JUDGMENT Ajit Kumar, J. Heard Sri Nisheeth Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri R.S. Umrao, learned Standing Counsel. 2. Petitioner is aggrieved by the order firstly by the disciplinary authority dated 26.06.2019, whereby, petitioner has been reverted back by five years to the minimum of the pay scale of a Constable, the order of the appellate authority dated 04.05.2020 affirming the same and of the revisional authority dated 17.11.2020 rejecting the revision on the ground that there is no procedural flaw in the matter of disciplinary proceedings. 3. The facts in a narrow compass can be drawn like this that the petitioner was issued with a charge sheet for remaining absent from duty w.e.f. 05.06.2002. He was proceeded against by holding a disciplinary proceeding and conducting departmental inquiry as a part thereof and since he was found guilty of the charges, he was issued with show cause notice on 01.04.2003 which was caused to be served upon him through his wife Smt. Sunita Yadav on 23.04.2003, however, when no reply was received from the petitioner, the disciplinary authority proceeded to inflict punishment of removal from service for being absent w.e.f. 05.06.2000 till the date of passing of the order and since he did not discharge his duties from 05.06.2002 till 28.05.2003 his leave was allowed without pay. This order came to be challenged before this Court in Writ Petition No. 15753 of 2006 and the Court found two directions in the punishment order to be self contradictory and accordingly the order dated 20.05.2003 was set aside. 4. The matter was remitted to the stage of inquiry report with a direction to the disciplinary authority to serve copy of inquiry report upon the petitioner and seek his reply and then decide the matter again. Thus, the disciplinary authority was to initiate the disciplinary proceedings from the stage of submission of reply by the petitioner to the inquiry report. The penultimate paragraph of the order is reproduced hereunder: Accordingly, you are issued with the show cause notice to submit your reply within 15 days of its receipt as to why you may not be punished by withholding three increments permanently and reverting you to the minimum of the pay scale admissible to the Constables for a period of five years under the U.P. Subordinate Police Officers (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1991 for carelessness in discharge of official duty and indiscipline. (English translation by Court) 5. Petitioner was reinstated in the service with status of suspended employee, and the direction was issued to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarnagar on 18.07.2018 to supply the petitioner copy of inquiry report along with charge sheet seeking his reply within a month. Thereafter, the petitioner was issued with charge sheet dated 28.07.2018 though without imputation of any particular charge, asking the petitioner to submit reply in his defence by 05.08.2018 failing which, it would be taken that petitioner had nothing to say and authority would accordingly proceed to pass orders. 6. Petitioner submitted his reply to the alleged charge sheet and took specific ground that this de novo inquiry was totally uncalled for under Rule 14(1) of 1991 Rules, however, still he explained away that since he was not feeling well and had an acute stomache while he was on duty as Tehsil Guard, he got himself examined at the Primary Health Centre, Meerapur, Muzaffarnagar where he was diagnosed to be suffering from Hepatitis B and Jaundice and then he explained as to how he suffered from such serious disease and could recover only on 25.05.2003 and so he reported for duty on 28.05.2003, at Reserve Police Lines, Muzaffarnagar. His records and medical certificates were not seen and he was removed from service on 28.05.2003. He claimed to be entitled for medical leave or his absence could have been condoned by adjusting the leave already available in his account under the relevant service rules and that he could have been reinstated without backwages. However, he pleaded that his absence from 05.06.2002 and 17.05.2003 deserved to be allowed restoring him in service by giving benefit of medical leave with pay. He had appended the medical certificate of the doctor concerned Sri Chaitanya Maheshwari dated 22.11.2018. 7. The authority after examining the above reply of the petitioner, held petitioner guilty for not informing the higher authority about his ailment and thus, the charge of remaining absent from duty without leave was found to be proved as per para 381 of Police Regulations and, therefore, the period from 05.06.2002 to 28.05.2003 was directed to be treated as leave without pay. Thus, the earlier order of punishment was changed into this punishment and was forwarded to the higher authority for necessary approval. Thus, the earlier order of punishment was changed into this punishment and was forwarded to the higher authority for necessary approval. The higher authority while agreed with the proposed punishment, issued show cause notice to the petitioner as to why he may not be reverted to the position of minimum of basic pay of the post in question by five years. 8. To this show cause notice dated 08.01.2019, petitioner submitted his reply, the same was considered by the authority and was found to be totally baseless and unsatisfactory and thus punishment was awarded to the petitioner reverting him by five years to the minimum of pay of the post in question. This order was unsuccessfully challenged in appeal. 9. Learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has argued that in the absence of any finding that petitioner's papers were forged or petitioner presented manipulated documents, the authority was not justified in rejecting the same and holding petitioner guilty of charge of absence from duty without notice. It is submitted that whenever some one falls ill, he immediately goes for rest as per the doctors advise and if such a person cannot approach the authority, he cannot be held guilty. He submits that of course after recovery, if the petitioner had not reported it could have been presumed that the petitioner absented from duty. He has brought all those documents in support of the pleadings raised in the writ petition in assailing the order impugned and submits that these documents were not at all considered by the authority. 10. Yet another argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the proposed punishment was to convert the period of absence from duty into leave without pay, and though higher authority could have issued a show cause notice of the punishment of higher degree than the recommended one but when the authority agreed with the recommendation made by the competent authority, the approving authority was not justified in issuing show cause notice for higher degree of punishment, inasmuch as, the authority also did not consider the reply of the petitioner in correct perspective, nor did it discuss the same while imposing the penalty under challenge. It is also argued that in the matter of proposed punishment of higher degree authority has not assigned any special reason as to why it defers from the recommendation made by the competent authority. 11. It is also argued that in the matter of proposed punishment of higher degree authority has not assigned any special reason as to why it defers from the recommendation made by the competent authority. 11. A further argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that when this Court had directed to serve a copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner and seek his reply and then passed order, there was no question holding inquiry afresh by issuing a charge sheet to the petitioner. It is also argued that the alleged charge sheet issued to the petitioner cannot be termed as charge sheet within the meaning of Rule 14(1) of 1991 Rules as there are no charges leveled in the alleged charge sheet dated 28.07.2018 issued to the petitioner. 12. It is submitted that the petitioner's reply to this aspect of the matter has not been considered at all either by the authority competent in the matter that proposed punishment in the nature of leave without pay nor by the authority that issued a show cause notice for higher punishment and ultimately imposed that punishment of higher degree. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that both the appellate authority as well as authority sitting in revision have manifestly erred in dismissing the appeal and revision. It is submitted that it was not proper either for higher authority that impose punishment or appellate authority and revisional authority to reject the reply/appeal/revision of the petitioner in just one line that stand of the petitioner was found to be baseless. 14. Sri Nisheeth Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the plea that negligence in terms of absence from duty looking to the facts and circumstances was not such as to place it in nature of such a serious misconduct as to impose major penalty of reversion and the other argument is also that punishment was disproportionate to the charge, if taken to be proved. He has placed reliance upon certain authorities of the Supreme Court on the point of back wages like Civil Appeal No. 6188 of 2019, Jayantibhai Raojibhai Patel v. Municipal Council, Narkhed & Ors; and Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. Ed.) & Ors, (2013) 10 SCC 324 upon the scope of interference by this Court in the matter of disciplinary proceedings and the departmental inquiry it has been repeatedly held by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court while exercising preliminary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the Court is not clothed with the power of appellate authority. 15. The Court while may consider it to be appropriate case where some procedural lacuna in holding the departmental inquiry of disciplinary proceedings is cited but otherwise not on merits merely for the reason that this Court may come to a different conclusion upon appreciation of facts and evidence than to what has been reached by the inquiry officer/inquiry committee and the disciplinary authority. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557 Supreme Court held that the propositions as were laid down by the Court earlier in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 should be a guiding factor for scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution in the matter of departmental inquiries. The Court observe that "there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charge against him the rule followed in criminal trial that an offence is not established unless proved by the evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied." If this principle is not applied, the Court observed, the High Court would not be competent to declare the order of authorities holding a departmental inquiry to be invalid. The second instance would be only whether there is any violation of statutory rules prescribing a particular mode of inquiry which has not been adopted. Vide para 23 the Court held thus: "23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an Appellate Court. The second instance would be only whether there is any violation of statutory rules prescribing a particular mode of inquiry which has not been adopted. Vide para 23 the Court held thus: "23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an Appellate Court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of facts however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a Tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorary. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [1964] 5 S.C.R. 64." 16. Again in the case of State of Karnataka & Anr v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 the Court relied upon its earlier judgment in the case of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 , wherein it had observed that the High Court will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in domestic inquiry. The Court cited para 7 and 10 of the said judgment which runs as under: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. The Court cited para 7 and 10 of the said judgment which runs as under: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India 1995 (6) SCC 749 , Union of India v. G. Gunayuthan - 1997 (7) SCC 463 , and Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana - 1999 (5) SCC 762 , High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashi Kant S Patil - 2001 (1) SCC 416. 10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceedings invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. This is more so when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him." 17. Concluding the principles of law on the point, the Court held that "once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by re-appreciating evidence as if the courts are the appellate authority." 18. This above judgment has been further followed and reiterated by the Supreme Court in Muzaffar Husain v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr, 2022 SCC Online SC 567, the Court in this case also referred to its earlier judgment in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 , wherein, the Court had observed thus: "The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the inquiry has been properly conducted. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the inquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution." 19. On the principle of degree of proof in matters of departmental inquiry in a disciplinary proceeding the principles that govern the criminal law where the burden lay upon the prosecution to establish the ingredients of offence beyond the reasonable doubt, is certainly not attracted. This aspect has been deliberated upon and discussed with precision by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka & Ors v. Umesh, (2022) 6 SCC 563 , the Supreme Court vide paras 16 & 17 has held thus: "16. The principles which govern a disciplinary enquiry are distinct from those which apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution for an offence punishable under the criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence. The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquire into an allegation of misconduct by an employee which results in a violation of the service rules governing the relationship of employment. Unlike a criminal prosecution where the charge has to be established beyond reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding, a charge of misconduct has to be established on a preponderance of probabilities. The rules of evidence which apply to a criminal trial are distinct from those which govern a disciplinary enquiry. The acquittal of the accused in a criminal case does not debar the employer from proceeding in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction. 17. In a judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh (1977) 2 SCC 491 , V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. set out the principles vide para 4, that govern disciplinary proceedings as follows: "4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Evidence Act, 1872 may not apply. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Evidence Act, 1872 may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The "residuum" rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground." (emphasis in original and supplied) 20. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground." (emphasis in original and supplied) 20. In the matter of disciplinary proceedings the charge of misconduct or doubtful integrity would otherwise be judged on the principle of preponderance of probability as to what the reasonable man would arrive at finally in its conclusion. Applying this test to the fact position of the present case, I find that in the total circumspect of the events right from the date petitioner absented from duty while he was sent to a particular place and then disappeared for about one year while staying in the same district would lead to conclude that petitioner was certainly negligent and that too so deliberately to make out a case of misconduct to transform such a negligence into a case of misconduct. ON the question of proportionality of the punishment imposed and whether it is commensurate to the charge or not, in my considered view the petitioner having failed to produce any evidence that he was bed ridden or hospitalized during last one year, he being in civil police, was certainly required to report his higher official as a disciplined member of the force. This unauthorized absence of the petitioner from official duty would have led to now other conclusion but that he was not innocently negligent so as not to make out a case of misconduct. Earlier order of removal has been reduced to a punishment of lowering down the petitioner to five years in terms of minimum of basic pay therefore, is not hit in any manner by the doctrine of proportionality and it cannot be said that the punishment imposed is not commensurate to the charge which has been admittedly proved it has been repeatedly held that the Court will certainly be interfering with the punishment in the event it shots to its consigns looking to the charge established this principle has been discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors v. P. Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610 broad principles have been laid down vide paragraph nos. 12 & 13 of the judgment which are reproduced hereunder: "12. 12 & 13 of the judgment which are reproduced hereunder: "12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." 21. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." 21. On the above principles, if the petitioner's case is tested, I am of the considered view that the petitioner's guilt of remaining absent from duty deliberately and willingly, has rightly been held to be amounting to a misconduct by a member of civil police and therefore, it cannot be said that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is not commensurate to the charge of misconduct proved. 22. The judgments that have been cited by learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner relating to back wages considering the fact that charge of guilt has been approved and the Court does not found the punishment to be disproportionate to the charge proved by the inquiring authority approved by the disciplinary authority, any issue as to payment for the period petitioner had absented from duty arise. The issue before the Court is as to the correctness of the decision taken by the disciplinary authority which has been affirmed in appeal and revision, no question of any back wages arise. 23. Sri R.S. Umrao, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents has argued that the petitioner was never admitted in any hospital at any point of time and therefore, he was also there in a position to intimate the higher authority/competent authority about the illness with which he suffered. In support of his argument Sri Umrao has drawn the attention of the Court to the reply of the petitioner to the charge sheet and also the medical certificate addressed to Senior Superintendent of Police dated 22.11.2018 by Dr. Chaitanya Maheshwari, the Medical Officer under whose treatment petitioner was and submits that there is nothing to demonstrate that petitioner was at any point of time admitted to the hospital. He submits that all that he has shown is that petitioner as a matter of fact was merely under treatment and in such circumstances, if the petitioner was able to visit the doctor for treatment, he could have been visited to the officer concerned to apprise him about his illness or at least he could have sought for medical leave, during this long period from 05.06.2002 to 25.06.2003. He submits that the absence from duty without intimation and notice by a person who is a member of disciplined force, is a serious misconduct and in the absence of any document to show that petitioner aver attempted bonafidely to intimate about his illness, the employer could not have taken the matter sympathetically. It is argued by learned Standing Counsel that this time petitioner has only been awarded with lesser punishment and therefore, this Court may not interfere with the findings of the inquiring authority including the disciplinary authority as to the nature of punishment. 24. If petitioner had ever attempted to intimate the higher authorities about his illness while admittedly he absented from duty for over a long one year by bringing anything on record to demonstrate that he was ever hospitalized, situation would have been different. 25. If one goes through the medical certificates, which is the only document available with the petitioner to show that he had been under treatment for valid reasons as he suffered from serious disease, one would find that doctor certified only this much that petitioner was under his treatment from 05.06.2002 to 25.06.2003 and it has been very categorically mentioned in the certificate that petitioner was an outdoor patient. This doctor is of Primary Health Centre, Meerapur, Muzaffarnagar. Petitioner, it appears from the documents to have resided at Police Lines, District Muzaffarnagar otherwise, he was a permanent resident of Ghaziabad. 26. In these above circumstances, if he could visit as OPD patient to the doctor, he could have communicated to the higher authorities in the police department also his illness. There is nothing to demonstrate from the entire pleadings raised in reply to the notice dated 28.07.2018 that the petitioner was bedridden during this period. One stand taken is that his wife Smt. Sunita Yadav had intimated on 07.06.2002 to Senior Superintendent of Police but it is very vague and evasive stand. About the fitness claimed by the petitioner, it would relate only to resuming his regular duty and would certainly not absolve him from the liability to intimate about his ailment to the higher authorities. 27. About the fitness claimed by the petitioner, it would relate only to resuming his regular duty and would certainly not absolve him from the liability to intimate about his ailment to the higher authorities. 27. It is true that negligence as such would not amount to a serious misconduct unless it is shown to be of such nature and deliberate one that would render an act or conduct to be unbecoming of an officer or a member of disciplined force but the parameters in organizations like police force, defence and security forces are certainly different. In Civil Police, a Constable has a very responsible role to play in day to day public administration and if a Constable suddenly disappears from the scene, while he was directed to report at a particular place and then keeps not informing the organization for a pretty long one year, it would certainly amount to such an indiscipline which may warrant a major penalty. 28. The yardsticks to maintain discipline in the case of disciplined force that looks after either the defence of the country or the one involved in civil police for the police administration is to be strictly applied and so the test to check indiscipline would be stricter. Reference to its earlier judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari (2006) 10 SCC 388 , Supreme Court in its subsequent judgment in the case of Union of India & Ors v. Diler Singh (2016) 13 SCC 71 has observed "when a member of the disciplined force deviates to such an extent from the discipline and behaves in an untoward manner which is not conceived of, it is difficult to hold that the punishment of dismissal as has been imposed is disproportionate and shocking to the judicial conscience." 29. In the present case, looking to the facts and circumstances I find that petitioner was under treatment as an OPD patient and he stayed at Muzaffarnagar for one long year and possibly in police lines, so it was all the more his duty to have intimated the higher officer in the department. He could have written letters through registered post also or may be sending a letter through his wife, but nothing was not done. He could have written letters through registered post also or may be sending a letter through his wife, but nothing was not done. So, I am not able to accept the argument that the conduct of the petitioner was of not such a degree so as to enough to count it as a amount a misconduct. 30. Coming to the other argument that the authority competent in the matter could have disagreed with the recommendations made by the competent authority only by assigning reasons and in the absence of cogent and convincing reason this different stand taken by the competent authority to issue show cause notice for punishment of higher degree/nature was not therefore, sustainable, I find that the contents of reply made by the petitioner were referred to by the authority and have been taking into consideration and were found to be totally baseless and unsatisfactory. These fact finding considerations cannot be further re-appreciated by this Court in its exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 31. It is pertinent to refer here para 381 of U.P. Police Regulations that reads as under: "381. Medical leave. -- It is incumbent on all applicants for medical leave or extension of leave on medical certificates to apprise the Superintendent of Police in writing of their intention to apply for a medical certificate. Any failure to do so may result in a decision that the medical certificate has been obtained by misrepresentation and may thereby entail serious consequences." 32. Looking to the above aspect, if one looks to the reply submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice and then earlier to the charge sheet, one would do not find any cogent and convincing material was ever placed so as to hold him innocent in the matter. Thus, in my considered view the authority having found petitioner guilty of the charges and this time having decided to punish him with lesser degree of punishment than originally it had imposed that was set aside by this Court in first round of litigation, I find merit in the argument advanced by learned Standing Counsel that any decision now by this Court to arrive at a different conclusion would amount to sitting in appeal over and above the decision of disciplinary authority, which would not be proper in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 33. 33. In view of the above, petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.