JUDGMENT VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA, J. - The Present Family Court Appeal is filed under Sec. 19 (1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 impugning the order dtd. 17/5/2023 in F.C.O.P. No.420 of 2022 on the file of the IV Additional District Judge-cum-Judge, Principal Family Court, Vijayawada, wherein a petition filed under Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act was dismissed since the Petitioner No.1 had taken a plea that his consent was obtained by force under threat, coercion, and influence. 2. Appellant herein was the Petitioner No.2/Wife and the Respondent herein was the Petitioner No.1/Husband before the trial Court. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter are referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court. Factual Background: 3. The Petitioners, being Husband and wife filed F.C.O.P.No.420 of 2022 under Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, seeking divorce by mutual consent. They have filed the said petition on 10/3/2022 stating that their marriage solemnized on 14/2/2021, disputes arose between them within 15 days of the marriage and as efforts for reconciliation failed, they have been living separately from 2/3/2021 and accordingly, they have mutually agreed to take divorce by mutual consent. 4. On 10/10/2022, the Court recorded the evidence of both parties. The Petitioners deposed before the Court as P.Ws. 1 and 2 respectively and Exs. P.1 to P.3 were the documents marked and the matter was posted for Orders on 20/10/2022. 5. Meanwhile, the Petitioner No.1/husband filed I.A.No.739 of 2022 seeking to reopen the petition, stating that his consent was obtained by force, fraud, and undue influence. The Court allowed the petition and reopened the matter for further hearing to 20/10/2022. On 20/10/2022, none represented the matter. Considering objection raised by the Petitioner No.1 for withdrawing his consent, the Family Court dismissed the petition. 6. Being aggrieved by the said Order dtd. 20/10/2022, the wife filed F.C.A.No.95 of 2022. This Court, vide order dtd. 3/2/2023 remanded the matter to the Family Court with a direction to enquire into the objections raised by the Petitioner No.1/husband for withdrawing his consent and directed to pass reasoned order on merits. 7. After remanding the matter, the Petitioner No.1/husband filed his fresh affidavit reiterating that his consent was obtained under threat, fraud, and undue influence and that he is always willing to live with his wife happily. 7. After remanding the matter, the Petitioner No.1/husband filed his fresh affidavit reiterating that his consent was obtained under threat, fraud, and undue influence and that he is always willing to live with his wife happily. He stated in the Affidavit that his wife and her family members are threatening to implicate him and his family members in criminal cases. He also stated that the consent for filing the mutual divorce petition is by force and is not free consent. Thereafter, the learned trial Judge dismissed the divorce petition, vide order dtd. 17/5/2023. 8. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dtd. 17/5/2023, Petitioner No.2/wife, carried the matter in Appeal before this Court, on the following grounds: a) Learned Family Court Judge misinterpreted Sec. 13 (B) of the H.M.A. and dismissed the mutual consent divorce petition holding that the party can withdraw the consent, ignoring the stage i.e., for pronouncement of Orders. On 23/9/2022, 26/9/2022, and also on 10/10/2022, both the parties appeared before the Court and on none of these occasions, such an application for withdrawal of consent was moved by the respondent herein. b) The mutual consent petition was filed on 10/3/2022. Till filing of I.A.No.739 of 2022 on 13/10/2022 and the matter is posted for hearing, the respondent never chose to raise any objection for granting divorce. Admittedly, the Petitioner No.1/husband is a highly educated man, who in fact appeared for Public Service Examination, cannot expect that he will not react and will keep quiet. His silence would show that there is no truth in the allegation and it is only for extraneous consideration. c) The impugned order is contrary to the directions of this Court in F.C.A.No.95 of 2022 as no findings were given on the allegations of withdrawal of the consent. The impugned order is vitiated on account of error apparent on the face, since it is completely based on conjectures and surmises. d) The learned Family Judge failed to enquire into the objections of the Respondent filed in I.A.No.739 of 2022. e) The learned Family Judge failed to consider the terms and conditions agreed upon as per the family agreement dtd. 12/6/2021 signed by all the family members. That the Petitioner No.1 is guilty of suppression of fact of existence of family agreement, dtd. 12/6/2021 in I.A.No.739 of 2022. e) The learned Family Judge failed to consider the terms and conditions agreed upon as per the family agreement dtd. 12/6/2021 signed by all the family members. That the Petitioner No.1 is guilty of suppression of fact of existence of family agreement, dtd. 12/6/2021 in I.A.No.739 of 2022. Elder brother of Petitioner No.1/husband i.e., Sri Vuyyuru Ratna Shekar filed W.P.No.43554 of 2022 before the High Court of Judicature at Telangana, where no relief was granted, vide orders dtd. 23/12/2022, wherein they suppressed the existence of compromise deed relating to the matrimonial dispute between the elder brother and his wife. They also filed F.C.O.P.No.1035 of 2022 on 30/6/2022. f) The citations relied on by the Petitioner No.1/husband in the case of Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, AIR 1992 SC 1904 . and Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar, AIR 2011 SC 1637 . are not applicable to the facts of the present case, as in these cases, consent was withdrawn by one of the parties before the date is fixed for hearing or on the date of hearing. It is urged that in the instant case, the husband filed chief examination affidavit and the documents were marked and both parties signed as witnesses when the matter is formally posted for pronouncement of Orders and thereafter an application for withdrawal of consent is filed. g) It is also submitted that the decision in Smruti Pahariya v Sanjay Pahariya, (2009) 13 SCC 338 . is wherein one of the parties did not appear at the time of conducting enquiry before the Family Court. Whereas, in the instance case, both parties appeared and gave their evidence and as an afterthought, the husband filed an application for withdrawal of the consent. h) As such, when the husband failed to prove the allegations that his consent was obtained by fraud, force and threat, mutual divorce petition is to be allowed. The trial Court ought not to have dismissed the mutual consent divorce petition, after competition of the enquiry for withdrawal of the consent by the Petitioner No.1. i) It is also contended that the decision of Kerala High Court in the case of Benny, rep. by his Mother and Power of Attorney Holder v.Mini, 2021 (2) KLRT 2. is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. j) Accordingly, the Appellant prays to allow the mutual consent divorce petition in F.C.O.P.No.420 of 2022. 9. i) It is also contended that the decision of Kerala High Court in the case of Benny, rep. by his Mother and Power of Attorney Holder v.Mini, 2021 (2) KLRT 2. is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. j) Accordingly, the Appellant prays to allow the mutual consent divorce petition in F.C.O.P.No.420 of 2022. 9. Heard Sri Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Challa Ajay Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent. 10. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the Petitioner assailing the order passed by the family Court in FCOP No.420 of 2022 dtd. 20/10/2022 approached this Court in FCA No.95 of 2022, wherein, directions were issued to the Family Court by this Court while remanding the matter for fresh consideration. He submits that the impugned order suffers from infirmity for not complying with the directions. He urges that the learned Family Court Judge without referring to the contents of the objections raised by the husband for passing the decree for mutual consent and the counter objections raised by the wife refuting the version of the husband, passed the impugned order. Learned counsel prays to set aside the impugned order and allow the FCOP No.420 of 2022 by granting decree of divorce by mutual consent. 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that after comprehensively referring to the Judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, learned Judge rightly held that the Petitioner has every right to withdraw his consent, even without reasons. In the light of the ratio enunciated in the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sureshta Devi case supra (1), which was even referred in the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court of the Constitutional Bench in Shilpa Sailesh v.Varun Sreenivasan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 544. and held that the party has every right to withdraw their consent before passing the decree for divorce under mutual consent. Learned counsel submits that the appeal lacks merits and deserves dismissal. Point for Determination 12. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel and on perusal of the material on record, the point that would emerge for determination is: Whether the order dtd. 17/5/2023 in F.C.O.P. No.420 of 2022 is sustainable under law or warrants any interference of this Court? Determination by the Court 13. Point for Determination 12. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel and on perusal of the material on record, the point that would emerge for determination is: Whether the order dtd. 17/5/2023 in F.C.O.P. No.420 of 2022 is sustainable under law or warrants any interference of this Court? Determination by the Court 13. Before dealing with the point in issue, it is beneficial to refer to the important events of the lis in a chronological way for easier understanding: 14/2/2021 Appellant and Respondent got married. Marriage was not consummated. 2/3/2021 They have been residing separately. 10/3/2022 A joint application is filed by them under Sec. 13-B of HMA 22/3/2022 Petition numbered 23/9/2022 The Family Court adjourned the matter for second motion after the cooling period. 8/10/2022 Chief Examination Affidavit of the husband was filed before the Family Court and he deposed on oath and documents marked in his evidence. 10/10/2022 Wife deposed before the Family Court through Chief Examination affidavit on oath After enquiry, learned family Court Judge posted the matter for Judgment on 20/10/2022. 13/10/2022 Husband filed I.A.No.739 of 2022 seeking to reopen the matter for further hearing his consent was obtained under threat and coercion. Learned Family Court Judge allowed the petition without notice to the wife, posted the matter to 20/10/2022 and on that day, both the parties did not appear before the Court and then dismissed the petition for default. Before High Court Wife preferred F.C.A.No.95 of 2022 before this Court assailing the order of the Learned Family Court Judge 3/2/2023 This Court allowed the Family Court Appeal by setting aside the impugned Order, and remanded the matter back to the Family Court "with a direction to enquire into the objections raised by the respondent herein by way of affidavit before it and to pass reasoned order on merits, as per law" Before Family Court After remand, husband filed his affidavit reiterating the contents of his petition IA No.739 of 2022 and in addition to that, he has stated that he has filed the petition under Sec. 9 of H.M.A., seeking restitution of conjugal rights. Wife filed a counter, raising several objections on the allegations made by the husband against her family and on consent. 17/5/2023 The Learned Family Court Judge dismissed the divorce petition under Sec. 13-B of H.M.A., holding that consent can be withdrawn at any stage. 14. Wife filed a counter, raising several objections on the allegations made by the husband against her family and on consent. 17/5/2023 The Learned Family Court Judge dismissed the divorce petition under Sec. 13-B of H.M.A., holding that consent can be withdrawn at any stage. 14. The issue in the present Appeal lingers around Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which is an enabling provision for presenting a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce by mutual consent. Sec. 13-B (2), however, provides for the procedural steps that are required to be taken once the petition for mutual divorce has been filed. The granting of the decree in a properly presented petition as above is not a matter of discretion of the concerned court, but the court shall pass a decree, subject to the provisions of the Act and on compliance with the procedure as provided by Sec. 13-B (2). 15. In Shilpa Sailesh case (referred supra), the scope and extent of the powers vide Article 142 of the Constitution in dispensing the period prescribed under Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was in issue. It was held that the Supreme Court while acting as a problem solver in balancing out equities between conflicting claims, can depart from the procedure as well as substantive laws, if the decision is based on considerations of fundamental general and specific public policy. While emphasising on Ss. 13 and 13-B of H.M.A., the Constitutional Bench had outlined the crux of the provision dealing with divorce by mutual consent as follows; "19. Sec. 13-B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act states that a decree of divorce may be granted on a joint petition by the parties on fulfilment of the following conditions: (a) the parties have been living separately for a period of one year or more before presentation of the petition; (b) they have not been able to live together; and (c) they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. 20. Sub-sec. (2) to Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that after the first motion is passed, the couple/parties would have to move to the court with the second motion, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meanwhile, after six months and not later than eighteen months of the first motion. 20. Sub-sec. (2) to Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that after the first motion is passed, the couple/parties would have to move to the court with the second motion, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meanwhile, after six months and not later than eighteen months of the first motion. No action can be taken by the parties before the lapse of six months since the first motion. When the second motion is filed, the court is to make an inquiry, and on satisfaction that the averments made in the petition are true, a decree of divorce is granted. Clearly, the legislative intent behind incorporating sub-sec. (2) to Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act is that the couple/party must have time to introspect and consider the decision to separate before the second motion is moved. However, there are cases of exceptional hardship, where after some years of acrimonious litigation and prolonged suffering, the parties, with a view to have a fresh start, jointly pray to the court to dissolve the marriage, and seek waiver of the need to move the second motion. On account of irreconcilable differences, allegations and aspersions made against each other and the family members, and in some cases multiple litigations including criminal cases, continuation of the marital relationship is an impossibility. The divorce is inevitable, and the cooling off period of six months, if at all, breeds misery and pain, without any gain and benefit. These are cases where the object and purpose behind sub-sec. (2) to Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act to safeguard against hurried and hasty decisions are not in issue and question, and the procedural requirement to move the court with the second motion after a gap of six months acts as an impediment in the settlement. At times, payment of alimony and permanent lump-sum maintenance gets delayed, while anxiety and suspicion remain. Here, the procedure should give way to a larger public and personal interest of the parties in ending the litigation(s), and the pain and sorrow effected, by passing a formal decree of divorce, as de-facto the marriage had ended much earlier." Emphasis supplied 16. In Sureshta Devi(referred supra), a couple pursuant to a one-hour meeting decided moved a Sec. 13-B petition before the District Court, as they were living separately for a considerable period of time. In Sureshta Devi(referred supra), a couple pursuant to a one-hour meeting decided moved a Sec. 13-B petition before the District Court, as they were living separately for a considerable period of time. The statements of the couple were recorded on 9/1/1985. On 15/1/1985, the wife filed an application stating that her statement dtd. 9/1/1985 was obtained under pressure and threat and she was not permitted to consult her relatives. The Family Court dismissed the divorce petition, thereafter on appeal, the High Court granted the decree for dissolution of marriage holding that unilateral withdrawal of consent cannot be permitted. On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the decree of the High Court and held as follows: "13. From the analysis of the Sec., it will be apparent that the filing of the petition with mutual consent does not authorise the court to make a decree for divorce. There is a period of waiting from 6 to 18 months. This interregnum was obviously intended to give time and opportunity to the parties to reflect on their move and seek advice from relations and friends. In this transitional period one of the parties may have a second thought and change the mind not to proceed with the petition. The spouse may not be a party to the joint motion under subsec. (2). There is nothing in the Sec. which prevents such course. The Sec. does not provide that if there is a change of mind it should not be by one party alone, but by both. The High Courts of Bombay and Delhi have proceeded on the ground that the crucial time for giving mutual consent for divorce is the time of filing the petition and not the time when they subsequently move for divorce decree. This approach appears to be untenable. At the time of the petition by mutual consent, the parties are not unaware that their petition does not by itself snap marital ties. They know that they have to take a further step to snap marital ties. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13-B is clear on this point. It provides that "on the motion of both the parties. ... if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall ... pass a decree of divorce ...". They know that they have to take a further step to snap marital ties. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13-B is clear on this point. It provides that "on the motion of both the parties. ... if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall ... pass a decree of divorce ...". What is significant in this provision is that there should also be mutual consent when they move the court with a request to pass a decree of divorce. Secondly, the court shall be satisfied about the bona fides and the consent of the parties. If there is no mutual consent at the time of the enquiry, the court gets no jurisdiction to make a decree for divorce. If the view is otherwise, the court could make an enquiry and pass a divorce decree even at the instance of one of the parties and against the consent of the other. Such a decree cannot be regarded as decree by mutual consent. 14. Sub-sec. (2) requires the court to hear the parties which means both the parties. If one of the parties at that stage says that "I have withdrawn my consent", or "I am not a willing party to the divorce", the court cannot pass a decree of divorce by mutual consent. If the court is held to have the power to make a decree solely based on the initial petition, it negates the whole idea of mutuality and consent for divorce. Mutual consent to the divorce is a sine qua non for passing a decree for divorce under Sec. 13-B. Mutual consent should continue till the divorce decree is passed. It is a positive requirement for the court to pass a decree of divorce. "The consent must continue to decree nisi and must be valid subsisting consent when the case is heard". [See (i) Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn., vol. 13 para 645; (ii) Rayden on Divorce, 12th edn., vol. 1, p. 291; and (iii) Beales v. Beales [(1972) 2 All ER 667, 674] ]." Emphasis supplied 17. In Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain, (2009) 10 SCC 415 . the Hon'ble Apex Court having referred position of law laid down in Sureshta Devi, expressed the following observations; "16. 13 para 645; (ii) Rayden on Divorce, 12th edn., vol. 1, p. 291; and (iii) Beales v. Beales [(1972) 2 All ER 667, 674] ]." Emphasis supplied 17. In Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain, (2009) 10 SCC 415 . the Hon'ble Apex Court having referred position of law laid down in Sureshta Devi, expressed the following observations; "16. The issue was raised in Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash [ (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292] wherein this Court held that the consent given by the parties to the filing of a petition for mutual divorce had to subsist till a decree was passed on the petition and that in the event, either of the parties withdrew the consent before passing of the final decree, the petition under Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act would not survive and would have to be dismissed. **** 17.In Sureshta Devi case [ (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292], although, indisputably consent for the petition under Sec. 13-B of the Act was withdrawn within a week from the date of the filing of the joint petition, the Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, granted a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Sec. 13-B of the Act and dissolved the marriage between the parties in order to meet the ends of justice, subject to certain conditions. It was also made clear that the decree would take effect only upon satisfaction of the conditions indicated therein. **** 26. Although the decision rendered in Sureshta Devi [ (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292] was referred to in the decision rendered in Ashok Hurra case [ (1997) 4 SCC 226 ] and it was observed therein that the said decision possibly required reconsideration in an appropriate case, none of the other cases has dealt with the question which arose in Sureshta Devi case [ (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292], namely, whether in a proceeding under Sec. 13- B of the Hindu Marriage Act, consent of the parties was required to subsist till a final decree was passed on the petition. **** 35. **** 35. While, therefore, following the decision in Sureshta Devi case [ (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292] we are of the view that this is a fit case where we may exercise the powers vested in us under Article 142 of the Constitution. The stand of the respondent wife that she wants to live separately from her husband but is not agreeable to a mutual divorce is not acceptable, since living separately is one of the grounds for grant of a mutual divorce and admittedly the parties are living separately for more than seven years. 36. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the petition for grant of mutual divorce under Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is accepted. Emphasis supplied 18. In Smruti Pahariya's case (referred supra), wherein, without ascertaining the consent of the husband, an ex parte decree for mutual divorce was granted. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court dealt with the law laid down in Sureshta Devi and has also addressed the point of reconsideration as made in Ashok Hurra and held thus; "38. The decision in Sureshta Devi [ (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292] was rendered by a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court. In a subsequent decision of two learned Judges of this Court in Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri [ (1997) 4 SCC 226 ] the judgment in Sureshta Devi [ (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292] was doubted as according to the learned Judges some of the observations in Sureshta Devi [ (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292] appear to be too wide and require reconsideration in an appropriate case. The learned Judges in Ashok Hurra [ (1997) 4 SCC 226 ] made it clear that they were passing the order in that case on the peculiar fact situation. This Court also held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Sec. 13-B of the Act was granted between the parties. (See paras 16 and 22 of the Report). It appears that those observations were made by the learned Judges without considering the provisions of the Family Courts Act. (See paras 16 and 22 of the Report). It appears that those observations were made by the learned Judges without considering the provisions of the Family Courts Act. In any event, the decision in Ashok Hurra [ (1997) 4 SCC 226 ] was considered by a larger Bench of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra [ (2002) 4 SCC 388 ] . No doubt was expressed by the larger Bench on the principles laid down in Sureshta Devi [ (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292] . 39. It appears that a petition for review was filed against the two-Judge decision in Ashok Hurra [ (1997) 4 SCC 226 ] and the same was dismissed. Thereafter, the question before the Constitution Bench in Rupa Ashok Hurra [ (2002) 4 SCC 388 ] was as follows: (SCC p. 396, para 1) "1. ... 'Whether the judgment of this Court dtd. 10/3/1997 [ (1997) 4 SCC 226 ] can be regarded as a nullity and whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution can be maintained to question the validity of a judgment of this Court after the petition for review of the said judgment has been dismissed are, in our opinion, questions which need to be considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court.' " 40. In the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra [ (2002) 4 SCC 388 ] this Court did not express any view contrary to the views of this Court in Sureshta Devi [ (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292] . We endorse the views taken by this Court in Sureshta Devi [ (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292] as we find that on a proper construction of the provision in Ss. 13-B(1) and 13-B(2), there is no scope of doubting the views taken in Sureshta Devi [ (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292] . In fact the decision which was rendered by the two learned Judges of this Court in Ashok Hurra [ (1997) 4 SCC 226 ] has to be treated to be one rendered in the facts of that case and it is also clear by the observations of the learned Judges in that case. 41. In fact the decision which was rendered by the two learned Judges of this Court in Ashok Hurra [ (1997) 4 SCC 226 ] has to be treated to be one rendered in the facts of that case and it is also clear by the observations of the learned Judges in that case. 41. None of the counsel for the parties argued for reconsideration of the ratio in Sureshta Devi [ (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292] . 42. We are of the view that it is only on the continued mutual consent of the parties that a decree for divorce under Sec. 13-B of the said Act can be passed by the court. If petition for divorce is not formally withdrawn and is kept pending then on the date when the court grants the decree, the court has a statutory obligation to hear the parties to ascertain their consent. From the absence of one of the parties for two to three days, the court cannot presume his/her consent as has been done by the learned Family Court Judge in the instant case and especially in its fact situation, discussed above. 43. In our view it is only the mutual consent of the parties which gives the court the jurisdiction to pass a decree for divorce under Sec. 13-B. So in cases under Sec. 13-B, mutual consent of the parties is a jurisdictional fact. The court while passing its decree under Sec. 13-B would be slow and circumspect before it can infer the existence of such jurisdictional fact. The court has to be satisfied about the existence of mutual consent between the parties on some tangible materials which demonstrably disclose such consent." Emphasis supplied 19. In Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar, AIR 2011 SC 1637 . the question of permissibility of withdrawal of consent after expiry of 18 months from the filing of divorce petition was in issue. Having reiterated the law laid down in the cases cited supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows; "14. The language employed in Sec. 13-B(2) of the Act is clear. the question of permissibility of withdrawal of consent after expiry of 18 months from the filing of divorce petition was in issue. Having reiterated the law laid down in the cases cited supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows; "14. The language employed in Sec. 13-B(2) of the Act is clear. The court is bound to pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage of the parties before it to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree, if the following conditions are met: (a) A second motion of both the parties is made not before 6 months from the date of filing of the petition as required under sub-sec. (1) and not later than 18 months; (b) After hearing the parties and making such inquiry as it thinks fit, the court is satisfied that the averments in the petition are true; and (c) The petition is not withdrawn by either party at any time before passing the decree. In other words, if the second motion is not made within the period of 18 months, then the court is not bound to pass a decree of divorce by mutual consent. Besides, from the language of the Sec., as well as the settled law, it is clear that one of the parties may withdraw their consent at any time before the passing of the decree. The most important requirement for a grant of a divorce by mutual consent is free consent of both the parties. In other words, unless there is a complete agreement between husband and wife for the dissolution of the marriage and unless the court is completely satisfied, it cannot grant a decree for divorce by mutual consent. Otherwise, in our view, the expression "divorce by mutual consent" would be otiose. 15. In the present fact scenario, the second motion was never made by both the parties as is a mandatory requirement of the law, and as has been already stated, no court can pass a decree of divorce in the absence of that. The nonwithdrawal of consent before the expiry of the said eighteen months has no bearing. We are of the view that the eighteen-month period was specified only to ensure quick disposal of cases of divorce by mutual consent, and not to specify the time period for withdrawal of consent, as canvassed by the appellant." Emphasis supplied 20. The nonwithdrawal of consent before the expiry of the said eighteen months has no bearing. We are of the view that the eighteen-month period was specified only to ensure quick disposal of cases of divorce by mutual consent, and not to specify the time period for withdrawal of consent, as canvassed by the appellant." Emphasis supplied 20. In Benny(referred supra), the issue before a Division Bench of the Hon'ble Kerala High Court was whether it is permissible to withdraw one's consent in a petition filed for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, filed pursuant to a compromise. The issue was decided in the context of Sec. 10-A of the Divorce Act, 1869. Arguments on one side were advanced stating that the consent cannot be withdrawn when the matter was listed for the pronouncement of judgment, whereas the other side contended that in view of Sec. 13-B and the law laid down in Hitesh Bhatnagar (referred supra), consent can be withdrawn at any time before passing the decree. The Hon'ble High Court held as follows; 11. In a case of almost identical nature, the High Court of Bombay in Prakash Alumal Kalandari (supra) interpreting an analogous provision under Sec. 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, held that when the parties agree to convert a pending petition for divorce to a petition for divorce by mutual consent, on the basis of a compromise, and on one of the parties fulfilling the terms of the compromise, the other party cannot unilaterally withdraw consent in view of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure ( in short 'Code'). *** 17. Taking a cue from the subtle distinction drawn in Prakash Alumal Kalandari (supra), we are of the view that the same principles laid down in the decisions are applicable to the facts of this case. The High Court of Bombay held that consent given on the basis of a compromise to convert a petition for divorce to a petition for divorce by mutual consent cannot be resiled. In the case on hand, the only difference is the litigations were withdrawn, on the basis of a compromise agreement, and a fresh petition for divorce by mutual consent was filed. 18. The appellant and the respondent executed a memorandum of settlement agreeing that all disputes between them arising out of the marriage were harmoniously settled. In the case on hand, the only difference is the litigations were withdrawn, on the basis of a compromise agreement, and a fresh petition for divorce by mutual consent was filed. 18. The appellant and the respondent executed a memorandum of settlement agreeing that all disputes between them arising out of the marriage were harmoniously settled. On the strength of reciprocal promises, both parties withdrew the pending litigations and the custody of the children was Mat.Appeal.No.1066 OF 2017 entrusted to the respondent, who also received an amount of Rs.10, 00, 000.00 as compensation. 19. Sec. 2 (e) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 states that every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other, is an agreement. There were reciprocal promises agreed by the parties, falling within the ambit of Sec. 51 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which was duly performed by the appellant. The respondent on getting the custody of the children and receiving the compensation was obliged to perform her part of the agreement, i.e, to give her consent for dissolution of the marriage. 24. Following the judgment in Prakash Alumal Kalandari (supra), we hold that once the parties agree to file a joint petition, pursuant to an agreement/compromise in pending proceedings, then the parties are estopped from resiling from the agreement. Therefore, the unilateral withdrawal of consent by the respondent, especially after the appellant has performed his part of the terms in the memorandum of agreement, is only a sharp practice which cannot be permitted or tolerated for a moment as it would shatter the faith of the litigants in the justice delivery system and make a mockery of alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Emphasis supplied 21. It is now relevant to refer to the decision rendered by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Prakash Alumal Kalandari v. Jahnavi Prakash Kalandari, AIR 2011 BOMBAY 119. which was relied by a Division Bench in Benny (referred supra). In Prakash Alumal Kalandari's case it was held as under: 13. Notably, in the application filed by the appellant for withdrawing his consent (Exhibit-80), no material facts have been pleaded to even remotely suggest that he had signed the Consent Terms (Exhibit-71) due to force, fraud or undue influence. which was relied by a Division Bench in Benny (referred supra). In Prakash Alumal Kalandari's case it was held as under: 13. Notably, in the application filed by the appellant for withdrawing his consent (Exhibit-80), no material facts have been pleaded to even remotely suggest that he had signed the Consent Terms (Exhibit-71) due to force, fraud or undue influence. In other words, the parties having acted upon the 12 FCA.61.10 Consent Terms in part and more particularly, the respondent-wife having acted to her detriment, including having withdrawn the criminal cases filed against the appellant, the appellant cannot be allowed to extricate himself from his commitment. In such a situation, in absence of assertion that the consent was obtained by force, fraud or undue influence, by virtue of Sec. 23(1)(bb) read with Sec. 23(1)(e) of the Act of 1955, the Court would assume jurisdiction to pass a decree under Sec. 13B on being satisfied that a marriage was solemnized between the parties and that the averments in the petition are true. As regards the grievance of the appellant regarding non-observance of the terms and conditions of the Consent Terms, the Court can always grant liberty to the parties to pursue the remedy in that regard - which will have to be decided on its own merits. 16. As aforesaid, if the Petition is filed 'simplicitor under Sec. 13B of the Act" for divorce by mutual consent, the Court must satisfy itself that the consent given by the parties continues till the date of granting decree of divorce. Even if one party unilaterally withdraws his/her consent, the Court does not get jurisdiction to grant decree of divorce by mutual consent in view of the mandate of Sec. 13B of the Act. However, the situation 18 FCA.61.10 would be different if the parties in the first instance resort to Petition for relief under Sec. 9 or 13 of the Act and during the pendency of such Petition, they decide to invite decree for divorce by mutual consent. However, the situation 18 FCA.61.10 would be different if the parties in the first instance resort to Petition for relief under Sec. 9 or 13 of the Act and during the pendency of such Petition, they decide to invite decree for divorce by mutual consent. On the basis of agreed arrangement, if the parties were to execute Consent Terms and then file a formal Petition/Application to convert the pending Petition to be treated as having been filed under Sec. 13B of the Act to grant decree of divorce by mutual consent, then, in the latter proceedings, before the decree is passed, one party cannot be allowed to unilaterally withdraw the consent if the other party has already acted upon the Consent Terms either wholly or in part to his/her detriment. In other words, the Court will have to be satisfied that: (i) there is sufficient, good and just cause for allowing the party to withdraw his consent, lest, it results in permitting the party to approbate and reprobate; (ii) that the other party would not suffer prejudice which is irreversible, due to withdrawal of the consent. If this twin requirement is not satisfied, the Court should be loath to entertain the prayer to allow the party to unilaterally withdraw his/her consent." Emphasis supplied 22. The views taken in K.I. Mohanan V. Smt. Jeejabai, 1986 SCC OnLine Ker 208 : AIR 1988 Ker 28 . Harcharan Kaur v. Nachattar Singh, 1985 SCC OnLine P&H 515. Santosh Kumari v. Virendra Kumar, AIR 1986 Raj 128 . have been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sureshta Devi as follows: 12. But the Kerala High Court in K.I. Mohanan v. Jeejabai [ AIR 1988 Ker 28 : (1986) 2 HLR 467 : 1986 KLT 990 ] and the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Harcharan Kaur v. Nachhattar Singh [AIR 1988 P & H 27 : (1987) 2 HLR 184 : (1987) 92 Punj LR 321] and Rajasthan High Court in Santosh Kumari v. Virendra Kumar [ AIR 1986 Raj 128 : (1986) 1 HLR 620 : 1986 Raj LR 441] have taken a contrary view. It has been inter alia, held that it is open to one of the spouses to withdraw the consent given to the petition at any time before the court passes a decree for divorce. It has been inter alia, held that it is open to one of the spouses to withdraw the consent given to the petition at any time before the court passes a decree for divorce. The satisfaction of the court after holding an inquiry about the genuineness of the consent, necessarily contemplates an opportunity for either of the spouses to withdraw the consent. The Kerala High Court in particular has ruled out the application of analogy under Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure since it is dissimilar to the situation arising under Sec. 13-B of the Act. **** 15. In our view, the interpretation given to the Sec. by the High Courts of Kerala, Punjab and Haryana and Rajasthan in the aforesaid decisions appears to be correct and we affirm that view. " Emphasis supplied 23. Keeping in mind, the judicial precedents referred to supra and also the directions issued by this Court in FCA No.95 of 2022, this Court shall examine the sustainability of the impugned order. Learned Family Court Judge distinguished the decision in Benny on the ground that it was a case where wife after receiving the compensation amount from the husband wanted to withdraw her consent. When she refused to return the compensation, the Court observed that wife has taken advantage of her own wrong and was attempting to unlawfully enrich herself. Learned Judge further discussed that in the case on hand, no such compensation was paid to either of the parties and both declared that there were no claims against each other. Observing the same, the learned trial Judge distinguished the said Judgment. 24. Coming to the facts of the case on hand, the Petitioner No.2/wife filed a family agreement, dtd. 11/6/2021, wherein, she stated that she, her husband and their parents respectively have signed and mutually agreed for the terms therein. It appears, no reply has been filed denying the said family agreement dtd. 11/6/2021. A bare perusal of the said agreement dtd. 11/6/2021 would reveal the following: a) both the parties agreed to take mutual divorce after completing one year of marriage. b) Both shall cooperate till the decree of divorce passed. It appears, no reply has been filed denying the said family agreement dtd. 11/6/2021. A bare perusal of the said agreement dtd. 11/6/2021 would reveal the following: a) both the parties agreed to take mutual divorce after completing one year of marriage. b) Both shall cooperate till the decree of divorce passed. c) No claim for belongings and no monetary claims d) Marriage was not consummated e) No claim of maintenance f) They depart like good friends g) They would not interfere or disturb each other h) In case of violation, aggrieved is at liberty to initiate civil and criminal action i) Wife agreed not to lodge any criminal case. 25. The assailed order herein, does not indicate even a reference of the pleadings of either of the parties i.e., the contents of IA No.739 of 2022 and consequential affidavit filed by the Petitioner No.1 /husband and also the counter filed by the Petitioner No.2/wife along with the family agreement. It is surprising to note that after discussing various authorities on the subject, learned Judge concluded at para -17, as under: "17. In view of the above proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court, 1stPetitioner has every right to withdraw the consent. He need not substantiate the reasons for such withdrawal. It is enough for him to say that he had withdrawn his consent, or he was not a willing party to the divorce. Once the 2ndPetitioner is legally entitled to withdraw the consent, this consequence is the dismissal of the petition. Accordingly, the point is answered." 26. The Impugned Order is shorn of the pleadings of the parties muchless any enquiry or finding as directed by this Court in FCA No.95 of 2022. In that view of the matter, the impugned order does not stand before law. It is not the case of the Petitioner No.1 though at the inception he has given valid consent for obtaining divorce under mutual consent, later he realised and decided to resile from his consent. It is his specific case that his consent was obtained under threat and coercion. Considering the said aspects, this Court in FCA No.95 of 2022 remanded the matter with specific directions. Learned trial Judge failed to understand the real purport of the said directions and went on discussing the case law and concluded and dismissed the FCOP. It is his specific case that his consent was obtained under threat and coercion. Considering the said aspects, this Court in FCA No.95 of 2022 remanded the matter with specific directions. Learned trial Judge failed to understand the real purport of the said directions and went on discussing the case law and concluded and dismissed the FCOP. Therefore, this Court deems it fit to interfere with the order impugned. 27. In result, the Family Court appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order dtd. 17/5/2023 in FCOP No.420 of 2022 on the file of the IV Additional District Judge-cum-Judge, Principal Family Court, Vijayawada and the matter is remanded back to the Family Court to conduct enquiry as to whether the initial consent given by respondent herein was vitiated by force, fraud and undue influence by affording an opportunity to both parties to adduce evidence in that regard and basing on the result of such enquiry, pass an appropriate order in divorce FCOP No.420 of 2022 expeditiously not later than three months from the date of receipt of copy of this Order. No costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.