JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Neerav Chitravanshi, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents-State and Shri Sharad Pathak, learned counsel for the respondent no.3. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 28.5.2009 passed by opposite party no.2 with further prayer to issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the opposite parties not to give effect to the impugned and further to grant approval for the dismissal of service of the opposite party no.3 in pursuance to the resolution of the petitioner dated 29.06.2007 (Annexure No.18 to the writ petition). 3. Facts of the case are that the Management Committee National Inter College, Fatehpur, Barabanki (hereinafter referred to as 'Society'), is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 which manages and runs National Inter College, Fatehpur, Barabanki through its Committee of Management to be elected as per the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 as well as the approved scheme of administration. The college is a recognized aided institution. The opposite party no.3 was working as Assistant Clerk in the National Inter College, Fatehpur, Barabanki (hereinafter referred to as 'College'), who was assigned the charge of Library of the College. On 24.1.2007, the opposite party no.3 was suspended by the petitioner in contemplation of a disciplinary enquiry in respect of several charges of very serious nature. The order of suspension was sent to the opposite party no.2 for his approval vide letter dated 24.2.2007. The Manager of the College was also appointed as the enquiry officer for conducting the inquiry against the opposite party no.3 vide resolution of the petitioner dated 24.01.2007 itself. Thereafter, on 14.3.2007, the opposite party no.2 had approved the order of suspension of the opposite party no.3. In the meantime, the enquiry officer had served the charge-sheet dated 9.2.2007 containing seven serious charges along with all the relevant material on the opposite party no.3 which was earlier refused to be received by the opposite party no.3 personally and had asked him to submit his reply to the charge-sheet within the time stipulated in the same. Despite service of the charge-sheet, the opposite party no.3 did not submit any reply to the charge-sheet within the stipulated time. Despite service of the charge-sheet, the opposite party no.3 did not submit any reply to the charge-sheet within the stipulated time. The enquiry officer again by means of several letters and reminders including dated 14.2.07, 17.2.07, 21.02.07, 05.03.07 and 14.03.07 asked the opposite party no.3 to submit his reply to the charge-sheet and also requested him to participate in the enquiry fixing date and time in the said letters and reminders for holding the enquiry and had also specifically asked the opposite party no.3 to be present before him on the specified date and time and if he wants any document or examine any record he may do so on the specified date and time. In spite of several letters and reminders, the opposite party no.3 did not submit any reply to the charge sheet nor he ever appeared before the enquiry officer on the date and time so specified in the said letters and reminders but he had been prolonging the enquiry by adopting the dilatory tactics and writing letters in this regard. Thereafter, the enquiry officer having left with no other option had concluded the enquiry ex-parte and submitted its report to the petitioner on 16.04.2007 in which all the charges levelled against the petitioner were found proved on the basis of evidence and material on record. On 17.4.2007, the enquiry officer issued a show cause notice to the opposite party no.3 along with the enquiry report asking him to submit any reply or representation to the charge-sheet or to the enquiry report, if any, as a last opportunity. In reply to the said notice, the opposite party no.3 submitted a letter demanding certain documents, though all the material referred to in the charge-sheet was already made available to the opposite party no.3. Subsequently, the enquiry officer submitted its enquiry report along with the show cause notice and all the relevant material and also explaining the conduct of the opposite party no.3 during the enquiry before the petitioner on 5.5.2007 and the petitioner inturn issued a notice to the opposite party no.3 on 6.5.2007 fixing 20.5.2007 as the date of meeting of the petitioner and had asked the opposite party no.3 to remain present on the said date before the petitioner and to present his case if he so desires, before the petitioner. In response to the said notice of the petitioner, the opposite party no.3 appeared before it on the said date fixed and submitted a letter demanding certain documents. Though all the material was already made available to the opposite party no.3 but taking a lenient view the petitioner again vide a letter dated 20/24.5.07 supplied all the relevant documents to the opposite party no.3. But, even after receiving the said documents, the opposite party no.3 did not submit any reply and only in order to further prolong the proceedings again submitted a letter demanding some more documents, though they have got no relevancy with the submission of reply. When the opposite party no.3 had again failed to submit any reply or representation to the charge-sheet or enquiry report or to present his case, the enquiry officer having regard to the conduct of the opposite party no.3 during the enquiry and after his suspension also submitted its supplementary report to the petitioner on 10.6.2007 in which all the charges were found proved against the opposite party no.3 in view of the earlier enquiry report. Subsequently, the petitioner in its meeting held on 29.06.07 considered the entire matter of the opposite party no.3 including the charge-sheet, enquiry report, notice, its reply as well as all the relevant material and evidence on record and unanimously passed the resolution for dismissing the services of the opposite party no.3. Thereafter, the said resolution of the petitioner along with all the relevant material in this regard including the charge-sheet, enquiry report, notice, its reply as well as the entire material on record was sent by the petitioner to the opposite party no.2 for his prior approval on 6.7.07. After the submission of letter dated 6.7.07, the petitioner never heard anything from the opposite party no.2 nor it was given any information about any proceedings held by the opposite party no.2 in this regard. It was only in the mid of February, 2009, the petitioner came to know that the opposite party no.2 has passed some order on 10.2.09, whereby he has set aside the order of suspension as well as resolution of the petitioner along with letter dated 6.7.07 issued with regard to the dismissal of the opposite party no.3 and has further directed for reinstating him in service. In the said order dated 10.02.2009, the opposite party no.2 has mentioned that the opposite party no.3 has given some representation to him on 29.01.09 on which he has sought the report from the petitioner fixing 09.02.09 as the date in the matter. But it does not disclose as to on what date the opposite party no.2 has issued any letter or order to the petitioner informing about the matter and as to whom the said letter or order was served in the college. It is respectfully submitted that no such letter or order of the opposite party no.2 as alleged was ever received in the college nor any such alleged information was ever received and as such, the petitioner was having no knowledge about any such alleged proceedings. Since the said order dated 10.02.2009 was passed ex-parte without providing any opportunity to the petitioner on the basis of unauthorized representation made by the Assistant Manager as well as the opposite party no.2 did not even consider the records relating to enquiry and resolution of the petitioner in this regard so, the petitioner has filed a writ petition before this Hon'ble Court being Writ Petition No.2495 (SS) of 2009 (Committee of Management of National Inter College v. Joint Director of Education and others), challenging the order dated 10.2.2009. The said writ petition was disposed of vide judgment and order dated 29.4.2009 directing the opposite party no.2 to consider and pass an order afresh after providing opportunity to the petitioner as well as having regard to the records submitted by the petitioner and the opposite party no.3. Though the entire records relating to enquiry and resolution passed by the petitioner have already been submitted before the opposite party no.2 way back on 06.07.2007 itself but in compliance of the judgment and order passed by this Court dated 29.4.2009, the petitioner has on 18.05.2009 again submitted a detailed representation before the opposite party no.2 along with all necessary material including charge-sheet, inquiry report as well as the resolution of the petitioner etc. for the purposes of grant of approval for dismissal of the opposite party no.3. The opposite party acknowledged the said representation of the petitioner has issued a letter on 18.5.2009 itself fixing 27.05.2009 at 12.00 noon as the next date for hearing in the matter. for the purposes of grant of approval for dismissal of the opposite party no.3. The opposite party acknowledged the said representation of the petitioner has issued a letter on 18.5.2009 itself fixing 27.05.2009 at 12.00 noon as the next date for hearing in the matter. The opposite party no.2 also required the opposite party no.3 to place the material, if any, on or before the date fixed. On the date fixed by the opposite party no.2 i.e. 27.5.2009 the Manager of College has gone to the office of the opposite party no.2 at 12.00noon and remained present their till 2.00 o'clock, but the opposite party no.2 has not come to his office during the said period. In the circumstances, the Manager submitted a letter in the office of the opposite party no.2 stating therein the aforesaid position and requested for informing about the next date fixed in the matter and then she left the office of the opposite party no.2. Thereafter, the petitioner never heard anything from the office of the opposite party no.2 about the next date fixed in the matter or any other information in this regard. However, on 30.5.2009, the petitioner came to know that the opposite party no.2 has again on 28.05.2009 ex-parte passed an order setting aside the order of suspension as well as the letter seeking approval for dismissal of service of the opposite party no.3 and further directed for payment of the arrears of salary. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order passed by the opposite party no.2 is illegal, malafide and has been issued without any application of mind, as such the same is liable to be quashed as he has totally ignored the entire material and evidence on record before him for taking decision as regards the grant of approval for dismissing the services of opposite party no.3 which has been submitted him after a detailed enquiry on the basis of material on record. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the impugned order has been passed by the opposite party no.2 without even providing any opportunity of being heard to the petitioner for the extraneous consideration in utter violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as well as principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience, as such also the impugned order is liable to be quashed. 6. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that opposite party no.2 also did not inform to the petitioner about any next date fixed in the matter as requested in the letter dated 27.5.2009 and the petitioner was given no information about the date fixed i.e. 28.5.2009 as alleged in the impugned order, which fact has also been incorrectly mentioned by the opposite party no.2. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the opposite party no.2 has also incorrectly mention the fact in the impugned order that the petitioner did not produce any material and evidence in the matter under reference without even failing to consider that the entire material relating to the enquiry as well as the resolution of the petitioner was before him along with letter dated 6.7.2007 seeking approval for dismissal of the opposite party no.3. He next submits that the opposite party no.2 has also failed to consider that the petitioner in compliance of the judgment and order of this Court has again on 18.5.2009 submitted all necessary material relating to enquiry and resolution of the petitioner along with its representation. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the opposite party no.2 has also failed to consider that the resolution of the petitioner for dismissal of service of the opposite party no.3 was unanimously passed after a detailed enquiry on the basis of documentary evidence on record and the entire material relating to the said enquiry was submitted before the opposite party no.2 along with the letter dated 6.7.2007 seeking his prior approval for dismissing the services of the opposite party no.3. He next submitted that the opposite party no.2 ought to have taken any decision only on the basis of the material on record before him and not otherwise. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that on the one hand, the opposite party no.2 is not acting in accordance with law in the matter of taking decision for the grant of approval for dismissal of the opposite party no.3 and again and again passing the orders for extraneous considerations and on the other hand, the opposite party no.2 is coercing the petitioner to make the payment of salary to the opposite party no.3. 10. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents-State submitted that pursuant to the order dated 29.4.2009 passed by Hon'ble Court in Writ Petition No.2495(SS) of 2009 letters were sent to the Committee of Management and Ajay Kumar Nigam for hearing and thereafter, giving them proper opportunity of hearing the matter was decided on documents made available to opposite party no.2 by the parties in question. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents-State next submitted the present Committee of Management was sought paragraph reply on the representation of opposite party no.3 dated 29.1.2009, but the Assistant Manager of the College informed the then DIOS that no documents have been made available to the present Committee of Management by the previous Committee of Management and the present Committee of Management has no complaint against the opposite party no.3 and no documents were made available and therefore, the impugned order was passed accordingly and the suspension and the dismissal of the opposite party no.3 were set aside. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents-State submitted that the then D.I.O.S. on the representation of the petitioner dated 18.5.2009 and 27.5.2009 have decided the entire issue after giving opportunity of hearing to both the parties and on the request of the petitioner the date of hearing has been postponed from 27.5.2009 to 28.05.2009. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent no.3, while adopting submissions advanced by learned counsel for the respondents-State, submitted that in the writ petition stand has been taken in regard to non-payment of subsistence allowance to the petitioner that bill regarding payment of subsistence allowance has been sent to the office of District Inspector of Schools, but the subsistence allowance has not been paid due to fault of the office of the District Inspector of Schools. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent no.3 next submitted that another contrary stand has been taken that the subsistence allowance because the petitioner did not come to College and did not request for payment of subsistence allowance and, therefore the subsistence allowance has been refused to be paid. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent no.3 next submitted that the contradictory stand itself disentitles the petitioner from approaching this Hon'ble Court under extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The fact is that the petitioner has not been paid subsistence allowance and the petitioner has made repeated request for payment of the same. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent no.3 next submitted that the contradictory stand itself disentitles the petitioner from approaching this Hon'ble Court under extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The fact is that the petitioner has not been paid subsistence allowance and the petitioner has made repeated request for payment of the same. On the repeated request of the petitioner for payment of subsistence allowance the then Manager (Shri Prabhakar Dutt Shukla) himself has directed for payment of subsistence allowance and directed the officiating Principal to prepare the bill for payment of subsistence allowance on 13.11.2007 and again on 17.11.2008. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent no.3 next submitted that on 27.5.2009 the District Inspector of Schools after finding that no enquiry has been conducted in the matter observed that the entire proceedings against the deponent is illegal and then adjournment was sought by Smt. Suman Singh. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent no.3 next submitted that in view of the aforesaid facts it is apparent that the petitioners are guilty of not only concealment of facts but also not approaching the Hon'ble Court with clean hands and, therefore, the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed by this Court. 18. Learned counsel for the respondents next submitted that opposite party no.3 retired from service. In the Basic Education Act, 1972 and Act of 1978, there is no provision to continue the disciplinary proceedings, therefore, his submission is that in absence of any provision under the Act to continue the disciplinary proceeding after the retirement, no proceeding can be continued against the petitioner, thus he is entitled for all benefits available. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the respondent no.3 has placed reliance upon judgment and order 18.1.2021 passed by this Court in the Case of C/M Sarswati Laghu Madhyamik Vidyalaya v. State of U.P. and others. 19. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 20. In the Case of C/M Saraswati Laghu Madhyamik Vidyalaya (supra) relied by learned counsel for respondent no.3, this Court has held in paragraphs 14,15,16 and 17 as under : "14. On perusal of the record, it is evident that the Director of Education (Basic) has directed the Committee of Management to make payment of salary as well as arrears to the respondent No.5. On perusal of the record, it is evident that the Director of Education (Basic) has directed the Committee of Management to make payment of salary as well as arrears to the respondent No.5. The Director of Education (Basic) in absence of any order passed by the District Basic Education Officer, has no jurisdiction to usurp the power of the District Basic Education Officer, but as a matter of fact, the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the respondent No.5 and proposal made to the District Basic Education Officer is subject to approval required under Rule 15 of the Rules of 1978. The provision contained under Rule 15 of The U.P. Recognised Basic Schools (Junior High Schools) (Recruitment And Conditions Of Service Of Teachers) Rules, 1978 is quoted below :- "15. Termination of service.-No Headmaster or Assistant Teacher of a recognised school may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the District Basic Education Officer : Provided that in the case of the Headmaster or an Assistant Teacher of a minority institution the approval of the District Basic Education Officer shall not be necessary." 15. The controversy in regard to the continuation of disciplinary proceeding and payment of salary after retirement came for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhagirathi Jena Vs. Board of Directors O.S.F.G. & others [ AIR 1999 SC 1841 ], wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the disciplinary proceeding after retirement, has held as under :- "It will be noticed from the abovesaid regulations that no specific provision was made for deducting any amount from the provident fund consequent to any misconduct determined in the departmental enquiry nor was any provision made for continuance of departmental enquiry after superannuation, in view of the absence of such provision in the abovesaid regulations, it must be held that the Corporation had no legal authority to make any reduction in the retiral benefits of the appellant. There is also no provision for conducting a disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the appellant and nor any provision stating that in case misconduct is established, a deduction could be made from retiral benefits. Once the appellant had retired from service on 30.6.95. There is also no provision for conducting a disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the appellant and nor any provision stating that in case misconduct is established, a deduction could be made from retiral benefits. Once the appellant had retired from service on 30.6.95. there was no authority vested in the Corporation or continuing the departmental enquiry even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits on retirement. Learned senior counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in T.S. Mankad v. State of Gujarat reported in, [1989] Suppl. 2 SCC 110. It is true that that was a case of imposing a reduction in the pension and gratuity on account of unsatisfactory service of the employee as determined in an enquiry which was extended beyond the date of superannuation. But the above decision cannot help the respondent inasmuch as in that case there was a specific rule namely Rule 241-A of the Junagadh State Pension and Parwashi Allowance Rules, 1932 which enabled the imposition of a reduction in the pension or gratuity of a person after retirement. Further, there were rules in that case which enabled the continuance of departmental enquiry even after superannuation for the purpose of finding out whether any misconduct was established which could be taken into account for the purpose of Rule 241-A. In the absence of a similar provision with Regulations of the respondent Corporation, the above judgment of Mankad's case cannot help the respondent. The question has also been raised in the appeal in regard to the payment of arrears of salary and other allowances payable to the appellant during the period he was kept under suspension and upto the date of superannuation. Inasmuch as the enquiry had lapsed, it is, in our opinion, obvious that the appellant would have to get the balance of the emoluments payable to him after deducting the suspension allowance that was paid to him during the abovesaid period. Inasmuch as the enquiry had lapsed, it is, in our opinion, obvious that the appellant would have to get the balance of the emoluments payable to him after deducting the suspension allowance that was paid to him during the abovesaid period. The appeal is therefore allowed directing the respondent to pay arrears of salary and allowances payable to him during the period of suspension upto the date of superannuation after deducting the suspension allowance paid to him for the said period and also to pay the appellant, all the retiral benefits otherwise payable to him in accordance with the rules and regulations applicable, as if there had been no disciplinary enquiry or order passed there in." In the circumstances the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The writ petition of the appellant is allowed in terms of the directions given above. No order as to costs." 16. This Court in the case of Ravindra Singh Rathore Vs. District Inspector of Schools and Others decided by the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No.16905 of 2000 vide judgment and order dated 26.9.2003 has held that in absence of provision, no disciplinary proceeding can continue after the retirement and the employee is entitled for all consequential benefit permissible to the post. The relevant paragraphs 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 are being quoted below :- "23. As noticed hereinbefore there is no specific provision which empowers the continuance of a disciplinary proceedings against an employee, teacher and Principal of an aided educational institution in the State of U.P. Rules 30 and 32 of the 1964 Rules also do not empower for continuance of departmental enquiry once the person has retired. Thus, the disciplinary proceedings could not have continued and it lapsed. 24. In the case of State Bank of India v. A.N. Gupta and Ors., (1997) 8 SCC 60 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether a departmental enquiry can be continued after the retirement in case of an employee of the State Bank of India. The Apex Court considered the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Narasiah v. State Bank of India, (1978) 2 LLJ 173 . In paragraph 14 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows : "14. The Apex Court considered the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Narasiah v. State Bank of India, (1978) 2 LLJ 173 . In paragraph 14 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows : "14. In the case before the Andhra Pradesh High Court (T. Narasiah) the petitioner was an officer in the State Bank. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him but before these could be completed the officer was informed by the Bank through its letter dated 5.5.1976, that it was not possible for the Bank to complete the enquiry well in time before the officer attained the age of 60 years which was the date of his superannuation. He was told he would therefore cease to be in the Bank's service on the date of his superannuation and he would not be paid any subsistence allowance with effect from that date. The officer was treated as having retired and ceasing to be in the employment of the Bank with effect from 10.5.1976. The Officer claimed his provident fund and pension and on the Banks' refusal to pay the same, a writ petition was filed. During the course of the hearing of the writ petition it was submitted by the Bank that it had since decided to pay the provident fund in full to the officer and the Bank had also no objection to pay his contribution to the pension and that as far as the payment of the Bank's share in the pension fund was concerned, the officer was not entitled thereto unless and until the Bank granted the same in accordance with Rule 11 of the Pension Rules. It was contended before the Andhra Pradesh High Court by the officer that Rule 11 had no application in his case and on attaining the age of superannuation he automatically went out of the service of the Bank. The Bank, however, relied on Rule 11 to withhold the Bank's contribution to the pension fund. The Court was of the view that Rule 11 had to be read in its context and consistent with the object behind the said Rule. It held that the Rule applied not only in the case of the retirement contemplated by Rule 19 but also to cases of retirement of employees on attaining the age of superannuation. The Court was of the view that Rule 11 had to be read in its context and consistent with the object behind the said Rule. It held that the Rule applied not only in the case of the retirement contemplated by Rule 19 but also to cases of retirement of employees on attaining the age of superannuation. The Court observed that it might happen that the irregularities of misfeasance of an employee could not be detected well before his retirement so as to initiate and complete disciplinary enquiry in the matter and again there might be a case where disciplinary enquiry was initiated but could not be completed before the delinquent employee attained the age of superannuation. The Court noted that there was no provision in the Service Rules of the Bank providing for extension of service of an employee to enable the authorities to complete the disciplinary enquiry against him which power was available under the Government Service Rules. The Court said even if an enquiry was pending against an employee there was nothing to stop him from retiring on his attaining the age of superannuation. The enquiry could not continue after his retirement. The Court was therefore, of the opinion that it was for that reason that the bank had reserved to itself the power to sanction the pensionary benefit under Rule 11 and if there was nothing wrong with the service of an employee throughout, the Bank would naturally sanction the pension, but if there was sufficient material disclosing grave irregularities on the part of the employee, the Bank might be well within its power in refusing to sanction the pensionary benefits, or in sanctioning them only partly. The learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court then went on to hold as under : "Of course, such decision has to be arrived at fairly, which necessarily means after holding an enquiry, giving a fair opportunity to the concerned officer to defend himself against the accusation. Such an enquiry would not be a 'disciplinary enquiry' within the ordinary meaning of the term, but an enquiry confined to the purposes of the Rules, viz., whether the employee should be granted any pensionary benefits ; and if so, to what extent? Such an enquiry would not be a 'disciplinary enquiry' within the ordinary meaning of the term, but an enquiry confined to the purposes of the Rules, viz., whether the employee should be granted any pensionary benefits ; and if so, to what extent? Such an enquiry can also be made after the retirement (of an employee ; and particularly in cases of retirement) on attaining the age of superannuation, probably, such enquiry will have to be conducted only after retirement." The Court, therefore, gave direction as to how the enquiry was to be conducted against the officer so as to entitle him to the pensionary benefits if he was exonerated. We are afraid that this view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court does not commend to us. By giving such an interpretation to Rule 11 the Andhra Pradesh High Court has, in effect, lend validity to disciplinary proceeding against an employee even after his superannuation for which no provision existed either in Pension Rules or in the Service Rules and when the High Court had himself observed that an enquiry even if initiated during the service period of the employee could not be continued after his retirement on superannuation." Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that no disciplinary proceedings against an employee even after his superannuation for which no provision existed either in the Pension Rules or in the Service Rules, can be continued. 25. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Anr., JT 2003 (6) SC 20, has held as follows : "37. .........A departmental proceeding can continue so long as the employee is in service. In the event, a disciplinary proceeding is kept pending by the employer the employee cannot be made to retire. There must exist specific provision in the pension rules in terms whereof, whole or a part of the pension can be withheld or withdrawn wherefor a proceeding has to be initiated. Furthermore, no rule has also been brought to our notice providing for continuation of such proceeding despite permitting the employee concerned to retire. In absence of such a proceeding, the High Court or the State cannot contend that the departmental proceedings against the appellant Mata Deen Garg could continue." 26. Furthermore, no rule has also been brought to our notice providing for continuation of such proceeding despite permitting the employee concerned to retire. In absence of such a proceeding, the High Court or the State cannot contend that the departmental proceedings against the appellant Mata Deen Garg could continue." 26. Applying the principle laid down in Chandra Singh (supra) and Bhagirathi Jena (supra) to the facts of the present case, in the absence of any specific provision in the 1964 Rules, the proceedings for continuation of enquiry after the retirement of the employee lapsed. 27. The disciplinary proceedings can also not be saved in the present case on the ground that the committee of management had passed a resolution dismissing Sri Ravindra Singh Rathore from the post of Principal in the college and only the proposed punishment was required to be approved by the Board under Section 21 of the Act of 1982. Section 21 of the Act of 1982 reads as follows : "21. Restriction on dismissal etc. of teachers.--The Management shall not, except with the prior approval of the Board, dismiss any teacher or remove him from service, or serve on him any notice of removal from service, or reduce him in rank or reduce his emoluments or withhold his increment for any period (whether temporarily or permanently) and any such thing done without such prior approval shall be void." 28. The statement of objects and reason for enacting the Act of 1982, inter alia, provided as follows ; "...................Under Section 16G (3) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, managements were authorised to impose punishment with the approval of the District Inspectors of Schools in matters pertaining to disciplinary action. This provision was found to be inadequate in cases where the management proposed to impose the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and so it was considered necessary that this power should be exercised subject to the prior approval of the Commission or the Selection Boards, as the case may be, which could function as an independent and impartial body." 29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Committee of Management, St. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Committee of Management, St. John Inter College v. Girdhari Singh and Ors., (2001) 4 SCC 296 , has, after taking into consideration the statement of objects and reasons of the Act of 1982, held that it unequivocally indicates that earlier provisions continued under Section 16G (3) (a) of the Education Act were found to be inadequate where the management proposed to impose the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. In other words, the Legislature thought that the power of approval/disapproval to an order of punishment imposed by the management should not be vested with a lower educational authority, like the District Inspector of Schools, but should be vested with an independent Commission or Board which would function as an independent and impartial body. 30. Under Section 21 of the Act of 1982 the Board has to examine the merits of the case and apply its mind independently to the question whether the evidence on record justify the removal or not. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Committee of Management Bishambhar Sharan Vaidic Inter College, Jaspur, Nainital and Anr. v. U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission and others, 1995 (Supp) 3 SCC 244, in paragraph 4 of the judgment, has held as follows : "............. We have also noticed Section 21 of the Act to which our attention was particularly drawn. We are of the view that the High Court has fallen in error in holding that the enquiry was vitiated because the charge-sheet was not framed by the enquiry committee but by the committee of management. The High Court has also committed an error in holding that the Commission could not have gone into the merits of the case. According to us, in view of the provisions of the said Section 21, the Commission while deciding whether or not to grant approval of the removal of a teacher, has necessarily to go into the merits of the case and apply its mind independently to the question whether the evidence on record justify the removal. It must be remembered that the commission appointed under the Act is a high-powered body and as a body entrusted with the important function of supervising the actions taken by the Management against the teachers, it has to discharge its responsibility circumspectively. It must be remembered that the commission appointed under the Act is a high-powered body and as a body entrusted with the important function of supervising the actions taken by the Management against the teachers, it has to discharge its responsibility circumspectively. It cannot exercise its function effectively unless it scrutinizes the material and applies its mind carefully to the facts on record..................." 31. In the case of Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Kunj Behari Misra, (1998) 7 SCC 84 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the disciplinary proceedings breaks into two stages. The first stage commences when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusion on the basis of the evidence, the enquiry officer's report and the delinquent employee replied to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusion. Since under Section 21 of the Act of 1982, it has been provided that if the management dismisses any teacher or removeshim from service or serves on him any notice of removal from service or reduces him in rank or reduces his emoluments or withholds his increments for any period, whether temporarily or permanently, except the prior approval of the Board, such thing done without such prior approval shall be void. 32. Thus, it can safely be said that till such time the Board after considering the relevant material and going into the merits of the charges either approves or disapproves the proposed order of punishment, the disciplinary proceedings are continuing. Since Sri Ravindra Singh Rathore has retired before the Board had considered the matter for according approval, as required under Section 21 of the Act of 1982, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be continued." 17. In view of the above, the cause of action in challenging the order of Director on the ground of jurisdiction is not required to be decided at present. It is admitted case of the parties that the District Basic Education Officer has yet not granted approval, as required under Rule 15, therefore, it cannot be termed that the disciplinary proceeding against the respondent No.5 has attained finality in the eyes of law. Under Rule 15, the District Basic Education Officer can approve the proposal of the Committee of Management and also can disapprove the same with the direction to conclude the disciplinary proceeding in the light of the observation made therein. Under Rule 15, the District Basic Education Officer can approve the proposal of the Committee of Management and also can disapprove the same with the direction to conclude the disciplinary proceeding in the light of the observation made therein. The respondent No.5 on attaining the age of superannuation, has retired from service on 30.6.2002, therefore, challenge to the order of Director has rendered infructuous." 21. Regulation 31 of the U.P. Education Manual which deals with the punishment, inquiry and suspension of Class IV employee, as translated, is as hereunder:- "31. Punishment awarded to the employees, for which prior approval of the Inspector or the Regional Inspector shall be necessary, may be in any of the following manners - (a) Appointment (b) Separation or release (c) Downgrading in category (d) Reductions in perquisites For awarding any of the aforesaid punishments to class four employees, the Principal or the Headmaster shall be competent. In case of punishment being awarded by the competent authority, class four employee may appeal before the Committee of Management. This appeal must be presented within one month from the date of information of the punishment and thereupon a decision shall be taken by the Committee of Management within a maximum period of 6 weeks of receipt of the appeal. On consideration of all the necessary documents and after hearing the employee, in case he does want to appear before the Committee of Management in person, the Committee of Management will give its decision on the appeal. The class four employee shall also have the right to make a representation to the District Inspector of schools/Regional Inspector of Girls school against the decision taken by the Committee of Management on his appeal, within one month from the date of information of the decision. Provided that in case the Committee of Management does not give its decision on the appeal within the aforesaid prescribed period of six weeks, then the concerned employee may submit his representation directly to the District Inspector of Schools/Regional Inspector of Girls' School, after lapse of aforesaid six weeks' period. The District Inspector of Schools/Regional Inspector of Girls' School shall give its decision on the aforesaid representation within a maximum period of three months from the date of receipt of such representation and this decision shall be final. The District Inspector of Schools/Regional Inspector of Girls' School shall give its decision on the aforesaid representation within a maximum period of three months from the date of receipt of such representation and this decision shall be final. With regard to submission of representation, consideration and decision, Regulation 96 to 98 of this Chapter with necessary modification shall be applicable." 22. On perusal of the above extracted judgment, it is evidently clear that the disciplinary proceedings breaks into two stages. The first stage commences when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusion on the basis of the evidence, the enquiry officer's report and the delinquent employee relied to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusion. It is also evidently clear that no disciplinary proceedings against an employee even after his superannuation for which no provision existed either in the Pension Rules or in the Service Rules, can be continued. 23. On perusal of the Regulation 31, it is evident that Regulation 31 of the U.P. Intermediate Education Regulations while providing for prior approval in case of Class IV employees the said paragraph refers to all employees and there is no reason to exclude Class IV employees from the applicability of the said regulation. Subsequent paragraph of the Regulation 31 also refers to Class IV employees. 24. Perusal of the material on record reflects that vide order dated 24.1.2007 the opposite party no.3 was placed under suspension by the Committee of Management. Charge sheet was given to opposite party no.3. Ex parte enquiry report was submitted on 16.4.2007 to which opposite party no.3 submitted his reply on the show cause notice dated 17.4.2007. Vide order dated 29.6.2007, resolution for dismissal of opposite party no.3 was passed. Subsistence allowance after being placed under suspension, was not paid. Vide order dated 10.2.2009, the District Inspector of Schools disapproved the proposed punishment of dismissal. The Committee of Management filed Writ Petition No.2495(SS) of 2009 which was disposed of with direction to D.I.O.S. to hear the Committee of Management again. The D.I.O.S. fixed dates for hearing on 18.5.2009, 26.5.2009 and 27.5.2009. After considering, D.I.O.S. has again disapproved the proposed punishment of dismissal. The Committee of Management filed Writ Petition No.2495(SS) of 2009 which was disposed of with direction to D.I.O.S. to hear the Committee of Management again. The D.I.O.S. fixed dates for hearing on 18.5.2009, 26.5.2009 and 27.5.2009. After considering, D.I.O.S. has again disapproved the proposed punishment of dismissal. The Committee of Management has to pass the final punishment order of dismissal from service only when the prior approval is given by the District Inspector of Schools, which on the contrary in the present was refused. No final order of punishment can be passed by the appointing authority i.e. Committee of Management as there is no provision contained in the Regulations under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 providing for passing punishment order after the employee attains the age of superannuation. In this view of the matter, the law-report cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is fully applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case. 25. In the various judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court, it has been repeatedly held that prior approval in case of dismissal of non-teaching staff is necessary and if such prior approval is not taken before termination of the services, the termination is illegal and prior approval of Inspector or Regional Inspectree is necessary. 26. It is the admitted position that the opposite party no.3 has retired on 30.6.2002 on attaining the age of superannuation, therefore there is no provision for conducting a disciplinary enquiry after his retirement and nor any provision stating that in case misconduct is established, a deduction could be made from retiral benefits. 27. Considering in totality of facts and circumstances of the case, respondent no.3 is entitled for the payment of salary applicable to the post of clerk of the institution inasmuch as the arrears of salary w.e.f. the date found due. Therefore, District Inspector of Schools is directed to ensure entire payment inasmuch as arrears of salary to the respondent no.3 within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. 28. In the result, the writ petition is finally disposed of.