JUDGMENT : Challenge in this Criminal Appeal is by the unsuccessful A.1 to the judgment, dated 09.11.2010 in Sessions Case No.618 of 2007, on the file of I Additional Sessions Judge, Anantapur (“Additional Sessions Judge” for short), whereunder the learned Additional Sessions Judge exonerated A.2, A.3 and A.4 of the charge under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (“I.P.C.” for short), but found the present appellant, who was A.1, guilty of the charge under Section 304-B of I.P.C., convicted him under Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“Cr.P.C.” for short) and after questioning him about the quantum of sentence, sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for eight years. 2. The parties to this Criminal Appeal will hereinafter be referred to as described before the learned Additional Sessions Judge for the sake of convenience. 3. The Sessions Case No.618 of 2007 arose out of a committal order in P.R.C.No.100 of 2007, relating to Crime No.77 of 2006 of Itikalapally Police Station. 4. The case of the prosecution, in brief, according to the charge sheet, is as follows: (i) The defacto-complainant, Manjula Ganesh (L.W.1) is the father of one Janshi Rani (hereinafter will be referred to as “deceased”) and resident of Yerraguntla Village of Dharmavaram Mandal. A.1 to A.4 are the husband, in-laws and brother-in-law of the deceased. (ii) On 11.05.2005 the marriage of the deceased was performed with A.1 as per Hindu rites and customs. At that time, the father of the deceased gave 10 tulas of gold and net cash of Rs.50,000/- as dowry to the accused. After the marriage, A.1 to A.4 and the deceased lived happily for three months at Mannela Village. Thereafter, A.1 to A.4 started harassing the deceased physically and mentally. They used to beat her to get Gas stove, Cell phone, Maxi, T.V. from her parents. At request of deceased, the complainant gave the household articles to the accused. The accused also demanded money for purchase of a tractor from the complainant through the deceased. When the deceased was sixth month pregnancy, her mother L.W.2-Pushpavathi went to the house of accused at Mannela village to bring the deceased to their house for delivery but, the accused refused to send her stating that no other person was available in their house to do household work. When the deceased was sixth month pregnancy, her mother L.W.2-Pushpavathi went to the house of accused at Mannela village to bring the deceased to their house for delivery but, the accused refused to send her stating that no other person was available in their house to do household work. (iii) On 01.10.2006 at about 6-00 p.m., the deceased along with her three months baby visited their house weeping and informed her parents that her husband A.1 sent her away. After three hours A.1 to A.4 visited his house and threatened them to send their daughter back to the house of the accused by paying additional dowry and that if they did not send her, they would perform second marriage. They also leveled allegation against the deceased that she committed theft of Rs.50,000/-from their house. On 02.10.2006 complainant and his wife took their daughter to the house of accused and left her there. One week prior to the death of the deceased, she informed her mother over telephone that on 19.10.2006 A.1 to A.4 beat her with sticks and also kicked her for not getting money as demanded by them for purchasing a tractor and that she sustained an injury on her head and fell unconscious. She also revealed that her mother-in-law (A.2) took her to Dr. Suhasini (L.W.8) and got her treated. Unable to bear the harassment for additional dowry by the accused, the deceased consumed pesticide poison and while she was being shifted to Government Hospital, Anantapur, she died on the way. (iv) On 02.11.2006 at 11-30 p.m., A.3-father-in-law of the deceased, informed about the death of his daughter to the complainant (L.W.1). Basing on the report of L.W.1, father of the deceased, S. Ghouse Mohiddin, HC 726 of Itikalapalli Police Station registered the case in Crime No.77 of 2006 under Sections 498-A and 304-B of I.P.C. The Sub Divisional Police Officer, Anantapur investigated into the offence. (v) On 03.11.2006 the Mandal Revenue Officer, Anantapur Rural, held inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of mediators and recorded the statements of blood relatives. On 03.11.2006 at about 3-15 p.m., S.D.P.O., seized a marriage photo from the complainant under the cover of police proceedings and on 04.11.2006 at about 9-30 a.m., S.D.P.O., Anantapur, examined the scene of offence and seized a medical prescription given by Dr. A. Suhasini under the cover of police proceedings. Dr. On 03.11.2006 at about 3-15 p.m., S.D.P.O., seized a marriage photo from the complainant under the cover of police proceedings and on 04.11.2006 at about 9-30 a.m., S.D.P.O., Anantapur, examined the scene of offence and seized a medical prescription given by Dr. A. Suhasini under the cover of police proceedings. Dr. N. Prabhakar Rao who conducted postmortem examination over the dead body of the deceased opined that she died of consuming Endosulfan, an insecticide poison. On 04.12.2006 the S.D.P.O., Anantapur, arrested A.1 to A.4 and sent them to judicial custody. Hence, the charge. 5. The learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Anantapur, took cognizance of case under Section 304-B r/w 34 of I.P.C. After complying the formalities under Section 207 of Cr.P.C., P.R.C.No.100 of 2007 was committed to the Court of Sessions and thereupon, it was numbered and made over to I Additional Sessions Judge, Anantapur, for disposal, in accordance with law. 6. On appearance of A.1 to A.4 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, charge under Section 304-B of I.P.C. was framed against A.1 to A.4 and explained to them in Telugu, for which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. To bring home the guilt of the accused, during the course of trial, on behalf of the prosecution, P.W.1 to P.W.11 were examined and Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.14 and M.O.1 to M.O.3 were marked. After closure of the evidence of the prosecution, accused were examined under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. with reference to the incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence let in, for which they denied the same. During Section 313 of Cr.P.C. examination, A.1 stated that the deceased died unable to adjust with the circumstances. On behalf of the accused, A.2 was examined as D.W.1. 8. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, on hearing both sides and on considering the oral as well as documentary evidence, found A.1 guilty of the charge under Section 304-B of I.P.C., convicted him under Section 235(2) of Cr.P.C, and after questioning him about the quantum of sentence, sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 8 years. The learned Additional Sessions Judge found A.2 to A.4 not guilty of the charge under Section 304-B of I.P.C. and accordingly acquitted them under Section 235(1) of Cr.P.C. Felt aggrieved of the conviction and sentence for the charge under Section 304-B of I.P.C., the unsuccessful A.1 filed the present Criminal Appeal. 9. The learned Additional Sessions Judge found A.2 to A.4 not guilty of the charge under Section 304-B of I.P.C. and accordingly acquitted them under Section 235(1) of Cr.P.C. Felt aggrieved of the conviction and sentence for the charge under Section 304-B of I.P.C., the unsuccessful A.1 filed the present Criminal Appeal. 9. The prosecution did not file any appeal against the acquittal of A.2 to A.4 for the charge under Section 304-B of I.P.C. So, the scope of the appeal is confined against A.1 only. 10. Hence, in deciding this Criminal Appeal, the points that arise for consideration are as follows: (1) Whether the prosecution before the learned Additional Sessions Judge proved that the deceased died within a period of seven years from the date of marriage otherwise in normal circumstances and that soon before her death she was subjected to dowry harassment by A.1? (2) Whether the judgment, dated 09.11.2010 in Sessions Case No.618 of 2007 is sustainable under law and facts and whether there are any grounds to interfere with the same? 11. P.W.1 was father of the deceased. P.W.2 was mother of the deceased. P.W.3 was sister of the deceased. P.W.4 was neighbourer to P.W.1 and P.W.2, who deposed in favour of the case of the prosecution. P.W.5, relative of P.W.1, being his brother, supported the case of the prosecution. P.W.6 and P.W.7 did not support the case of the prosecution. P.W.6 was cited as a witness to speak about the events and he did not support the case of the prosecution. Though P.W.7, the so-called Doctor, who gave treatment to the deceased, when she was allegedly subjected to physical torture did not support the case of the prosecution, but, during cross examination by the learned Public Prosecutor, she admitted about Ex.P.11 prescription in the name of Jhansi, whose evidence will be hereinafter be referred to at the appropriate stage. P.W.8 was the Mandal Executive Magistrate, who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. P.W.9 was the Doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. P.W.10 was the Head Constable, who registered the FIR basing on the report of P.W.1. P.W.11 was the SDPO concerned and the investigating officer. D.W.1 was no other than A.2. 12. P.W.9 was the Doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. P.W.10 was the Head Constable, who registered the FIR basing on the report of P.W.1. P.W.11 was the SDPO concerned and the investigating officer. D.W.1 was no other than A.2. 12. The marriage between the deceased and A.1 was not in dispute and the fact that the deceased and A.1 was blessed with a child about three months by the time of the death of deceased was not in dispute. The evidence of P.W.1 with regard to the material aspects is that the deceased was given in marriage to A.1 about 18 months prior to the offence. He paid Rs.50,000/- towards dowry and 10 tulas of gold to A.1. The marriage took place at the house of accused. Both A.1 and his deceased daughter lived happily for about 3 months. Later, all the accused demanded additional dowry of Rs.1,00,000/- to enable them to purchase a tractor. As he was unable to pay, he did not pay it. As he failed to pay the same, all the accused harassed his daughter. They all demanded for T.V., Cell Phone, Grinder, Mixi, Gas stove, etc. and he met with the said demand. When the deceased was carrying sixth month pregnancy and when he and his wife went to the house of accused to bring their daughter for the purpose of delivery, they refused to send her. Ultimately, at the time of ninth month pregnancy, they took her to their house and they got joined her in Bathalapalli R.D.T. Hospital for delivery. She underwent caesarian operation and gave birth to female child. Three months after delivery, A.1 came to their house and requested them to send their daughter. They informed that she is not feeling well and he went away. On the next day all the accused visited his house, picked up a quarrel with them and took the deceased to their house. Later, the deceased came to them one day before Dussahra by weeping and by carrying three months baby and informed them that she does not want to A.1 and does not want to live with the accused. They consoled her. At 9-00 a.m., on that day all the accused came there in an auto and requested his daughter to come to their house, otherwise they will celebrate second marriage to A.1. They consoled her. At 9-00 a.m., on that day all the accused came there in an auto and requested his daughter to come to their house, otherwise they will celebrate second marriage to A.1. On the next day, he and his wife took the deceased and left the deceased in the house of accused. Later, she received a phone call from the deceased that she was beaten by A.1 and A.2 and she received injury and she was taken to a Doctor and some treatment was given. On 02.11.2006 at 11-30 p.m., he received a phone call from A.3 that the deceased died due to taking poison. Then they came over to Anantapur hospital at 1-00 a.m. on 03.11.2006. After their arrival, accused left the hospital by handing over three months baby to an old lady. On 03.11.2006 he gave complaint to police which is Ex.P.1. M.R.O. held inquest over the dead body of deceased. 13. The evidence of P.W.2, the wife of P.W.1, is similar as that of the evidence of P.W.1. 14. P.W.3, the sister of the deceased, also supported the case of the prosecution similar to the lines of P.W.1 and P.W.2. 15. The prosecution examined P.W.4, the so-called neighbourer to the house of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and her evidence in substance is that at one occasion the deceased informed her that accused are torturing her and used to beat her and they are demanding dowry to purchase a tractor. She spoke of the so-called incident at 9-00 p.m., that all the accused and others came to the house of P.W.1 and demanded P.W.1 and P.W.2 to send their deceased daughter and that they subsided the issue with an assurance to send the deceased on the next day. On the next day, P.W.1 took his daughter and went to the house of accused. Later, she came to know that the daughter of P.W.1 died. 16. The evidence of P.W.5, the relative of P.W.1, is in favour of the case of the prosecution with regard to the so-called demands made by the accused to P.W.1 to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- for additional dowry. 17. As pointed out P.W.6 did not support the case of the prosecution. 18. 16. The evidence of P.W.5, the relative of P.W.1, is in favour of the case of the prosecution with regard to the so-called demands made by the accused to P.W.1 to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- for additional dowry. 17. As pointed out P.W.6 did not support the case of the prosecution. 18. The evidence of P.W.7, who was a Private Medical Practitioner, after she was declared as hostile, during cross examination by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, is that she passed M.B.B.S. Since 2002, she is running a private clinic at Anantapur. Ex.P.11-medical prescription is issued by her. The name of the patient in Ex.P.11 is Jhansi. She did not find any injuries on the person of Jhansi. She gave pain killers as a prescription to Jhansi. She gave three varieties of tablets i.e., Injection, one Gel ointment and she found swellings on the body of the patient and that she prescribed the Gel directing to apply the same. She gave pain killers as Nos.3 and 4 in her prescription. There is no cross examination of P.W.7 on behalf of the accused. 19. There is no dispute about inquest conducted by P.W.8. Apart from this, according to the opinion of P.W.9, he conducted postmortem examination over the dead body of the deceased, preserved the visira and he sent the same to the chemical examiner. Basing on chemical examiner report, he opined that the deceased died of consuming endosulphan, an insecticide poison. Ex.P.6 is postmortem certificate. 20. P.W.10 spoke of the registration of FIR basing on the report of P.W.1 and sent copies of FIR to all concerned and that subsequent investigation was taken up by SDPO, Anantapur. 21. P.W.11 spoke of his investigation and crucial aspects in his investigation is such that during the course of investigation he seized Ex.P.11-prescription slip issued by the Doctor in the house of the accused. 22. Sri P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for appellant, would contend that as against the four accused, the learned Additional Sessions Judge exonerated three accused i.e., A.2 to A.4, the parents and brother of A.1. The allegations in Ex.P.1 were that the accused demanded the deceased to get Rs.1,00,000/- from her parents to purchase a tractor. It cannot be taken as a demand for additional dowry. P.W.1 to P.W.4 were kith and kin of the deceased and thus they naturally would support the case of the prosecution. The allegations in Ex.P.1 were that the accused demanded the deceased to get Rs.1,00,000/- from her parents to purchase a tractor. It cannot be taken as a demand for additional dowry. P.W.1 to P.W.4 were kith and kin of the deceased and thus they naturally would support the case of the prosecution. The alleged incident of the accused beating the deceased took place about two weeks prior to her death. The cause of death was said to be consumption of pesticide poison. The allegations in Ex.P.1 were totally vague. There is no specific instances where on which date and in which occasion, accused were alleged to have made demands for dowry. Though the date of death of the deceased was said to be on 02.11.2006, report could be lodged on the next day with the delay of one day. According to the accused, the delay was happened on account of due deliberations and concoctions. Non-lodging of Ex.P.1, though the death of deceased came to the knowledge of P.W.1 on 02.11.2006 is fatal to the case of the prosecution. Basing on Ex.P.1, it cannot be held that there was a demand for additional dowry. According to the averments in the charge sheet, one week prior to the death of deceased made so-called telephone call to the parents informing that on 19.10.2006 she was subjected to physical harassment. It is not known how the defacto-complainant party would keep quite when there was physical harassment, especially, after she gave birth to a child. There are omissions in the testimony of P.W.2 and P.W.3 which amounts to contradictions. The medical officer, who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased, could not note any injury. These omissions that were elicited from the mouth of the prosecution witnesses were admitted by P.W.11, who was the investigating officer. Improvements were made with regard to the demand for T.V., Gas Stove, Cell Phone, Mixi, etc. and there was no whisper about the same in Ex.P.1 report. Neighbouring witnesses at the house of accused were not examined to prove the bonafidies in the case of the prosecution. There was no evidence of harassment basing on the material available on record. There should be proximity between date of death of the deceased and the alleged harassment. Evidence is missing in this regard. 23. Neighbouring witnesses at the house of accused were not examined to prove the bonafidies in the case of the prosecution. There was no evidence of harassment basing on the material available on record. There should be proximity between date of death of the deceased and the alleged harassment. Evidence is missing in this regard. 23. In support of the contention, the learned Senior Counsel, would rely upon a decision in Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab and others : (2000) 5 Supreme Court Cases 207, and would contend that ‘soon before death’ means that proximate or live link must be shown to exist between the course of conduct relating to cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demand and consequential death. The allegations in Ex.P.1 for additional amount to purchase a tractor cannot be taken as a demand as additional dowry. With the above said submissions, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that when the Court extended benefit of doubt with the same set of evidence as against A.2 to A.4, there was no justification in convicting A.1 basing on the same set of evidence. 24. Sri Y. Jagadeeswara Rao, learned counsel, representing learned Public Prosecutor, would contend that the allegation in Ex.P.1 was that apart from the amounts that were given at the time of marriage, accused demanded additional amount to purchase a tractor through the deceased from P.W.1 and his wife and it amounts to dowry harassment. P.W.1, his wife (P.W.2), P.W.3, sister of P.W.2 and P.W.3, neighbor of P.W.1 and P.W.2, supported the case of the prosecution fully. There was evidence of P.W.7, the Doctor, who treated the injured and about her medical prescription when one Jhansi came before her. For obvious reasons she turned hostile. Ultimately, she was made to admit the truth as mentioned in Ex.P.11. The incident of violent in this regard was happened just in the month of October. Apart from this, unable to bear the harassment, the deceased committed suicide. The defence of the accused before the prosecution witnesses is that the deceased was not accustomed to live in the house of the accused and she was not willing to take food of previous day on the next day and the family of A.1 were not sophisticated as that of the family of the deceased at her parent’s house and unable to adjust with the same, she committed suicide. But the evidence of D.W.1 would reveal in cross examination that the deceased made every effort even to attend the agricultural operations, as such, the contention of the prosecution that the deceased was not able to adjust with the environment in the house of the accused cannot stand to any reason. Apart from this, the prosecution categorically proved that the death of the deceased was other than the normal circumstances happened within seven years of the marriage and the prosecution proved that the deceased was subjected to dowry harassment soon before her death. The learned Additional Sessions Judge on thorough appreciation of the evidence on record, recorded an order of conviction and as there were no specific overt acts against A.2 to A.4 as evident from the evidence of P.W.1, they were exonerated and the evidence insofar as A.1 was concerned, it was convincing before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, as such, appeal is liable to be dismissed. 25. As the charge under Section 304-B of I.P.C., it is pertinent to extract here Section 304-B of IPC which runs as follows: 1[304B. Dowry death. - (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation: For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.] 26. Explanation: For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.] 26. Apart from this, there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act regarding dowry death which runs as follows: Section 113-B in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 "113-B: Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation - For the purposes of this section 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." 27. At this juncture, it is pertinent to look into the case of the prosecution as projected in Ex.P.1 because it is the contention of the appellant that there were several omissions developing the case of the prosecution from Ex.P.1. 28. As seen from Ex.P.1 the material allegations are such that the marriage of the deceased with A.1 took place 18 months prior to 02.11.2006 and they were blessed with three months baby. At the time of marriage 10 tulas of gold and Rs.50,000/- of cash were given. Three months thereafter, there was a demand from the accused family apart from the amount given at the time of marriage to bring more money to purchase a tractor, as such, she was subjected to harassment from all the accused and the deceased used to reveal the same to her parents and they subsided the issue. Ultimately, on 02.11.2006 at 11-30 p.m., they received phone call that her daughter consumed pesticides and when she was taken to Government General Hospital, she died. The father-in-law of the deceased i.e., A.2 revealed the same to him during night at 11-30 p.m., as such, they decided to lodge the report on 03.11.2006. This is the substance of the allegations. 29. It is to be noted that P.W.1 to P.W.4 spoke of the above said report. The father-in-law of the deceased i.e., A.2 revealed the same to him during night at 11-30 p.m., as such, they decided to lodge the report on 03.11.2006. This is the substance of the allegations. 29. It is to be noted that P.W.1 to P.W.4 spoke of the above said report. Of course, Ex.P.1 did not reveal that there were allegations of demand for T.V., Cell Phone, Mixi, Gas Stove, etc., but P.W.1 deposed the same and it was developed during the course of examination of the said witness. Though that part of evidence is excluded for consideration, the rest of the allegations in Ex.P.1 were spoken to by P.W.1. Admittedly, the testimony of P.W.2 and P.W.3 also regarding providing of T.V., Mixi, Cell phone, Gas Stove, etc., were not found place in Ex.P.1. Ex.P.1 cannot be taken as encyclopedia. Even the allegations in the case of the prosecution with regard to the demand for T.V., Mixi, Cell phone, Gas Stove, etc., were excluded, substratum of the case of the prosecution with regard to the demand to get Rs.1,00,000/- from the parental house to purchase a tractor remained in Ex.P.1 which was spoken to by P.W.1 to P.W.4. The substratum of the case of the prosecution remained there in Ex.P.1 and from the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4. Even the demand for T.V., Mixi, Cell phone, Gas Stove, etc., are excluded, the case on hand is not suffering with any material omissions or contradictions. 30. It is to be noted that the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is that the demand of Rs.1,00,000/- to purchase a tractor cannot be a demand to get additional dowry. It is to be noted that the language employed in Ex.P.1 is such that an amount of Rs.50,000/- and 10 tulas of gold were given to the accused at the time of marriage and after three months apart from the above said amount, accused demanded for more money of Rs.1,00,000/- to purchase a tractor. Absolutely, it would amounts to making an additional demand for dowry so as to purchase a tractor. The purpose of additional demand for dowry was to purchase a tractor. There is categorical evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4 in this regard. Absolutely, it would amounts to making an additional demand for dowry so as to purchase a tractor. The purpose of additional demand for dowry was to purchase a tractor. There is categorical evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4 in this regard. Hence, I am of the considered view that the so-called demand narrated by the prosecution witnesses with reference to Ex.P.1 was nothing but a demand for additional dowry, but the purpose was to purchase a tractor. So, it cannot be isolated from the purview of the demand of dowry. 31. When the date of marriage of the deceased with A.1 was on 11.05.2005, the date of death was on 02.10.2006 hardly within a period of 1 ½ years from the date of marriage. The date of death of the deceased was within the period of seven years from the date of marriage. Apart from this, the date of death of the deceased was at her in-laws house. The cause of death was due to consumption of pesticides. The death was other than in normal circumstances. The prosecution satisfied the ingredients of death within seven years and that it was other than in normal circumstances. 32. Now the prosecution has to prove that soon before her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty. The learned Senior Counsel for appellant by relying upon Kans Raj’s case (1 supra), would contend that the prosecution did not succeed in establishing the proximity test. 33. It is to be noted that before going to appreciate as to whether the evidence on record would meet proximity test, firstly, this Court would like to deal with as to whether a demand from the accused to bring a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- to purchase a tractor would means to additional dowry in view of settled legal position of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 34. It is pertinent to look into the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal Asawa and others : (2004) 4 SCC 470 . It is a case where the learned Sessions Judge found favour with the case of the prosecution and convicted A-1 to A-3. 34. It is pertinent to look into the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal Asawa and others : (2004) 4 SCC 470 . It is a case where the learned Sessions Judge found favour with the case of the prosecution and convicted A-1 to A-3. They filed an Appeal before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the High Court reversed the judgment of conviction on the findings that to constitute dowry, demand should be made directly or indirectly either at the time of marriage or before the marriage or at any time after the marriage and that if there was no agreement between the parties to give or take any property or valuable security and after the marriage if further amounts are demanded, such demand will not fall within the meaning of dowry. While holding so, the High Court of A.P. reversed the judgment of conviction. Then, the State of Andhra Pradesh went for Appeal in Criminal Appeal No.384 of 1998 before the Hon’ble Apex Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with the essential ingredients Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and further looked into the term dowry as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and held that under Section 304-B IPC demand of dowry itself is punishable and it neither conceives or conceive of any agreement. If for convicting any offender, agreement for dowry is to be proved, hardly any offenders would come under the clutches of law. 35. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Raj Gopal Asawa (2nd supra) at Para Nos.6 and 7 dealt with the essential ingredients of Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and further the definition of the word ‘dowry’ in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and dealt with the issue elaborately at Para Nos.8 to 11. It is necessary to extract here the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court, as above: “8. Explanation to Section 304B refers to dowry "as having the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Act", the question is: what is the periphery of the dowry as defined therein? The argument is, there has to be an agreement at the time of the marriage in view of the words "agreed to be given" occurring therein, and in the absence of any such evidence it would not constitute to be a dowry. The argument is, there has to be an agreement at the time of the marriage in view of the words "agreed to be given" occurring therein, and in the absence of any such evidence it would not constitute to be a dowry. It is noticeable, as this definition by amendment includes not only the period before and at the marriage but also the period subsequent to the marriage. This position was highlighted in Pawan Kumar and Ors. v. State of Haryana (1998 CriLJ 1 144). 9. The offence alleged against the respondents is under Section 304B IPC which makes "demand of dowry" itself punishable. Demand neither conceives nor would conceive of any agreement. If for convicting any offender, agreement for dowry is to be proved, hardly any offenders would come under the clutches of law. When Section 304B refers to "demand of dowry", it refers to the demand of property or valuable security as referred to in the definition of "dowry" under the Act. The argument that there is no demand of dowry, in the present case, has no force. In cases of dowry deaths and suicides, circumstantial evidence plays an important role and inferences can be drawn on the basis of such evidence. That could be either direct or indirect. It is significant that Section 4 of the Act, was also amended by means of Act 63 of 1984, under which it is an offence to demand dowry directly or indirectly from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride. The word "agreement" referred to in Section 2 has to be inferred on the facts and circumstances of each case. The interpretation that the respondents seek, that conviction can only be if there is agreement for dowry, is misconceived. This would be contrary to the mandate and object of the Act. "Dowry" definition is to be interpreted with the other provisions of the Act including Section 3, which refers to giving or taking dowry and Section 4 which deals with a penalty for demanding dowry, under the Act and the IPC. This makes it clear that even demand of dowry on other ingredients being satisfied is punishable. It is not always necessary that there be any agreement for dowry. 10. Section 113B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. This makes it clear that even demand of dowry on other ingredients being satisfied is punishable. It is not always necessary that there be any agreement for dowry. 10. Section 113B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113B reads as follows:- "113-B: Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation - For the purposes of this section 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated 10th August, 1988 on 'Dowry Deaths and Law Reform'. Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry related deaths, legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is in this background presumptive Section 113B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the definition of 'dowry death' in Section 304B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the concerned woman must have been "soon before her death" subjected to cruelty or harassment "for or in connection with the demand of dowry". Presumption under Section 113B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the Court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials: (1) The question before the Court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the Court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials: (1) The question before the Court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304B IPC). (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death. 11. A conjoint reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expression 'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC are pressed into service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to expression 'soon before' used in Section 114. Illustration (a) of the Evidence At is relevant. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to expression 'soon before' used in Section 114. Illustration (a) of the Evidence At is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods 'soon after the theft, is either the thief has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence”. 36. In the light of the above said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, there need not be any agreement at the time of marriage with regard to the dowry. As pointed out, the death of the deceased was other than the normal circumstances and was within a period of seven years from the date of marriage. 37. Here, now it is a matter of appreciation to decide as to whether the testimony of P.W.1 to P.W.4 with regard to the demand to get an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- to purchase a tractor is believable. During cross examination of P.W.1 on behalf of the accused, the contention of the accused is that the house of the accused was situated in a lonely place in the fields and there was no toilet in the house of the accused and the intimates used the fields to attend calls of nature and there was no T.V. and fridge in the house of the accused. Apart from this, the contention of the accused was that P.W.1’s family members were not in the habit of taking remaining food of the previous day on the next day and that the deceased was accustomed to delicious food at their parental house, as such, she was disliking A.1 as he was an agricultural land and was not on good looks. The defence of the accused before P.W.1 was that the deceased was not in the habit of taking previous food of the day on the next day and as there were no facilities in their house regarding toilet, etc., she was not able to adjust. P.W.1 denied the above said suggestion. 38. It is to be noted that the deceased continuously resided with A.1 for considerable period of time, thereby both A.1 and deceased were blessed with a child. According to the evidence of P.W.1, they wanted to get their daughter to their house for the purpose of enabling her to get delivery of the child for which the accused refused to send her back and at ninth month only, they could get their daughter to their house. When the deceased was able to adjust in the family of A.1 even during the course of pregnancy, it is very difficult to say that she was not able to adjust with the family environment of A.1. The suggestions that were given to P.W.1 to P.W.4 were denied by them in this regard. 39. It is to be noted that A.2 in the capacity of D.W.1 entered into witness box to depose certain facts. Her deposition in substance is that they are residing in the garden located at a distance of about 4 k.ms. from Mannela Village. Deceased is her daughter-in-law and wife of A.1. She died by consuming pesticide about one year after marriage. A.1 is working with drilling machine. Deceased did not like the above avocation of A.1 as he used to work with such machines while having oil over his body and clothes. As they are residing in garden, there are no such facilities of separate bathroom and toilet and ceiling fan so also T.V. Deceased was a native of Dharmavaram. She studied up to 10th class. A.1 failed VII class and stopped education. They take Ragimudda with chutney and chilli powder (Karampodi), but deceased did not like such food. As they are residing in garden, there are no such facilities of separate bathroom and toilet and ceiling fan so also T.V. Deceased was a native of Dharmavaram. She studied up to 10th class. A.1 failed VII class and stopped education. They take Ragimudda with chutney and chilli powder (Karampodi), but deceased did not like such food. She does not know how to work in the field. When she attempted to work in the field, they asked her not to do so as she could not attend it properly. On account of the above circumstances, deceased herself committed suicide by consuming pesticide. Therefore, they are not responsible for her death. 40. It is to be noted that when it was the contention of the accused before P.W.1 that as the deceased was not in the habit of taking previous day food on the next day, a theory was put forth by D.W.1 that they used to take Ragimudda with chutney and chilli powder and the deceased did not like such food and that she does not know how to work in the field. It is to be noted that it is not the evidence of D.W.1 that they were habit of taking previous day food on the next day which was not liked by the deceased. On the other hand, her evidence is that they used to take Ragimudda with chutney and chilli powder. During cross examination by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, she was made to admit that they were cultivating paddy crop and that they were getting considerable yield of paddy during cultivation. Apart from this, she admitted during cross examination that they have got Ac.5-00 cents of land and they used to crop paddy and groundnuts. They used to get two crops in a year. A.3 is working as driver in A.P.S.R.T.C. and get salary of Rs.15,000/- per month. He joined in such service about 15 years back. A.1 get salary of Rs.6,000/- or Rs.7,000/-per month. A.4 is running tractor by attending the works of others as coolie. It is true that the deceased was given in marriage to A.1 after seeing their financial position and status and employment of A.3 so also family status. He joined in such service about 15 years back. A.1 get salary of Rs.6,000/- or Rs.7,000/-per month. A.4 is running tractor by attending the works of others as coolie. It is true that the deceased was given in marriage to A.1 after seeing their financial position and status and employment of A.3 so also family status. These admissions made by D.W.1 go to show that they were of civilized persons and looking into their financial status and the family background only the deceased was given in the marriage with A.1. So, the contention that was put forth before P.W.1 as if they used to take food of previous day on the next day, etc., is not at all probabalized. Apart from this, even chief examination of D.W.1 goes to prove that when the deceased attempted to work in the field, they asked her not to do so as she could not attend it properly. This admission made by D.W.1 in chief examination goes to prove that the deceased made every effort to reconcile herself with the family work of her in-laws even by attempting agricultural operations which were not accepted by D.W.1 and her family members. 41. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that the deceased was not able to adjust with the family environment of A.1 and committed suicide cannot stand to any reason. The place of death of deceased was in the house of accused by consuming pesticide. Except a reason that the deceased was not able to adjust with family environment of A.1 and his parents, there remained nothing in support of the defence of the accused. Under the circumstances, I am of the considered view that the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4 is fully convincing. 42. Apart from this, it was a case where the case of the prosecution is that when A.1 beaten her A.2 took the deceased before P.W.7 and provided some treatment. Unfortunately, for obvious reasons, P.W.7 turned hostile to the case of the prosecution. However, she was made to admit the contents of Ex.P.11-medical prescription. As seen from Ex.P.11, the medical prescription, it runs to the effect that there was a hit to the head and spine of the deceased, as such, P.W.7 made some medical prescriptions. 43. Unfortunately, for obvious reasons, P.W.7 turned hostile to the case of the prosecution. However, she was made to admit the contents of Ex.P.11-medical prescription. As seen from Ex.P.11, the medical prescription, it runs to the effect that there was a hit to the head and spine of the deceased, as such, P.W.7 made some medical prescriptions. 43. It is to be noted that the circumstances in which the deceased was taken to the hospital of P.W.7 for getting treatment to the pains was not explained by the accused. Absolutely, there is no cross examination of P.W.7 though she was made to admit the contents of Ex.P.11. The prosecution proved by virtue of P.W.7 evidence coupled with Ex.P.11 that the deceased had an occasion to get treatment for the swelling, etc., with the help of P.W.7 and it was happened when the deceased was in the in-laws house for which A.1 had no explanation whatsoever. It is to be noted that even according to Ex.P.11, the date of treatment was on 19.10.2006. According to the evidence of P.W.1, he received phone call from the deceased that at one occasion she was beaten and A.1 and A.2 took her to Doctor and got provided treatment. The evidence of P.W.1 in this regard has also support from Ex.P.11. 44. It is to be noted that the contention of the accused is that the prosecution failed to prove the proximity test that the alleged harassment was in consequence of that harassment. 45. It is no doubt true that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kans Raj’s case (1 supra) had an occasion to deal with as to what is ‘soon before’ and the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the prosecution should establish proximate or live link regarding the harassment and the consequential death. 46. It is to be noted that the learned Additional Sessions Judge appreciating the case of the prosecution also relied upon the decision of Prem Kanwar vs. State of Rajasthan : 2009(1) ALT (Cri.) S.C. 276, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with words “soon before her death” used in Section 304-B of I.P.C. and Section 113-B of Indian Evidence Act. 47. 47. Admittedly, in view of the language employed in Section 304-B IPC as well as Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, relating to the presumption under dowry deaths, prosecution is bound to establish that such demands are made soon before her death. What is ‘soon before the death’ is a question to be considered by this Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Raj Gopal Asawa’s case (2nd supra), had an occasion to deal with how ‘soon before death’ is to be ascertained in view of the provisions of Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. It is apposite to extract here the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court at Para No.11, which are as follows: “11. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expression 'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to expression 'soon before' used in Section 114. Illustration (a) of the Evidence At is relevant. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to expression 'soon before' used in Section 114. Illustration (a) of the Evidence At is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods 'soon after the theft, is either the thief has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence”. 48. So, by virtue of the above, it is very clear that ‘soon before’ is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straightjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. No definite period has been indicated. Soon before death is not defined. The Court has to decide as to what is soon before death, basing on the proximity test. 49. Coming to the present case on hand, the date of death of deceased was on 02.11.2006. The allegations about the dowry harassment were there continuously. As pointed out, there was an occasion to the deceased to go to hospital on 19.10.2006 to get treatment about the physical harassment meet out by her by the accused. In my considered view, the evidence on record squarely established the live link between the dowry harassment and consequential death. The evidence on record would meet the requirement of proximity test in my considered view. 50. In my considered view, the evidence on record squarely established the live link between the dowry harassment and consequential death. The evidence on record would meet the requirement of proximity test in my considered view. 50. Coming to the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that though the death was on 02.11.2006, but the report came to be lodged on 03.11.2006, this Court would like to make it clear that Ex.P.1 was undoubtedly presented to the police on 03.11.2006 at 10.00 a.m. According to its contents on previous day at 11-30 p.m., they came to know about the occurrence. According to the evidence of P.W.1 on coming to know about the occurrence at 11-30 p.m., on 02.11.2006, they came over to Anantapur Hospital at 1-00 a.m. midnight and being accompanied by his wife and others and on their arrival, accused left the hospital by handing over three months baby to an old lady. They lodged report on 03.11.2006. Considering the nature of offence, I am of the considered view that there is no delay as contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant. It is not that immediately after coming to the police station, they shall lodge a report with police. The paramount consideration was by then to look into the circumstances under which the deceased died and to take care of the baby. 51. Having regard to the above, I am of the considered view that the delay, if any, in lodging Ex.P.1 is not at all fatal to the case of the prosecution. Absolutely, on account of the fact that FIR came to be lodged at 10-00 a.m. on the next day, there was no possibility at all for due deliberations and concoctions. On the other hand, the very defence of the accused that the deceased unable to adjust with the atmosphere in the house of A.1 and committed suicide cannot stands to any reason, especially, when the deceased and A.1 were blessed with three months child and when the deceased was at her in-laws house till ninth month pregnancy. 52. In the light of the above, I am of the considered view that the evidence on record amply proves the fact that soon before her death, deceased was subjected to dowry harassment by A.1. 52. In the light of the above, I am of the considered view that the evidence on record amply proves the fact that soon before her death, deceased was subjected to dowry harassment by A.1. The learned Additional Sessions Judge recording the reasons that there were no specific overt acts against A.2 to A.4 and looking into the evidence available on record, came to a conclusion that the benefit of doubt is to be given in favour of A.2 to A.4. The appellant cannot contend that because A.2 to A.4 were acquitted of the charge, he is to be given such benefit basing on the same set of evidence. 53. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Additional Sessions Judge on thorough appreciation of the evidence on record found present appellant guilty of the offence under Section 304-B of I.P.C. and the prosecution proved the charge against appellant beyond reasonable doubt, as such, the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is sustainable under law and facts and there are no grounds to interfere with the same. 54. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment, dated 09.11.2010 in Sessions Case No.618 of 2007, on the file of I Additional Sessions Judge, Anantapur, insofar as conviction and sentence of A.1 is concerned. 55. The Registry is directed to take steps immediately under Section 388 Cr.P.C. to certify the judgment of this Court to the trial Court on or before 26.12.2023 and on such certification, the trial Court shall take necessary steps to carry out the sentence imposed against the appellant and to report compliance to this Court. 56. The Registry is directed to forward the copy of the judgment along with original records to the trial Court on or before 26.12.2023. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.