JUDGMENT : (Irshad Ali, J.) 1. Heard Sri Gaurav Mehrotra, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondent and Sri R.K. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the respondent-Commission. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs :- "i) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the opposite parties to provide the relaxation in maximum age and consider the application form/ candidature of the petitioner for the post for which the petitioner has applied in pursuance of the advertisement dated 07.02.2014 (Annexure No.3 to the writ petition). 1)(a) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the Government orders dated 14.11.1985, 03.09.1992 and 31.10.2013. ii) to pass any other suitable order or direction which is deemed just and proper in the circumstances of the case may also be passed. iii) to allow the writ petition with costs. iv) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari, quashing the final result declared by the Respondents on 30.10.2018 (Annexure No. 11) to the extent that the candidate placed at serial no. 47 has been given benefit of reservation under the Dependents of Freedom fighters category; v) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to consider the candidature of the petitioner against the vacancy reserved for category of candidates belonging to dependents of freedom fighters in the selections at hand;" 3. Brief fact of the case is that the State Government issued a government order dated 27.9.1972, providing age relaxation to the dependent of freedom fighters. In addition to the aforesaid government order, the State Government issued government orders dated 1.11.1947, 31.1.1957. 14.8.1972, 19.2.1977, 14.11.1985, 3.9.1992 and 31.10.2013 on the issue involved in the present writ petition. Prior to government order dated 14.8.1972, the exemption/ relaxation in age limit was four years and vide government order dated 14.8.1972, the same was of five years and the government orders are beneficial in nature and by the said government orders, relaxation was given to the freedom fighters, the dependent/ family members of freedom fighters, as defined from time to time and in the said government orders, no time limit is prescribed in relation to the benefit provided. 4. 4. In the year 1993, the State Government promulgated the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters and Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993 (in short, 'the Act, 1993) and the Act was lastly amended in the year 2009 and as per the Act, the petitioner is dependent of freedom fighter namely, Late Laxmi Shankar Bajpai, the grandfather of the petitioner. 5. The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher in Basic Shiksha Parishad in the year 1999. The respondent No.2 published an advertisement for appointment/ recruitment dated 7.2.2014 on the post of Lecturers in the State Council for Education Research and Training (S.C.E.R.T.). In the said advertisement, it has not been mentioned that relaxation in age will be given to the dependents of freedom fighters. The petitioner has applied in pursuance to the aforesaid advertisement. 6. The respondent No.2 had also issued advertisement No.A-1/E-1/2-13 dated 23.3.2013, A-2/E-1/2013 dated 23.5.2013 and advertisement No.A-3/E-1/2013 dated 14.6.2013 and in the said notifications, age relaxation of five years is provided to the dependents of freedom fighters. 7. During the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner had been permitted to appear in the selection process and having been declared successful in the written examination, she was called for interview which was held on 12.10.2018 only for the post of Lecturer in Social Work. Final result of the selection has been declared, subject to the final outcome of the instant writ petition. However, the name of the petitioner did not find place in the final result declared for appointments made on the post of Lecturer in Social Work. 8. During the pendency of the instant writ petition, the petitioner has been provided certain information by the respondent No.3 under the Right to Information Act, pertaining to the category wise cut-off marks obtained by the selected candidates in the selection in question as well as copy of the final result. 9. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that from perusal of the information provided by the respondent No.3, it is evident that the respondents have adopted a pick and choose policy while selecting candidates in the selections at hand which has not been made in fair and transparent manner, thereby violating the fundamental right enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 10. 10. It is submitted that the petitioner is the dependent of freedom fighter as defined in Section 2(b) (ii) of the Act, 1993 and is entitled to age relaxation in the light of the government order dated 27.9.1972 in the process of recruitment initiated by the respondent No.2 for the post of Lecturers under the Uttar Pradesh Teachers Education (Lecturers Cadre) Service Rules, 2010 and in the advertisement dated 7.2.2014, the relaxation of age has not been mentioned to the dependents of freedom fighters. 11. He submits that for the purposes of carrying out the functions of S.C.E.R.T. including recruitment on the post of Lecturers, guidelines were framed by the Central Government and in the year 2010, on the issue of recruitment of Lecturer, the State Government framed the Rules of 2010 under the proviso Article 309 of the Constitution of India. As per Rule 2 of the Rules of 2010, the Lecturers cadre service is Subordinate Non Gazette Service i.e. Group-C post. As per Rule 3(d), Commission means Uttar Pradesh Public Services Commission. Rule 5 of the Rules of 2010 says that recruitment to the various categories of post in the service, as defined under rule 2(j), shall be made by direct recruitment through the Commission. Rule 6 of the Rules of 2010 relates to giving reservation to certain class such as scheduled caste, scheduled tribe including the persons covered under the Act of 1993. Rule 10, as amended vide Notification dated 22.08.2013, relates to age of a candidate for direct recruitment and according to the same, a candidate for direct recruitment must have attained the age of 21 years and must not have attained the age of more than 40 years on the first day of July of the calendar year in which vacancies are advertised and proviso of Rule 10 says that the upper age limit in the case of candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and such other categories as may be notified by the Government from time to time shall be greater by such number of years as may be specified. Rule 24 of the Rules of 2010 gives power of relaxation to the State Government and rule 25 specifically says that nothing in these rules affect reservations and other concessions required to be provided for the candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and other special categories of persons in accordance with the orders of the Government issued from time to time in this regard. 12. He submits that the government order dated 27.09.1972 relates to relaxation of upper age limit and reservation in government services to the dependants of freedom fighters and as per the same five years relaxation in upper age limit in the recruitment process has to be given to the dependants of freedom fighters and in the year 1993 the Act of 1993 was promulgated to provide reservation to certain classes mentioned in the Act of 1993. 13. It is further submitted that the petitioner has a good academic record and she was appointed as Assistant Teacher in Basic Shiksha Parishad on 11.12.1999 and at that point of time the petitioner was M.Sc. (Botany) and B.Ed. and thereafter in the year 2002, she obtained the certificate of computer and in the year 2010, she passed M.A. (Education) and got 68% marks and thereafter, in the year 2012 she passed M.A. (Social Work) with 72.4%. It is also pointed out that the petitioner passed High School with 60%, Intermediate with 53%, B.Sc. with 59%, M.Sc. with 60% and B.Ed. with 58% in the year 1986, 1988, 1991, 1993 and 1997 respectively. 14. It is also submitted that the present is presently holding the post of Assistant Teacher in Junior High School, as she has been promoted from the post of Assistant Teacher (Primary School) and has also performed the duties in the District Institute of Education and Training (D.I.E.T.), District Raebareli as Teacher Educator. 14. It is also submitted that the present is presently holding the post of Assistant Teacher in Junior High School, as she has been promoted from the post of Assistant Teacher (Primary School) and has also performed the duties in the District Institute of Education and Training (D.I.E.T.), District Raebareli as Teacher Educator. He further submitted that selection/recruitment on the posts of Lecturers under the Rule of 2010, advertisement No. 5/2013-2014 dated 07.02.2014 was issued by opposite party No.2 and as per the said advertisement the last date of submitting the application form was 11.03.2014 and submitting the documents was 21.03.2014 and as per the said advertisement, the minimum age for the post advertised is 21 years and maximum is 40 years and the said advertisement in regard to the relaxation of age only says "relaxation on age, as per rules" and as per condition No.4, the age aforesaid has to be calculated on 01.07.2014. The said condition also prescribed relaxation in to certain classes of person. In the said age condition there is no mention about providing relaxation of age to the dependants of freedom fighters and the said act of the opposite parties is arbitrary and illegal and is unsustainable. 15. He further submitted that the respondent No.2 had also issued advertisement No.A-1/E-1/2013 dated 23.03.2013, A-2/E-1/2013 dated 23.05.2013 and advertisement No.A-3/E-1/2013 dated 14.06.2013, copies whereof have been filed herewith as Annexure No.5, 6 and 7 to the writ petition respectively, and a bare perusal of the condition No.14 (1), 12 and 14 (2) respectively of the above mentioned advertisements would show that the age relaxation of 5 year is provided to the dependents of freedom fighters but in the present case the said benefit has not been extended to the dependents of freedom fighters including the petitioner and as per Rules of 1993 as amended in 2009 vide notification dated 20.08.2009, the petitioner is dependent of freedom fighter namely Late Laxmi Shankar Bajpai, the grand-father of the petitioner and as such the petitioner has suffered irreparable loss and injury. Copy of the certificate dated 26.12.1997 has been filed as Annexure No.8 to the writ petition. 16. In pursuance of the advertisement dated 07.02.2014 the petitioner has applied for the post of Lecturer (Biology), Lecturer (Education) and Lecturer (Social Work) for which she is fully eligible and qualified. Copy of the certificate dated 26.12.1997 has been filed as Annexure No.8 to the writ petition. 16. In pursuance of the advertisement dated 07.02.2014 the petitioner has applied for the post of Lecturer (Biology), Lecturer (Education) and Lecturer (Social Work) for which she is fully eligible and qualified. The advertisement dated 07.02.2014 is silent on the issue of providing the relaxation in maximum age to the dependents of freedom fighters and it is a possibility that the respondent No.2 will reject the application form of the petitioner on the ground of maximum age and due to the same, the petitioner has approached this Hon'ble Court for a direction to the opposite parties to provide age relaxation to the petitioner. It is next submitted that the opposite parties are not extending the benefit of age relaxation to the dependent of freedom fighters in clear terms as would appear from the advertisement dated 07.02.2014 and, thus, the action of the opposite parties is arbitrary and illegal and liable to be interfered by this Hon'ble Court. 17. It is also argued that the opposite parties are providing the age relaxation to the dependents of freedom fighters, as would appear from the advertisement dated 23.03.2013 and 14.06.2013 mentioned hereinabove, but on the other hand are not providing the same in the advertisement dated 07.02.2014 and, thus, the action of the respondents is contrary to the spirit of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is also pertinent to mention that in view of Government Order dated 27.09.1972 and aforesaid facts and circumstances, the petitioner is entitled to relaxation in age of 5 years. The Act of 1993 and Government Order dated 27.09.1972 are relevant and are applicable to the case of the petitioner and the opposite parties are under obligation to extend the benefits of the same in reasonable and fair manner. 18. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that from a perusal of the final result, it is evident that out of the 70 total vacancies for the post of Lecturer (Social Work), 35 seats have been allotted for candidates belonging to unreserved category, 15 seats for scheduled castes category candidates, one seat for scheduled tribes category candidate and 19 seats have been allotted for candidates belonging to other backward classes. In the horizontal category of reservation, one seat has been allotted for candidates belonging to dependents of freedom fighters (related to the instant matter), 3 seats for ex-servicemen, 14 seats for women candidates and three seats have been allotted to candidates belonging to disability quota. 19. During the pendency of the present writ petition, the petitioner had applied under the Right to Information Act vide letters dated 02.02.2019 and 20.04.2019, seeking certain information pertaining to the category wise cut off marks obtained by the selected candidates in the selection in question. In response thereto, vide office memorandum dated 02.05.2019 issued by the Public Information officer of respondent No.2, the petitioner has been provided the the following category wise cut off marks: Unreserved category- 56 Other Backward Classes- 50 Scheduled Castes- 45 Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes- 45 Women- 53 Dependents Of Freedom Fighters/O.B.C.- 52 Ex-servicemen- not available Disability (locomotor)- 42 Disability (auditory)- 42 Disability (blindness)- not available Copy of the said office memorandum dated 02.05.2019 has been annexed herewith as Annexure No.12 to the writ petition. 20. He submits that moreover vide office memorandum dated 17.01.2019 issued by the Public Information Officer of respondent No.3 whereby the petitioner was provided a copy of the final result, copy whereof is annexed as Annexure no. 11 to the writ petition, the petitioner has also been provided the following information: "1. The petitioner has been awarded 50 marks in the interview. 2. The cut-off marks of the last selected candidate belonging to unreserved category is 56 marks." Copy of the office memorandum dated 17.01.2019 has been annexed as Annexure No.13 to the writ petition. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is relevant to note that under the category of candidates belonging to dependents of freedom fighters, three candidates had been invited for appearing in the interview, namely Sri Shrayas Yadav, Sri Rajnish Kumar and the petitioner. To the best knowledge of the petitioner, out of the aforesaid three candidates, Sri Rajnish Kumar obtained less than 50 marks, because of which he was not selected in either category of OBC or dependents of freedom fighter, to which he belonged. The petitioner has obtained 50 marks and Sri Shrayas Yadav has obtained 52 marks, thus, Sri Shrayas Yadav consequently got selected on the single post which was reserved for candidates belonging to category of dependents of freedom fighters. The petitioner has obtained 50 marks and Sri Shrayas Yadav has obtained 52 marks, thus, Sri Shrayas Yadav consequently got selected on the single post which was reserved for candidates belonging to category of dependents of freedom fighters. Copy of the relevant extract of the list of candidates who were called for interview in the selection, wherein name of Sri Rajnish Kumar finds at serial No.14 has been annexed as Annexure no. 14 to the writ petition. 22. It is further submitted that name of Sri Shrayas Yadav finds mention at serial No.47 of the final select list, wherein it has been also clearly mentioned that Sri Shrayas Yadav belongs to both categories of other backward classes as well as dependent of freedom fighters, however, since the cut-off marks of the of the candidates belonging to other backward classes is 50 marks, whereas as per the information provided to the petitioner under the Right to Information Act, the cut-off marks of the candidates belonging to the category of dependents of freedom fighters is 52 marks, which appear to be the marks obtained by Sri Shrayas Yadav, it is evident that Sri Shrayas Yadav has been selected on the single post reserved for candidates belonging to category of dependents of freedom fighters, even though Sri Shrayas Yadav ought to have been selected on one of the posts reserved for candidates belonging to other backward caste, since he obtained more marks than the last selected candidate belonging to other backward caste (i.e. more than 50 marks). It is also pertinent to draw attention to clause 13.6 of the advertisement dated 11.03.2014 on the basis of which the selection at hand took place. In clause 13.6 of the advertisement dated 11.03.2014, it has been categorically mentioned that those candidates who are seeking reservation under two different categories, shall be given and be eligible for reservation under only one category, being that category which is more beneficial for such candidate. Therefore, Sri Shrayas Yadav ought to have been selected under the category of other backward caste and not on the single post which was reserved for candidates belonging to dependents of freedom fighters, meaning thereby that the single post reserved for candidates belonging to category of dependents of freedom fighters ought to have been filled by the petitioner, who was next in line after Shri Shrayas Yadav in order of merit. 23. 23. He submitted that the impugned action of the respondents in granting benefit of double reservation to certain candidates while depriving the petitioner of benefit of reservation under the category of dependents of freedom fighters does not withstand the litmus test of reasonableness, fairness and equality, which are the necessary ingredients of every administrative action and are not only illegal and arbitrary but also unsustainable in the eyes of the law. 24. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the following judgments :- (i) Ramesh Chandra Sankla & Others Vs. Vikram Cement & Others [ (2008) 14 SCC 58 ]; paragraphs 97 and 98 (ii) Shangrila Food Products & Another Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Another [ (1996) 5 SCC 54 ]; paragraph 11 (iii) Shaheen Parveen & Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others [(2015) SCC OnLine All 9489]; paragraph 17 (iv) State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Dr. Dina Nath Shukla & Another [ (1997) 9 SCC 662 ]; paragraphs 11 and 13 (v) Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma & Others Vs. The Chancellor, Nagpur University & Others [ (1990) 4 SCC 55 ]; paragraphs 10 and 11 (vi) Davesh Nagalya (Dead) & Others Vs. Pradeep Kumar (Dead) through Legal Representatives & Others [ (2021) 9 SCC 796 ]; paragraph 12 (vii) Pasupuleti Venkateshwarlu Vs. The Motor and General Traders [ (1975) 1 SCC 770 ]; paragraph 4 25. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-Commission submits that the Commission had issued an advertisement No.5/2013-14 dated 7.2.2014 for the post of Lecturer in State Council for Education Research and Training. In pursuance of government order No.724/dk-2013 dated 31.10.2023 in the advertisement, no relaxation in the upper age limit to the Dependents of Freedom Fighters was provided. It is submitted that the petitioner's claim of relaxation in the upper age limit in the aforesaid category in view of the government order No.7/2/72-Niyukti-4 dated 27.9.1972 is misconceived as the said government order is not applicable as is evident from the government order No.724/dk-2013 dated 31.10.2023. However, the petitioner was allowed relaxation in upper age limit on account of being a government servant and her online application was accepted and she was allowed to participate in the selection process. 26. He submits that the petitioner was called for an interview for the post of Lecturer, Social Work. However, the petitioner was allowed relaxation in upper age limit on account of being a government servant and her online application was accepted and she was allowed to participate in the selection process. 26. He submits that the petitioner was called for an interview for the post of Lecturer, Social Work. The interview of the petitioner was conducted on 12.10.2018. The result for all 70 posts of Lecturer, Social Work was declared on 30.10.2018 but the petitioner could not succeed. Thereafter, the petitioner has challenged the result by making an amendment to the prayer clause of the writ petition. The claim of the petitioner is mainly based on the point that she belongs to the category of dependents of freedom fighters and instead of declaring her successful against one vacancy reserved for dependents of freedom fighters another person namely Shreyas Yadav has wrongly been selected against one vacancy reserved for dependents of freedom fighters whereas he was already selected against the vacancy of OBC. Thus, she has been allowed the reservation under two categories i.e. OBC and dependents of freedom fighters category. 27. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that Shreyas Yadav is an OBC candidate and also belongs to dependents of freedom fighters, got 52 marks, therefore, he was selected under the OBC quota (cut-off marks for OBC is 50). Since he also belongs to the dependents of freedom fighters category, therefore, he has been adjusted against the quota of dependents of freedom fighters. The horizontal reservations are made in accordance with the provisions contained in the Uttar Pradesh Public Service (Reservation for Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters and Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993, which is in consonance with the law laid down in respect of horizontal reservations in the case of Indra Sawhney Vs. Union of India [1992 Supp (3) SCC 217], paragraph 812, which has further been reiterated in the case of Anil Kumar Gupta Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others [ (1995) 5 SCC 173 ], paragraph 18 and Rajesh Kumar Daria Vs. Rajasthan Public Service Commission and others [ (2007) 8 SCC 785 ], paragraph 6. 28. After having heard the rival submission advanced by learned counsel for the parties, I perused the material on record. 29. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others [ (1995) 5 SCC 173 ], paragraph 18 and Rajesh Kumar Daria Vs. Rajasthan Public Service Commission and others [ (2007) 8 SCC 785 ], paragraph 6. 28. After having heard the rival submission advanced by learned counsel for the parties, I perused the material on record. 29. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a judgment in the case of Ramesh Chandra Sankla (Supra), relevant paragraphs 97 and 98 are being quoted below :- "97. The learned counsel for the Company placed heavy reliance on Shangrilla Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1996) 5 SCC 54 . In a suit by A, an order was passed by the Estate Officer against B holding that it was in unauthorized occupation and was liable to be evicted under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. He also ordered B to pay damages of Rs. 12 lakhs. An appeal was filed by B against the order and the Appellate Authority confirmed the order of eviction. The High Court, however, felt that an opportunity ought to have been afforded to B to prove that it was a lawful sub-tenant. The matter, therefore, required remand. At that stage, A prayed that in that case, the matter be remanded as a whole to be decided afresh considering the question of payment of rent/damages also. The High Court upheld the plea, negativing the contention of B that A had never challenged the order setting aside the direction as to payment of damages. B approached this Court. Dismissing the appeal, confirming the order of the High Court and adverting to substantial justice, this Court stated : """It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief. What precisely has been done by the learned Single Judge, is clear from the above emphasised words which be re-read with advantage. The question of claim to damages and their ascertainment would only arise in the event of the Life Insurance Corporation, respondent, succeeding to prove that the appellant Company was an unlawful sub-tenant and therefore in unauthorised occupation of public premises. If the finding were to go in favour of the appellant Company and it is proved to be a lawful sub-tenant and hence not an unauthorised occupant, the direction to adjudge the claim for damages would be rendered sterile and otiose. It is only in the event of the appellant Company being held to be an unlawful sub-tenant and hence an unauthorised occupant that the claim for damages would be determinable. We see therefore no fault in the High Court adopting such course in order to balance the equities between the contestants especially when it otherwise had power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution in addition. We cannot be oblivious to the fact that when the occupation of the premises in question was a factor in continuation the liability to pay for the use and occupation thereof, be it in the form of rent or damages, was also a continuing factor. The cause of justice, as viewed by the High Court, did clearly warrant that both these questions be viewed inter-dependently. For those who seek equity must bow to equity". (emphasis supplied)"" 98. From the above cases, it clearly transpires that powers under Articles 226 and 227 are discretionary and equitable and are required to be exercised in the larger interest of justice. While granting relief in favour of the applicant, the Court must take into account balancing interests and equities. It can mould relief considering the facts of the case. It can pass an appropriate order which justice may demand and equities may project. While granting relief in favour of the applicant, the Court must take into account balancing interests and equities. It can mould relief considering the facts of the case. It can pass an appropriate order which justice may demand and equities may project. As observed by this Court in Shiv Shankar Dal Mills v. State of Haryana, (1980) 1 SCR 1170 , Courts of equity should go much further both to give and refuse relief in furtherance of public interest. Granting or withholding of relief may properly be dependent upon considerations of justice, equity and good conscience." 30. He relied upon a judgment in the case of Shangrila Food Products (Supra), relevant paragraph 11 is being quoted below :- "11. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognisance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorty, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief. What precisely has been done by the learned Single Judge, is clear from the above emphasised words which be re-read with advantage. The question of claim to damages and their ascertainment would only arise in the event of the Life Insurance Corporation, respondent, succeeding to prove that the appellant Company was an unlawful sub-tenant and therefore in unauthorised occupation of public premises. If the finding were to go in favour of the appellant Company and it is proved to be a lawful sub-tenant and hence not an unauthorised occupant, the direction to adjudge the claim for damages would be rendered sterile and otiose. It is only in the event of the appellant Company being held to be an unlawful sub-tenant and hence an unauthorised occupant that the claim for damages would be determinable. It is only in the event of the appellant Company being held to be an unlawful sub-tenant and hence an unauthorised occupant that the claim for damages would be determinable. We see therefore no fault in the High Court adopting such course in order to balance the equities between the contestants especially when it otherwise had power of superintendance under Article 227 of the Constitution in addition. We cannot be oblivious to the fact that when the occupation of the premises in question was a factor in continuation the liability to pay for the use and occupation thereof, be it in the form of rent or damages, was also a continuing factor. The cause of justice, as viewed by the High Court, did clearly warrant that both these questions be viewed inter-dependently. For those who seek equity must bow to equity." 31. He relied upon a judgment in the case of Shaheen Parveen (Supra), relevant paragraph 17 is being quoted below :- "17. The writ court, being a court of equity, must take into consideration all relevant factors brought before it to deliver substantial justice. Equity justifies bending the rules, where fair play is not violated, with a view to promote substantial justice. A writ court cannot contemplate any limitation on its power to deliver substantial justice. It has to be ensured that a consumer of justice gets complete justice, instead of going into the nicety of law. Under the circumstances, the court cannot be a mere onlooker if injustice is likely to be caused." 32. He relied upon a judgment in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Dr. Dina Nath Shukla & Another (Supra), relevant paragraphs 11 and 13 are being quoted below :- "11. In Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma & Ors. vs. The Chancellor, Nagpur University & Ors. [ (1990) 4 SCC 55 ] instead of making subjectwise recruitment, an advertisement in respect of total of 77 posts including 13 posts of Professors, 29 posts of Readers and 35 posts of Lecturers were issued and recruitment was sought to be made. In Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma & Ors. vs. The Chancellor, Nagpur University & Ors. [ (1990) 4 SCC 55 ] instead of making subjectwise recruitment, an advertisement in respect of total of 77 posts including 13 posts of Professors, 29 posts of Readers and 35 posts of Lecturers were issued and recruitment was sought to be made. When it was questioned, this Court tested the principle on the anvil of equality and fairness of procedure posing the question thus: """Is non-reserving the posts of University teachers subjectwise in the employment notice a breach of letter and spirit of reservation policy contained in Section 77-C read with Section 57 of the Act?"" This Court had laid down in paras 10 to 12 thus: As regards the first question, we have narrated earlier the method which was adopted by the University for reserving the posts. It announced the posts categorywise as professors, Readers and Lecturers in different subjects and made a blanket declaration that 6 of the posts of Professors, 12 of the posts of Readers and 16 of the posts of Lecturers would be reserved for backward casts. Neither the University nor the candidates knew at that time as to for which of the subjects and in what number the said posts were reserved. The result was that the candidates belonging to the reserved category in particular, who wanted to apply for the reserved posts did not know for which of the posts they could apply and whether they could apply at all for the posts in the subjects in which they were qualified. That this could be the expected consequence of such an employment notice can legitimately be inferred and need not be and indeed cannot be, demonstrated by evidence of what actually happened, for there may be a number of candidates who on account of the said uncertainty might to take a chance. What is further, the selection committees which were appointed to interview that candidates for the respective posts did not also know whether they were interviewing the candidates for reserved posts or not, and to assess merits of the candidates from the reserved category as such candidates. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that the selection committee even without knowing to the candidates from the reserved category and, therefore, it cannot be said that any injustice had resulted to them is without merit. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that the selection committee even without knowing to the candidates from the reserved category and, therefore, it cannot be said that any injustice had resulted to them is without merit. In the first instance, the contention proceeds on the footing that all those belonging to the reserved category who wanted to apply for all the said posts had done so even without knowing that the concerned posts were reserved. Secondly, it also presumes that all eligible candidates from unreserved category had applied for the posts without knowing whether the posts were reserved or not. The possibility that many eligible candidates belonging to both reserved and unreserved categories might not have taken the risk and chosen to gamble cannot be ruled out. This argument further ignores the fact, that the suitability of a candidate from a reserved category to the particular post has to be adjudged by taking into consideration various factors and the desired result cannot be obtained by merely giving uniform weightage marks to the candidates concerned which was the only method followed by the selection committees while selecting the candidates. Further, there is nothing on record to show that this method of giving weightage to the candidate was not followed in respect of reserved category candidates even if they had not applied for the post in the reserved seats. What is more, there is also nothing on record to show whether any candidate belonging to the reserved category had applied for a particular post in a reserved seat, without the prior knowledge that the post was reserved. It is, therefore, difficult to understand as to how the selection committees proceeded to give weightage to the candidates without knowing whether they had applied for reserved or nonreserved seats. What is more objectionable in the procedure was that its Executive Council proceeded to classify the posts in different subjects between reserved and non-reserved posts after the lists of selected candidates were received from different selection committees. This method was open to an obvious objection since it gave a scope to eliminate unwanted selected candidates at that stage. Whether it occurred in the present case or not is immaterial for testing the validity and the propriety of the method followed by the university. This method was open to an obvious objection since it gave a scope to eliminate unwanted selected candidates at that stage. Whether it occurred in the present case or not is immaterial for testing the validity and the propriety of the method followed by the university. As has been stated earlier, in fact, after the receipt of the list of selected candidates not only the Executive Council constituted yet another committee to decide which of the subjectwise posts should be reserved or not but the Executive Council also decided that although candidates for 47 posts were selected only 30 of the posts were set apart although the candidates were selected for them, and they were so set apart for being filled in afresh by candidates belonging tot he reserved category. Interestingly, however, the employment notice issued subsequently for these posts mentioned reservations postwise (subjectwise). According to us, the word "post" used in the context has a relation to the faculty, discipline, or the subject for which it is created. When, therefore, reservations are required to be made "in posts", the reservations have to be postwise, i.e. subjectwise. The mere announcement of the number of reserved posts is no better than inviting applications for posts without mentioning the subjects for which the posts are advertised. When, therefore, Section 57(4)(a) requires that the advertisement or the employment notice would indicate the number of reserved posts, if any, it implies that the employment notice cannot be vague and has to indicate the specific post, i.e., the subject in which the post is vacant and for which the applications are invited from the candidates belonging to the reserved class. A non-indication of the post in this manner itself defeats the purpose for which the applications are invited from the reserved category candidates and consequently negates the object of the reservation policy. That this is also the intention of the legislature is made clear by Section 57(4)(d) which requires the selection committees to interview and adjudge the merits of each candidate and recommend him or her for appointment to "the general posts" and "the reserved posts", if any, advertised. That this is also the intention of the legislature is made clear by Section 57(4)(d) which requires the selection committees to interview and adjudge the merits of each candidate and recommend him or her for appointment to "the general posts" and "the reserved posts", if any, advertised. A support was also sought to be derived by the appellants to their contention from the policy of reservation as enunciated in Government Resolution dated March 30, 1981 wherein instructions are issued in the matter in exercise of the power conferred on the Government under Section 77 (c) of the Act." 13. Thus, it could be seen that if the subjectwise recruitment is adopted in each service or post in each cadre in each faculty, discipline, speciality or super-speciality, it would not only be clear to the candidates who seek recruitment but also there would not be an over-lapping in application of the rule of reservation to the service or posts as specified and made applicable by Section 3 of the Act. On the other hand, if the total posts are advertised without subjectwise specifications, in every faculty, discipline, speciality or super-speciality, it would be difficult for the candidates to know as to which of the posts be available either to the general or reserved candidates or whether or not they fulfil or qualify the requirements so as to apply for a particular post and seek selection. As indicated earlier, if there is any single post of Professor, Reader or Lecturer in each faculty, discipline, speciality or super-speciality which cannot be reserved for reserved candidates, it should be clubbed roster applied and be made available for the reserved candidates in terms of Section 3(5) of the Act. Even if there exists any isolated post, rule of rotation by application of roster should be adopted for appointment. For achieving the said object, the Vice-Chancellor, who is responsible authority under Section 4 to enforce the Act, would ensure that single posts in each category are clubbed since admittedly all the posts in each of the categories of Professors, Readers or Lecturers carry the same scale of pay. Therefore, their fusion is constitutional and permissible. The Vice-Chancellor should apply the rule of rotation and the roster as envisaged under sub-section (5) of Section 3. Therefore, their fusion is constitutional and permissible. The Vice-Chancellor should apply the rule of rotation and the roster as envisaged under sub-section (5) of Section 3. The advertisements are required to be issued so that the reserved and the general candidates would apply for consideration of their claims of recruitment in accordance therewith. This interpretation would subserve and elongate constitutional objective and public policy of socioeconomic justice serving adequacy of representation in a service or post, grade or cadre as mandated and envisaged in Articles 335 and 16(4) read with Articles 14 and 16(1), Preamble, Article 38 and Article 46 of the Constitution and all other cognate provisions. 33. He relied upon a judgment in the case of Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma (Supra), relevant paragraphs 10 and 11 are being quoted below :- "10. As regards the first question, we have narrated earlier the method which was adopted by the University for reserving the posts. It announced the posts categorywise as Professors, Readers and Lecturers in different subject and made a blanket declaration that 6 of the posts of Professor, 12 of the posts of Readers and 16 of the posts of Lecturers would be reserved for backward castes. Neither the Universi-ty nor the candidates knew at that time as to for which of the subjects and in what number the said posts were re-served. The result was that the candidates belonging to the reserved category in particular, who wanted to apply for the reserved posts did not know for which of the posts they could apply and whether they could apply at a11 for the posts in the subjects in which they were qualified. That this could be the expected consequence of such an employment notice can legitimately be inferred and need not be and indeed cannot be, demonstrated by evidence of what actually happened, for there may be number of candidates who on account of the said uncertainty might have refrained from applying for the posts as against those who applied to take a chance. What is further, the selection committees which were appointed to interview the candidates for the respective posts did not also know whether they were interviewing the candidates for reserved posts or not, and to assess merits of the candidates from the reserved category as such candidates. What is further, the selection committees which were appointed to interview the candidates for the respective posts did not also know whether they were interviewing the candidates for reserved posts or not, and to assess merits of the candidates from the reserved category as such candidates. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that the selection committees even without know whether the posts concerned were reserved or not, had given weightage to the candidates from the reserved category and, therefore, it cannot be said that any injustice had resulted to them is without merit. In the first instance, the contention proceeds on the footing that all those belonging to the reserved category who wanted to apply for a11 the said posts had done so even without knowing that the concerned posts were reserved. Secondly, it also presumes that all eligible candidates from unreserved category had applied for the posts without knowing whether the posts were reserved or not. The possibility that many eligible candidates belonging to both reserved and unreserved categories might not have taken the risk and chosen to gamble cannot be ruled out. This argument further ignores the fact that the suitability of a candidate from a reserved category to the particular post has to be adjudged by taking into consideration various factors and the desired result cannot be obtained by merely giving uniform weightage marks to the candidates concerned which was the only method followed by the selection committees while selecting the candidates. Further, there is nothing on record to show that this method of giving weightage to the candidate was not followed in respect of reserved category candidates even if they had not applied for the post in the reserved seats. What is more, there is also nothing on record to show whether any candidates belonging to the reserved category has applied for a particular post in a reserved seat, without the prior knowledge that the post was reserved. It is, therefore, difficult to understand as to how the selection committees proceeded to give weightage to the candidates without knowing whether they had applied for reserved or nonreserved seats. What is more objectionable in the procedure was that its Executive Council proceeded to classify the posts in different subjects between reserved and non-reserved posts after the lists of selected candidates were received from different selection committees. What is more objectionable in the procedure was that its Executive Council proceeded to classify the posts in different subjects between reserved and non-reserved posts after the lists of selected candidates were received from different selection committees. This method was open to an obvious objection since it gave a scope to eliminate unwanted selected candidates at' that stage. Whether it occurred in the present case or not is immaterial for testing the validity and the propriety of the method followed by the University. As has been stated earlier, in fact, after the receipt of the list of selected candidates not only the Executive Council constituted yet another committee to decide which of the subjectwise posts should be reserved or not but the Executive Council also decided that although candidates for 47 posts were selected only 30 of them should be appointed permanently. The latter included some backward class candidates for reserved posts so categorised later. But 17 of the posts were set apart although the candidates were selected for them, and they were so set apart for being filled in afresh by candidates belonging to the reserved category. Interestingly, however, the employment notice issued subsequently for these 17 posts mentioned reservations postwise (subjectwise). 11. The argument based on Section 57(4)(a) of the Act to support the procedure adopted by the University is, accord-ing to us, not well merited. The contention is that since Section 57(4)(a) requires the University to state in the advertisement only the total number of posts and the number of reserved posts and not postwise, i.e., subjectwise, the employment notice in question was not bad in law. According to us, the word "post" used in the context has a relation to the faculty, discipline, or the subject for which it is created. When, therefore, reservations are required to be made "in posts", the reservations have to be postwise, i.e., subjectwise. The mere announcement of the number of reserved posts is no better than inviting applications for posts without mentioning the subjects for which the posts are advertised. When, therefore, reservations are required to be made "in posts", the reservations have to be postwise, i.e., subjectwise. The mere announcement of the number of reserved posts is no better than inviting applications for posts without mentioning the subjects for which the posts are advertised. When, therefore, Section 57(4) (a) requires that the advertisement or the employment notice would indicate the number of reserved posts, if any, it implies that the employment notice cannot be vague and has to indicate the specific post, i.e., the subject in which the post is vacant and for which the applications are invited from the candidates belonging to the reserved classes. A non-indication of the post in this manner itself defeats the purpose for which the applications are invited from the reserved category candidates and consequently negates the object of the reservation policy. That this is also the intention of the legislature is made clear by Section 57(4)(d) which requires the selection committees to interview and adjudge the merits of each candidate and recommend him or her for appointment to "the general posts" and "the reserved posts", if any, advertised." 34. He relied upon a judgment in the case of Davesh Nagalya (Supra), relevant paragraph 12 being quoted below :- "12. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that subsequent events consequent to the order passed by the District Magistrate had to be taken into consideration. The High Court however failed to take into consideration death of one of the partners leading to deemed vacation of the premises. The appellant relied upon the judgment of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, wherein it has been held as under: “4. We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis-à-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is not violated, with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case, has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into Section 10(3) (iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact." 35. He relied upon a judgment in the case of Pasupuleti Venkateshwarlu (Supra), relevant paragraph 4 is being quoted below :- "4. We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis a vis circumstances which come into being Subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis a vis circumstances which come into being Subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief for the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decrotal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice--subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling (actors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myraid. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case, has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict in view of the inhibition written into s. 10(3) (iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact." 36. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon a judgment in the case of Rajesh Kumar Daria (Supra), whereby the other two judgments i.e. Indra Sawhney (Supra) and Anil Kumar Gupta (Supra) have been considered. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact." 36. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon a judgment in the case of Rajesh Kumar Daria (Supra), whereby the other two judgments i.e. Indra Sawhney (Supra) and Anil Kumar Gupta (Supra) have been considered. Relevant paragraph 9 in the case of Rajesh Kumar Daria (Supra) is being quoted below :- "9. The second relates to the difference between the nature of vertical reservation and horizontal reservation. Social reservations in favour of SC, ST and OBC under Article 16(4) are 'vertical reservations'. Special reservations in favour of physically handicapped, women etc., under Articles 16(1) or 15(3) are 'horizontal reservations'. Where a vertical reservation is made in favour of a backward class under Article 16(4), the candidates belonging to such backward class, may compete for non-reserved posts and if they are appointed to the non-reserved posts on their own merit, their numbers will not be counted against the quota reserved for the respective backward class. Therefore, if the number of SC candidates, who by their own merit, get selected to open competition vacancies, equals or even exceeds the percentage of posts reserved for SC candidates, it cannot be said the reservation quota for SCs has been filled. The entire reservation quota will be intact and available in addition to those selected under Open Competition category. [Vide -Indira Sawhney (Supra), R. K. Sabharwal vs. State of Punjab ( 1995 (2) SCC 745 ), Union of India vs. Virpal Singh Chauvan ( 1995 (6) SCC 684 and Ritesh R. Sah vs. Dr. Y. L. Yamul ( 1996 (3) SCC 253 )]. But the aforesaid principle applicable to vertical (social) reservations will not apply to horizontal (special) reservations. Where a special reservation for women is provided within the social reservation for Scheduled Castes, the proper procedure is first to fill up the quota for scheduled castes in order of merit and then find out the number of candidates among them who belong to the special reservation group of 'Scheduled Castes-Women'. If the number of women in such list is equal to or more than the number of special reservation quota, then there is no need for further selection towards the special reservation quota. If the number of women in such list is equal to or more than the number of special reservation quota, then there is no need for further selection towards the special reservation quota. Only if there is any shortfall, the requisite number of scheduled caste women shall have to be taken by deleting the corresponding number of candidates from the bottom of the list relating to Scheduled Castes. To this extent, horizontal (special) reservation differs from vertical (social) reservation. Thus women selected on merit within the vertical reservation quota will be counted against the horizontal reservation for women. Let us illustrate by an example : If 19 posts are reserved for SCs (of which the quota for women is four), 19 SC candidates shall have to be first listed in accordance with merit, from out of the successful eligible candidates. If such list of 19 candidates contains four SC women candidates, then there is no need to disturb the list by including any further SC women candidate. On the other hand, if the list of 19 SC candidates contains only two woman candidates, then the next two SC woman candidates in accordance with merit, will have to be included in the list and corresponding number of candidates from the bottom of such list shall have to be deleted, so as to ensure that the final 19 selected SC candidates contain four women SC candidates. [But if the list of 19 SC candidates contains more than four women candidates, selected on own merit, all of them will continue in the list and there is no question of deleting the excess women candidate on the ground that 'SC-women' have been selected in excess of the prescribed internal quota of four.]" 37. In the judgment of Ramesh Chandra Sankla (Supra), the Apex Court has held that powers under Articles 226 and 227 are discretionary and equitable and are required to be exercised in the larger interest of justice. While granting relief in favour of the applicant, the Court must take into account balancing interests and equities. It can mould relief considering the facts of the case. It can pass an appropriate order which justice may demand and equities may project. While granting relief in favour of the applicant, the Court must take into account balancing interests and equities. It can mould relief considering the facts of the case. It can pass an appropriate order which justice may demand and equities may project. Further in the case of Shangrila Food Products (Supra), it has been held that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognisance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorty, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief. Similar view has been taken in the case of Shaheen Parveen (Supra), wherein it has been held that the writ court, being a court of equity, must take into consideration all relevant factors brought before it to deliver substantial justice. Equity justifies bending the rules, where fair play is not violated, with a view to promote substantial justice. A writ court cannot contemplate any limitation on its power to deliver substantial justice. It has to be ensured that a consumer of justice gets complete justice, instead of going into the nicety of law. Under the circumstances, the court cannot be a mere onlooker if injustice is likely to be caused. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Dr. Dina Nath Shukla & Another (Supra), it has been held that the advertisements are required to be issued so that the reserved and the general candidates would apply for consideration of their claims of recruitment in accordance therewith. This interpretation would subserve and elongate constitutional objective and public policy of socioeconomic justice serving adequacy of representation in a service or post, grade or cadre as mandated and envisaged in Articles 335 and 16(4) read with Articles 14 and 16(1), Preamble, Article 38 and Article 46 of the Constitution and all other cognate provisions. Similar view has been taken in the case of Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma (Supra). Similar view has been taken in the case of Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma (Supra). In the case of Davesh Nagalya (Supra), the Supreme Court has affirmed the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. Lastly, in the case of Pasupuleti Venkateshwarlu (Supra), the Supreme Court has held that if a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief for the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decrotal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice--subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling (actors or just circumstances. 38. On overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as also the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the parties, it is found that once Shreyas Yadav has obtained more marks than the O.B.C. category candidate, which is 50 marks and he has obtained 52 marks, therefore, he would have been selected under O.B.C. category and not by giving benefit of horizontal reservation under O.B.C. category of dependents of freedom fighter quota. In case, he is selected under O.B.C. category, being higher in merit, his selection shall be deemed to be made under O.B.C. category. 39. The judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent in the case of Rajesh Kumar Daria (Supra), thus, is clearly distinguishable and does not apply to the present facts and circumstances of the case. 40. In the supplementary affidavit filed on 12.3.2021, there is a categorical statement of fact on the basis of information furnished under Right to Information Act, 2005 that there are four vacancies lying vacant. This information was furnished vide letter dated 6.8.2019. 41. 40. In the supplementary affidavit filed on 12.3.2021, there is a categorical statement of fact on the basis of information furnished under Right to Information Act, 2005 that there are four vacancies lying vacant. This information was furnished vide letter dated 6.8.2019. 41. In view of the above, to meet out the substantial justice and in order to balance equities, in case the candidature of the petitioner be considered under dependents of freedom fighter against one vacancy, nobody is going to be affected. 42. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing discussion as also on the basis of catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed to the extent that the candidature of the petitioner shall be considered in the light of the observation made above against one vacancy of dependents of freedom fighters quota and in case, she comes under the category of dependents of freedom fighters quota, she shall be given appointment forthwith.