JUDGMENT : 1. The instant appeal has been preferred by the defendants/appellants against the judgment and decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court dated 20th January, 1982 passed in Civil Appeal No. 338 of 1980, as a result, a suit for specific performance of contract bearing R.S. No. 133 of 1973 which was dismissed by the Trial Court has been decreed by the Lower Appellate Court. 2. The aforesaid second appeal was admitted by means of order dated 26.05.1982 but no substantial questions of law was formulated. Later on 13.11.2017, the Court formulated the substantial question of law which reads as under:- “(I) Whether the impugned judgment suffers from manifest illegality as the Lower Appellate Court did not formulate the point of determination and has not been complied with the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C.?” 3. During the course of the hearing, this Court by means of order dated 23.05.2023 formulated another question of law which reads as under:- “(I) Whether the respondent was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?” 4. It is upon the aforesaid two questions of law that the Court has heard Dr. R.S. Pandey, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Virendra Bhatt, for the appellants and Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Mohd. Shadab Khan, learned counsel for the respondents. 5. Before adverting to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it will be appropriate to notice the facts giving rise to the instant appeal, first:- 6. The dispute in question relates to a double storied house bearing No. 497/13 situate in Babuganj, P.S. Hasanganj, District Lucknow and bounded as under:- North:-House of Ram Chandra son of Mahavir Prasad South:-Faizabad Road East:-House of Sant Prasad West:-Lane 7. The aforesaid property in question belonged to Ganga Prasad and Jagannath who had sold the said house in favour of Sri Gurdeen on 08.05.1970 for a total sale consideration of Rs. 2,500/-. On the very same day, it was agreed between Gurdeen and Ganga Prasad and Jagannath that if within a period of three years Ganga Prasad and Jagannath would pay a sum of Rs. 2,500/-to Gurdeen along with rent for the aforesaid premises at Rs. 50 per month then Gurdeen would re-convey the property to Sri Ganga Prasad and Jagannath. 8. On the very same day, it was agreed between Gurdeen and Ganga Prasad and Jagannath that if within a period of three years Ganga Prasad and Jagannath would pay a sum of Rs. 2,500/-to Gurdeen along with rent for the aforesaid premises at Rs. 50 per month then Gurdeen would re-convey the property to Sri Ganga Prasad and Jagannath. 8. It is in the aforesaid factual backdrop that Ganga Prasad and Jagannath instituted a suit for specific performance of contract on 08th May, 1973 against Gurdeen before the Court of Munsif (South) Lucknow which was registered as R.S. No. 133 of 1973. 9. It was pleaded that the plaintiffs had sold the said house to the defendant on 08.05.1970 and on the same day, the defendant had agreed to re-convey the property to the plaintiffs within three years upon receiving a sum of Rs. 2,500/-as well as rent at the rate of Rs. 50/-per month. It was also pleaded that a sum of Rs. 400/-towards rent had been paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant on 06.01.1971 and thereafter the plaintiffs had requested the defendant to accept the balance amount and re-convey the property to the plaintiffs but the defendant delayed the same. 10. Lastly, on 08.05.1973, it was agreed that the plaintiffs would pay the remaining amount and the defendant would execute the sale deed by reaching the office of Sub Registrar, Lucknow. Despite the plaintiffs having waited at the office of the Sub Registrar, Lucknow till 12:00 Noon yet the defendant did not turn up and thereafter the plaintiffs on the very same day filed the suit for specific performance of contract. 11. The suit came to be contested by Gurdeen who filed his written statement denying the aforesaid plea and specifically stated that the plaintiffs throughout the period of three years did not make any attempt to pay the amount to the defendant and even did not pay the rent regularly. It was also denied that there was any agreement that the defendant would reach the Sub-Registrar’s office on 08.05.1973. It was specifically pleaded that the plaintiffs did not have the money nor there was any readiness and willingness on their part and since the plaintiff had breached the agreement, hence, they were not entitled to the decree apart from the fact that the suit was barred by limitation. 12. It was specifically pleaded that the plaintiffs did not have the money nor there was any readiness and willingness on their part and since the plaintiff had breached the agreement, hence, they were not entitled to the decree apart from the fact that the suit was barred by limitation. 12. Upon the exchange of pleadings, initially, the Trial Court had framed four issues:- (I) Whether the plaintiffs or the defendant committed default to comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement? (II) Whether the suit was time barred? (III) Whether on 08.05.1973, the defendant did not reach the Registrar’s office? (IV) The relief? 13. The plaintiffs only examined one witness Sri Ram as P.W.1 and he is the person from whom the plaintiffs had borrowed money to pay the defendant and also to establish that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of their obligations. 14. On the other hand, Sri Gurdeen examined himself as the sole witness denying the aforesaid contentions and averments and reiterated that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing nor had the capacity to pay. It was also deposed that the suit was barred by limitation and that there was no understanding or agreement between the parties that the defendant would reach the Sub- Registrar’s office on 08.05.1973. 15. The Trial Court by means of judgment and decree dated 18.01.1977 dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs preferred a regular civil appeal which was allowed by means of judgment and decree dated 25.10.1978 passed by the District Judge, Lucknow whereby the matter was remanded to the Trial Court for decision afresh after permitting the parties to lead fresh evidence. 16. After the aforesaid remand, the Trial Court permitted the parties to lead fresh evidence and in pursuance thereof Sri Jagannath, the plaintiff no. 2 was examined as a witness so also Sri Mathur who was the counsel for the plaintiffs was examined as P.W. 2 and Sri Ram was again examined as P.W. 3. 17. 16. After the aforesaid remand, the Trial Court permitted the parties to lead fresh evidence and in pursuance thereof Sri Jagannath, the plaintiff no. 2 was examined as a witness so also Sri Mathur who was the counsel for the plaintiffs was examined as P.W. 2 and Sri Ram was again examined as P.W. 3. 17. The defendant also examined Smt. Vimla Devi (widow of Gurdeen as by then Gurdeen had expired and his widow and children had been substituted) and once again the Trial Court by means of judgment and decree dated 22.09.1980 dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiffs had breached the conditions of the agreement and did not have the requisite money to pay and perform their part of the agreement. The Trial Court also noticed that since the institution of the suit, certain subsequent events had intervened, inasmuch as, Gurdeen had expired and he was survived by his widow and six children and the aforesaid fact was treated to be a circumstance which tilted the discretion in favour of the defendant in terms of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1960 and with the aforesaid findings, the suit was dismissed. 18. The plaintiffs once again filed a regular civil appeal bearing No. 338 of 1980 which was heard by the 6th Additional District Judge, Lucknow who allowed the appeal by means of judgment and decree dated 20.01.1982 and decreed the suit for specific performance and while doing so held that the plaintiffs had the requisite means to pay and therefore it cannot be said that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and it further held that there was no pleading by the defendant that after the death of Gurdeen there were any such changed circumstances that in case of grant of decree of specific performance, the defendant would suffer greater hardship, hence, the reason recorded by the Trial Court to refuse the decree of specific performance on the aforesaid grounds was not valid. 19. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the defendants have challenged the judgment of reversal passed by the Lower Appellate Court dated 20.01.1982 in the instant second appeal on the two substantial questions of law which has been noticed hereinabove. 20. Dr. 19. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the defendants have challenged the judgment of reversal passed by the Lower Appellate Court dated 20.01.1982 in the instant second appeal on the two substantial questions of law which has been noticed hereinabove. 20. Dr. R.S. Pandey, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has primarily focused his submissions on the question regarding readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs. It is urged by the learned Senior Counsel that in a suit for specific performance of contract, it is per se essential for the plaintiffs to plead and prove with adequate evidence that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and this readiness and willingness must commence from the agreement and should remain throughout till the conclusion of the Court proceedings. 21. It is submitted that on 08.05.1970, the parties had agreed to re-convey the property on the condition that within a period of three year, the plaintiffs would pay a sum of Rs. 2,500/-and also a sum of Rs. 50/-per month as rent. The plaintiffs only paid a sum of Rs. 400/-towards rent and did not make good the payment of rent nor paid the agreed sum of Rs. 2,500/-and thus it clearly indicated that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform their obligations under the agreement. 22. The learned Senior Counsel has also emphasized that the plaintiffs did not have the means to pay the aforesaid sum and even from the own showing of the case as set up by the plaintiff, it would reflect that it is only on the last date of limitation for filing the suit i.e. 08.05.1973 that the plaintiffs had borrowed money to file the suit which clearly established the fact that the plaintiffs were not having the adequate means nor they were ready and willing to perform their part. It is also submitted that though it was pleaded by the plaintiffs that they were ready and willing to perform their part but this fact stood belied by the conduct of the plaintiffs who neither could lead any cogent evidence to establish that since the date of the agreement i.e. 08.05.1970 and till the date of institution of the suit i.e. 08.05.1973 and thereafter during the entire period of three years the plaintiffs had made any attempt to offer the balance sale consideration and the rentals to get the property re-conveyed. 23. It is further submitted that a bald plea has been raised by the plaintiffs that they had requested the defendants on several occasions to receive the remaining consideration but the same was never proved. Even the suit was instituted on the last day of limitation for filing the suit and the plaintiffs had to borrow money for not only paying the consideration to the defendants but also for the court fee for instituting the suit and it clearly established the fact that the plaintiffs did not have the means to comply with their obligations and lastly even prior to the institution of the suit at no point of time, the plaintiffs issued any notice or called upon the defendant to receive the consideration and execute the sale deed which clearly reflects the non-seriousness as well as the inability of the plaintiffs regarding the reconveyance agreement. 24. 24. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that apart from the issue of readiness and willingness, the Courts are also required to consider the import of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (prior to its amendment in the year 2018) and it is in the aforesaid circumstances that the Trial Court had taken a holistic view and found that the discretionary relief of Specific Performance of Contract could not be exercised in favour of the plaintiffs and therefore by taking note of the admitted facts regarding the death of Gurdeen and he being survived by his widow and six children and that they could not have foreseen the fact that they would have to give up the shelter over their heads and for the said reasons the exercise of discretion in terms of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was appropriately exercised and the same has been reversed by the Lower Appellate Court on insufficient grounds and reasons. 25. Taking his submissions forward in the aforesaid backdrop, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the Lower Appellate Court being the Court of both law and fact was obliged to have considered the matter in its correct perspective and was required to follow the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. In the instant case, the Lower Appellate Court by not formulating the points for determination has violated the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. and this also vitiates the judgment and decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court, thus, for all the aforesaid reasons, the judgment and decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court deserves to be set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court dated 22.09.1980 deserves to be affirmed. 26. The learned Senior Counsel in support of his submissions has relied upon the following decisions:- (i) K. Karuppuraj Vs. M. Ganeshan; (2021) 10 SCC 777 . (ii) U.N. Krishnamurthy Vs. A.M. Krishnamurthy; 2022 SCC Online SC 840. (iii) Surinder Kaur Vs. Bahadur Singh (2019) 8 SCC 575 . (iii) Smt. Ram Ratti and Another Vs. Gorakh Prasad Dubey 2023 (1) ADJ 569 . 27. Sri Mohd. M. Ganeshan; (2021) 10 SCC 777 . (ii) U.N. Krishnamurthy Vs. A.M. Krishnamurthy; 2022 SCC Online SC 840. (iii) Surinder Kaur Vs. Bahadur Singh (2019) 8 SCC 575 . (iii) Smt. Ram Ratti and Another Vs. Gorakh Prasad Dubey 2023 (1) ADJ 569 . 27. Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents while combating the aforesaid submissions has defended the judgment passed by the Lower Appellate Court on the ground that the Trial Court had committed an error on two counts. It is urged that the defendant were only entitled to the money which was agreed between the parties. How the plaintiffs arranged for the money was not the problem of the defendant. Even though, the plaintiff borrowed money from Sri Ram but nevertheless the fact remains that the plaintiffs had the necessary means and they had deposited the said sum before the Trial Court. This clearly indicated that the plaintiffs were not only serious of getting the property re-conveyed but had made the necessary arrangements to raise the amount and pay the defendant. 28. It is also urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents that the plaintiffs had approached the defendant for accepting the balance consideration and get the sale deed executed but it was the defendant who had prolonged the matter. On 06.05.1973, it was agreed between the plaintiffs and Gurdeen in presence of Sri Ram that the sale deed would be executed on 08.05.1973 in the office of Sub-Registrar, Lucknow where the plaintiffs would be present along with the necessary funds and the defendant agreed to be present to execute the sale deed and it was actually the defendant who did not turn up despite the plaintiffs waiting at the Sub-Registrar’s office for a reasonable time and thereafter once the plaintiffs realized that the defendant was not turning up, they immediately went and got the suit filed as it was the last day of limitation for filing the suit which also clearly establishes the seriousness of the plaintiffs to institute the suit. It is accordingly submitted that these facts which are not disputed clearly tilted the case in favour of the plaintiffs and the evidence was incorrectly appreciated by the Trial Court who deduced incorrect inferences and committed an error. 29. It is accordingly submitted that these facts which are not disputed clearly tilted the case in favour of the plaintiffs and the evidence was incorrectly appreciated by the Trial Court who deduced incorrect inferences and committed an error. 29. It is also urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents that the discretion, if any, in terms of Section 20 of the Act of 1963 is not unbridled but is to be exercised in accordance with the settled legal principles and not arbitrarily. The defendant either in the first instance or even after the suit was remanded by the Lower Appellate Court did not plead or raise any contention regarding any hardships either in the pleadings nor in the evidence and in absence thereof it was not open for the Trial Court to have considered the aforesaid aspect and refuse the decree of specific performance merely on the ground that during the pendency of the proceedings, the sole defendant, Gurdeen had died and he was survived by his widow and six children. This indicates that the exercise of discretion by the Trial Court was arbitrary and was not based on any subjective material before the Court and such exercise of power cannot be accepted. This aspect was considered by the Lower Appellate Court in the correct perspective and it returned a finding that the plaintiffs had the necessary funds which was offered to the defendant and he did not appear in the office of the Sub-Registrar for execution of the sale deeds and on the same day, the money was deposited in the Court through tender and the suit was instituted which clearly indicated the readiness as well as the willingness. Since the suit was filed within the period of limitation, hence, there was no legal impediment in the grant of decree of specific performance. The discretion which was exercised by the Trial Court was also found to be based on inadequate material and the same has been corrected by the Lower Appellate Court which is the final court of both fact and law and as such the decision of the Lower Appellate court does not require any interference. 30. The discretion which was exercised by the Trial Court was also found to be based on inadequate material and the same has been corrected by the Lower Appellate Court which is the final court of both fact and law and as such the decision of the Lower Appellate court does not require any interference. 30. It is lastly submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents that Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. mandates the Appellate Court to comply with the provisions but in the instant case, it would be found that there is no violation, inasmuch as, the contention of both the sides, the issue before the Lower Appellate Court have been noticed and after considering the respective submissions and re-appraising the evidence available before it, the Lower Appellate Court has reversed the judgment and decree by recording its own findings which is based on evidence and material on record. Moreover, it is not the contention of the appellant nor it could be demonstrated what prejudice has been caused to the appellants merely by non-framing of the points of determination whereas all the other ingredients of Order 41 Rule 31 were complied with and thus for all the aforesaid reasons, the judgment and decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court does not fall foul of the provisions and the appeal being devoid of merits is liable to be dismissed. 31. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel for the respective parties and from the perusal of the material on record as well as noticing the two questions of law which have been formulated, this Court deems appropriate to first deal with the issue regarding non-compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. as raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. 32. In this context, if the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 is seen at a glance, it would indicate that it mandates the Appellate Court to state the points for determination, the decision thereon, the reasons for the decision and where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 33. The aforesaid provision has been the subject matter of consideration both by this Court as well as by the Apex Court. In K. Karuppuraj V. M. Ganesan (2021) 10 SCC 777 , the Apex Court in paragraph 11 has held as under:- “11. 33. The aforesaid provision has been the subject matter of consideration both by this Court as well as by the Apex Court. In K. Karuppuraj V. M. Ganesan (2021) 10 SCC 777 , the Apex Court in paragraph 11 has held as under:- “11. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, if the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is considered, in that case, there is a total non-compliance of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. The High Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it as a first appellate court; the High Court has not at all re-appreciated the entire evidence on record; and not even considered the reasoning given by the learned trial court, in particular, on findings recorded by the learned trial court on the issue of willingness. Therefore, as such, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable and in normal circumstances we would have accepted the request of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent to remand the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of appeal. However, even on other points also, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is not sustainable. We refrain from remanding the matter to the High Court and we decide the appeal on merits.” 34. From the perusal of the decision of the Apex Court in Karuppuraj (supra), it would reveal that the Apex Court intervened in the matter for non-compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. not only on the ground that the points for determination were not formulated but for the reasons that the First Appellate Court did not discuss the entire matter and the issue in detail and from the perusal of the judgment, it did not indicate that the First Appellate Court had considered and re-appreciated the evidence while disposing of the first appeal and it also noticed that the First Appellate Court had decided the appeal under Section 96 C.P.C. in a casual and perfunctory manner. This shall be evident from para 7 and 11 of the said report. Thus, it cannot be said that for mere non-framing of the points for determination, the decision has been reversed. 35. This Court in Dalla Vs. This shall be evident from para 7 and 11 of the said report. Thus, it cannot be said that for mere non-framing of the points for determination, the decision has been reversed. 35. This Court in Dalla Vs. Nanhu 2019 (1) ADJ 246 (LB) had considered the issue of Order 41 Rule 31 in detail and again in Banwari Lal Vs. Rajkumari 2019 (37) LCD 506 this Court had the occasion to consider the provision of Order 41 Rule 31 in detail and mere in context with the factual scenario as to whether the appeal can be remanded merely for non-framing of points for determination. The relevant portion of the decision in Banwari Lal (supra) reads as under:- “………..17. The spirit of the provision is to ensure that the appellate Court must record reasons for the decisions and is to focus attention of the Court to rival contentions of the parties which arise for determinations and also to offer the litigating parties an opportunity of knowing and understanding the grounds upon which the decision is founded in a view to enable them to know the basis of decision and if they think proper and so advised to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC. 18. This matter also need to be seen from another angle inasmuch as Section 99 CPC provides as under:- "99. No decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction.-No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party." 19. It would indicate that a decision of a Court cannot be up set merely based on technical or immaterial defects. The Rules of procedure are made to sub-serve the ends of justice. It would indicate that a decision of a Court cannot be up set merely based on technical or immaterial defects. The Rules of procedure are made to sub-serve the ends of justice. The object of Section 99 CPC is to prevent technicalities from overcoming the ends of justice and from operating as a means of circuity of litigation where the decision is correct on merits and is within the jurisdiction of the Court, no error or defect or irregularity which does not go to the root of the matter will vitiate the order or invalidate the action. (See Mohammad Husain Khan vs. Babu Kishva Nandan Sahai, AIR 1937 PC 233 and Kiran Singh and others vs. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1954 SC 340 ). 20. Section 108 CPC provides that the provisions of this part relating to appeals from original decrees shall, so far as may be, apply to appeals from appellate decrees. It is in pursuance thereof that Order XLII Rule 1 CPC has been incorporated which is being reproduced as under: "Order XLII. Procedure.-The rules of Order XLI shall apply, so far as many be, to appeals from appellate decrees." 21. Thus, it would been seen that where a judgment passed by the first appellate Court though otherwise conforms to the requirements as provided under Order XLI Rule 31 CPC, that is to say that the first appellate Court has made a narration of facts of the case of the parties to the lis, the issues arising in the case and submissions urged by the parties, the legal principles applicable to the issues and reasons in support of the findings in support of its conclusion, it would substantially comply with the provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC and merely by not stating the points of determination in so many words, it would not make the judgment wholly void. 22. 22. In the case of Jagdish Singh vs. Amresh and another, reported (2018 (36) LCD Page 2729, in Para-13, this Court held as under:- “"So far as the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that there is no statutory compliance of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC is concerned, suffice is to observe that the Apex Court in a recent judgment dated 4.8.2017 passed in Civil Appeal No. 9951 of 2017; U. Manjunath Rao vs. U. Chandrashekhar and Anr., has held that the compliance of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC will depend in the facts and circumstances of the case and in case there is substantial compliance of Order XLI Rule 31 no illegality can be attributed. In the present case there is substantial compliance of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC as such the contention raised has no force." 23. In order to successfully canvass the point of non-compliance of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC, it is not mere non framing of points of determination alone, but consequent failure of justice must also be established occasioned to a party. 24. The purpose and object of incorporating Section 99 CPC is to prevent mischief, which may be caused by the reversal of the decree in a case of this kind. Thus, unless and until the non-compliance of Order XLI and Rule 31 CPC is of such a nature that it affects the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court or the soul of the provision is robbed by not discussing the bare facts, issues arising therefrom, the rival points urged and recording of reasons upon which the judgment is based, till then minor infraction of the aforesaid provision will not give a latitude to a party to assail a judgment and seek its reversal only on this infraction under Section 100 CPC. 25. Needless to say that Rules of procedure though couched in a mandatory format must be given a reasonable construction so that it may not cause an ultimate failure of justice. Thus, merely non-framing of the point of determination without any consequent failure of justice and if the judgment otherwise complies with the mandate of narration of facts, consideration of submissions and recording of reasons as required in law will not cause the aforesaid issue to be termed as a substantial question of law.” 36. Thus, merely non-framing of the point of determination without any consequent failure of justice and if the judgment otherwise complies with the mandate of narration of facts, consideration of submissions and recording of reasons as required in law will not cause the aforesaid issue to be termed as a substantial question of law.” 36. In another subsequent decision of this Court the issue of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. in context of non-framing of points for determination was considered in Gita Devi and Others Vs. Jai Nath Manu/U.P./0585/2019, and this Court relying upon the earlier decisions of this Court in Dalla Vs. Nanhu 2019 (1) ADJ 246 turned down the plea that the judgment was bad for non framing of points for determination and complying the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. This decision was upheld by the Apex Court in Gita Devi and Another Vs. Jai Nath Manu/SCOR/48230/2022. 37. Thus, it would be seen that if the proposition culled out from the aforesaid decisions, is applied to the present case, it would be found that the Lower Appellate Court has definitely considered the submissions of the respective parties, the issue before it and it also considered the evidence and has reversed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. Merely by non-framing the points for determination, it cannot be said that the judgment is per se bad especially when all other ingredients are present, coupled with the fact that the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant could not establish that what proposition/submissions was raised before the Lower Appellate Court which has not been considered nor it could be demonstrated as to what prejudice has been caused to the appellants merely because the points for determination was not formulated by the Lower Appellate Court even though it has considered and giving his own independent findings in respect of issue nos. (i) and (iii) which were pressed before the Lower Appellate Court. 38. In light of the aforesaid, this Court is convinced that the judgment passed by the Lower Appellate Court does not fall foul of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C., consequently, the submissions of learned Senior Counsel for the appellants on the aforesaid issue fails and the question of law is answered accordingly. 39. 38. In light of the aforesaid, this Court is convinced that the judgment passed by the Lower Appellate Court does not fall foul of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C., consequently, the submissions of learned Senior Counsel for the appellants on the aforesaid issue fails and the question of law is answered accordingly. 39. Considering the second issue regarding readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs in light of the admitted facts and evidence available on record, the Trial Court did not find the plaintiffs to be ready and willing and it invoked the provisions of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and refused the decree of specific performance. The Lower Appellate Court on the other hand reversed the finding on both the aforesaid counts and decreed the suit. In light of the aforesaid, this Court has to adjudge as to whether the Trial Court or the Lower Appellate Court was right in returning their respective verdict. 40. Before dwelling into the aforesaid aspect, it will be worthwhile to consider what does the readiness and willingness really means and in what manner the discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act is to be exercised. 41. This Court considered the issue of readiness and willingness in Ramzan Ali and another v. Altafur Rahman, 2023: AHC-LKO-30146 and held as under:- "27. In the Corpus Juris Secundum, vol. 81 pp.950-951, the readiness and willingness has been interpreted to mean, a general principle of law that a person seeking specific performance must show that he has performed or offered to perform or is ready, able and willing to perform, all the essential acts required by the contract and he must not remain quiet or hold himself aloof so as to enforce or abandon the contract as events may prove advantageous. The plaintiff is entitled to specific performance where he alleges and proves that he has complied substantially with the conditions of the contract or is able, ready and willing to perform the contract. (See also Satya Jain v Anis Ahmed Rushdie AIR 2013 SC 434 ). 28. The plaintiff is entitled to specific performance where he alleges and proves that he has complied substantially with the conditions of the contract or is able, ready and willing to perform the contract. (See also Satya Jain v Anis Ahmed Rushdie AIR 2013 SC 434 ). 28. In the case of Bijai Bahadur v. Shri Shiv Kumar AIR 1985 All 223 , this Court held that so far as the question of readiness and willingness is concerned while 'willingness' is merely a mental process, 'readiness' is something to do with translating that will into action and is preceded by a necessary preparation for being in a position to be ready. As to the averments about this continuous readiness and willingness the law never insists on any particular form and the necessary averment may be made in any language the plaintiff may choose to employ. The language is not important. The crucial thing is that the totality of the averments made in the plaint must indicate the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff, even though by necessary inference. 29. This Court also notices the decision of the Apex Court in His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji Vs. Sitaram Thapar; 1996 (4) SCC 526 wherein the concept of readiness and willingness has been noticed and has been held as under:- "2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract. According to the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff was to supply the draft sale deed to the defendant within 7 days of the execution of the agreement, i.e., by 27-2-1975. The draft sale deed was not returned after being duly approved by the petitioner. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff's part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The draft sale deed was not returned after being duly approved by the petitioner. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff's part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The facts of this case would amply demonstrate that the petitioner/plaintiff was not ready nor had the capacity to perform his part of the contract as he had no financial capacity to pay the consideration in cash as contracted and intended to bide for the time which disentitles him as time is of the essence of the contract." 30. Similarly, In J.P. Builders and Another Vs. A. Ramadas Rao and Another; 2011 (1) SCC 429 wherein the Apex Court in paragraph nos. 22 to 27 has observed as under:- "22. The words "ready" and "willing" imply that the person was prepared to carry out the terms of the contract. The distinction between "readiness" and "willingness" is that the former refers to financial capacity and the latter to the conduct of the plaintiff wanting performance. Generally, readiness is backed by willingness. 23. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao [ (1995) 5 SCC 115 ] at SCC para 5, this Court held: (SCC pp. 117-18) "5. ... Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that the plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract." 24. In P. D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu [ (2004) 6 SCC 649 ] this Court observed: (SCC p. 654, paras 19 and 21) "19. It is indisputable that in a suit for specific performance of contract the plaintiff must establish his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. The question as to whether the onus was discharged by the plaintiff or not will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No straitjacket formula can be laid down in this behalf. *** 21. ... The readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract would also depend upon the question as to whether the defendant did everything which was required of him to be done in terms of the agreement for sale." 25. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates "readiness and willingness" on the part of the plaintiff and it is a condition precedent for obtaining relief of grant of specific performance. It is also clear that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must allege and prove a continuous "readiness and willingness" to perform the contract on his part from the date of the contract. The onus is on the plaintiff. 26. It is also clear that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must allege and prove a continuous "readiness and willingness" to perform the contract on his part from the date of the contract. The onus is on the plaintiff. 26. It has been rightly considered by this Court in R.C. Chandiok v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal [ (1970) 3 SCC 140 ] that "readiness and willingness" cannot be treated as a straitjacket formula. This has to be determined from the entirety of the facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. 27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is noncompliance with this statutory mandate, the court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. "Readiness and willingness" to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties."" 42. In so far as the exercise or discretion in terms of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is concerned, the Apex Court has considered how the discretion is to be exercised in the following cases:- (I) Ramesh Chand V. Asruddin 2015 (33) LCD 2927 (SC) (II) G. Jayashree and Others Vs. Bhagvandas and Others (2016) 1 SCC 653 . (III) Jayakantham and Others Vs. Abaykumar (2017) 5 SCC 178 (IV) Ferrodous Estates (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. P. Gopirathnam (Dead) and Others 2020 SCC Online SC 825 43. Lately in Shenbagam and others v. K.K. Rathinavel, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 71, the Apex Court in paragraphs 36 to 41 has held as under:- "36. Even assuming that the respondent was willing to perform his obligations under the contract, we must decide whether it would be appropriate to direct the specific performance of the contract in this case. Lately in Shenbagam and others v. K.K. Rathinavel, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 71, the Apex Court in paragraphs 36 to 41 has held as under:- "36. Even assuming that the respondent was willing to perform his obligations under the contract, we must decide whether it would be appropriate to direct the specific performance of the contract in this case. In Zarina Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam (2015) 1 SCC 705 a two-judge Bench of this Court while dealing with a suit for specific performance of a contract regarding the sale of immovable property observed that the remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy and Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act confers a discretion on the Court. The Court held: “24. It is well settled that remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy. The court while granting decree of specific performance exercises its discretionary jurisdiction. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act specifically provides that the Court's discretion to grant decree of specific performance is discretionary but not arbitrary. Discretion must be exercised in accordance with sound and reasonable judicial principles.” 37. In the context of the discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, several decisions of this Court have considered whether it is appropriate to direct specific performance of a contract relating to the transfer of immovable property, especially given the efflux of time and the escalation of prices of property. In Satya Jain v. Anis Ahmed Rushdie (2013) 8 SCC 131 this Court held: “39. The long efflux of time (over 40 years) that has occurred and the galloping value of real estate in the meantime are the twin inhibiting factors in this regard. The same, however, have to be balanced with the fact that the plaintiffs are in no way responsible for the delay that has occurred and their keen participation in the proceedings till date show the live interest on the part of the plaintiffs to have the agreement enforced in law. 40. The discretion to direct specific performance of an agreement and that too after elapse of a long period of time, undoubtedly, has to be exercised on sound, reasonable, rational and acceptable principles. 40. The discretion to direct specific performance of an agreement and that too after elapse of a long period of time, undoubtedly, has to be exercised on sound, reasonable, rational and acceptable principles. The parameters for the exercise of discretion vested by Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot be entrapped within any precise expression of language and the contours thereof will always depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The ultimate guiding test would be the principles of fairness and reasonableness as may be dictated by the peculiar facts of any given case, which features the experienced judicial mind can perceive without any real difficulty. It must however be emphasised that efflux of time and escalation of price of property, by itself, cannot be a valid ground to deny the relief of specific performance. […] 41. The twin inhibiting factors identified above if are to be read as a bar to the grant of a decree of specific performance would amount to penalising the plaintiffs for no fault on their part; to deny them the real fruits of a protracted litigation wherein the issues arising are being answered in their favour.” (emphasis supplied) 38. In directing specific performance of the agreement, this Court in Satya Jain (supra) held that sale deed must be executed for the current market price of the suit property. 39. In Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corporation (P.) Ltd. (2002) 8 SCC 146 , a three-judge Bench of this Court observed that in case of a phenomenal increase in the price of the land, the Court may impose a reasonable condition in the decree such as payment of an additional amount by the purchaser. In decreeing the suit for specific performance, the Court observed: “6. It is true that grant of decree of specific performance lies in the discretion of the court and it is also well settled that it is not always necessary to grant specific performance simply for the reason that it is legal to do so. It is further well settled that the court in its discretion can impose any reasonable condition including payment of an additional amount by one party to the other while granting or refusing decree of specific performance. Whether the purchaser shall be directed to pay an additional amount to the seller or converse would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case. Whether the purchaser shall be directed to pay an additional amount to the seller or converse would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is not to be denied the relief of specific performance only on account of the phenomenal increase of price during the pendency of litigation. That may be, in a given case, one of the considerations besides many others to be taken into consideration for refusing the decree of specific performance. As a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for her alone, the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the value of the property during the pendency of the litigation. While balancing the equities, one of the considerations to be kept in view is as to who is the defaulting party. It is also to be borne in mind whether a party is trying to take undue advantage over the other as also the hardship that may be caused to the defendant by directing specific performance. There may be other circumstances on which parties may not have any control. The totality of the circumstances is required to be seen.” (emphasis supplied) 40. In KS Vidyanadam v. Vairavan (1997) 3 SCC 1 , an agreement to sell immovable property was entered into between the plaintiff-buyer and the defendant-seller for a consideration of Rs. 60,000, where earnest money of Rs. 5,000 had been paid in advance. The agreement stipulated that the plaintiff had to purchase stamp papers and pay the balance amount within six months and call upon the defendants to execute the sale deed. The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance after a lapse of two and a half years seeking performance of the contract. The Court held: “10. It has been consistently held by the courts in India, following certain early English decisions, that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. It has been consistently held by the courts in India, following certain early English decisions, that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the time-limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time-limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean nothing. […] In this case, the suit property is the house property situated in Madurai, which is one of the major cities of Tamil Nadu. The suit agreement was in December 1978 and the six months' period specified therein for completing the sale expired with 15-6-1979. The suit notice was issued by the plaintiff only on 11-7-1981, i.e., more than two years after the expiry of six months' period. The question is what was the plaintiff doing in this interval of more than two years? […] There is not a single letter or notice from the plaintiff to the defendants calling upon them to get the tenant vacated and get the sale deed executed until he issued the suit notice on 11-7-1981. It is not the plaintiff's case that within six months’, he purchased the stamp papers and offered to pay the balance consideration. […] 13. In the case before us, it is not mere delay. It is a case of total inaction on the part of the plaintiff for 2½ years in clear violation of the terms of agreement which required him to pay the balance, purchase the stamp papers and then ask for execution of sale deed within six months. Further, the delay is coupled with substantial rise in prices — according to the defendants, three times — between the date of agreement and the date of suit notice. Further, the delay is coupled with substantial rise in prices — according to the defendants, three times — between the date of agreement and the date of suit notice. The delay has brought about a situation where it would be inequitable to give the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff.” (emphasis supplied) 41. True enough, generally speaking, time is not of the essence in an agreement for the sale of immoveable property. In deciding whether to grant the remedy of specific performance, specifically in suits relating to sale of immovable property, the courts must be cognizant of the conduct of the parties, the escalation of the price of the suit property, and whether one party will unfairly benefit from the decree. The remedy provided must not cause injustice to a party, specifically when they are not at fault. In the present case, three decades have passed since the agreement to sell was entered into between the parties. The price of the suit property would undoubtedly have escalated. Given the blemished conduct of the respondent-plaintiff in indicating his willingness to perform the contract, we decline in any event to grant the remedy of specific performance of the contract. However, we order a refund of the consideration together with interest at 6% per annum." 44. After having taken a look at the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court which clearly lays down the guidelines both in respect of readiness and willingness as well as regarding the discretion to be exercised in terms of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (prior to amendment of 2018) and if the aforesaid principles are applied to the facts of the instant case as well as the evidence available on record the following inferences can be deduced. (i) Admittedly, it was agreed between the parties that the agreement to reconvey the property could be executed within three years on payment of Rs. 2500/- and rent at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. It is admitted that only a sum of Rs. 400/-was paid on 06.01.1971 towards the rent as pleaded in paragraph 3 of the plaint. (ii) The period of three years was to expire on 08.05.1973 and prior thereto neither the entire rent nor the sum of Rs. 2500/-as agreed was paid. 50/- per month. It is admitted that only a sum of Rs. 400/-was paid on 06.01.1971 towards the rent as pleaded in paragraph 3 of the plaint. (ii) The period of three years was to expire on 08.05.1973 and prior thereto neither the entire rent nor the sum of Rs. 2500/-as agreed was paid. At this stage, what becomes controversial is that the plaintiffs state that they had repeatedly approached the defendant to accept the balance consideration and execute the sale deed and this is categorically denied by the defendant by saying that the plaintiffs did not ever approach nor pay the rent and also they did not have the requisite means to pay. (iii) It is in the aforesaid background, if the evidence is seen, it would reveal that in the first instance before the suit was remanded for trial afresh, the plaintiffs did not enter into the witness box and lead any evidence rather the only witness examined on behalf of the plaintiff was Sri Ram. It is only after the remand that Sri Jagannath was examined as P.W.1, Sri Mathur, the counsel for the plaintiffs was examined as P.W. 2 and Sri Ram was examined as P.W. 3. (iv) Taking a glance at their depositions, it would be clear that prior to the institution of the suit, no notice was given by the plaintiffs calling upon the defendant to receive the consideration and execute the deed nor it was expressed that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. The suit for specific performance came to be filed on the last date of the expiry of the limitation. Moreover, no rent was paid to the defendant by the plaintiffs after 04.01.1971. (v) The statement of Sri Ram indicates that he had lend money to the plaintiffs only on 08.05.1973 when the plaintiffs had filed the suit. There is no substantiating material to indicate or prove that prior to the date of institution of the suit, the plaintiffs had ever approached the defendant for paying the consideration and getting the deed executed. (v) The statement of Sri Ram indicates that he had lend money to the plaintiffs only on 08.05.1973 when the plaintiffs had filed the suit. There is no substantiating material to indicate or prove that prior to the date of institution of the suit, the plaintiffs had ever approached the defendant for paying the consideration and getting the deed executed. Even the statement of P.W. 2 would indicate that the plaintiffs were only able to collect the money and the suit was filed but there is nothing to establish that on 08.05.1973 prior to the institution of the suit, the plaintiffs had visited the Sub-Registrar’s office for getting the sale deed executed. (vi) There is no material to substantiate that the plaintiffs waited at the office of the Sub-Registrar for getting the sale deed executed especially when it was deposed that the plaintiffs had visited the house of the defendant on 06.05.1973 to pay the consideration and get the sale deed executed and it was decided that the parties would meet in the office of Sub-Registrar on 08.05.1973 for the aforesaid purpose. (vii) This fact is belied for the reason that Sri Ram who is said to accompany the plaintiffs on 06.05.1973 could not have gone to give the money because it was stated by Sri Ram that he had paid the money only to the plaintiffs on 08.05.1973, thus, if at all, the plaintiffs had gone to the house of the defendant on 06.05.1973 even then they did not have the money in hand. 45. Noticing the aforesaid evidence and material in context with the decisions of the Apex Court which has been noticed hereinabove relating to the readiness and willingness, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs were ready and willing throughout from the date of the agreement i.e. 08.05.1970 till the date of institution of the suit i.e. 08.05.1973. Even though, the suit may have been filed within the period of limitation but that in itself is not sufficient, inasmuch as, the readiness and willingness has to be not only pleaded but established by evidence at every stage till the conclusion of the proceedings before the Court. 46. Even though, the suit may have been filed within the period of limitation but that in itself is not sufficient, inasmuch as, the readiness and willingness has to be not only pleaded but established by evidence at every stage till the conclusion of the proceedings before the Court. 46. The finding returned by the Lower Appellate Court that since the suit was within the limitation and the plaintiff had deposited the money at the time of institution amplifies the readiness and willingness is not quite a correct reflection of the proposition as to how the readiness and willingness is to be construed. Readiness and willingness both have to be a continuous process throughout the proceedings and merely by depositing the money on the last date of limitation to get the agreement enforced and along with the institution of the suit does not amplify the continuity and ever presence of readiness and willingness as there is no evidence regarding it for the period between 08.05.1970 till 08.05.1973. 47. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court does not agree with the finding returned by the Lower Appellate Court as it runs contrary to the settled legal principles which have been noticed hereinabove. In case if the plaintiffs are not ready and willing, in any case, they are not entitled to a decree of specific performance but nevertheless since the issue of discretion in terms of Section 20 has been raised and is a ground upon which the Lower Appellate Court has reversed the finding of the Trial Court, this Court finds it necessary to deal with the same as well. 48. In this regard, noticing the decisions as considered hereinabove, it would be seen that the parties have been litigating since 1973. The agreement to re-convey was a formal understanding between the parties and was not reduced in writing. In any case, an agreement to re-convey is to be strictly construed and though in a suit for specific performance relating to an immovable property, time may not be necessarily be an essence of the contract but the same is not applicable to an agreement to reconveyance where time is taken to be the essence. 49. It is in this backdrop along with the fact that the defendant had clearly pleaded that the plaintiffs did not have the requisite means to pay. 49. It is in this backdrop along with the fact that the defendant had clearly pleaded that the plaintiffs did not have the requisite means to pay. This clearly substantiated the fact that both the readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs was under cloud. 50. The fact that the money was borrowed by the plaintiffs on the last date of expiry of the limitation which also included for the payment of Court fee and institution of the suit does raise a doubt over the readiness and willingness. The defendants have been residing in the said premises since 1970 after having purchased the same from the plaintiffs and over a period of time with the escalation of the prices of the property noticing that the property in question is in the heart of the city of Lucknow. Coupled with the fact that the defendants while residing therein must have made improvements and that the suit for specific performance had been dismissed and the appeal was allowed by the First Appellate Court and thereafter the matter has been engaging the attention of this Court since 1982 and as such it would indicate that the parties have been litigating since 1973 and a period of 50 years has gone by, accordingly, noticing the over all facts and circumstances including the dictum of the Apex Court in Shenbegam (supra), Jayakantham (supra) and Ramesh Chand V. Asruddin (supra). 51. This Court is of the view that in the instant case, as already noticed above, the plaintiffs could not establish their readiness and willingness and the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree of specific performance and even the discretion, if at all, to be exercised, in the aforesaid backdrop would also be in the favour of the defendants, hence, this Court for the reasons as noticed hereinabove is of the view that the present Second Appeal deserves to be allowed. The question is answered accordingly. 52. For the detailed reasons, the Second Appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 20.01.1982 passed by the 6th Additional District Judge in Regular Civil Appeal No. 338 of 1980 is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court dated 18.01.1977 in Regular Suit No. 133 of 1974 is affirmed. Any amount, which may be in deposit, as made by the plaintiffs before the Trial Court can be withdrawn by the plaintiffs. 53. Any amount, which may be in deposit, as made by the plaintiffs before the Trial Court can be withdrawn by the plaintiffs. 53. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. The records of the Trial Court be returned expeditiously.