S. Vasantha, Hyd v. Chariman, Central Bank Of India, Mumbai
2023-02-21
A.ABHISHEK REDDY
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER: This writ petition is filed seeking the following reliefs: “(i) declare that the petitioner is entitled to be paid monthly pension in terms of Central Bank of India (Employees) Pension Regulation, 1995 w.e.f. 1.7.2001 onwards. (ii) declare the action of the Respondents in denying the payment of monthly pension to the petitioner as arbitrary, unjust and untenable. (iii) direct the respondents forthwith to release the arrears of pension payable commencing from 1.7.2001 onwards with interest at 12% thereon. (iv) Allow the petitioner to have all such benefits such as payment of pension etc.” 2. It is the case of the petitioner that she joined the service of the respondent - Central Bank of India as a clerk on 07.12.1968. Subsequently, she was promoted as an Officer in Junior Manager Grade Scale-I on 28.01.1980. It is stated that she had opted for voluntary retirement under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme and retired from service on 30.06.2001. The grievance of the petitioner is that the respondents are not paying pension to her from 01.07.2001. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that due to the mistake committed by the respondent Bank authorities, the petitioner cannot be blamed and denied the benefits of pension. The learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the letter dated 24.11.2000 addressed by the Chief Manager, Central Bank of India, to the PRS Department, Zonal Office, Hyderabad, which shows that the petitioner had opted for the pension way back in the year 1996 itself. Moreover, the petitioner was diligent in pursuing the matter with the respondent Bank authorities and the correspondence between the petitioner and the respondent Bank authorities substantiates the same. Therefore, the letter dated 24.12.2001 addressed by the Chief Manager – PRS, Central Bank of India, to the petitioner herein stating that she is nonoptee of pension as per the records, is contrary to the letter dated 24.11.2000, wherein it is clearly stated that the petitioner has opted for the pension in 1996 itself. The learned counsel has further stated that in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, they have made self contradictory statements and in the additional counter affidavit, a new plea has been taken stating that the petitioner has given an undertaking opting for new pension.
The learned counsel has further stated that in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, they have made self contradictory statements and in the additional counter affidavit, a new plea has been taken stating that the petitioner has given an undertaking opting for new pension. The learned counsel has stated that the said undertaking given by the petitioner cannot be construed as waiver of her right to receive the pensionary benefits, which are due to her from 01.07.2001 to 26.11.2009. In support of the said contentions, the learned counsel has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.S.Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 Supreme Court Cases 305. 4. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Bank has vehemently opposed the very maintainability of the writ petition and stated that the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground that during the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner has voluntarily given an undertaking to the respondent Bank that she has opted for the new pension and once the undertaking is given by the petitioner, the lis in the present writ petition comes to an end and cannot be re-agitated by the petitioner again. The learned Standing Counsel has stated that as per the undertaking given by the petitioner, the amounts due to her have been settled and therefore, at this juncture, the petitioner cannot re-agitate her claim for the pension for the period between 01.07.2001 and 26.11.2009, and if any amounts are now directed to be paid, it will amount to giving double benefit to the petitioner, and the same is impermissible under law and in violation of the undertaking given by the petitioner. In support of the said contentions, the learned Standing Counsel has relied on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pepsu Road Transport Corporation, Patiala v. Amandeep Singh, (2017) 2 SCC 766 and High Court of Punjab and Haryana v. Jagdev Singh, (2016) 14 SCC 267 . 5. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that the petitioner cannot be found fault for the lapses committed by the respondent Bank authorities and the undertaking given by the petitioner cannot be construed as waiver of her right to receive the pensionary benefits, which she is entitled to. 6.
5. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that the petitioner cannot be found fault for the lapses committed by the respondent Bank authorities and the undertaking given by the petitioner cannot be construed as waiver of her right to receive the pensionary benefits, which she is entitled to. 6. Admittedly, in the present case, during the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner has given an undertaking to the respondent Bank, which reads as under: “I hereby declare that I have read and understood the terms of Settlement/Joint Note dated 27.04.2010 for extending another option to join Pension Scheme. I have understood that the terms of the Settlement/Joint Note have been arrived at on the basis of the Unions/Associations offering to contribute 30% of the initial funding gap assessed for extending another option for joining the pension scheme. I am agreeable to the said contribution of 30% towards the funding gap and hereby voluntarily opt for Bank’s Pension Scheme as per the provisions of the said Settlement/Joint Note. I undertake to refund the Bank’s Contribution to Provident Fund together with accrued interest thereon paid to me on my retirement plus an amount equal to 56% of the Bank’s contribution to Provident Fund with interest received at the time of retirement being 30% of contribution towards the initial funding gap in terms of Joint Note dated 27.4.2010 and the Settlement dated 27.4.2010.” 7. In Pepsu Road Transport Corporation’s case (2 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “From the facts of the present case, it is clear that although Regulations were in force from 1992, the plaintiff retired on 30.11.2011 and after retirement received CPF benefits without any protest and at no point of time before retirement he has raised any grievance. The benefit which was available to him under CPF Scheme was received by the plaintiff, he cannot be allowed to have another benefit flowing from the pension scheme which he never opted. Extending benefit of the pension scheme to the plaintiff shall be extending double benefits- CPF benefit as well as pension scheme which was never contemplated by the Regulations.” 8.
Extending benefit of the pension scheme to the plaintiff shall be extending double benefits- CPF benefit as well as pension scheme which was never contemplated by the Regulations.” 8. In High Court of Punjab and Haryana’s case (3 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “The submission of the respondent, which found favour with the High Court, was that a payment which has been made in excess cannot be recovered from an employee who has retired from the service of the State. This, in our view, will have no application to a situation such as the present where an undertaking was specifically furnished by the officer at the time when his pay was initially revised accepting that any payment found to have been made in excess would be liable to be adjusted. While opting for the benefit of the revised pay scale, the respondent was clearly on notice of the fact that a future refixation or revision may warrant an adjustment of the excess payment, if any, made. The principle enunciated in proposition (ii) above cannot apply to a situation such as in the present case. In the present case, the officer to whom the payment was made in the first instance was clearly placed on notice that any payment found to have been made in excess would be required to be refunded. The officer furnished an undertaking while opting for the revised pay scale. He is bound by the undertaking.” 9. As rightly pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel and as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pepsu Road Transport Corporation’s case (2 supra) and High Court of Punjab and Haryana’s case (3 supra), once the petitioner has settled the issue with the respondent Bank authorities and given an undertaking, the petitioner cannot re-agitate her claims in the pending writ petition contrary to the undertaking given by her. Furthermore, once an undertaking is given by the petitioner, the question of paying any previous dues to her does not arise. Moreover, it is not even the case of the petitioner that she was coerced or threatened to give an undertaking. Once the petitioner has voluntarily of her own volition given an undertaking and the same was acted upon, she cannot once again re-agitate her claim afresh. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to grant the relief sought for by the petitioner. 10.
Once the petitioner has voluntarily of her own volition given an undertaking and the same was acted upon, she cannot once again re-agitate her claim afresh. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to grant the relief sought for by the petitioner. 10. The Writ Petition is devoid of merits and the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any shall also stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.