JUDGMENT : 1. The Appellant herein filed this Appeal under Section 30 of Workmen’s Compensation Act, against the Order and Decree dated 25.11.2021 passed in W.C.No.2 of 2019 by the Court of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Vijayawada, (in short ‘learned Tribunal’) whereby the learned Tribunal has granted a total compensation of Rs. 5,70,720/- for the death of the deceased/driver during the course of his employment. 2. The appellant herein is the 2nd opposite party; 1st respondent herein is the applicant, who is wife of deceased Mr. Kootam Narasimha Rao and 2nd respondent herein is the 1st opposite party before the learned Tribunal. 3. The 1st respondent/applicant has filed a claim petition before the tribunal alleging that the deceased workman as a driver, stopped lorry to attend natural call at 4.00 a.m on 03.12.2018 at Amalapuram, as the driver did not turn up in time, the cleaner went to enquire and found the driver fell on the ground unconscious condition. The cleaner sprayed some water with a bid to wake up, but in vain, suspecting the condition cleaner made a call to 108 Ambulance and they came to spot and declared dead after check up. A case in Crime No.154 of 2018 was registered by Allavaram Police Station. Therefore, the 1st respondent approached the appellant/2nd opposite party and 2nd respondent with a request to pay compensation, but in vain. Hence the applicant/1st respondent have approached the Tribunal. 4. The 1st respondent filed counter by admitting the employment of the deceased workman and he used to pay Rs. 12,000/- per month towards salary and Rs. 200/- per day towards batta. It is further stated that the deceased had valid driving license and the insurance at the time of the accident. 5. The 2nd opposite party before the tribunal have filed counter denying all material allegations made in the claim petition and mainly contended that they denied the employment and occurrence of the incident and the applicant has to show the proof for the dependency on the deceased workman. Therefore the claim is liable to be dismissed. Therefore this appellant is not liable to indemnify the liability of the 2nd respondent/1st opposite party and that the claim petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. Therefore the claim is liable to be dismissed. Therefore this appellant is not liable to indemnify the liability of the 2nd respondent/1st opposite party and that the claim petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. Basing on the pleadings, the learned Tribunal has framed the following issues viz., 1) Whether the deceased Sri Kootam Narasimha Rao was a workman U/s.2(1)(n) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act at the time of his death and whether the deceased had died during and out of the course of employment? 2) Whether or not the 2nd opposite party is liable to pay compensation amount as workman died with heart attack? 3) If so, what is the age and wage of the deceased at the time of his death? 4) What is the amount of compensation and from which date the compensation amount is due? 7. During the course of trial, the 1st respondent was examined as AW-1 and got marked Ex.A1 to A9 and the appellant/2nd opposite party examined as RW-1 and no documents were marked. 8. Learned Tribunal, after hearing on both sides passed an order holding that the opposite parties 1 and 2 are jointly and severally held liable to pay the compensation of Rs. 5,70,720/- to the applicant i.e 1st respondent. Assailing the same, the present C.M.A came to be filed by the appellant/2nd opposite party. 9. Heard Mr. Naresh Byrapaneni, learned Counsel for the Appellant and none represented for the respondents. 10. During hearing learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the learned Tribunal ought to have saddled the liability to pay compensation of Rs. 5,70,720/- to the 1st respondent. The court below failed to appreciate that no legal fiction can be raised that the deceased died while attending calls of nature in the course of employment is attributable to the stress and strain during the course of his employment. The 1st respondent failed to establish that the death was caused by reason of failure of heart and is because of the stress and strain of the work. There is no medical evidence to prove the nature of death of the deceased. But the learned tribunal without considering these aspects and went wrong presumption that the deceased died of heart attack due to stress and strain, during the course of employment is not at all correct. There is no medical evidence to prove the nature of death of the deceased. But the learned tribunal without considering these aspects and went wrong presumption that the deceased died of heart attack due to stress and strain, during the course of employment is not at all correct. Therefore, the appellant is not liable to pay any compensation to the 1st respondent and requested to allow the appeal. 11. Perused the record. 12. In the instant case, the deceased was died due to heart attack during the course of employment as documents, which are marked as Ex.A1 to A9. It is the contention of the 1st respondent that the deceased attended his duties without any interruption and the deceased along with cleaner started from Undrajavaram to Bodasakurru for load on 02.12.2018, the deceased felt very stress and tidiness in the meantime he suffered with heart attack due to stress and strain. As per issue No.2, the worker’s suffering from stress and strain, in unloading the cement. Therefore learned tribunal came to a conclusion that the deceased workman felt stress and strain of the work during the course of employment and died. 13. During the course of hearing learned Standing Counsel for the appellant placed on record the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in “Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and Another”, Indian Kanoon-http://indiankanoon.org/doc/405550/ = Appeal (Civil) No.4778 of 2006, dt.10.11.2006 wherein it was held as follows: “Only because the cause of death was due to heart attack, the same by itself may not be a ground to arrive at a conclusion that an accident had occurred resulting in injury. The nature of duty of the deceased was that of a helper. Per se that the duties would not be such which could cause stress or strain. If an additional duty were required to be performed by him, the same was required to be clearly stated. Unless evidence is brought on record to elaborate that the death by way of cardiac arrest has occurred because of stress or strain, the Commissioner would not have jurisdiction to grant damages. In other words, the claimant was bound to prove jurisdictional fact before the Commissioner. Unless such jurisdictional facts are found, the Commissioner will have no jurisdiction to pass an order. In other words, the claimant was bound to prove jurisdictional fact before the Commissioner. Unless such jurisdictional facts are found, the Commissioner will have no jurisdiction to pass an order. It is now well-settled that for arriving at a finding of a jurisdictional fact, reference to any precedent would not be helpful as a little deviation from the fact of a decided case or an additional fact may make a lot of difference by arriving at a correct conclusion. For the said purpose, the statutory authority is required to pose unto himself the right question. Section 30 of the said Act postulates an appeal directly to High Court if a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. A jurisdictional question will involve a substantial question of law. A finding of fact arrived at without there being any evidence would also give rise to a substantial question of law. From the order passed by the Commissioner, it appears, he has not arrived at a finding that the job involved any stress or strain. It was merely stated that he was working as a Khalasi in a truck which was going to Tavarewadi Village from Kolhapur to get the milk. The autopsy was conducted at Chandgad District Hospital. The driver Prashant Chandrakant Shreshti admittedly brought him to hospital. He was his brother. The post mortem examination commenced from 6.30 a.m. on 28.9.2002 and ended at 7.30 a.m. on the same day. From the post mortem report, it appears that in the accompanying report, it is stated that the death was due to sudden heart attack. When exactly the death took place is not known. It will bear repetition to state that under what circumstances the death took place is also not known. There was also no pleading in this behalf. The Commissioner came to the conclusion that the death took place during the course of the employment but then no evidence has been brought on record to show that it had a causal connection between accident and serious injury so as to fulfill the requirements of the terms "out of employment". Indisputably, there has to be an proximate nexus between cause of death and employment. A stray statement made by Appellant that the deceased had died while working in the vehicle and stress or strain of the work did not appear to have any foundation. Indisputably, there has to be an proximate nexus between cause of death and employment. A stray statement made by Appellant that the deceased had died while working in the vehicle and stress or strain of the work did not appear to have any foundation. Admittedly she was not present at the spot. She had also no personal knowledge. All these facts she had admitted in cross-examination”. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that in view of the ratio as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court cited supra, the Insurance Company i.e appellant herein is not liable to pay any compensation to the 1st respondent. So also, argued that the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal is highly excessive and exorbitant. 15. Upon perusal of the impugned Award would show that the learned tribunal has not applied properly the ratio while assessing the compensation is within the parameters of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. Therefore the impugned order is cryptic and warrants interference. The decision cited supra is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case. Following the said decision, this Court is inclined to allow the C.M.A. 16. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, upon perusal of the material available on record and considering the submissions of the both the counsel, the C.M.A is allowed, while setting aside the impugned order and decree dated 25.11.2021 passed by the learned Tribunal. The appellant herein has deposited an amount of Rs. 5,70,720/- before the learned Tribunal under protest before filing the Appeal as per Memo dated 03.02.2022. The same shall be entitled to be withdrawn by the appellant by filing proper application before the learned tribunal. The amounts, if any, as withdrawn by the respondent/ claimant, the same shall be recovered from the owner of the vehicle i.e 2nd respondent/ 1st respondent by the appellant by following due procedure. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.