that services of husband of respondent No. 2 were terminated by order dated 18.08.2000. Subsequently from 26.05.2003 he was re-engaged on salary of Rs. 1500/-per month on the post of Chowkidar/Potter on contractual basis upto 05.11.2013. 4. The dispute in the present case relates to non-payment of the amount of gratuity to the husband of respondent No. 2 in regard to which a claim was filed under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 before the Controlling Authority. In the claim, it was stated that the husband of respondent No. 2 was in continuous services of petitioners from 03.12.1982 till his superannuation on 05.11.2013 i.e. for a period of 31 years and during the said period he was receiving salary from the petitioner and lastly he was receiving Rs. 12000/-per month, and was therefore entitled to gratuity which has illegally and arbitrarily withheld by the petitioner. 5. Notices were issued to the petitioner who was put in appearance and a written statement was filed by them opposing the claim of respondent No. 2. It has been fairly submitted by learned counsel for petitioner that after filing of the written statement their counsel never appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Controlling Authority. 6. In the said order, the Controlling Authority has recorded that there is no dispute with regard to appointment of husband of respondent No. 2 but the claim of respondent No. 2 has been partly accepted to the extent that the services of husband of respondent No. 2 were terminated on 18.08.2000 and subsequently he was re-engaged on contractual basis from 26.05.2003 till 05.11.2013. 7.
7. The contention of petitioner has been accepted to the extent that husband of respondent No. 2 had rendered 28 years 01 month and 24 days of services. With regard to last salary drawn by husband of respondent No. 2, it was stated by the petitioners in the written statement that he was receiving only Rs. 4,000/-per month instead of Rs. 12,000/-per month as claimed by respondent No. 2. In this regard the Controlling Authority has relied upon the evidence adduced by respondent No. 2 where a cheque was issued by petitioner in favour of respondent No. 2 holding the same to be on account of wages paid to husband of respondent No. 2 and accepted that he was receiving Rs. 8500/-per month and consequently quantified the amount of gratuity to be paid to him on the said basis. 8. Learned counsel for petitioner in the present writ petition has disputed only the quantum of the salary on the basis of which the amount of gratuity has been granted by the Controlling Authority by means of impugned order dated 15.03.2021. He further stated that in his written statement, the petitioner has clearly stated that husband of respondent No. 2 was receiving only Rs. 4000/-per month while the Controlling Authority in most illegal and arbitrary manner has allowed the claim of husband of respondent No. 2 treating his montly salary to be Rs. 8500/-per month. In this regard it is noticed that evidence was led by the respondent No. 2 and also documents were furnished by them including the cheque indicating that husband of respondent No. 2 was receiving Rs. 8500/-per month as salary. 9. From the order-sheet, it is clear that the statement of respondent No. 2 was recorded and repeated opportunities were given to the petitioner to cross examine him but no cross-examination was conducted by the petitioner and on the basis of material before the Controlling Authority, he concluded that husband of respondent No. 2 was receiving Rs. 8500/-per month as salary. It is noticed that the said finding is based upon material on record and it cannot be said that the same is perverse or there is any infirmity in the same.
8500/-per month as salary. It is noticed that the said finding is based upon material on record and it cannot be said that the same is perverse or there is any infirmity in the same. It is further noticed that it is the fault of the petitioners that they did not participate in the proceedings after filing of the written statement and the proceedings were continuing for a period of 09 years before the Controlling Authority. Merely because averment has been made in the written statement disputing claim regarding the quantum of salary would not make their stand conclusive and binding until there is documentary or oral evidence adduced in this regard. No documents were proved before the Controlling Authority by the petitioner in support of their averment regarding the amount of salary paid to the employee, while the employee had submitted oral and documentary evidence in this regard, and adequate reasons have been given by the Controlling Authority for returning a finding with respect to the salary drawn by the husband of respondent No. 2 to be Rs. 8500/- per month. 10. The Controlling Authority while deciding the said matter has based his order on the evidence before him and the statement recorded and the documents filed by the respective parties. The written statement of the petitioner has been duly considered and reasons for recording a finding that husband of respondent No. 2 was receiving Rs. 8500/-per month has been duly discussed and is based on cogent material which is the evidence of payment by cheque presented by respondent No. 2 in the proceedings. 11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that the matter be remanded for fresh consideration as the petitioner was not heard before hearing of impugned order. He submitted that the counsel for the petitioner did not appear after filing the written submission and in absence of any representation on the behalf of petitioner case was decided and hence in order to afford due opportunity of hearing, in the interest of justice the matter should be remanded. 12. With regards to remand, the law is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in several decisions. 13. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Arvind Kumar Jaiswal (D) Thr. LR. Vs.
12. With regards to remand, the law is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in several decisions. 13. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Arvind Kumar Jaiswal (D) Thr. LR. Vs. Devendra Prasad Jaiswal Varun, 2023 SCC Online SC 146, has held as under:- "An order of remand prolongs and delays the litigation and hence, should not be passed unless the appellate court finds that a re-trial is required, or the evidence on record is not sufficient to dispose of the matter for reasons like lack of adequate opportunity of leading evidence to a party, where there had been no real trial of the dispute or there is no complete or effectual adjudication of the proceedings, and the party complaining has suffered material prejudice on that account. Where evidence has already been adduced and a decision can be rendered on appreciation of such evidence, an order of remand should not be passed remitting the matter to the lower court, even if the lower court has omitted to frame issue(s) and/or has failed to determine any question of fact, which, in the opinion of the appellate court, is essential. The first appellate court, if required, can also direct the trial court to record evidence and finding on a particular aspect/issue in terms of Rule 25 to Order XLI, which then can be taken on record for deciding the case by the appellate court." 14. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Nadakerappa (D) Vs. Pillamma (D), 2022 SCC Online SC 387, has held as under:- "It is settled law that the order of remand cannot be passed as a matter of course. An order of remand cannot also be passed for the mere purpose of remanding a proceeding to the lower court or the Tribunal. An endeavour has to be made by the Appellate Court to dispose of the case on merits.Where both the sides have led oral and documentary evidence, the Appellate Court has to decide the appeal on merits instead of remanding the case to the lower court or the Tribunal." 14. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Shivakumr and others Vs. Sharanabappa and others, 2021 (11) SCC 277 has held as under:- "25.2. Rule 23A came to be inserted in Order XLI CPC by way of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976.
Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Shivakumr and others Vs. Sharanabappa and others, 2021 (11) SCC 277 has held as under:- "25.2. Rule 23A came to be inserted in Order XLI CPC by way of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. Prior to this amendment, it was generally accepted by the Courts that although under Rule 23, an order of remand could be made only on reversal of a decree disposing of suit on a preliminary point but, the Appellate Court has the inherent power of remanding a case where it was considered necessary to do so in the interest of justice. Some of the High Courts had made similar provisions by way of their respective amendments. Insertion of Rule 23A in Order XLI by the Amending Act of 1976 makes it explicit that even when the suit has been disposed of otherwise than on a preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal, the Appellate Court shall have the power of remand, if a re-trial is considered necessary. 25.3. A comprehension of the scheme of the provisions for remand as contained in Rules 23 and 23A of Order XLI is not complete without reference to the provision contained in Rule 24 of Order XLI that enables the Appellate Court to dispose of a case finally without a remand if the evidence on record is sufficient; notwithstanding that the Appellate Court proceeds on a ground entirely different from that on which the Trial Court had proceeded. 25.4. A conjoint reading of Rules 23, 23A and 24 of Order XLI brings forth the scope as also contours of the powers of remand that when the available evidence is sufficient to dispose of the matter, the proper course for an Appellate Court is to follow the mandate of Rule 24 of Order XLI CPC and to determine the suit finally. It is only in such cases where the decree in challenge is reversed in appeal and a re-trial is considered necessary that the Appellate Court shall adopt the course of remanding the case. It remains trite that order of remand is not to be passed in a routine manner because an unwarranted order of remand merely elongates the life of the litigation without serving the cause of justice.
It remains trite that order of remand is not to be passed in a routine manner because an unwarranted order of remand merely elongates the life of the litigation without serving the cause of justice. An order of remand only on the ground that the points touching the appreciation of evidence were not dealt with by the Trial Court may not be considered proper in a given case because the First Appellate Court itself is possessed of jurisdiction to enter into facts and appreciate the evidence. There could, of course, be several eventualities which may justify an order of remand or where remand would be rather necessary depending on the facts and the given set of circumstances of a case. 25.4.1. The decision cited by the learned Counsel for the appellants in the case of Mohan Kumar (supra) is an apt illustration as to when the Appellate Court ought to exercise the power of remand. In the said case, the appellant and his mother had filed the civil suit against the Government and local body seeking declaration of title, perpetual injunction and for recovery of possession in respect of the land in question. The Trial Court partly decreed the suit while holding that the plaintiffs were the owners of the land in dispute on which trespass was committed by the respondents and they were entitled to get the encroachment removed; and it was also held that the Government should acquire the land and pay the market value of the land to the appellant. Such part of the decree of the Trial Court was not challenged by the defendants but as against the part of the decision of the Trial Court which resulted in rejection of the claim of the appellant for allotment of an alternative land, the appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court not only dismissed the appeal so filed by the appellant but proceeded to dismiss the entire suit with the finding that the plaintiff-appellant had failed to prove his ownership over the suit land inasmuch as he did not examine the vendor of his sale deed.
The High Court not only dismissed the appeal so filed by the appellant but proceeded to dismiss the entire suit with the finding that the plaintiff-appellant had failed to prove his ownership over the suit land inasmuch as he did not examine the vendor of his sale deed. In the given circumstances, this Court observed that when the High Court held that the appellant was not able to prove his title to the suit land due to non-examination of his vendor, the proper course for the High Court was to remand the case to the Trial Court by affording an opportunity to the appellant to prove his title by adducing proper evidence in addition to what had already been adduced. Obviously, this Court found that for the conclusion reached by the High Court, a case for re-trial was made out particularly when the Trial Court had otherwise held that the appellant was owner of the land in dispute and was entitled to get the encroachment removed as also to get the market value of the land. Such cases where retrial is considered necessary because of any particular reason and more particularly for the reason that adequate opportunity of leading sufficient evidence to a party is requisite, stand at entirely different footings than the cases where evidence has already been adduced and decision is to be rendered on appreciation of evidence. It also remains trite that an order of remand is not to be passed merely for the purpose of allowing a party to fillup the lacuna in its case. 25.5. It gets perforce reiterated that the occasion for remand would arise only when the factual findings of Trial Court are reversed and a re-trial is considered necessary by the Appellate Court." 15. It is apposite to consider the fact that in the instant case the petitioner themselves was not appearing in the proceeding before the Controlling Authority. The same is founded in the principle of law contained in the legal maxim which reads as under: "commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet"; (no party can take undue advantage of his own wrong). 16. The Apex Court in (2007) 11 SCC 447 (Kusheshwar Prasad Singh Vs.
The same is founded in the principle of law contained in the legal maxim which reads as under: "commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet"; (no party can take undue advantage of his own wrong). 16. The Apex Court in (2007) 11 SCC 447 (Kusheshwar Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar) considered the said legal maxim and opined as under: - "It is a maxim of law, recognized and established, that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong; and this maxim, which is based on elementary principles, is fully recognized in courts of law and of equity, and, indeed, admits of illustration from every branch of legal procedure." 17. It is settled principle of law that a man cannot be permitted to take undue and unfair advantage of his own wrong to gain favourable interpretation of law. It is sound principle that he who prevents a thing from being done shall not avail himself of the non-performance he has occasioned. To put it differently, "a wrongdoer ought not to be permitted to make a profit out of his own wrong." The petitioner had put in appearance and participated in the proceedings and also filed their written statement. They did not participate thereafter. Evidence of the workman was recorded and several opportunities for cross examination were afforded but they did not take advantage of the same. No cogent reasons is forthcoming for not participating in the proceeding after filing of the written statement. This is not a case where the employer was never served with the summons or he was not aware of the proceedings initiated by the employee, but initially he appeared and participated but without any reason stopped participating thereafter. 18. In the peculiar facts of the present case and also considering the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court this court is of the considered opinion that remand of a case cannot be granted on mere asking of a party unless he is able to demonstrate that in the interest of justice the matter should be remanded. The proceedings were pending before the Controlling Authority for a substantial period of time. Undisputedly the petitioner was aware of the proceedings as he had initially participated in the same and filed his written statement.
The proceedings were pending before the Controlling Authority for a substantial period of time. Undisputedly the petitioner was aware of the proceedings as he had initially participated in the same and filed his written statement. He cannot in the present circumstances be permitted to justify his deliberate non-appearance, where no justifiable cogent reason of the same, either exists or could be demonstrated before this Court. In the present case remand order would be contrary to "interest of justice". The petitioner in any case cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own callousness and deliberate omission in not prosecuting the case before the Controlling Authority deligently. 19. It the opinion of this Court, the said legal principle will apply in this matter also with full force. 20. In light of the above, this Court does not find any infirmity so as to interfere with the impugned order in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. 21. Supplementary affidavit filed today is taken on record.