JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mohd. Atif, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ravi Prakash Srivastava, learned counsel for all the respondents. 2. The petitioner by means of this petition has invoked extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 09.06.2022 whereby he has been transferred to Airport of Bhuvaneshwar from Airport of Varanasi while working as Sub-Inspector in Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). 3. Petitioner is aggrieved by the order for the reason that he has served for more that 11 years and 6 months out of home sector and as per their own policy of transfer and adjustment promulgated by the respondents, petitioner was entitled to be given posting in home sector. Learned counsel has also assailed the order on the ground that once he has been given posting in his home sector at Varanasi in the year 2018 after having served out at places of posting out of home sector, he could not have been declared as surplus staff to be adjusted at a different place out of his home sector. It is submitted that the persons junior to him were adjusted within the home sector by placing them from Varanasi to Patna. He in this regard has taken names of juniors to the petitioner namely, Anuprekha Kumari, Akshita Sinha and Bharat Chaubey who according to him in the first instance should have been placed out of his home sector. Thus he pleads discrimination meeted out to him in matter of transfer and posting. 4. In support of his above arguments learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the transfer policy/rules framed by the department itself that provides for a tenural period to be spent by Constables, Head Constables, Assistant Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors at different sectors during service career and which would not include the period of basic training. 5. Vide paragraph 12 it is contended that the first, second, third and fourth tenure period of service are treated to be with a division of seven years as out of home sector, 12 years in home sector then again six years out of home sectors and the last four years in home sector. 5. Vide paragraph 12 it is contended that the first, second, third and fourth tenure period of service are treated to be with a division of seven years as out of home sector, 12 years in home sector then again six years out of home sectors and the last four years in home sector. He submits that the petitioner having already spent more than 11 years and 6 months since the date of initial appointment in the year 2006, deserved to be posted in home sector and this is the reason perhaps why he was given posting at Varanasi on 03.04.2018. He submits that Varanasi is a place falling within his home sector because the petitioner's permanent residence is located at district Kaimur in the State of Bihar and Varanasi district falls within the eastern sector which includes the districts of Bihar vide Clause 13 of the transfer policy/rules. 6. Per contra, it is argued by learned counsel for the respondents that the transfer and posting rules contain also discretionary powers of authority in matters of transfer and postings vide Clause 10(c) and Clause 39 (xx). According to him this transfer policy/rules would be laying down broad parameters for transfer and postings of the personnels and the final decision would rest with the competent authority of the C.I.S.F., inasmuch as vide Clause 39 (xx) these transfer rules would not come in the way of discretion of the competent authority in posting any personnel at a particular place even without assigning any reason. It is argued that transfer policy/rules or notifications or circulars by whatever name it is known are purely administrative instructions and are aimed at providing guidelines to meet administrative exegencies and are not enforceable as such. 7. It is further submitted that the petitioner's application to give him posting at Patna which would fall within the home sector has already been rejected by the competent authority by passing order dated 14.06.2022, which is not under challenge. 8. In rejoinder to the above affidavit, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that even if the policy lays down broad principles with discretionary powers vested with authorities but this power is to be exercised in exceptional circumstances only. 8. In rejoinder to the above affidavit, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that even if the policy lays down broad principles with discretionary powers vested with authorities but this power is to be exercised in exceptional circumstances only. The authority should abide by its own policies and guidelines otherwise it will be an absolutely uncanalised power in the name of discretion to shift an employee from one place to another for various extraneous considerations and at times for whims. He argues, therefore, that policy/rules/instructions/notification or circular by whatever name it is called, it would be rendered to be a waste paper. He argues that no administrative power vested in an authority can be unchecked in a rule of law society. 9. It is also argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that he need not challenge the order dated 14.06.2022 because it has not been passed by any competent authority. According to him the competent authority in the matter is Director General (C.I.S.F.) as per Sub clause (i) of Clause 10 of the guidelines. It is further argued that if it is taken to be a delegated power, the delegation will have to be to a competent authority having territorial authority over and above the sector concerned to which the petitioner/employee belongs and not the officer of the rank who has passed the order being D.I.G., Northern Sector. He submits that the petitioner admittedly belongs to eastern sector. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and their arguments raised across the bar, in my view two main issues arise for consideration by this Court which are as follows: a) Whether the authorities are bound by their own transfer rules and guidelines under transfer policy that they have themselves framed at their own discretion and any violation thereof would not warrant judicial intervention by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; b) Whether the authorities were justified in ignoring claim of the petitioner in the matter of seniority while giving him posting at the place within the sector to which the petitioner would be entitled as his home sector. 11. 11. In my considered view, if the first question stands unanswered in favour of the petitioner the second would only require to be looked into the extent as to whether the order that has been relied upon by the respondents to have rejected the claim of the petitioner is justified enough and has been passed by the competent authority or not. 12. As far as the transfer policy is concerned, I have carefully gone through the entire transfer policy and guidelines given therein that has been issued vide Circular No.134 dated 25.09.2017. 13. The Central Industrial Security Force is the security force that has been brought into existence with the specific purpose to safeguard security at the airport and other public industrial Sectors and Government establishments as may be required by the Central Government. The duty that is to be discharged by the Security Officers who are drawn from different places of the country and are required to render their rigorous service to have a constant vigil so as to ensure security of the airport, other industrial places and Government establishments throughout day and night i.e. 24x7. Keeping this in mind and in order to ensure better deployment of force guidelines lay down different sectors vide clauses 13. Clause 13 is reproduced hereunder: “13. For the purpose of this policy there shall be following Sectors. i) North Sector-Comprising of J&K, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan, Chandigarh, Uttarakhand & UP excluding the districts under Eastern UP as mentioned under Eastern Sector. ii) NCR Sector -comprising of units under NCR Zone, SSG, GBS, DMRC & other Units as notified under NCR Sector from time to time. iii) Eastern Sector -Comprising of Bihar, Jharkhand and Eastern UP(districts of Varanasi, Jaunpur, Ghazipur, Chandauli, Mirzapur, Sant Ravidas Nagar, Sonbhadra, Deoria, Gorakhpur, Kushi Nagar, Maharaj Ganj, Ambedkar Nagar, Faizabad, sultanpur, Amethi,Barabanki, Bahraich, Balrampur, Gonda, Shravasti, Basti, Sant Kabir Nagar, Siddharth Nagar, Azamgarh, Balia, Mau, Allahabad, Fatehpur, Kaushambi, Pratapgarh). iv) South Eastern Sector-Comprising of West Bengal, Orissa, Andaman & Nicobar lslands and Sikkim. v) North Eastern Sector Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Tripura. vi) Central Sector - Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. vii) Western Sector -Maharashtra, Goa, Gujarat, Daman & Diu and Dadra Nagar Haveli. viii) Southern Sector -Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Telangana, Tamil Nadu, Puducherry and Lakshadweep. v) North Eastern Sector Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Tripura. vi) Central Sector - Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. vii) Western Sector -Maharashtra, Goa, Gujarat, Daman & Diu and Dadra Nagar Haveli. viii) Southern Sector -Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Telangana, Tamil Nadu, Puducherry and Lakshadweep. However, the area under Sectors can be changed by the DG/CISF at any time depending upon administrative requirement and operational exigencies.” 14. Upon bare reading of the aforesaid clause it is clear that the country has been divided into as many as eight sectors so as to deploy Central Industrial Security Force. Now eastern sector comprises of the entire State of Bihar, Jharkhand and eastern Uttar Pradesh that includes district Varanasi where the petitioner was posted at the time when the impugned order of transfer and adjustment came to be passed. 15. The question therefore arises as to whether it would not be pragmatic for a welfare state to consider posting of such personnel or officers in the Central Industrial Security Force in or around their home districts/sectors for certain period in their entire service career and in my view it would be and that is why the Central notification in question provides for the tenure of postings also and vide Clause 12 the policy lays down tenure postings, which is reproduced hereunder: “12. TENURE OF POSTING The Out of Home Sector(OHS) and Home Sector(HS) tenure for posting in respect of NGOs are subject to availability of vacancies, operational and administrative needs and new inductions. The details are as follows: OUT OF HOME SECTOR/HOME SECTOR TENURE FOR CONSTABLEs HCs, ASIs SIs & INSPECTORs OF ALL SECTORS EXCEPT FOR EXCEPTIONS MENTIONED UN THIS CIRCULAR BASIC TRAINING PERIOD : NEITHER TO BE COUNTED IN HOME SECTOR NOR OUT OF HOME SECTOR a) 1st Tenure-07 Years in Units in Out of Home Sector (excluding basic training) b) 2nd Tenure-12 Years in Units in Home Sector c) 3rd Tenure-06 years in Out of Home Sector d) 4th Tenure (Remaining Service)-Home Sector Note: 1. During the lnter Sector Transfer for 3rd tenure the individuals shall be asked their choice of Out of Home Sector(OHS) from among the existing OHSs by giving their preference for the OHSs in the order of priority and efforts shall be made to accommodate their Out of Home Sector(OHS) choices on merit subject to availability of vacancies. During the lnter Sector Transfer for 3rd tenure the individuals shall be asked their choice of Out of Home Sector(OHS) from among the existing OHSs by giving their preference for the OHSs in the order of priority and efforts shall be made to accommodate their Out of Home Sector(OHS) choices on merit subject to availability of vacancies. Explanation i) Merit shall be based on the duration of OHS (in months) already served. ii) In case of tie, preference would be given to those having higher age. lf there is still tie between two or more personnel, the preference will be given to those who have joined CISF earlier (Date of joining). 2. Home Sector posting will be considered subject to availability of vacancies in Home Sector (Vacancies would be calculated with stipulation that the Sector should not have more than 60% of HS personnel). This shall be applicable for both HS tenures (2nd and 4th tenures) 3. During Inter Sector Transfer if an individual has become eligible for HS posting from OHS, he/she can also give his preference for maximum of two OHS (other than where he/she is presently posted) where he can be posted in the event he is not posted to his HS on account of his low merit. However, once posted to OHS as per his preference, he will have to complete the full tenure of 02/03 years as applicable, depending upon the location of unit, before he is again considered for HS posting. But such OHS posting shall not be counted against HS posting even though he had given preference for the same, as he could not be accommodated in his HS despite being due for HS posting This shall be applicable to postings for both the HS tenures.(2nd and 4th tenure)” 16. The above clause therefore, clearly demonstrates that in the entire period of service while a personnel or an officer would be rendering total about 29-30 years of service in the force, maximum period he/she would be serving out of the home sector. It is the maximum period of 12 years that he/she would be allowed posting in home sector. The above clause therefore, clearly demonstrates that in the entire period of service while a personnel or an officer would be rendering total about 29-30 years of service in the force, maximum period he/she would be serving out of the home sector. It is the maximum period of 12 years that he/she would be allowed posting in home sector. Home sector as I have already perused above, is not necessarily to be a place of permanent address of the personnel but it comprises of a very large area, like for instance, if a person belongs to State of Bihar, he can be posted in Jharkhand or Eastern Uttar Pradesh and that would all amount to a posting within the home sector. No one needs to explain as to what is the distance between Bihar and Jharkhand or Jharkhand and district Ballia or between District Kaimur of Bihar and Pratapgarh and Kaushambi districts that fall within eastern sector. 17. In the circumstances therefore, it appeals to reason that the policy was framed with a view to give posting to the personnels in the home sector. The postings are broadly made definitely in tune with the guidelines and the principles that have been laid down in the notification. However, in so far as the argument that the guidelines are only to be considered in the broader perspective inasmuch as they do not create a bar for the discretion to be exercised by the authority in giving posting at any place, in my considered view would normally be taken into account where special circumstances are assigned for posting an officer repeatedly at a particular place. The authorities should adhere to the rules framed by them normally and overriding power to exercise discretion should be only special circumstances where situation so demands. So normally when no special reasons are assigned, it is expected that the Government would certainly be relying upon its own guidelines that have been laid down. Normally, the rule framing authority should adhere to the guidelines have to be complied with by the authority framing it giving a pragmatic view. Only in exceptional circumstances, the authority can bypass the guidelines. It is not the case where any exceptional circumstance has been placed before this Court by learned counsel for the respondents. Normally, the rule framing authority should adhere to the guidelines have to be complied with by the authority framing it giving a pragmatic view. Only in exceptional circumstances, the authority can bypass the guidelines. It is not the case where any exceptional circumstance has been placed before this Court by learned counsel for the respondents. Nothing has been stated in the entire counter affidavit which may justify the adjustment of the petitioner from the airport of Varanasi to airport of Bhuvaneshwar which falls outside the home sector. 18. Petitioner was given posting in the home sector only in the year 2018 and, therefore, he could have been continued for further more period but he has been shifted to Bhuvaneshwar under the order impugned assigning reasons that he is a surplus staff. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court towards the chart which has been appended alongwith the writ petition as Annexure-9 that shows Anuprekha Kumari, Bharat Chaubey and Akshita Sinha were junior to the petitioners and had been given posting at Varanasi which is also their home sector. 20. It is claimed that they were juniors to the petitioner so naturally they must have rendered lesser service than the petitioner. 21. Now Rakesh Kumar who was posted alongwith the petitioner and Bharat Chaubey, have been shifted from Varanasi to Patna. Patna also falls within the home-sector as the Varanasi falls in the same sector as per the transfer rules. 22. In the circumstances, therefore the persons who were junior to the petitioner should have been first taken to be surplus staff to be shifted to a different place of posting outside the sector. 23. Thus in the given facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said to be a decision taken by the authority in the public interest or in the administrative exigency which are the powers that can be enforced in the light of what has been pleaded by learned counsel for the respondent invoking powers given provisions contained under Clause 10 (c) and 13 (xx) of the transfer rules. If this kind of action is sustained in law and is said to be outside the purview of judicial review by this Court, then it would certainly be defeating the very object and purpose with which the policy is framed. 24. If this kind of action is sustained in law and is said to be outside the purview of judicial review by this Court, then it would certainly be defeating the very object and purpose with which the policy is framed. 24. This Court is conscious of the well laid position of law that transfer being in exigency of service, an employee cannot have a choice of posting and administrative circulars and guidelines as a mode of transfer policy cannot confer any vested right upon an employee to make it enforceable by writ court ( AIR 2020 SC 3040 : Punjab and Sind Bank and Ors. vs. Durgesh Kuwar) but there are well laid exceptions to the above rule, like malafide exercise of discretion, transfer affecting monitory benefits to employee’s prejudice, discriminatory exercise of discretion upsetting the seniority or meeting out unequals equally to their prejudice. Even in the case of infraction of policy guidelines or executive instructions made of course, may warrant judicial intervention. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and others: (1979) 3 SCC 489 , Supreme Court very categorically held thus: It is a well settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. This rule was enunciated by Mr Justice Frankfurter in Viteralli v. Saton [359 U.S. 535: Law Ed (Second series) 1012] where the learned Judge said: An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged .... Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed .... This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword." 25. Even earlier in the case of Union of India vs. K.P. Joseph and others: (1973) 1 SCC 194 , the Supreme Court held that: "9. Generally speaking, an administrative Order confers no justiciable right, but this rule, like all other general rules, is subject to exceptions. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword." 25. Even earlier in the case of Union of India vs. K.P. Joseph and others: (1973) 1 SCC 194 , the Supreme Court held that: "9. Generally speaking, an administrative Order confers no justiciable right, but this rule, like all other general rules, is subject to exceptions. This Court has held in Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Another ( AIR 1967 SC 1910 ) that although Government cannot supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, yet, if the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution are silent on any particular point, the Government can fill up gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed and these instructions will govern the conditions of service." 26. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Dharmendra Kumar Saxena vs. State of Uttar Pradesh And others: 2013 (7) ADJ 153 has held that: “23.......the Government is bound by executive orders/policies. The guidelines are made to follow it and not to breach it without any justifiable reasons. Whenever the Government deviates from its policies/guidelines/ executive instructions, there must be cogent and strong reasons to justify the order; when transfer order is challenged by way of representation, there must be material on record to establish that the decision was in public interest and it does not violate any statutory provision, otherwise the order may be struck down as being arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The authorities cannot justify their orders that breach of executive orders do not give legally enforceable right to aggrieved person. As observed by Justice Frankfurter "An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged". 24. It is true that the Supreme Court has consistently taken the view that in transfer matters breach of guidelines/policy/ executive orders do not confer upon government servants any legally enforceable right. But on a careful reading of the judgments of the Supreme Court on this issue, it is also evident that in all those cases the Supreme Court has ruled that in case of breach of executive instructions/orders, the Government Servant can make representation to the appropriate authority and if any such representation is made, the appropriate authority must consider it in proper perspective and in accordance with law.” 27. The aforesaid judgment of co-ordinate Bench was cited with approval by Division Bench in the case of Param Singh and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others: 2018 SCC OnLine All 5677 and on the issue of compliance of administrative instructions by the executive, the Division Bench relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia v. The State of Punjab: (1975) 3 SCC 503 vide paragraph 21, 22, 23 and 24 has held thus: “21. We are in agreement with the said view. The object of framing the transfer policy/ guidelines is to ensure that the power of transfer should be exercised in public interest and for the efficiency in the service. It cannot be done for unauthorized purpose. We find that law laid down in Dharmendra Kumar Saxena (supra) is based on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in a Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Ramana Daya Ram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and others, (1979) 3 SCC 489 and the other cases referred in the judgment. 22. In the case of Dr. Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia v. The State of Punjab and others, (1975) 3 SCC 503 the Supreme Court applied the principle enunciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in William Vincent Vitarelli v. Fred A. Seaton, Secretary of Interior, et al., 359 U.S. 535 (1959): Manu/USSC/0176/1959 where the learned Judge said: "An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. See Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 318 U.S. 87-88. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. See Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established, and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that sword. " 23. In Dr. Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia (supra) the Supreme Court preferred the view taken by U.S. Supreme Court while interpretating the administrative instructions. The British Courts take rather conservative view on the administrative orders. The following discussion and conclusion are apt and relevant for our purposes: "8. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that sword. " 23. In Dr. Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia (supra) the Supreme Court preferred the view taken by U.S. Supreme Court while interpretating the administrative instructions. The British Courts take rather conservative view on the administrative orders. The following discussion and conclusion are apt and relevant for our purposes: "8. ...Now, it is true that clause (2) (ii) of the memorandum dated 25th October, 1965 was in the nature of administrative instruction, not having the force of law, but the State Government could not at its own sweet will depart from it without rational justification and fix an artificial date for commencing the length of continuous service in the case of some individual officers only for the purpose of giving them seniority in contravention of that clause. That would be clearly violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The sweep of Articles 14 and 16 is wide and pervasive. These two articles embody the principle of rationality and they are intended to strike against arbitrary and discriminatory action taken by the, 'State' Where the State Government departs from a principle of seniority laid down by it, albeit by administrative instructions, and the departure is without reason and arbitrary, it would directly infringe the guarantee of equality under articles 14 and 16. It is interesting to notice that in the United States it is now well settled that an executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. vide the judgment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Vitaralli v. Seaton, 359 US 535, 546-547 : 3 L Ed. 2nd 1012. This view is of course not based on the equality clause of the United State Constitution and it is evolved as a rule of administrative law. But the principle is the same, namely, that arbitrariness should be eliminated in State action." 24. It is trite that non-statutory direction is not enforceable in Court. The transfer policy framed by the Government is non-statutory guideline, therefore, it cannot be enforced. The legal position in this regard is too well settled to require any reiteration. But the Supreme Court in Dr. It is trite that non-statutory direction is not enforceable in Court. The transfer policy framed by the Government is non-statutory guideline, therefore, it cannot be enforced. The legal position in this regard is too well settled to require any reiteration. But the Supreme Court in Dr. Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia (supra) has taken a middle path that administrative orders are binding on State and it cannot completely ignore the instructions issued by it.” (Emphasis added) 28. I may further add here that if genuine reasons are not given so as to exercise discretion overriding the general rules of transfer, it would amount to an exercise vitiated for malice and not necessary for any fact but it can be in law as well. The manner in which by means of a very cryptic order the representation of the petitioner has been rejected as has been brought on record by means of counter affidavit, non application of mind is writ large on the face of record. Any discretion if exercised by passing the normal rule, if represented against must be defended by reasoned or well informed decision. A mere order that representation is turned down would only lead to an inevitable inference that authority had no reason to defend its order on parameters of rules and policies and so it simply turned down the respondents. This is malice in law. The Supreme Court in the case of Somesh Tiwari vs. Union of India: (2009) 2 SCC 592 has held that “Mala fide is of two kinds -one malice in fact and the second malice in law. The order in question would attract the principle of malice in law as it was not based on any factor germane for passing an order of transfer and based on an irrelevant ground i.e. on the allegations made against the appellant in the anonymous complaint. It is one thing to say that the employer is entitled to pass an order of transfer in administrative exigencies but it is another thing to say that the order of transfer is passed by way of or in lieu of punishment. When an order of transfer is passed in lieu of punishment, the same is liable to be set aside being wholly illegal.” 29. When an order of transfer is passed in lieu of punishment, the same is liable to be set aside being wholly illegal.” 29. An administrative authority while taking a decision must ensure that its decision is well informed dealing with the aspect with which a representation has been made by an employee questioning his transfer. While it is a well laid principle of law that in exercise of administrative discharge of duty an executive must give reasons for decision to be taken as its fundamental to good administration. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, 1990 (4) SCC 594 has reiterated the necessity of recording reasons by administrative body/authority. Thus the order rejecting the representation dated 14.06.2022 being nonspeaking is held to be unsustainable in law. 30. In the circumstances therefore, the impugned decision taken by the authority is such an administrative action that deserves judicial intervention by this Court. 31. Coming to the second issue, I find that the petitioner had been given posting at Varanasi in the year 2018 like other two persons, Rakesh Kumar and Bharat Chaubey . 32. It has not been disclosed in the order that has been enclosed with the counter affidavit, as to why these persons were continued at their home sector and the petitioner has been picked to be shifted out of his home sector as surplus staff. 33. Still further I find merit in the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner holds merit that the competent authority in the matter would be the Director General (Central Industrial Security Force) vide Clause 10 (a) of the guidelines/policies which is reproduced hereunder: “A) The Director General shall be the final authority for deciding all such transfers/postings.” 34. Admittedly, the order has been passed by the D.I.G. (Central Industrial Security Force), North Zone, Airport Sector who is not the competent authority. 35. In any view of the matter, since I am not able to sustain the order passed by the authority to treat the petitioner as surplus staff at Varanasi leaving juniors to him to continue at that place of posting, the order passed by the authority dated 09.06.2022 in respect of the petitioner is hereby quashed and so also the consequential order dated 17.06.2022 passed in the matter. 36. 36. The respondents are directed to consider the claim of the petitioner and pass appropriate orders within three weeks of presentation of certified copy of this order, giving him posting at any place within his home sector. The decision shall be taken by the competent authority within a period of four weeks and under any circumstances on or before 25.08.2023. 37. It is, however, made clear that until such decision petitioner would continue at the present place of posting and shall be paid salary. 38. The writ petition thus succeeds and is allowed in above terms.