JUDGMENT : ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J. 1. By way of the present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 the petitioner has challenged the notice dated 17.02.2020 (Annex.8) and discharge order dated 29.06.2020 (Annex.12) 2. In nutshell, the facts of the petition are that, the petitioner having acquired B.A., B.Ed., LL.B, LL.M. and D.LL., was initially appointed as Teacher Grade-II in Education Department, Government of Rajasthan w.e.f. 30.12.2014. 3. Thereafter in pursuance of advertisement dated 18.11.2017, issued by Rajasthan High Court, the petitioner applied for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division). She was declared successful vide order dated 04.11.2018 and appointed as Civil Judge & Judicial Magistrate vide order dated 11.02.2019. 4. The petitioner joined the services at Rajasthan Judicial Academy, Jodhpur as a trainee RJS on 06.03.2019 and successfully completed her training on 07.03.2020. 5. Vide order dated 06.03.2020, the petitioner was kept under Awaiting Posting Order (APO) and then vide order dated 23.03.2020, her headquarter was changed from Jodhpur to District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur Metro. 6. The petitioner received a notice dated 17-2-2020, by which she was asked to submit a detailed explanation on certain points. She submitted reply to the said notice on 02.03.2020. 7. It is the assertion of the petitioner that the allegations levelled against her, falls under Rule 16 of Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CCA Rules’) but the procedure prescribed under Rule 16 of CCA Rules was not followed. 8. The enquiry report was prepared by the Enquiry Judge. The report was placed before the Full Court of Rajasthan High Court. Thereafter, by an order dated 29.05.2020, the petitioner was discharged from the services. 9. The petitioner has also averred that she was not given an opportunity to assail the said enquiry report, prepared against her, which is in violation of principles of natural justice. 10. The petitioner has further averred that as per the notice dated 17.02.2020 (Annex-8), the petitioner was asked to submit her detailed explanation on 5 allegations, which are as follows: a) While studying in LL.B. first year, the petitioner also obtained degree of B.Ed. in the same year, thus fraudulently succeeding in showing attendance in both the courses. The contention of the petitioner is that she did not obtain the degree of LL.B and B.Ed. in the same year. in the same year, thus fraudulently succeeding in showing attendance in both the courses. The contention of the petitioner is that she did not obtain the degree of LL.B and B.Ed. in the same year. As per the Ordinance No.168A of the Ordinance Handbook of Rajasthan University, a candidate cannot appear in two main examinations in the same year. As per the petitioner, LL.B First Year Examination is not main examination for obtaining the degree of LL.B. b) The petitioner while being in Government job as a Teacher did her LL.M. and again fraudulently succeeded in showing attendance in both the courses. The petitioner has given the explanation that she did not show her attendance fraudulently at two places simultaneously because generally no regular classes are held for LL.M. in the University. c) The petitioner concealed the fact of her employment in Government job as a Teacher in the checklist submitted at the time of interview of RJS. To this the petitioner has given her explanation to the effect that, there were no columns in Checklist for Interview wherein she was required to say that she was employed in Government service. The petitioner submitted that she had filled her checklist on 02.11.2018, whereas the petitioner submitted her resignation from the government service on 25-10-2018 and had stopped reporting to service. d) The petitioner did not obtain any permission or ‘No Objection Certificate’ from the Education Department for appearing in the RJS Examination. To this the petitioner has given explanation that there is no provision in RJS Rules to obtain prior permission from the employer for appearing in RJS examination. e) The petitioner upon selection in RJS concealed this information from the High Court as well as from Education Department and joined the judicial services after resignation on medical grounds. To this the petitioner has explained that as on the date of joining RJS, the petitioner was not in Government service, therefore, no information was required to be furnished by the petitioner. 11. With the above-mentioned averments, the petitioner has submitted that principles of natural justice mentioned under Rule 16 of CCA Rules have not been followed and the rights guaranteed under Article 311 of the Constitution of India have not been given to the petitioner. Therefore, the notice dated 17.02.2020 and discharge order dated 29.05.2020 may be quashed and set aside and that the petitioner may be reinstated in RJS. Therefore, the notice dated 17.02.2020 and discharge order dated 29.05.2020 may be quashed and set aside and that the petitioner may be reinstated in RJS. 12. The respondent No.1 in its preliminary submissions of the reply filed in the writ petition, has averred that an advertisement No.RHCJ/EXAMCELL/RJS/CIVILJUDGECADRE/2017/1104 dated 18.11.2017, was published for the recruitment of 35 posts in Civil Judge Cadre. The application forms of the eligible candidates were invited online. Clause 14 of the advertisement expressly provided for the requirement of submission of permission and ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) from the employer by a candidate appearing in examination, who was at that time employed as a Government servant. In the same clause, it has been unequivocally mentioned that in case any information was received regarding any candidate, not having obtained requisite permission or having been denied permission to appear in the examination, the candidature of such candidate would be liable to be rejected at any stage. 13. It is further stated that the petitioner after having being selected in RJS examination 2017 was appointed on probation for a period of 2 years vide order dated 11.02.2019 and was sent for one year's training at Rajasthan Judicial Academy, Jodhpur. When the petitioner was undergoing the training, Mr. Abhishek Verma and Mr. Ram Niwas Meena made two separate complaints against the petitioner on 16.11.2018 and 22.03.2019 respectively. In the aforesaid complaints, it was alleged that the petitioner had obtained two professional degrees i.e. LL.B. Part-I and B.Ed. simultaneously in the same year from Rajasthan University. She passed LL.B. Part-I in May, 2012 and obtained degree of B.Ed. in the same academic session i.e. 2011-2012 and then she served as Teacher Grade-II (English) in Government Secondary School, Bhadauli, Tehsil Bonli, District Sawai Madhopur from 2015 to 2018. It was also alleged that while serving as a Teacher, she simultaneously pursued LL.M. from 2015 to 2017 and obtained her degree from Rajasthan University as a regular student without obtaining permission from Education Department. She also did not disclose to Education Department about her degree of LL.B. It was contended that the petitioner had passed the RJS examination by concealing the facts with regard to her previous employment in Education Department and also furnished false affidavit in training. 14. It is also stated that in pursuance of the aforesaid complaints, a fact finding report was prepared. 14. It is also stated that in pursuance of the aforesaid complaints, a fact finding report was prepared. The Registrar, Rajasthan University, Jaipur and Director Secondary Education were asked to furnish necessary relevant documents and information with regard to the petitioner by the Registrar (Vigilance), Rajasthan High Court. 15. The Registrar, Rajasthan University vide his letter dated 18.10.2019 informed that a student is not allowed to pursue B.Ed. and LL.B. courses simultaneously in the same year as per the provisions of Ordinance 168-A and Ordinance 168-B in Hand Book of University of Rajasthan. It was further informed that the petitioner had appeared in two examinations in the same year, which is also not permissible. 16. It is further averred in the reply of the petitioner that as per the information/documents furnished by the Headmaster, Government Secondary School, Bhedoli, District Sawai Madhopur, the petitioner was appointed as Senior Teacher (English) vide order dated 22.12.2014. Thereafter, petitioner submitted an application for resignation on 25.10.2018 from the aforesaid post on the ground of domestic circumstances and sickness, her resignation was accepted by the Department vide order dated 28.12.2018 w.e.f. 25.10.2018 whereas, she was declared successful in the final result of Civil Judge Cadre, 2017 on 04.11.2018. It was apprised by the Headmaster that the petitioner had not submitted any application for pursuing higher studies or for seeking permission to appear in the RJS Examination pursuant to the advertisement dated 18.11.2017. The petitioner’s resignation was accepted by the Education Department vide order dated 28.12.2018. 17. It has been further averred that the results of preliminary examination (held on 25.03.2018) and main examination (held on 08/09.09.2018) were declared on 17.05.2018 and 02.10.2018 respectively, but the petitioner concealed and suppressed the factum of her government employment even at the time of interview (held on 02.11.2018) and also at the time of filling her attestion form on 19.11.2018. It was also averred in the reply that competent authority accepted her resignation subsequently on 28.12.2018, meaning thereby that during the said period she was in government employment. 18. The Registrar (Vigilance) submitted a detailed report regarding the complaints made against the petitioner by one Mr. Ram Niwas Meena and it was found that all the allegations were prima facie established. The petitioner was asked to submit her detailed explanation on each of the allegations levelled in the notice dated 17-2-2020. 19. 18. The Registrar (Vigilance) submitted a detailed report regarding the complaints made against the petitioner by one Mr. Ram Niwas Meena and it was found that all the allegations were prima facie established. The petitioner was asked to submit her detailed explanation on each of the allegations levelled in the notice dated 17-2-2020. 19. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the Full Court and after thorough examination of all relevant aspects, the Full Court resolved that the petitioner was not fit for confirmation in Rajasthan Judicial Service and decided to discharge her from RJS. Thereafter, vide order dated 29.05.2020 the petitioner was discharged from service. 20. In the reply, the respondent No.1 has averred that at the time when the impugned order of discharge of the petitioner from RJS was passed, she was working as a probationer. During the probation period, the suitability for continuation and confirmation in service, has to be adjudged by the employer. In the present case, the decision to discharge the petitioner from service was taken by the respondents considering her overall performance, conduct and suitability for the post. It is also averred that in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the High Court has a solemn duty to consider and appreciate the services of a Judicial Officer before confirming him in service and for this not only judicial performance but also probity as to how one has conducted himself, is relevant and important. 21. Mr. R. N. Mathur, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Shovit Jhajharia appearing on behalf of the petitioner invited Court’s attention towards Ordinance 168-A of Hand Book of the University of Rajasthan and submitted that a candidate shall not appear in two main examinations simultaneously and the examination of LL.B. First Year is not the final examination. The petitioner has not obtained the degree of LL.B. and B.Ed. in the same year and as such she has not shown her attendance at two places simultaneously. After thorough checking, the admission card was issued by the University and then she was allowed to appear in the examination as per the Ordinance 168-A and thus, she has not committed any fraud. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that there was no column in the Check List wherein the petitioner was required to mention that she was in the Government service. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that there was no column in the Check List wherein the petitioner was required to mention that she was in the Government service. She submitted her resignation from Government service on 25.10.2018 and stopped reporting to service. The resignation was accepted w.e.f. 25.10.2018 and the documents have been placed on record. The petitioner filled her checklist on 02.11.2018 and resigned from Government service w.e.f. 25.10.2018 hence, on a fateful day when the checklist for interview was filled, she was not in Government service and thus, discharge of petitioner is illegal. 23. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, there is no provision in the Rules of 2010 to obtain prior permission from Education Department for appearing in the Rajasthan Judicial Service Examination. It was also contended that it was not mandatory to obtain permission from employer and it was also not desired by the Appointing Authority/Recruiting Authority to submit ‘No Objection Certificate’ along with application form. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that it is true that resignation of the petitioner was accepted w.e.f. 25.10.2018, but then, the fault did not lie with the petitioner to submit any information to the Education Department. On the day the petitioner joined, she was not in Government service and there was no requirement to submit information about prior employment to the Rajasthan High Court. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner also invited Court’s attention towards the notice dated 17.02.2020, which was issued under Rule 14 of the Rules of 2010, and argued that the aforesaid notice alleges misconduct committed by the petitioner. She has resorted to fraud, concealment and non-submission of ‘No Objection Certificate’ from the Government. Learned counsel argued that such allegation as per law, requires to be proved by the Appointing Authority under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules and not under Rule 14 of the Rules of 2010, but the same has not been done in the instant case and thus, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel also submitted that the allegations levelled against the petitioner does not relates to her conduct and performance during probation period and not a single instance has been quoted by respondents about her misconduct during probation period and thus, the action of the respondents is erroneous. 26. Learned counsel also submitted that the allegations levelled against the petitioner does not relates to her conduct and performance during probation period and not a single instance has been quoted by respondents about her misconduct during probation period and thus, the action of the respondents is erroneous. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the petitioner cannot be discharged on the ground of unsatisfactory progress during probation, as the service record of the petitioner was unblemished. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that the word ‘material information’ has not been defined and nothing was stated in the advertisement dated 20.11.2017 or in any other document. It was contended that the ‘material information’ means concealing of any material which would reasonably be expected to have a material effect, whether positive or negative and which is likely to affect the result. The non-disclosure of information, must be such which has substantial effect, which the Appointing Authority would consider in making a decision. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that while submitting online application form, there was no such column with regard to submitting information about petitioner’s Government employment. The petitioner ceased to be an employee of Education Department w.e.f. 25.10.2018 and there is no column in the application form with regard to previous employment and hence, the allegation of suppressing ‘material information’ is patently incorrect. 29. Having made submission on merits of his case, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that the petitioner, who is indisputably a meritorious candidate, may be reinstated in Rajasthan Judicial Service. 30. Learned counsel for the petitioner while relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Samsher Singh Vs. of Punjab & Anr. reported in AIR 1974 (2) SCC 831 submitted that the substance of the order and not the form would be decisive. Relevant para Nos.62, 65, 66 & 106 are reproduced hereinbelow : “62. The position of a probationer. of Punjab & Anr. reported in AIR 1974 (2) SCC 831 submitted that the substance of the order and not the form would be decisive. Relevant para Nos.62, 65, 66 & 106 are reproduced hereinbelow : “62. The position of a probationer. was considered by this Court in Purshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [1958] S C.R. 828 Das, C.J., speaking for the Court said that where a person is appointed to a permanent post in Government service on probation the termination of his service during or at the end of the period of probation win not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment because the Government servant so appointed has no right to continue to hold such a post any more than a servant employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to do so. Such a termination does not operateas a forfeiture of any right of a servant to hold the post, for he has no such right. Obviously such a termination cannot be a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank by way of punishment. There are, however, two important observations of Das, C.J., in Dhingra's case (supra). One is that if a right exists under a contract or service Rules to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant. The other is that if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and violates Article 311 of the constitution. The reasoning why motive is said to be irrelevant is that it inheres in the state of mind which is not discernible. on the other land, if termination is founded on misconduct it is objective and is manifest. 65. The fact of holding an inquiry is not always conclusive. What is decisive is whether the order is really by way of punishment. (See State of Orissa v. Ramnarain Das [1961] 1 S.C.R. 606). If there is an enquiry the facts and circumstances of the case will be looked into in order to find out whether the order is one of dismissal in substance. In R.C. Lacy v. State of Bihar & Ors. (See State of Orissa v. Ramnarain Das [1961] 1 S.C.R. 606). If there is an enquiry the facts and circumstances of the case will be looked into in order to find out whether the order is one of dismissal in substance. In R.C. Lacy v. State of Bihar & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 590 of 1962 decided on 23 October, 1963) it was held that an order of reversion passed following an enquiry into the conduct of the probationer in the circumstances of that case was in the nature of preliminary inquiry to enable the Government to decide whether disciplinary action should be taken. A probationer whose terms of service provided that it could be terminated without any notice and without any cause being assigned could not claim the protection of Article 311 (2). A preliminary inquiry to satisfy that there was reason to dispense with the services of a temporary employee has been held not to attract Article 311. On the other hand, a statement in the order of termination that the temporary servant is undesirable has been held to import an element of punishment. 66. If the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the substance of the order is that the termination is by way of punishment then a probationer is entitled to attract Article 311. The substance of the order and not the form would be decisive. 106. Nehru, Patel, Munshi, Sir B.N. Rao,. Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Aiyar and, above all, Dr. Ambedkar, who was Chairman of the Drafting Committee, spoke in one voice, with marginal variations on points immaterial to our major purpose. What emerges from such a study is that, with minimal innovations, a Parliamentary-style quasi-federalism was accepted, rejecting the substance of a Presidential-style executive. This welding of statesmanship and scholarship and willingness to borrow whatever was beneficial resulted in a constitutional college where the Westminster symbols, backed by Indian experience, were reverentially preserved and the pattern of ministerial responsibility was built into the framework of federal republicanism. While the shopping list of Constitutions was large, our founders' selectivity narrowed it down to the Constitutions of Commonwealth countries. Also British export of Cabinet Government had been made Swadeshi by past experience. Ill-assorted excerpts from the speeches of the activists make for marvelous unanimity on the Cabinet form.” 31. While the shopping list of Constitutions was large, our founders' selectivity narrowed it down to the Constitutions of Commonwealth countries. Also British export of Cabinet Government had been made Swadeshi by past experience. Ill-assorted excerpts from the speeches of the activists make for marvelous unanimity on the Cabinet form.” 31. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Gopi Kishore reported in AIR 1960 SC 689 and submitted that motive of the order is relevant. The para Nos.3, 4, 5 & 6 are quoted thus : “3. But, if instead of terminating such a person's service without any enquiry, the employer chooses to hold an enquiry into his alleged misconduct or inefficiency of for some similar reason, the termination of service is by way of punishment, because it puts a stigma on his competence and thus affects his future career. In such a case, he is entitled to the protection of Art.311(2) of the Constitution. 4. In the last-mentioned case, if the probationer is discharged on any one of those grounds without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge, it will amount to a removal from service within the meaning of Art.311(2) of the Constitution and will, therefore, be liable to be struck down. 5. But, if the employer simply terminates the services of a probationer without holding an enquiry and without giving him a reasonable chance of showing cause against his removal from service, probationary civil servant can have no cause of action, even though the real motive behind the removal from service may have been that his employer thought him to be unsuitable for the post he was temporarily holding, on account of his misconduct or inefficiency or some such cause. 6. It would thus appear that, in the instant case, thought the respondent was only a probationer he was discharged from service really because the Government had on enquiry come to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that he was unsuitable for the post he held on probation. This was clearly by way of punishment and, therefore, he was entitled to the protection of Art.311(2) of the Constitution. This was clearly by way of punishment and, therefore, he was entitled to the protection of Art.311(2) of the Constitution. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the respondent, being a mere probationer, could be discharged without any enquiry into his conduct being made and his discharge could not mean any punishment to him, because he had no right to a post. It is true, if the Government came to the conclusion that the respondent was not a fit and proper person to hold a post in the public service of the State, it could discharge him without holding any enquiry into his alleged misconduct. If the Government proceeded against him in that direct way, without casting any aspersion on his honesty or competence, his discharge would not, in law, have the effect of a removal from service by way of punishment and he would, therefore, have no grievance to ventilate in any Court. Instead of taking that easy course, the Government chose the more difficult one of starting proceedings against him and of branding him as a dishonest and an incompetent officer. He had the right, in those circumstances, to insist upon the protection of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. That protection not having been given to him, he had the right to seek his redress in Court. It must, therefore, be held that the respondent had been wrongly deprived of the protection afforded by Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. His removal from the service, therefore, was not in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution. 32. Learned counsel for the petitioner while contending that if misconduct was a basis to the discharge and no enquiry was made, the management is to satisfy the Tribunal about the misconduct, and relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd & Ors Vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & Ors reported in (1980) 2 SCC 593 . The relevant para No.76 is being reproduced hereinbelow : “76. If misconduct was basic to the discharge and no enquiry precedent to the dismissal was made the story did not end there in favour of the workmen. The law is well-settled that the Management may still satisfy the tribunal about the misconduct.” 33. The relevant para No.76 is being reproduced hereinbelow : “76. If misconduct was basic to the discharge and no enquiry precedent to the dismissal was made the story did not end there in favour of the workmen. The law is well-settled that the Management may still satisfy the tribunal about the misconduct.” 33. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that if a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without giving him/her a reasonable opportunity, it may amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. In support of his submission, learned counsel relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Registrar General, High Court of Gujarat & Anr. Vs. Jayshree Chamanlal Buddhabhatti reported in (2013) 16 SCC 59. The relevant extract of the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court is being reproduced hereunder:- “27. These judgments have been followed by a bench of seven Judges in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in AIR 1974 SC 2192 (equivalent to 1974 (2) SCC 831 ), where this Court was concerned with the termination of the services of a probationary judicial officer on the basis of a vigilance inquiry, which was conducted by the State Government on the request of the High Court. The Court held the termination to be bad, and while doing so laid down the law in this behalf in no uncertain terms in paragraphs 63 to 66 (of the SCC report) which read as follows:- “63. No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are terminated it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 64. Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. 64. Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But in those cases the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the other hand, the probationer is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311(2) he can claim protection. In State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad it was said that if the Government proceeded against the probationer in the direct way without casting any aspersion on his honesty or competence, his discharge would not have the effect of removal by way of punishment. Instead of taking the easy course, the Government chose the more difficult one of starting proceedings against him and branding him as a dishonest and incompetent officer. 65. The fact of holding an enquiry is not always conclusive. What is decisive is whether the order is really by way of punishment. If there is an enquiry the facts and circumstances of the case will be looked into in order to find out whether the order is one of dismissal in substance it was held that an order of reversion passed following an enquiry into the conduct of the probationer in the circumstances of that case was in the nature of preliminary inquiry to enable the Government to decide whether disciplinary action should be taken. A probationer whose terms of service provided that it could be terminated without any notice and without any cause being assigned could not claim the protection of Article 311(2). A probationer whose terms of service provided that it could be terminated without any notice and without any cause being assigned could not claim the protection of Article 311(2). A preliminary inquiry to satisfy that there was reason to dispense with the services of a temporary employee has been held not to attract Article 311. On the other hand, a statement in the order of termination that the temporary servant is undesirable has been held to import an element of punishment. 66. If the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the substance of the order is that the termination is by way of punishment then a probationer is entitled to attract Article 311. The substance of the order and not the form would be decisive.” 28. These propositions have been reiterated in a number of judgments thereafter, and the counsel for the respondent referred to Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. of India reported in 1984 (2) SCC 369 , where this Court held that, the Court can go behind the formal order of discharge to find out the real cause of action. In that matter, the order of discharge of the probationer on the ground of unsuitability was actually based upon the report/recommendation of the concerned authority indicating commission of an alleged misconduct by the probationer. The Court held that the order was punitive in nature, and in the absence of any proper inquiry it amounted to violation to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. At the end of paragraph 13 of the judgment this Court observed as follows:- “13……..Even though the order of discharge may be non-committal, it cannot stand alone. Though the noting in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the order cannot be ignored. The recommendation of the Director which is the basis or foundation for the order should be read along with the order for the purpose of determining its true character. If on reading the two together the Court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground as the appellant has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution.” 29. The propositions in this behalf, as to what constitutes a motive, and what constitutes a foundation for the action were once again crystallized in the judgment of this Court in Chandra Prakash Shahi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in 2000 (5) SCC 152 , where in paragraph 28 and 29 of the judgment of this Court laid down the relevant propositions which are as follows:- “28. The important principles which are deducible on the concept of “motive” and “foundation”, concerning a probationer, are that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post in question. If for the determination of suitability of the probationer for the post in question or for his further retention in service or for confirmation, an inquiry is held and it is on the basis of that inquiry that a decision is taken to terminate his service, the order will not be punitive in nature. But, if there are allegations of misconduct and an inquiry is held to find out the truth of that misconduct and an order terminating the service is passed on the basis of that inquiry, the order would be punitive in nature as the inquiry was held not for assessing the general suitability of the employee for the post in question, but to find out the truth of allegations of misconduct against that employee. In this situation, the order would be founded on misconduct and it will not be a mere matter of “motive”. 29. “Motive” is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, “motive” is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? If it was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would be upheld in law. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? If it was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were found to be true in the preliminary inquiry.” 34. Per contra, Mr. A. K. Sharma, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Vishnu Kant Sharma opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and contended that the Registrar, Rajasthan University, Jaipur vide his letter dated 18.10.2019 informed that a student was not allowed to pursue B.Ed. and LL.B. Courses simultaneously in the same year as per the provisions of Ordinance 168-A and Ordinance 168-B of the Hand Book of University of Rajasthan. Similarly, while serving as a Government Teacher at Government Secondary School, Bhedoli, District Sawai Madhopur, the petitioner could not have pursued LL.M. which is a regular course. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner had appeared in two examinations in the same year, which according to the Ordinances of the University, is not permissible. The relevant extract of the aforesaid letter dated 18.10.2019 and Ordinance 168-A of Hand Book of University of Rajasthan respectively are reproduced thus : “In this context, please note that a student is not allowed to pursue B.Ed. Course and LL.B. Course simultaneously in University of Rajasthan as per provisions of Ord. 168-A and Ord. 168-B. A photocopy of this Ordinance is also being enclosed herewith for your information.” Ordinance 168-A of Hand Book of the University of Rajasthan: “O.168-A. Notwithstanding anything contained in these Ordinances, a candidate shall in no case be permitted to appear at two main examination of the University simultaneously in the same year. N.B. : this will not apply to the examination for the Diploma in Indian Culture and Certificate/Diploma in Modern EuropeanLanguages/Sanskrit/Persian/StenoTyping/Certificate in Spoken English/Certificate Courses in Dramatics/Certificate Course in Computer Application/Diploma in Journalish/Tourism and Hotel Management.” 35. N.B. : this will not apply to the examination for the Diploma in Indian Culture and Certificate/Diploma in Modern EuropeanLanguages/Sanskrit/Persian/StenoTyping/Certificate in Spoken English/Certificate Courses in Dramatics/Certificate Course in Computer Application/Diploma in Journalish/Tourism and Hotel Management.” 35. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the petitioner deliberately suppressed and concealed material information from the respondent as well as from the Education Department with a view that in case she did not succeed in the examination, she will continue as a Government Teacher. 36. Learned counsel for the respondent further contended that it is incorrect that there was no column inquiring about Government employment. One sub-column was specified in Column No.3 for mentioning ‘Additional Category (If Yes)’ and there were two options in this sub-column one is ‘Panchayat Samiti/Zila Parishad/State Public Sector Undertaking Employee in Substantive Capacity’ and second is ‘State Government Employee’. If a candidate opted to select any one of these two category, then the selected option was displayed in the print out of the filled in column in the application form and if a candidate did not opt to select any one of the two categories, the column ‘Additional Category’ would not be displayed in the print out of the filled in application form. It shows intention of the petitioner to suppress material facts. She purposely chose to download the format which was not applicable to the candidates already in employment at the time of submitting application for RJS Examination, 2017. 37. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that permission from employer was mandatory as stated in the Clause-14 of the advertisement dated 18.11.2017 which provides for submission of permission and ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) from the employer, with the application form by a candidate appearing in the examination, who was already a Government servant. 37. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that permission from employer was mandatory as stated in the Clause-14 of the advertisement dated 18.11.2017 which provides for submission of permission and ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) from the employer, with the application form by a candidate appearing in the examination, who was already a Government servant. Clause 14 of the advertisement dated 18.11.2017 reads thus : ^^14 vukifŸkizek.k i= %& jktLFkku jkT;] iapk;rlfefr;ksa] ftykifj"knksa ;k lkotZfud {ks= ds miØeksa@fuxeksa ds dk;Zdykiksa ds lEcU/k esa vf/k"Bk;h gSfl;r ls lsokjr O;fDr;ksa dks vkosnu djus ds iwoZ gh vius fu;ksDrksa dks fyf[kr esa lwfpr dj bl ijh{kk ds fy;s vkosnu djus dh vuqefr izkIr dj ysuh pkfg;sA ;fn fu;ksDrk }kjk jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; dks vkosnd }kjk vuqefr ugha fy;s tkus vFkok vkosnd dks ijh{kk esa cSBus dh vuqefr ugha fn;s tkus ds ckjs esa lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS rks vkosnd dh vH;fFkZrk ¼ candidature ½ rqjUr izHkko ls fdlh Hkh Lrj ij jn~n dh tk ldrh gSA 38. He argued that such Clause stipulates that, in case any information with regard to a candidate having not obtained permission or having been denied permission to appear in the examination is withheld, then the candidature of such candidate would be liable to be rejected at any stage. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that on the date of joining as RJS Officer, she was not in Government employment is wholly misconceived. 39. Sum and substance of aforesaid arguments by learned counsel for the respondent was, that the petitioner was appointed as a RJS Officer on the basis of irregular or improper means and by concealing material facts, she had appeared in the examination conducted for the post of Civil Judge cum Judicial Magistrate and got appointment and thus, she cannot be held eligible for reinstatement. 40. Learned counsel for the respondent further argued that the petitioner submitted an application on 25.10.2018 before the Headmaster, Government Secondary School, Bhedoli, District Sawai Madhopur requesting him to accept her resignation from the post of Senior Teacher (English) w.e.f. 25.10.2018 on the ground of domestic circumstances and sickness. Her resignation was accepted by the Department vide order dated 28.12.2018 w.e.f. 25.10.2018 whereas, she was declared successful in the final result of Civil Judge Cadre, 2017 on 04.11.2018. Her resignation was accepted by the Department vide order dated 28.12.2018 w.e.f. 25.10.2018 whereas, she was declared successful in the final result of Civil Judge Cadre, 2017 on 04.11.2018. It was apprised by the Headmaster that the petitioner had not submitted any application for pursuing higher studies or for seeking permission to appear in the RJS Examination pursuant to the advertisement dated 18.11.2017. The petitioner’s resignation was accepted by the Education Department vide order dated 28.12.2018 whereas she was declared successful in the final result dated 04.11.2018 and thus, she concealed and suppressed the factum of her Government employment. Learned counsel also submitted that resignation letter was submitted to the Headmaster, who was not competent to accept it. The petitioner deliberately suppressed and concealed material information from the answering respondent as well as from the Education Department with a view that in case she did not succeed in the examination, she will continue as a Government Teacher. 41. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the matter of confirmation of RJS Officer is governed by Rules 44, 45 & 46 of Rules of 2010, which are reproduced hereinbelow : “44. Probation :-All persons appointed to the service in the cadre of Civil Judge and District Judge by direct recruitment shall be placed on probation for a period of two years: Provided that such of them as have previous to their appointment to the service officiated on temporary post in the service may be permitted by the Appointing Authority on the recommendation of the Court to count such officiation or temporary service towards the period of probation. 45. Confirmation :-(1) A probationer appointed to the service in the cadre of Civil Judge shall be confirmed in his appointment by the Court at the end of his initial or extended period of probation, if the Court is satisfied that he is fit for confirmation. (2) A person appointed to the service in the cadre of Senior Civil Judge by promotion shall be substantively appointed by the Court in the cadre as and when permanent vacancies occur. (3) A probationer appointed to the service in the cadre of District Judge by direct recruitment shall be confirmed in his appointment by the Court at the end of his initial or extended period of probation, if the Court is satisfied that he is fit for confirmation. (3) A probationer appointed to the service in the cadre of District Judge by direct recruitment shall be confirmed in his appointment by the Court at the end of his initial or extended period of probation, if the Court is satisfied that he is fit for confirmation. (4) A person appointed to the service in the cadre of District Judge by promotion on the basis of merit-cum-seniority or by Limited Competitive Examination shall be confirmed in his appointment by the Court on availability of permanent vacancies in the cadre. 46. Unsatisfactory progress during probation and extension of probation period :-(1) If it appears to the Court, at any time, during or at the end of the period of probation that a member of the service has not made sufficient use of the opportunities made available or that he has failed to give satisfactory performance, the Appointing Authority may, on recommendations of the Court, discharge him from service: Provided that the Court may, in special cases, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the period of probation of any member of the service for a specified period not exceeding one year. (2) An order sanctioning such extension of probation shall specify the exact date up to which the extension is granted and further specify as to whether the extended period will be counted for the purpose of increment. (3) If the period of probation is extended on account of failure to give satisfactory service, such extension shall not count for increments, unless the authority granting the extension directs otherwise. (4) If a probationer is discharged from service during or at the end of the initial or extended period of probation under sub-rule (1), he shall not be entitled to any claim whatsoever.” 42. In view of the aforementioned Rules, it transpires that when the impugned order was passed, the petitioner was working as a probationer. A person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in service. In the present case, the decision to discharge the petitioner from service was taken by the respondent considering her overall performance, conduct and suitability. A person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in service. In the present case, the decision to discharge the petitioner from service was taken by the respondent considering her overall performance, conduct and suitability. It is settled law that the Appointing Authority should consider and appreciate the services of a Judicial Officer before confirming him/her in service and for this not only judicial performance but also probity as to how one has conducted himself/herself, is relevant and important. 43. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently denied the submission of the petitioner that during the training period from 06.03.2019 to 07.03.2020 conduct of the petitioner was unblemished. Learned counsel submitted that soon after her joining the training, a complaint dated 22.03.2019 was made by one -Shri Ram Niwas Meena and notice was issued to the petitioner on 17.02.2020. The petitioner herself had submitted her explanation. 44. In addition to it, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that as no enquiry under Rule 16 of CCA Rules was initiated against the petitioner, there was no need to follow the said Rule. 45. Learned counsel further submitted that according to Rule 882 of Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules of 1952’), copy of Full Court resolution cannot be provided to any person. Rule 882 of the Rules of 1952 is reproduced hereunder : “882. Confidential papers:-(1) No copy of, or extract from, any minute, letter or document on any administrative or confidential file of the Court shall be issued except under an order in writing of the Chief Justice countersigned by the Registrar. Every such Order shall be kept in a file by the Registrar and he shall make a note thereof duly dated and signed by him on such minute, letter or document. (2) No copy of, or extract from, the minute book of the Administrative Committee shall be given except in accordance with any resolution passed at a meeting of the Administrative Committee. (3) No copy of, or extract from, the minute book of the Full Court or a Full 'Court circulation' file marked confidential or secret, shall be issued. 46. Learned counsel further submitted that the law with respect of termination of services of a probationer is now well settled. (3) No copy of, or extract from, the minute book of the Full Court or a Full 'Court circulation' file marked confidential or secret, shall be issued. 46. Learned counsel further submitted that the law with respect of termination of services of a probationer is now well settled. However, it is also well settled that the principles of natural justice need not be followed before termination of services of a probationer. In catena of judgments Hon’ble the Supreme Court has observed that while taking a decision with respect to termination of services of a probationer no notice is necessary to be given to the probationer. He argued that the termination order is a termination simplicitor and cannot be called as stigmatic. He, therefore, argued that the order is sustainable in the eyes of law and, therefore, the present petition is a fit case for dismissal. 47. Heard learned counsel for the parties, and perused the record. 48. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it would not be out of context to firstly refer to and reproduce relevant Rule 14 of the Rules of 2010 : “14. Employment by irregular or improper means:-A candidate who is or has been declared by the Recruiting Authority or the Appointing Authority, as the case may be, guilty of impersonation or of submitting fabricated or tampered with documents or of making statements which are incorrect or false or of suppressing material information or using or attempting to use unfair means in the examination or interview or otherwise resorting to any other irregular or improper means for obtaining admission to the examination or appearance at any interview shall, in addition to rendering himself liable to criminal prosecution, be debarred either permanently or for a specified period,- (a) by the Recruiting Authority or the Appointing Authority, as the case may be, from admission to any examination or appearing at any interview held by the Recruiting Authority for selection of candidates, or (b) by the Government from employment under the Government.” 49. We find no merit in the argument of the petitioner that the notice dated 17.02.2020 was a notice under Rule 16 of CCA Rules. As has been pointed out by the counsel for the respondents, the said notice was in fact issued to seek explanation from the petitioner on certain complaints made against her. 50. We find no merit in the argument of the petitioner that the notice dated 17.02.2020 was a notice under Rule 16 of CCA Rules. As has been pointed out by the counsel for the respondents, the said notice was in fact issued to seek explanation from the petitioner on certain complaints made against her. 50. As per Clause 14 of the advertisement, the petitioner was required to obtain a ‘No Objection Certificate’, failing which, as per the said clause, the candidature of a candidate could be cancelled at any stage. 51. Further the petitioner deliberately suppressed and concealed the factum of her employment as a government teacher. It was submitted by the counsel for respondent that in the application form, one sub-column was specified in Column No.3 for mentioning ‘additional category (if Yes)’. Following options in the sub-column are reproduced hereinbelow : “1) Panchayat Samiti/Zilla Parishad/State Public Sector undertaking employee in substantive capacity and 2) State Government employee” 52. If a candidate opted to select any of these two categories then the selected option would have been displayed on the print out of the filled in application form. If the candidate did not opt to select any of these two categories, then the column ‘additional category’ would not be displayed in the print out of the filled in application form. It is sufficiently clear from the record that at the time of filling of the application form, the petitioner was a State Government Employee. 53. From perusal of record, it transpires that the petitioner actively concealed material information about her Government Employment at every stage. She did not fill the requisite details in the application form of RJS Examination-2017, even though the application form mandatorily required her to do so. At the stage of the interview, the petitioner did not furnish the details that she was a government employment. The petitioner neither obtained ‘No Objection Form’ from the Education Department nor did she inform the department about her intentions to appear in the RJS examination. 54. Additionally, the petitioner simultaneously pursued B.Ed and LL.B courses, which was impermissible under Ordinance 168-A and 168-B of Handbook of University of Rajasthan. Further, the record clearly suggests that while being in regular employment in the Education Department of Rajasthan as a Teacher at Sawai Madhopur, she also pursued LL.M., which is also a regular course. 55. 54. Additionally, the petitioner simultaneously pursued B.Ed and LL.B courses, which was impermissible under Ordinance 168-A and 168-B of Handbook of University of Rajasthan. Further, the record clearly suggests that while being in regular employment in the Education Department of Rajasthan as a Teacher at Sawai Madhopur, she also pursued LL.M., which is also a regular course. 55. As per the counsel for the respondents these aspects were considered by Full Court while considering the ‘suitability’ of the petitioner to be confirmed for the post of RJS. 56. It was contended by the petitioner that the order dated 29.05.2020 was in nature of termination on the ground of misconduct and the same was punitive in nature. Further, it was contended that since the termination was punitive, an enquiry must have been conducted and an opportunity of being heard must have been given to the petitioner. However, Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Gopi Kishore Prasad reported in AIR 1960 SC 689 , has observed thus : “In so far as those observations have a bearing on the termination of service or discharge of a probationary public servant, they may be summarised as follows : 1. Appointment to a post on probation gives to the person so appointed no right to the post and his service may be terminated, without taking recourse to the proceedings laid down in the relevant rules for dismissing a public servant, or removing him from service. 2. The termination of employment of a person holding a post on probation without any enquiry whatsoever cannot be said to deprive him of any right to a post and is, therefore, no punishment. 3. But, if instead of terminating such a person's service without any enquiry, the employer chooses to hold an enquiry into his alleged misconduct, or inefficiency, or for some similar reason, the termination of service is by way of punishment, because it puts a stigma on his competence and thus affects his future career. In such a case, he is entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 4. In such a case, he is entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 4. In the last mentioned case, if the probationer is discharged on any one of those grounds without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge, it will amount to a removal from service within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and will, therefore, be liable to be struck down. 5. But, if the employer simply terminates the services of a probationer without holding an enquiry and without giving him a reasonable chance of showing cause against his removal from service, the probationary civil servant can have no cause of action, even though the real motive behind the removal from service may have been that his employer thought him to be unsuitable for the post he was temporarily holding, on account of his misconduct, or inefficiency, or some such cause.” 57. Thus in the present case, discharging the petitioner without any enquiry, cannot be said to have deprived her of any right to a post and, therefore, is not punitive in nature. This Court is of the view that it was a discharge simpliciter and not a punitive termination. Further, in light of the above discussed judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court and after perusal of record of this case, it is abundantly clear that since no enquiry was conducted to terminate the petitioner, the discharge cannot be said to be stigmatic in nature. Further, no stigmatic observations were made in the discharge order dated 29.05.2020. 58. The petitioner has also placed reliance on Shamsher Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 1974 SC 2192 . In the opinion of this court, much reliance cannot be placed by the petitioner on the judgment, as no enquiry was conducted in the present case and no enquiry was required to be conducted, as the petitioner was a probationer. 59. Furthermore, it was observed by the Court, in the above mentioned judgment that if a right to terminate the services of the probationer exists and no enquiry has been conducted while exercising the said right, the motive on part of the employer becomes irrelevant. The situation is similar in the present case and hence the motive to terminate does not come into question. The relevant para is cited for convenience : “62. The situation is similar in the present case and hence the motive to terminate does not come into question. The relevant para is cited for convenience : “62. The position of a probationer was considered by this Court in Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India MANU/SC/0126/1957 : (1958)ILLJ544SC Das, C.J., speaking for the Court said that where a person is appointed to a permanent post in Government service on probation the termination of his service during or at the end of the period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment because the Government servant so appointed has no right to continue to hold such a post any more than a servant employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to do so. Such a termination does not operate as a forfeiture of any right of a servant to hold the post, for he has no such right. Obviously such a termination cannot be a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank by way of punishment. There are, however, two important observations of Das, C.J., in Dhingra's case (supra). One is that if a right exists under a contract or service Rules to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant.” 60. As per rule 45 of the Rules of 2010, the fitness for confirmation of a probationer has to be seen before he or she is appointed permanently on the post of RJS Officer. 61. It is clear from the above discussion that the respondent-High Court was well within its power to check the fitness for confirmation of the probationer, and consequently if the probationer was unfit for confirmation, it may very well discharge the probationer. 62. The fitness for confirmation may not necessarily pertain to the meritorious performance of the probationer and may very well pertain to the overall suitability of the probationer. 63. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of discharge of a judicial officer has in the case of Rajesh Kohli Vs. High Court of J. & K. and Ors (MANU/SC/0751/2010) opined that : “26. Upright and honest judicial officers are needed not only to bolster the image of the judiciary in the eyes of litigants, but also to sustain the culture of integrity, virtue and ethics among judges. High Court of J. & K. and Ors (MANU/SC/0751/2010) opined that : “26. Upright and honest judicial officers are needed not only to bolster the image of the judiciary in the eyes of litigants, but also to sustain the culture of integrity, virtue and ethics among judges. The public's perception of the judiciary matters just as much as its role in dispute resolution. The credibility of the entire judiciary is often undermined by isolated acts of transgression by a few members of the Bench, and therefore it is imperative to maintain a high benchmark of honesty, accountability and good conduct.” 64. At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer to the observation made by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Rajasthan High Court Vs. Ved Priya and Ors. : MANU/SC/0318/2020. The said observation relates to the exercise of writ jurisdiction against the decision of full court. The same is as follows: “13. At the outset, we may observe that both the Appellant as well as the impugned judgment have elucidated the correct statement of law regarding the width and sweep of judicial review by a High Court over the decisions taken by its Full Court on administrative side. Although it would be a futile task to exhaustively delineate the scope of writ jurisdiction in such matters but a High Court Under Article 226 has limited scope and it ought to interfere cautiously. The amplitude of such jurisdiction cannot be enlarged to sit as an 'appellate authority', and hence care must be taken to not hold another possible interpretation on the same set of material or substitute the Court's opinion for that of the disciplinary authority. This is especially true given the responsibility and powers bestowed upon the High Court Under Article 235 of the Constitution. The collective wisdom of the Full Court deserves due respect, weightage and consideration in the process of judicial review.” 65. Therefore, we find that the writ petition is devoid of merits. Hence, it is dismissed. 66. Pending application(s), if any, along with stay application also stand(s) disposed of.