ORDER : (Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.) 1. The two appellants herein (original writ petitioners) were chargesheeted by the investigating authority before the jurisdictional criminal court for commission of offence under Section 498A of the IPC on the complaint of respondent No.4 herein on which they applied for discharge from the aforesaid charge which the criminal court did not entertain and rejected the application for discharge from the said offence and further, framed charge for offence under Section 498A of the IPC by order dated 5-5-2022. The two writ appellants unsuccessfully challenged the order rejecting their discharge application and the order framing charge for the offence as well as the first information report (FIR) and the charge-sheet by filing writ petition (criminal) before this Court. The learned Single Judge, however, declined to entertain the writ petition holding that the writ appellants herein have failed to make out a case for interference in the charge-sheet/order framing charge and consequently, dismissed the writ petition. The two appellants have called in question legality, validity and correctness of the order passed by the learned Single Judge declining to exercise the jurisdiction and thereby dismissing their writ petition (criminal) on the ground that the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, have not been followed in its letter and spirit and therefore the order impugned deserves to be set aside. 2. 2. When the matter was taken-up for hearing, learned counsel appearing for the State/respondents No.1 to 3 and learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 would submit that since the writ petition was basically filed against the judicial order passed by the criminal court declining to entertain the application for discharge and further, against the order framing charge for offence under Section 498A of the IPC, therefore, this order would be a basically judicial order and the writ petition would be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and thus, the instant writ appeal filed by virtue of the proviso appended to Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006 (for short, ‘the Act of 2006’) would be barred and as such, the writ appeal deserves to be dismissed to which learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit, in reply, that the writ appellants in addition to questioning the order declining to discharge them and the order framing charge, have also assailed legality and validity of the FIR and the charge-sheet and therefore the writ petition was essentially a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and as such, writ appeal by virtue of Section 2(1) of the Act of 2006 would be maintainable and therefore the writ appeal be heard on merits. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties on the question of maintainability of writ appeal and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 4. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar qua the maintainability of writ appeal against the order passed by the learned Single Judge, it would be appropriate at this stage to notice the provisions contained in Section 2(1) of the Act of 2006, which states as under: - “2. 4. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar qua the maintainability of writ appeal against the order passed by the learned Single Judge, it would be appropriate at this stage to notice the provisions contained in Section 2(1) of the Act of 2006, which states as under: - “2. Appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a Judgment or order of one judge of the High Court made in exercise of original jurisdiction.—(1) An appeal shall lie from a judgment or order passed by one Judge of the High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to a Division Bench comprising of two Judges of the same High Court : Provided that no such appeal shall lie against an interlocutory order or against an order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.” 5. A careful perusal of the Act of 2006 would show that this Act has been enacted to provide for an appeal from a judgment or order passed by one Judge of the High Court to a Division Bench comprising of two Judges of the same High Court. Proviso appended to Section 2(1) would show that firstly, no appeal shall lie against an interlocutory order and secondly, against an order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. Section 2(1) of the Act of 2006 uses the phrase “in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India”. The phrase “original jurisdiction” has not been defined in the Act of 2006. However, Article 226(1) of the Constitution of India states as under: - “226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part III and for any other purpose.” 7. A focused glance of the provision contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would show that the power of the High Court to issue the writs under Article 226 can be exercised for a twofold purpose, viz., the enforcement of (a) fundamental rights, as well as of (b) non-fundamental or ordinarily legal rights. The words “for any other purpose” have been advisedly used and must mean something in addition to the enforcement of the fundamental right conferred by Part III. Undoubtedly, Article 226 contemplate the issue of directions, order or writs for purposes after than the enforcement of fundamental right. The expression “for any other purpose” in Article 226 makes the jurisdiction of the High Courts more extensive, yet the courts must exercise the same with certain restraints and within some parameters (see Director of Settlements v. M.R. Appa Rao, (2002) 4 SCC 638). 8. Under the first part of Article 226 of the Constitution, a writ may be issued only after a decision that the aggrieved party has a fundamental right and that it has been infringed, whereas under the second part, it may be issued only after a finding that the aggrieved party has a legal right, which entitles him to any of the aforesaid writs, and that such right has been infringed. 9. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and others, AIR 1962 SC 1044 , while considering the nature and scope of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has clearly held that Article 226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. It was further held by their Lordships that persons other than those claiming fundamental rights can also approach the High Court seeking a relief thereunder and Article 226 is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right. The existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The legal right that can be enforced under Article 226 like Article 32, must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief. The right that can be enforced under Article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified. 10. The principle of law laid down in Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. (supra) was followed with approval by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute and another, (2003) 4 SCC 225 , by holding that a writ under Article 226 lies only when the petitioner establishes that his or her fundamental right or some other legal right has been infringed. 11. With this brief background, turning back to Section 2(1) of the Act of 2006, appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court is maintainable against the judgment or order passed by one Judge of the High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The term “original jurisdiction” has not been defined in the Act of 2006. The word “jurisdiction” has been interpreted by Diplock, J. in the matter of Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission and another, (1968) 2 Q.B. 862 , wherein it has been observed that “jurisdiction” is an expression which is used in a variety of senses and takes its colour from its context. However, in a recent judgment in the matter of Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties and others, (2020) 6 SCC 557 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered elaborately the meaning of the word “jurisdiction” by holding that jurisdiction is the authority of law to act officially, it is an authority of law to act officially in a particular matter in hand and it is the power to take cognizance and decide the cases. It has been pertinently observed in paragraphs 20, 21 and 43 of the report as under: - “In re: Meaning of the word “jurisdiction” 20. It has been pertinently observed in paragraphs 20, 21 and 43 of the report as under: - “In re: Meaning of the word “jurisdiction” 20. Jurisdiction is the power to decide and not merely the power to decide correctly. Jurisdiction is the authority of law to act officially. It is an authority of law to act officially in a particular matter in hand. It is the power to take cognizance and decide the cases. It is the power to decide rightly or wrongly. It is the power to hear and determine. Same is the foundation of judicial proceedings. It does not depend upon the correctness of the decision made. It is the power to decide justiciable controversy and includes questions of law as well as facts on merits. Jurisdiction is the right to hear and determine. It does not depend upon whether a decision is right or wrong. Jurisdiction means power to entertain a suit, consider merits, and render binding decisions, and "merits" means the various elements which enter into or qualify plaintiff's right to the relief sought. If the law confers a power to render a judgment or decree, then the court has jurisdiction. The court must have control over the subject matter, which comes within classification limits of law under which the court is established and functions. 21. The word “jurisdiction” is derived from Latin words "juris" and "dico", meaning "I speak by the law" and does not relate to rights of parties as between each other but to the power of the court. Jurisdiction relates to a class of cases to which a particular case belongs. Jurisdiction is the authority by which a judicial officer takes cognizance and decides the cases. It only presupposes the existence of a duly constituted court having control over subject-matter which comes within classification limits of the law under which court has been established. It should have control over the parties’ litigant, control over the parties' territory, it may also relate to pecuniary as well as the nature of the class of cases. Jurisdiction is generally understood as the authority to decide, render a judgment, inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to pronounce a judgment. When there is the want of general power to act, the court has no jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is generally understood as the authority to decide, render a judgment, inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to pronounce a judgment. When there is the want of general power to act, the court has no jurisdiction. When the court has the power to inquire into the facts, apply the law, render binding judgment, and enforce it, the court has jurisdiction. Judgment within a jurisdiction has to be immune from collateral attack on the ground of nullity. It has co-relation with the constitutional and statutory power of tribunal or court to hear and determine. It means the power or capacity fundamentally to entertain, hear, and determine. * * * 43. Again, in Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, AIR 1969 SC 823 , it has been observed that before a court can be held to have the jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, it must not only have the jurisdiction to try the suit brought but must also have the authority to pass the order sought from it. It should have the power to hear and decide the issue. The Court observed: (AIR pp. 827-28, paras 12-13) “12. It is plain that if the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to pass the order in question then the order is null and void. It is equally plain that if he had jurisdiction to pronounce on the plea put forward before him the fact that he made an incorrect order or even an illegal order cannot affect its validity. Therefore, all that we have to see is whether Ramfry, J. had jurisdiction to entertain the application made by the settlor. 13. What is meant by jurisdiction? This question is answered by Mukherjee, Acting C.J., speaking for the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Hriday Nath Roy v. Ramachandra Barna Sarma, 1920 SCC OnLine Cal 85 : ILR (1921) 48 Cal 138 : AIR 1921 Cal 34. At p. 146 of the report ILR (Cal) = (at p. 36 of AIR) the learned judge explained what exactly is meant by jurisdiction. We can do no better than to quote his words: (SCC OnLine Cal). At p. 146 of the report ILR (Cal) = (at p. 36 of AIR) the learned judge explained what exactly is meant by jurisdiction. We can do no better than to quote his words: (SCC OnLine Cal). ‘In the order of reference to a Full Bench in Sukh Lal Sheikh v. Tara Chand Ta, 1905 SCC OnLine Cal 164 : ILR (1906) 33 Cal 68, it was stated that jurisdiction may be defined to be the power of a court to “hear and determine a cause, to adjudicate and exercise any judicial power in relation to it:” in other words, by jurisdiction is meant “the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision”. An examination of the cases in the books discloses numerous attempts to define the term “jurisdiction”, which has been stated to be “the power to hear and determine issues of law and fact”, “the authority by which the judicial officers take cognizance of and “decide causes”;” “the authority to hear and decide a legal controversy”, “the power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy between parties to a suit and to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them”; “the power to hear, determine and pronounce judgment on the issues before the court”; “the power or authority which is conferred upon a court by the legislature to hear and determine causes between parties and to carry the judgments into effect”; “the power to enquire into the facts, to apply the law, to pronounce the judgment and to carry it into execution”.’ ” (emphasis supplied) 12.The phrase “original jurisdiction” has been explained by the Calcutta High Court in the matter of State of Tripura v. Province of Bengal, 1947 SCC OnLine Cal 219, in which it has been held as under: - “It is a settled principle that a Court of first instance which tries a suit or proceeding exercises its original jurisdiction. ...” 13. The Federal Court of Malaysia in the matter of Merck KGaA v. Leno Marketing (M) Sdn Bhd, 2018 SCC OnLine MYFC 13, defines the term “original jurisdiction” to mean the jurisdiction to hear a case as a court of first instance and held in paragraph 56 as under: - “56. ...” 13. The Federal Court of Malaysia in the matter of Merck KGaA v. Leno Marketing (M) Sdn Bhd, 2018 SCC OnLine MYFC 13, defines the term “original jurisdiction” to mean the jurisdiction to hear a case as a court of first instance and held in paragraph 56 as under: - “56. It is evident that the term “original jurisdiction” has been historically understood to mean the jurisdiction to hear a case as a court of first instance. The definition of “original jurisdiction” in Black’s Law Dictionary was adopted by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Ang Cheng Hai (supra) at 206: “The concept of ‘original jurisdiction’ has been defined to mean ‘jurisdiction to consider a case in the first instance ... to take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it and pass judgment upon the law and facts’: Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed).” (emphasis added) 14. Similarly, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 , while dealing with the question of power which is exercised by the High Court under Article 226 i.e., whether it is appellate, revisional or original jurisdiction, held as under: - “(9) Article 226 confers a power on a High Court to issue the writs, orders, or directions mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. This is neither an appellate nor a revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Though the power is not confined to the prerogative writs issued by the English Courts, it is modeled on the said writs mainly to enable the High Courts to keep the subordinate tribunals within bounds. Before the Constitution, the chartered High Courts, that is, the High Courts at Bombay Calcutta and Madras, were issuing prerogative writs similar to those issued by the King's Bench Division, subject to the same limitations imposed on the said writs. In Venkataratnam v. Secretary of State, ILR 53 Mad 979 : (AIR 1930 Mad 896), a division Bench of the Madras High Court, consisting of Venkatasubba Rao and Madhavan Nair, JJ., held that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari was original jurisdiction. In Venkataratnam v. Secretary of State, ILR 53 Mad 979 : (AIR 1930 Mad 896), a division Bench of the Madras High Court, consisting of Venkatasubba Rao and Madhavan Nair, JJ., held that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari was original jurisdiction. In Ryots of Garabandha v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, ILR 1938 Mad 816 : ( AIR 1938 Mad 722 ), another division Bench of the same High Court, consisting of Leach, C.J., and Madhavan Nair, J., considered the question again incidentally and came to the same conclusion and held that a writ of certiorari is issued only in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court. In Ramayya v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 Mad 300 , a division Bench, consisting of Govinda Menon and Ramaswami Gounder, JJ,, considered the question whether the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution are in exercise of the original Jurisdiction or revisional jurisdiction of the High Court; and the learned Judges held that the power to issue writs under Art. 226 of the Constitution is original and the jurisdiction exercised is original jurisdiction. In Hamid Hassan v. Banwarilal Roy, 1947-2 Mad LJ 32 at p. 35 : ( AIR 1947 PC 90 at p. 93), the Privy Council was considering the question whether the original civil jurisdiction which the Supreme Court of Calcutta possessed over certain classes of persons outside the territorial limits of that jurisdiction has been inherited by the High Court. In that context the Judicial Committee observed: "It cannot be disputed that the issue of such writs is a matter of original jurisdiction". The Calcutta High Court, in Budge Budge Municipality v. Mangru , 57 Cal WN 25 : ( AIR 1953 Cal 433 ) (SB), came to the same conclusion, namely, that the jurisdiction exercised under Art. 226 of the Constitution is original as distinguished from appellate or revisional jurisdiction; but the High Court pointed out that the jurisdiction, though original, is a special jurisdiction and should not be confused with ordinary civil jurisdiction under the Letters Patent. The Andhra High Court in Satyanarayanamurthi v. IT. Appellate Tribunal Madras Bench, (S) AIR 1957 Andh Pra 123 described it as an extraordinary original jurisdiction. The Andhra High Court in Satyanarayanamurthi v. IT. Appellate Tribunal Madras Bench, (S) AIR 1957 Andh Pra 123 described it as an extraordinary original jurisdiction. It is, therefore, clear from the nature of the power conferred under Art. 226 of the Constitution and the decisions on the subject that the High Court in exercise of its power under Art. 226 of the Constitution exercises original jurisdiction, though the said jurisdiction shall not be confused with the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Court. This jurisdiction, though original in character as contrasted with its appellate and revisional jurisdictions, is exercisable throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and may, for convenience, be described as extraordinary original jurisdiction. If that be so, it cannot be contended that a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is a continuation of the proceedings under the Act.” 15. Now, the question for consideration would be, whether the judicial order passed by the criminal court rejecting the application for discharge and the order framing charge, that was principally challenged in the writ petition preferred by the writ appellants before the writ Court can be said to violate the fundamental right of the appellants enshrined under Part-III of the Constitution of India? 16. This issue is no longer res integra and stands adjudicated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others v. State of Maharashtra and Another, AIR 1967 SC 1 , in which their Lordships have considered the issue as to whether judicial order or judicial decision would violate the fundamental right of a litigant and it was held by their Lordships that a judicial decision pronounced by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him for adjudication would not affect the fundamental rights of the citizens under Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India and the order passed by the Court on the merits of the dispute before it can be challenged only in appeal and cannot be said to contravene the fundamental rights of the litigants before the Court. Their Lordships pertinently observed as under: - “37. The next question which calls for our decision is : does the impugned order contravene the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art. 19(1)? Their Lordships pertinently observed as under: - “37. The next question which calls for our decision is : does the impugned order contravene the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art. 19(1)? In dealing with this question, it is essential to bear in mind the object with which the impugned order has been passed. As we have already indicated, the impugned order has been passed, because the learned Judge was satisfied that the interests of justice required that Mr Goda should not be exposed to the risk of excessive publicity of the evidence that he would give in court. This order was passed by the learned Judge after hearing arguments from both the parties to the suit. Thus, there is no doubt that the learned Judge was satisfied that in order to be able to do justice between the parties before him, it was essential to grant Mr Goda's request for prohibiting the publication of his testimony in the newspapers from day to day. The question is : can it be said that an order which has been passed directly and solely for the purpose of assisting the discovery of truth and for doing justice between the parties, infringes the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art. 19(1)? The argument that the impugned order affects the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art. 19(1), is based on a complete misconception about the true nature and character of judicial process and of judicial decisions. When a Judge deals with matters brought before him for his adjudication, he first decides questions of fact on which the parties are at issue, and then applies the relevant law to the said facts. Whether the findings of fact recorded by the Judge are right or wrong, and whether the conclusion of law drawn by him suffers from any infirmity, can be considered and decided if the party aggrieved by the decision of the Judge takes the matter up before the appellate Court. But it is singularly inappropriate to assume that a judicial decision pronounced by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him for adjudication can affect the fundamental rights of the citizens under Art. 19(1). What the judicial decision purports to do is to decide the controversy between the parties brought before the court and nothing more. What the judicial decision purports to do is to decide the controversy between the parties brought before the court and nothing more. If this basic and essential aspect of the judicial process is borne in mind, it would be plain that the judicial verdict pronounced by court in or in relation to a matter brought before it for its decision cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of citizens under Art. 19(1). 38. The impugned order is, in a sense, an order of a collateral nature; it has no direct relation with the decision of the dispute which had been brought before the Court in the proceedings between the parties. The learned Judge however, thought that in order that he should be able to do full justice between the parties it was necessary to pass the impugned order. Thus, though the order in a sense is collateral to the proceedings which were pending before the Court, it was directly connected with the said proceedings inasmuch as the learned Judge found that he could not do justice between the parties and decide the matter satisfactorily unless the publication of Mr Goda's evidence was prohibited pending the trial. The order is not collateral in the sense that the jurisdiction of the Judge to pass that order can be challenged otherwise than by a proceeding in appeal. Just as an order passed by the court on the merits of the dispute before it can be challenged only in appeal and cannot be said to contravene the fundamental rights of the litigants before the Court, so could the impugned order be challenged in appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution, but it cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of the petitioners. The character of the judicial order remains the same whether it is passed in a matter directly in issue between the parties, or is passed incidentally to make the adjudication of the dispute between the parties fair and effective. On this view of the matter, it seems to us that the whole attack against the impugned order based on the assumption that it infringes the petitioners' fundamental rights under Art. 19(1), must fail.” 17. On this view of the matter, it seems to us that the whole attack against the impugned order based on the assumption that it infringes the petitioners' fundamental rights under Art. 19(1), must fail.” 17. Later on, the Supreme Court in the matter of Umaji Keshao Meshram and others v. Radhikabai, widow of Anandrao Banapurkar and another, 1986 (Supp) SCC 401, has held that a proceeding under Article 226 is an original proceeding and it has been observed as under in paragraph 101:- “101. Under Article 226 an order, direction or writ is to issue to a person, authority or the State. In a proceeding under that Article the person, authority or State against whom the direction, order or writ is sought is a necessary party. Under Article 227, however, what comes up before the High Court is the order or judgment of a subordinate court or tribunal for the purpose of ascertaining whether in giving such judgment or order that subordinate court or tribunal has acted within its authority and according to law. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution, the Chartered High Courts as also the Judicial Committee had held that the power to issue prerogative writs possessed by the Chartered High Courts was an exercise of original jurisdiction (see Mahomedalli Allabux v. Ismailji Abdulali, AIR 1926 Bom 332, Raghunath Keshav Khadilkar v. Poona Municipality, AIR 1945 Bom 7, Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi, AIR 1942 PC 164 and Moulvi Hamid Hasan Nomani v. Banwarilal Roy, AIR 1947 PC 90 ). In the last mentioned case which dealt with the nature of a writ of quo warranto, the Judicial Committee held : In their Lordships' opinion any original civil jurisdiction possessed by the High Court and not in express terms conferred by the Letters Patent or later enactments falls within the description of ordinary original civil jurisdiction. By Article 226 the power of issuing prerogative writs possessed by the Chartered High Courts prior to the commencement of the Constitution has been made wider and more extensive and conferred upon every High Court. The nature of the exercise of the power under Article 226, however, remains the same as in the case of the power of issuing prerogative writs possessed by the Chartered High Courts. The nature of the exercise of the power under Article 226, however, remains the same as in the case of the power of issuing prerogative writs possessed by the Chartered High Courts. A series of decisions of this Court has firmly established that a proceeding under Article 226 is an original proceeding and when it concerns civil rights, it is an original civil proceeding (see, for instance, State of U.P. v. Vijay Anand Maharaj, (supra) C.I.T. v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas, AIR 1965 SC 1818 , Ramesh v. Seth Gendalal Motilal Patni, AIR 1966 SC 1445 , Arbind Kumar Singh v. Nand Kishore Prasad, AIR 1968 SC 1227 and Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnand, (1972) 1 SCC 898 : AIR 1972 SC 1598 ).” 18. However, in the matter of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, (2003) 6 SCC 675 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that the orders and proceedings of a judicial court subordinate to the High Court are amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by observing in paragraph 19 as under: - “19. Thus, there is no manner of doubt that the orders and proceedings of a judicial court subordinate to the High Court are amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 19. The correctness of the principles of law laid down in Surya Dev Rai (supra) was questioned in the matter of Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others, (2009) 5 SCC 616 , and the mater was referred to larger Bench (three judges) of the Supreme Court in the matter of Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others, (2015) 5 SCC 423 , for consideration that whether an order of the civil court was amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution? Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the issue and categorically held that judicial orders do not infringe the fundamental rights or legal rights and therefore cannot be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and observed in paragraphs 18, 21 and 27 and finally, answered the issue in paragraph 29 as under : - “18. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the issue and categorically held that judicial orders do not infringe the fundamental rights or legal rights and therefore cannot be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and observed in paragraphs 18, 21 and 27 and finally, answered the issue in paragraph 29 as under : - “18. While the above judgments dealt with the question whether judicial order could violate a fundamental right, it was clearly laid down that challenge to judicial orders could lie by way of appeal or revision or under Article 227 and not by way of a writ under Articles 226 and 32. * * * 21. Thus, it has been clearly laid down by this Court that an order of the civil court could be challenged under Article 227 and not under Article 226. * * * 27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view25 of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. * * * 29. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows: 29.1. Judicial orders of the civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 29.2. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction under Article 226. 29.3. Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai, (supra) is overruled.” 20. The proposition of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam (supra) would clearly show that judicial orders of the civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and judicial orders of the civil court can be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 21. The proposition of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam (supra) would clearly show that judicial orders of the civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and judicial orders of the civil court can be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 21. The Full Bench of the M.P. High Court in the matter of Shaillendra Kumar v. Divisional Forest Officer and another, AIR 2018 MP 120 , where the question was, “whether an intra-Court appeal under Section 2(1) of the M.P. Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 would be maintainable against an order passed by learned Single Bench assailing an Award passed by the Labour Court?”, held that the orders passed by the Judicial Courts, subordinate to a High Court even in criminal matters when challenged in proceedings before the High Courts are only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and observed in paragraph 18 of the report as under: - “18. We may clarify that the orders passed by the Judicial Courts, subordinate to a High Court even in criminal matters when challenged in proceedings before the High Courts are only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Thus no intra Court appeal would be maintainable against an order passed by the learned Single Judge in proceedings arising out of an order passed by Judicial Courts, may be civil or criminal proceedings.” 22. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited and another v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299 , has held that an order framing a charge can only be challenged either under revisional power of High Court or under Section 482 of the CrPC or under Article 227 of the Constitution, and observed in paragraphs 27 & 28 as under: - “27. Thus, even though in dealing with different situations, seemingly conflicting observations may have been made while holding that the order framing charge was interlocutory order and was not liable to be interfered with under Section 397(2) or even under Section 482 CrPC, the principle laid down in Madhu Limaye, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 still holds the field. Order framing charge may not be held to be purely an interlocutory order and can in a given situation be interfered with under Section 397(2) CrPC or 482 CrPC or Article 227 of the Constitution which is a constitutional provision but the power of the High Court to interfere with an order framing charge and to grant stay is to be exercised only in an exceptional situation. 28. We have thus no hesitation in concluding that the High Court has jurisdiction in an appropriate case to consider the challenge against an order framing charge and also to grant stay but how such power is to be exercised and when stay ought to be granted needs to be considered further.” 23. Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Rajneesh Sahu v. Divya Umesh Mishra and others, W.A.No.576/2015, decided on 17-8-2017, relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana and Others, (2017) 5 SCC 533 , (paragraphs 61 and 62) held that since the effort of the petitioners (therein) was to avoid criminal investigation and the result of the final order of the writ court is quashment of further criminal proceedings, therefore, an appeal would not lie against that judgment to the Division Bench and accordingly, the writ appeals were dismissed as not maintainable. 24. In view of the aforesaid analysis and following the principles of law laid down in the above-stated judgments, it is quite vivid that when this Court is approached under Article 226 of the Constitution as the court of first instance for issuance of any writs or order for protecting the fundamental right or any other legal right and in turn, appropriate writ or order is issued within the confines of Article 226, it is said to have exercised the original jurisdiction, whereas if the order under challenge is a judicial order of the court/judicial body against which no writ lies under Article 226, the Court is deemed to have exercised the power of superintendence as conferred under Article 227. Section 2(1) of the Act of 2006 makes it abundantly clear that writ appeal would lie only against those orders which were passed by this Court (writ court) in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and writ appeal is barred by proviso to Section 2(1) of the Act of 2006, if the writ court has exercised jurisdiction and passed order in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, as the order passed under Article 227 has been excluded from exercising the jurisdiction of writ appeal by the Division Bench and no right of appeal has been conferred by the legislature against the order passed under Article 227. 25. Reverting to the facts of the instant case in light of the law laid down and the discussion made herein-above, it is quite vivid that the present appellants have questioned the order dated 5-5-2022 declining to discharge them from offence under Section 498A of the IPC after submission of charge-sheet against them and further challenged the order framing charge dated 5-5-2022 for offence under Section 498A of the IPC which they had challenged unsuccessfully by filing writ petition (criminal) before the writ court and against the dismissal of which, this writ appeal has been preferred. As such, essentially, the writ petition preferred by the appellants was not for enforcement of any fundamental right, but against the judicial order declining to discharge them from offence under Section 498A of the IPC and against the order framing charge which was principally challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, by virtue of the proviso appended to Section 2(1) of the Act of 2006, remedy of writ appeal is expressly barred to the appellants and consequently, writ appeal not being maintainable under Section 2(1) of the Act of 2006 against the order passed in writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the present writ appeal is dismissed as not maintainable. No order as to cost(s).