JUDGMENT : Sameer Jain, J. 1. Since common issue is involved in all these writ petitions, with the consent of the parties, they were heard together and are now being decided by way of this common order. D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9532/2006 is taken as lead file to peruse the facts. 2. The petitioner-company is engaged in the business of running and operating hotels throughout the country, including the city of Jaipur in Rajasthan. The petitioner-company was operating the Hotel Rajputana Palace Sheraton in Jaipur, for which the land in question was leased for a period of 20 years vide lease deed dated 14.07.1989. The subject matter of the present writ petitions are three strips of land bearing Khasra No. 328/3 admeasuring 800 sqmtr, 400 sqmtr, and 380 sqmtr, which are within the Atal Ban area on which the hotel is constructed. The present writ petitions arises out of proceedings for adjudication of classification of lease deed dated 23.03.1998 executed by M/s J.K. Atal HUF in favour of the petitioner-company, with regard to the three strips of land as mentioned above, the levy and charge of stamp duty thereupon as also the valuation of the lease deed for aforesaid purpose. When the lease deed was presented for registration before the Respondent No.2 / Sub-Registrar, Jaipur, the Respondent No.2 classified it as a perpetual lease and for the purpose of determining value of the subject land, applied a land rate being 110% of Rs. 36,000/-per square meter. The Respondent No.2 had obtained the said rate from the rates prescribed by the District Level Committee (for short "DLC") for commercial property situated at main station road, Jaipur. As the petitioner was not satisfied with the valuation arrived at by Respondent No.2, the matter was referred to Respondent No. 3 / The Additional Collector (Stamp), Jaipur, under Section 47-A (i) of the Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1952"). The Respondent No. 3 confirmed the proposal made by the Respondent No. 2 vide impugned order dated 31.12.2005. Against the said impugned order, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the Tax Board, which was also dismissed vide impugned order dated 03.10.2006. Being aggrieved by the impugned orders dated 31.12.2005 and 03.10.2006, the present writ petitions were filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution on India. 3. Against the said impugned order, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the Tax Board, which was also dismissed vide impugned order dated 03.10.2006. Being aggrieved by the impugned orders dated 31.12.2005 and 03.10.2006, the present writ petitions were filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution on India. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Respondent No. 2 had mis-classified the lease deed dated 23.03.1998 as perpetual lease because the lease was clearly issued only for the time till the adjacent premises were used by the petitioner-company for running the hotel. The lease for the hotel, dated 14.07.1989, was only for a period of 20 years and at the time of execution of lease deed dated 23.03.1998, more than ten years had already elapsed and accordingly the petitioner-company was only leasing the subject property for a definite period of about 9-10 years. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that there was a termination clause in the lease deed itself, which goes to show that the lease deed was never intended to be for indefinite or perpetual. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that even the classification of hotel activity as commercial activity is erroneous in light of Notification dated 04.03.1989 bearing No. F.12(4) IInd/85, issued by Industries (Gr.I) Department, Government of Rajasthan, by which the State Government had declared all tourism units to be treated as an industry. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that Respondent No. 2 ought to have applied the industrial rate and not the commercial rate, in consonance with the correct and latest legal position. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that as per Section 47-A of the Act of 1952, the Respondent No. 3 was obligated to conduct an inquiry in respect of the market value of the property and on the basis of such inquiry, the quantum of tax/duty could be determined. However, the Respondent No. 3 failed to conduct any inquiry and mechanically approved the levy of duty as arrived at by Respondent No. 2. The statutory power of framing an assessment which has been conferred onto the competent authority necessarily have to be exercised by him/her by applying his/her own mind to relevant material and factors. However, the Respondent No. 3 failed to conduct any inquiry and mechanically approved the levy of duty as arrived at by Respondent No. 2. The statutory power of framing an assessment which has been conferred onto the competent authority necessarily have to be exercised by him/her by applying his/her own mind to relevant material and factors. That being the settled position, it is contended that, it is not open for the competent authority to abdicate his/her statutory powers and functions by mechanically following any administrative circular issued by any Department in respect of determination of market value and assessment of stamp duty. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on Apex Court judgments of B. Arvind Kumar Vs. Govt. of India & Ors. reported in (2007) 5 SCC 745 , State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Lalji Tandon (Dead) through LRs reported in (2004) 1 SCC 1 , Juthika Muliek (Smt.) & Anr. Vs. Mahendra Yashwant Bal & Ors. reported in (1995) 1 SCC 560 and Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd. vs. Hede and Company reported in (2007) 5 SCC 614 and Allahabad High Court judgment of Ashish Kumar vs. Deputy Commissioner (Stamp) and Ors. reported in 2010 (7) ADJ 55 . 4. Per contra, learned AAG representing the respondents submits that the valuation of lease-hold property was done as per provisions of law. Learned AAG has placed reliance on Clause/Entry 35 of Appendix D (Stamp Duty payable under various articles included in Schedule II of the Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 from time to time from 08.03.1976 upto 26.05.2004, when the new Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 came into force from 27.05.2004), which provides for levy of Stamp Duty on ‘Lease’. The said clause was amended from 30.03.1997 and as per Sub-clause (a)(iii), when the lease purports to be for a term in excess of twenty years, the duty payable would be the same duty as on conveyance on the market value of the property which is the subject matter of the lease. Learned AAG has highlighted that though the lease deed dated 14.07.1989 was initially for a period of twenty years, the same has been renewing from time to time. Learned AAG has highlighted that though the lease deed dated 14.07.1989 was initially for a period of twenty years, the same has been renewing from time to time. The lease deed in question, i.e. lease deed dated 23.03.1998, which prescribes the period of lease from execution of lease till the time the petitioner-company is operating the hotel in adjacent land, is in effect also a lease deed for a period of over 20 years and therefore the stamp duty was rightly levied. Learned AAG has also highlighted that as per Clause 4 of the lease deed dated 23.03.1998 itself, the possession and occupation of the subject land was already with the petitioner-company since 1992. Learned AAG further contends that the reliance placed on notification dated 04.03.1989 is also misplaced. Simply because the government has decided to consider tourism as an industry would not mean that the land has become industrial, especially since the notification was not issued under any provisions of the Stamp Act. 5. Heard the arguments advanced by both the sides, scanned the record of the writ petitions and considered the judgments cited at Bar. 6. The petitioners have challenged the impugned orders, primarily, on the ground of classification of lease deed as perpetual lease and on the ground of classification of operating hotel as commercial activity, as opposed to industrial activity. 7. Before adverting to the merits of the matter, it would be apt to consider the relevant clauses of the lease deed in question and relevant provisions of the Act of 1952. The relevant clauses of the lease deed dated 23.03.1998 are reproduced as under: “Clause 3 (A): The lessor hereby gives on lease to the Lessee the land detailed in Schedule I hereunder for a period which shall be so long as the Lessee runs the hotel in the complex. Clause 4: That the parties hereto confirm that the land in reference is already in possession, occupation and use of Lessee, in terms of Operating License Agreement dated 30th June 1992 referred to above which stand superseded on the execution of Sale/Transfer Deed dated 23rd March 1998 in respect of the exempt land and building comprising of hotel complex, the lease signed by the other 2 HUFs in respect of their part of the free hold land referred to above and the lease hereunder. Clause 5: The Lease shall not be liable to termination except as provided hereunder: a) In case of any deficiency in service or otherwise Atals shall give a written notice to ITCHL stating the breach and give 60 (sixty) days notice to rectify such breach. ITCHL shall rectify the breach within the said period of 60 (sixty) days. b) In case the said breach continues beyond the notice period then Atals shall give another 30 (thirty) days notice to ITCHL failing which they would be entitled to terminate the lease.” The relevant Entry No. 35 of Appendix D (Stamp Duty payable under various articles included in Schedule II of the Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 from time to time from 08.03.1976 upto 26.05.2004, when the new Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 came into force from 27.05.2004), is reproduced as under: “35. Lease: From 30.03.1997: Clause (a)-Subs. Vide Raj. Act 9 of 1997 as under:- (a) Where, by such lease, the rent is fixed and no premium is paid or delivered - (I) Where the lease purports to be a term for less than one year The same duty as on a Bond (No. 15) for the whole amount payable under such lease. (ii) Where the lease purports to be for a term of not less than one year but note more than twenty years The same duty as on conveyance (No. 23) for consideration equal to the amount or value of the average rent of two years. (iii) Where the lease purports to be for a term in excess of twenty years or perpetuity or where the term is not mentioned. The same duty as on conveyance (No. 23) on the market value of the property which is the subject matter of the lease. Emphasis supplied” 8. Having considered the rival submissions and on careful analysis of the above, the following points emerge: 8.1. As per clause 3 of the lease deed, the land in question was transferred with the understanding and consensus that the period of the lease shall be as long as the petitioner-company operates the hotel in the complex. It is an admitted position that the petitioner-company has been operating the hotel without disturbance since 1989 and is also in possession and occupation of the land in question since 1992. It is an admitted position that the petitioner-company has been operating the hotel without disturbance since 1989 and is also in possession and occupation of the land in question since 1992. Therefore, as the petitioner-company have been enjoying the possession and occupation of land well over 20 (twenty) years, the duty payable would necessarily have to be determined as per the relevant entry in force, i.e. Entry No. 35 Sub-clause (a)(iii), as reproduced above. 8.2. Even at the time of determination, the Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3 were cognizant of the fact that the lease deed for the hotel, dated 14.07.1989, was for a period of 20 (twenty) years. But as the same was renewable, which has been renewed from time to time, the Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3 had rightly levied the impugned duty on the lease deed dated 23.03.1998, in terms of Entry No. 35 as quoted above, as the phrase used in the said entry is ‘purports to be for a term in excess of twenty years’. 8.3. None of the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner-company have considered the specific Entry No. 35, as applicable after 30.03.1997, and therefore, all those judgments are distinguishable and inapplicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 8.4. Although the petitioner-company had earlier contested the classification of operating hotel as commercial activity, the said ground was not pressed anymore, on account of subsequent developments. Therefore, this Court refrains from recording any finding on the said aspect. However, it is important to note that the notification dated 04.03.1989 was issued by the Industries (Gr.I) Department, and not Department of Stamps and Registration or Department of Finance, and therefore the said notification would be of no significance in the instant case. 9. In view of the above, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the concurrent findings as arrived at by all the authorities below. 10. The writ petition(s) are accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.