Mohd. Zubair v. Additional District Judge Court No. 13 Lucknow
2023-07-04
MANISH MATHUR
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Manish Mathur, J. These petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India have been filed by tenant challenging order dated 19.04.2008 whereby applications under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been allowed while rejecting application preferred by tenant under Section 20 (4) of U.P. Act No.XIII of 1972 in one of the cases. Revisional orders dated 20.01.2014 are also under challenge in both petitions. 2. Since both the said petitions have been consolidated and pertain to the same cause of action, they are being decided by means of a common judgment. 3. Heard. Mr. Mohd. Arif Khan, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Mohd. Aslam Khan, learned counsel for petitioner and Mr. Anil Kumar Tewari, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Vivek Kumar, learned counsel for private opposite parties no. 4 to 14. 4. Notices to opposite parties no.1 and 2 being merely proforma parties, are dispensed with. 5. Private opposite parties who are admittedly the landlords of premises in question had filed suit for arrears of rent and ejectment pertaining to the tenanted area situate in building bearing Municipal No.118/134, 9A Cantonment Road, Police Station Kaiserbagh, Lucknow. The aforesaid suits were registered as SCC Suits No.132 and 133 of 2007. It was stated that both the suits pertained to different shops but given in the tenancy of the defendants/petitioner. It was stated that originally Mohd. Anees, father of defendant was the tenant of shop in question and defendant/petitioner succeeded to the tenancy after demise of original tenant Mohd. Anees. Boundaries of the shop in question were indicated in plaint with the averment that rent of aforesaid two shops was Rs.245/- per month pertaining to suit premises which was subject matter of SCC Case No.132 of 2007 and Rs.335 per month pertaining to SCC Case No.133 of 2007. 6. Upon presentation of aforesaid two suits, summons were issued to defendant-petitioner on 26.10.2007 intimating the first date of hearing as 26.11.2007. Petitioner appeared on the said date where after power was filed on 10.01.2008 and written statement was filed on 03.04.2008 along with an application under Section 20(4) of the Act of 1972.
6. Upon presentation of aforesaid two suits, summons were issued to defendant-petitioner on 26.10.2007 intimating the first date of hearing as 26.11.2007. Petitioner appeared on the said date where after power was filed on 10.01.2008 and written statement was filed on 03.04.2008 along with an application under Section 20(4) of the Act of 1972. It is a relevant factor that the said application was filed by petitioner only in SCC Suit No.132 of 2007 with the plea that suit premises in both suits were one and under a composite tenancy and therefore a single application under Section 20(4) of Act of 1972 was being filed indicating the admitted amount of rent as Rs.330/ per month. Interest of Rs.90/- with effect from July 2007 till March 2008 was also tendered. It was stated that the composite tenancy comprised one shop and two go-downs at a monthly rent of Rs.330/- per month in respect of which rent up-till June 2007 was already paid. 7. The opposite parties-landlords filed objections to the application but prior to that, application under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code was filed seeking striking off defence separately in both cases. 8. By means of impugned order, the applications under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code have been allowed and the application filed under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 in SCC Suit No.132 of 2007 was rejected. 9. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the applications under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code have been allowed without indicating any reasons for the same but only on the basis of submissions of landlord that deposit was not made by tenant on the first date of hearing. It is submitted that since the order has not indicated any reasons for allowing the application under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code, it is clearly vitiated on that account. 10. It is also submitted that in SCC Case No.132 of 2007, the trial court while allowing the application under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code has rejected the application filed under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 again without recording any reasons for the same. It is therefore submitted that the orders are liable to be set aside on that ground.
It is therefore submitted that the orders are liable to be set aside on that ground. It is further submitted that the revisional court also has not adverted to the fact that deposit was clearly made on the first date of hearing and was a factor which has not been considered by the Revisional Court which has rejected the revisions only on the ground that deposit was not made on first date of hearing. 11. It has been submitted that both Courts have lost sight of the settled law that first date of hearing in SCC proceedings is the date on which the Court proposes to apply its mind and is not the date indicated in summons and since in the present case, deposit of rent was made by tenants on the very first day alongwith filing of written statement, the deposit as such was made on the first date of hearing and finding recorded to the contrary by courts below is against settled principles of law. 12. Learned counsel has placed reliance on judgments in the cases of Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Shri Prem Nath Kapoor reported in AIR 1993 SC 2525 , Advaita Nand v. Judge, Small Causes Court, Meerut & Ors passed in Civil Appeal No.4166 of 1995 (Arising out of Spl. L.P. (Civil) No.13838 of 1994), Vasant Ganesh Damle v. Shrikant Trimbak Datar & Anr. reported in AIR 2002 SC 1237 , Ashok Kumar & Ors v. Rishi Ram & Ors. reported in 2002 (48) ALR 401, Smt. Neena Dhawan v. Divisional Level Committee, Care of Joint Director of Education, U.P. Allahabad & Ors. reported in 2002 (48) ALR 405, Chitranjan Singh v. Samarpal Singh reported in 2012(92) ALR 350 and Manohar Lal Gaira v. Smt. Santosh Kapoor reported in 2013 (98) ALR 604. 13. Learned counsel appearing for answering opposite parties has refuted submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioner with the submission that it would be evident from a perusal of impugned orders that the tenant had appeared on the date indicated in the summons but neither filed Vakalatnama nor deposited admitted amount of rent on that date which was 26.11.2007. Vakalatnama in fact was filed on 10.01.2008 but again without any deposit.
Vakalatnama in fact was filed on 10.01.2008 but again without any deposit. On 29.02.2008, application under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code was filed by the landlord and it was only thereafter that written statement was filed on 03.04.2008 along with deposit under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972. 14. It is submitted that a perusal of application would indicate that it was filed only under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 and not under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code. It is also submitted that despite specific averment made in the plaint that there was no composite tenancy, the tenant has filed a single application claiming it to be a composite tenancy but such a claim was never substantiated by the tenant. It is further submitted that even otherwise the application preferred by the tenant under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 is neither in terms of Section 20 (4) of the Act nor under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code since it does not satisfy either conditions and was not maintainable. 15. Learned counsel has also submitted that provisions of Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 and those of Order XV Rule 5 of the Code operate in different spheres with different terminology and as such the application filed under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 cannot even otherwise be construed to be an application under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code particularly when the date of first hearing in both cases has been settled to be different by various judgments. 16. It is submitted that as such the application neither being on the first date of hearing nor being in conformity with statutory provisions, was rightly rejected by both courts. Learned counsel for opposite parties has placed reliance on followings cases; Jagannath & Anr. v. Ram Chandra Srivastava & Anr. reported in 1982 SCC Online All 641 and Satya Kumari Kamthan v. Noor Ahmad & Ors reported in (2013) 9 SCC 177 . 17. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsels for parties and perusal of material on record, it is evident that the land-lord filed separate SCC proceedings registered as SCC Suit Nos.132 and 133 of 2007 indicating two different shops to be under tenancy of tenant. The plaint indicated different rates of rent for both the shops as narrated herein-above.
17. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsels for parties and perusal of material on record, it is evident that the land-lord filed separate SCC proceedings registered as SCC Suit Nos.132 and 133 of 2007 indicating two different shops to be under tenancy of tenant. The plaint indicated different rates of rent for both the shops as narrated herein-above. Boundaries of both shops were also delineated in the plaint which indicated different boundaries. 18. It is admitted that there was no lease agreement between the parties pertaining to the rented properties but the tenant in his written statement has clearly denied separate tenancy and has in fact indicated that suit premises in both suits compromise a composite tenancy with monthly rental of Rs.330/-. 19. Once it is admitted that there was no written lease agreement between the parties and the landlord in his plaint specifically averred that suit premises in both cases were different with different boundaries and monthly rent, then burden was upon the tenant to have substantiated his averments to the contrary. However a perusal of material on record does not indicate that the tenant adduced any oral or documentary evidence to substantiate composite tenancy with regard to both suit properties. 20. It is also admitted between the parties that applications under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code were preferred by landlord in both SCC proceedings with the tenant filing a single application under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 particularly on the claim that it was a composite tenancy. 21. Even leaving aside the aspect of whether the deposit was made on the first date of hearing or not, this Court exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can very well decide whether such application was in conformity with the provisions under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 or even under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code, which in the considered opinion of this Court would be a fact much more material than the question whether deposit was made on the first date of hearing or not particularly when objection regarding maintainability of application under Section 20(4) of the Act was raised by the Land Lord in his objections. 22.
22. A perusal of application under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 filed by tenant clearly indicates it having been filed in SCC Case No.132 of 2007. It states that there is a composite tenancy of one shop and two go-downs at a monthly rent of Rs.330/-, in respect of which rent upto June 2007 was already paid. Paragraph 3 of the application thereafter indicates the amount of arrears of rent @ Rs.330/- per month with effect from July 2007 till March 2008 amounting to Rs.2970/- and interest of Rs.90/- for the entire period for which a total amount of Rs.3060/- was sought to be deposited. The application is dated 03.04.2008. 23. Here it is necessary to indicate differences between the provisions of Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 and under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code. While under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972, the tenant is liable to deposit the entire amount of arrears of rent claimed in the plaint along with interest, it is only the admitted amount of dues along with interest which is required to be deposited by tenant under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code with continued monthly deposits as stipulated. 24. In the present case, although the application has been filed under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 but it pertains only to the admitted amount of dues and not the arrears of rent as being demanded by landlord in the plaint. Clearly deposits sought to be made by tenant under Section 20 (4) of the Act only with regard to admitted amount of rent, does not come within the four corners of provisions of Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972. As such, in the considered opinion of this Court, there was no error in rejecting the application preferred by tenant under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972. 25. Although the aforesaid aspect has not been considered by either of the Courts but is an aspect which goes to the root of the nature of deposit and therefore this Court exercising extraordinary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has adverted to such an aspect. 26.
25. Although the aforesaid aspect has not been considered by either of the Courts but is an aspect which goes to the root of the nature of deposit and therefore this Court exercising extraordinary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has adverted to such an aspect. 26. Learned counsel for petitioner has thereafter also submitted that the application under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 may be considered as an application under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure or a representation in terms of explanation 3(2) to Order XV Rule 5 of the Code which stipulates that before making an order for striking off defence, the Court may consider any representation made by defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within ten days of the first hearing or, of the expiry of the week referred to in Sub-section(1) as a case may be. 27. So far as submission of learned counsel for petitioner is concerned that the application under Section 20(4) of the Act may be considered as an application under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code is concerned, it is relevant that the application should come within the four corners of provisions of Order XV Rule 5 of the Code which clearly prescribes that not only the entire admitted amount of rent is to be deposited but also that interest thereon at the rate of 9% per annum is also to be deposited. In the present case, the application preferred by defendant and the calculation indicated therein clearly denotes the fact that interest deposited on the admitted arrears of rent is much lower than the 9% per annum required to be deposited. In such circumstances, the application even if assumed to be under provisions of Order XV Rule 5 of the Code is not in conformity therewith. 28. In order to consider the application under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 as a representation under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code, it would be necessary that such an application should be in the nature of a representation. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Asha Rani Gupta v. Vineet Kumar reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 829 has considered the aforesaid aspect in the following terms:- "37.
Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Asha Rani Gupta v. Vineet Kumar reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 829 has considered the aforesaid aspect in the following terms:- "37. Though the aforesaid decisions in cases of Miss Santosh Mehta, Smt. Kamla Devi and Manik Lal Majumdar related to the respective rent control legislations applicable to the respective jurisdictions, which may not be of direct application to the present case but and yet, the relevant propositions to be culled out for the present purpose are that any such provision depriving the tenant of defence because of default in payment of the due amount of rent/arrears have been construed liberally; and the expression 'may' in regard to the power of the Court to strike out defence has been construed as directory and not mandatory. In other words, the Courts have leaned in favour of not assigning a mandatory character to such provisions of drastic consequence and have held that a discretion is indeed reserved with the Court concerned whether to penalise the tenant or not. However, and even while reserving such discretion, this Court has recognised the use of such discretion against the defendant tenant in case of wilful failure or deliberate default or volitional non-performance. This Court has also explained the principles in different expressions by observing that if the mood of defiance or gross neglect is discerned, the tenant may forfeit his right to be heard in defence. The sum and substance of the matter is that the power to strike off defence is considered to be discretionary, which is to be exercised with circumspection but, relaxation is reserved for a bonafide tenant like those in the cases of Miss Santosh Mehta and Smt. Kamla Devi (supra) and not as a matter of course. The case of Bimal Chand Jain (supra) directly related with Order XV Rule 5 CPC where the tenant had deposited the arrears admitted to be due but, failed to make regular deposits of monthly rent and failed to submit representation in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order XV. The defence was struck off in that matter with the Trial Court and the High Court taking the said provisions of Order XV Rule 5 CPC as being mandatory in character.
The defence was struck off in that matter with the Trial Court and the High Court taking the said provisions of Order XV Rule 5 CPC as being mandatory in character. Such an approach was not approved by this Court while indicating the reserve of discretion in not striking off defence if, on the facts and circumstances existing on record, there be good reason for not doing so. The common thread running through the aforesaid decisions of this Court is that the power to strike off the defence is held to be a matter of discretion where, despite default, defence may not be struck off, for some good and adequate reason. 44. In the totality of facts and circumstances, we are clearly of the view that there was absolutely no reason for the High Court to have interfered in the present case, where the Trial Court had struck off the defence after finding that there was no evidence on record to show the payment or deposit of rent in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant-respondent. The Revisional Court had also approved the order of the Trial Court on relevant considerations. Even the High Court did not find the pleas taken by the defendant-respondent to be of bonafide character, particularly when survey number of the shop let out to him was clearly stated in the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff. We find it rather intriguing that, despite having not found any cogent reason for which discretion under Rule 5 of Order XV CPC could have been exercised in favour of the defendant-respondent, the High Court, in the last line of paragraph 45 of the order impugned, abruptly stated its conclusion that:'yet the defendant/tenant deserves some indulgence'. 45. With respect, the said conclusion of the High Court could only be said to be an assumptive one, being not supported by any reason. In paragraph 44, of course, the High Court observed with reference to the decisions of this Court that the discretionary power must be exercised with great circumspection but, such enunciation by this Court cannot be read to mean that whatever may be the fault and want of bonafide in the defendant/tenant, he would be readily given the so-called 'indulgence' of not striking off defence. Such an approach is neither envisaged by the statutory provisions nor by the referred decisions.
Such an approach is neither envisaged by the statutory provisions nor by the referred decisions. In fact, such an approach would simply render the relevant provisions of law rather nugatory. The expected circumspection would require the Court to be cautious of all the relevant facts and the material on record and not to strike off the defence as a matter of routine. However, when a case of the present nature is before the Court, disclosing deliberate defiance and volitional/elective non-performance, the consequence of law remains inevitable, that the defence of such a defendant would be struck off." 29. The aforesaid judgment clearly indicates that for exercising discretion in favour of a tenant under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code, cogent reason is required to be considered. For such a cogent reason to be considered by the Court, naturally such a cogent reason should be indicated in any application/representation under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code indicating plausible reason for default on the part of tenant in paying rent. 30. In the present case, a perusal of the application under Section 20 (4) of the Act clearly indicates admission on the part of tenant that rent for the month of July, 2007 till March 2008 was not paid. No explanation whatsoever has been furnished by the tenant for such arrears of rent. The application as such can be clearly construed to be only under Section 20 (4) of the Act and by no stretch of imagination can be said to be within the four corners of an application for deposit of rent or as a representation under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code since it is not in conformity with provisions thereof. 31. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that although this aspect has also not been considered by either of the Courts but is an aspect gone into by this Court exercising extraordinary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India particularly since such aspect goes to the root of the matter. 32. It has already been held hereinabove for reasons indicated that the application filed by tenant purportedly under Section 20(4) of the Act is not in conformity with such provisions but in view of discussion made herein-above, it is evident that the application is not in conformity with provisions of order XV Rule 5 of the Code either. 33.
32. It has already been held hereinabove for reasons indicated that the application filed by tenant purportedly under Section 20(4) of the Act is not in conformity with such provisions but in view of discussion made herein-above, it is evident that the application is not in conformity with provisions of order XV Rule 5 of the Code either. 33. The application preferred by the tenant purportedly under Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 being not in conformity with either Section 20 (4) of the Act nor Order XV Rule 5 of the Code, the aspect of whether it was filed on the first date of hearing or not, in the considered opinion of this Court, becomes immaterial. 34. In view of discussion made herein-above, it is evident that the application filed by tenant purportedly under Section 20(4) of the Act No. XIII of 1972 was not maintainable under either of the provisions and was therefore rightly rejected. 35. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the petitions being devoid of merit are dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.