ORDER : 1. Heard Sri A. Srinath, learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition. 2. Prayer made in the Writ Petition is as under: “For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit, it is prayed that this Hon'ble court may be pleased to pass an order or direction or a writ, more specifically a writ in the nature of a Mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in paying compensation at the rate of Rs. 4.2 lakhs per acre instead of Rs. 5.5 lakh per acre and refusing to pay the balance of Rs. 1.30 lakhs per acre as mandated under G.O.Ms. No. 259 dated 21.06.2016 in spite of the receipt of notice dated 09.08.2020 as illegal, unconscionable and violative of the petitioner’s rights guaranteed under article 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India as also the rulings of the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.P. No. 23148 of 2018 and also of the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Ors. Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Ors. in Civil Appeal Nos. 4412 of 1985 and consequently direct payment of balance compensation at the rate of Rs. 1.3 lakhs per acre of the land acquired in respect of Acres 3.78 cents of the land of petitioner in survey no. 842/A1 of Gani Village, Gadivemula Mandal, Kurnool district, Andhra Pradesh and pass such other order or further orders as are deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case and in the interests of justice.” 3. From the above prayer, it is clear that the Writ Petitioner was already paid compensation at the rate of Rs. 4,20,000/- per acre, whereas it is the claim of the Writ Petitioner that she ought to have been paid Rs. 5,50,000/- per acre as per her legal entitlement. Facts as submitted by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner 4. The Writ Petitioner was assigned Ac. 3.76 cents in Sy. No. 842-A1 of Gani Village, Gadivemula Mandal, Kurnool District, Andhra Pradesh by the Government in the year 2005. This land was acquired by the Government for setting up of Ultra Mega Solar Power Plant by the Andhra Pradesh Solar Power Corporation Limited in the year 2015. 5. The Writ Petitioner was assigned Ac. 3.76 cents in Sy. No. 842-A1 of Gani Village, Gadivemula Mandal, Kurnool District, Andhra Pradesh by the Government in the year 2005. This land was acquired by the Government for setting up of Ultra Mega Solar Power Plant by the Andhra Pradesh Solar Power Corporation Limited in the year 2015. 5. It is submitted that in the proposed acquisition, the name of the Writ Petitioner was not included in the year 2014, on the basis that the assigned lands came to be resumed by the Government vide Proceedings R.C. No. 131/2014 without paying any compensation. Accordingly, on or about 02.01.2015, possession of land was forcibly taken away by the Government by Proceedings dated 02.01.2015 bearing R.C.A. 131/2014 (Ex.P.3). Several assignees, including the Writ Petitioner herein were informed that their lands have been resumed for violation of conditions mentioned in the D-form Patta. According to the Government, this is the reason that justifies the Government to resume the land without paying any compensation. Several assignees approached this Court. This Writ Petitioner filed W.P. No. 21023 of 2015 questioning the Resumption Order dated 02.01.2015. The Government of Andhra Pradesh took “in principle” decision on 13.06.2017 to pay compensation to all the assignees, including the Writ Petitioner herein. Resumption Order was set aside by this Court by taking serious view of the matter and directed personal appearance of several Officers. It is also submitted that after accepting apologies from the Officials and also the undertaking given by the Government that they will pass Orders according to law and also pay the compensation to all the assignees, the said matters were closed. 6. By a Common Order dated 14.07.2017 in W.P. No. 16274 of 2017 and batch, the Learned Single Judge was pleased to allow the batch of Writ Petitions. Following directions were also given by the Learned Single Judge: (a) the petitioners are directed to file petition/representation before respondent Nos. 3 and 4 claiming compensation as referred in the letter dated 10.07.2017, for resuming the assigned land from petitioners within eight weeks from today. (b) the petitioners shall state all the details and enclose true or xerox copies of all the documents in their possession in support of their claim for payment of compensation. 3 and 4 claiming compensation as referred in the letter dated 10.07.2017, for resuming the assigned land from petitioners within eight weeks from today. (b) the petitioners shall state all the details and enclose true or xerox copies of all the documents in their possession in support of their claim for payment of compensation. (c) the petitioners shall further produce originals in the enquiry to be held by respondents 3 and 4, and also return the originals while receiving the compensation from the respondents for resuming the assigned land. (d) respondents 2 to 4 are directed to start enquiring each one of the claims expeditiously and meticulously, take all steps required for completion of enquiry and payment of compensation to each one of the petitioners as noted above within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (e) the petitioners/assignees who do not wish to take compensation from respondents are given liberty to file appeal under BSO against the impugned proceedings and work out their grievances, for this Court is of the view that the remedy of appeal, revision etc. under BSO is effective and compatible to the nature of enquiry involved in the matter viz. whether land is brought under cultivation or not etc. 7. It is further submitted that the Writ Petitioners therein, like the other assignees, were made to believe by the Government Officials that they are being paid on par with the pattadars. Learned Counsel would submit that it is only after accepting the compensation at the rate of Rs. 4,20,000/- per acre, the Writ Petitioner secured knowledge that they were treated discriminately when compared to the pattadars since the pattadars were paid compensation at the rate of Rs. 5,50,000/- per acre. Since the Writ Petitioner secured knowledge, subsequently, she has approached this Court by filing the present Writ Petition claiming the differential amount between the amount paid to her per acre as compensation and the amount paid to the pattadars as compensation. Insofar as the amount fixed for the assignees, the Writ Petitioner has already received the amounts. 8. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to various decisions rendered by this Court, particularly, the decision rendered by the Larger Bench of this Court in Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevalla Division and Others Vs. Insofar as the amount fixed for the assignees, the Writ Petitioner has already received the amounts. 8. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to various decisions rendered by this Court, particularly, the decision rendered by the Larger Bench of this Court in Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevalla Division and Others Vs. Mekala Pandu, 2004 (2) APLJ 108 (HC) (LARGER BENCH) by corum of Hon’ble seven Judges of this Court. 9. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to Para Nos. 108 and 109 of this Judgment on the proposition that the Government cannot meet-out differential treatment between pattadars and assignees in the issues of land acquisition and payment of compensation. Para Nos. 108 and 109 are usefully extracted hereunder: “108. In the result, we hold that “no compensation” clause, restricting the right of the assignees to claim full compensation in respect of the land resumed equivalent to the market value of the land, is unconstitutional. The “no compensation clause” infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 31-A of the Constitution. We are conscious that Article 21 essentially deals with personal liberty. But in cases where deprivation of property would lead to deprivation of life or liberty or livelihood, Article 21 springs into action and any such deprivation without just payment of compensation amounts to infringement of the right guaranteed thereunder. The doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions” applies in all its force. 109. In the circumstances, we hold that the assignees of the government lands are entitled to payment of compensation equivalent to the full market value of the land and other benefits on par with full owners of the land even in cases where the assigned lands are taken possession of by the State in accordance with the terms of grant or patta, though such resumption is for a public purpose. We further hold that even in cases where the State does not invoke the covenant of the grant or patta to resume the land for such public purpose and resorts to acquisition of the land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the assignees shall be entitled to compensation as owners of the land and for all other consequential benefits under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. No condition incorporated in patta/deed of assignment shall operate as a clog putting any restriction on the right of the assignee to claim full compensation as owner of the land.” 10. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner has further submitted that this Order of Larger Bench was challenged by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in Civil Appeal Nos. 7904 of 2012 and batch; that by Order dated 04.08.2014, a Bench consisting of three Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to uphold the ratio of the decision (of the Larger Bench) of this Hon’ble Court and was further pleased to dismiss the Civil Appeals. 11. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner would therefore submit that the ratio insofar as the embargo on differential treatment between the pattadars and assignees has attained finality, and therefore, he would submit that the State has no choice but to meet-out the equal treatment between the pattadars and assignees where compensation has to be paid for acquiring their lands. 12. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner has also relied on decision rendered in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and another Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156 on the proposition with regard to the inequality of bargaining power and where unequal conditions exists, wherein it is held that the terms of contract shall not be binding on the weaker party in contractual matters pertaining to State. It is further said that under such conditions, the contract agreement became voidable. Learned Counsel relied on Para Nos. 91 and 92 of the said Judgment, which are usefully extracted hereunder: “91. Is a contract of the type mentioned above to be adjudged voidable or void? If it was induced by undue influence, then under Section 19-A of the Indian Contract Act, it would be voidable. It is, however, rarely that contracts of the types to which the principle formulated by us above applies are induced by undue influence as defined by Section 16(1) of the Indian Contract Act, even though at times they are between parties one of whom holds a real or apparent authority over the other. In the vast majority of cases, however, such contracts are entered into by the weaker party under pressure of circumstances, generally economic, which results in inequality of bargaining power. In the vast majority of cases, however, such contracts are entered into by the weaker party under pressure of circumstances, generally economic, which results in inequality of bargaining power. Such contracts will not fall within the four corners of the definition of “undue influence” given in Section 16(1). Further, the majority of such contracts are in a standard or prescribed form or consist of a set of rules. They are not contracts between individuals containing terms meant for those individuals alone. Contracts in prescribed or standard forms or which embody a set of rules as part of the contract are entered into by the party with superior bargaining power with a large number of persons who have far less bargaining power or no bargaining power at all. Such contracts which affect a large number of persons or a group or groups of persons, if they are unconscionable, unfair and unreasonable, are injurious to the public interest. To say that such a contract is only voidable would be to compel each person with whom the party with superior bargaining power had contracted to go to court to have the contract adjudged voidable. This would only result in multiplicity of litigation which no court should encourage and would also not be in the public interest. Such a contract or such a clause in a contract ought, therefore, to be adjudged void. While the law of contracts in England is mostly judgemade, the law of contracts in India is enacted in a statute, namely, the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In order that such a contract should be void, it must fall under one of the relevant sections of the Indian Contract Act. The only relevant provision in the Indian Contract Act which can apply is Section 23 when it states that “The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless.....the court regards it as..... opposed to public policy.” 92. The Indian Contract Act does not define the expression “public policy” or “opposed to public policy.” From the very nature of things, the expressions “public policy” or “opposed to public policy” or “contrary to public policy” are incapable of precise definition. Public policy, however, is not the policy of a particular government. It connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the public interest. Public policy, however, is not the policy of a particular government. It connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the public interest. The concept of what is for the public good or in the public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the public interest has varied from time to time. As new concepts take the place of old, transactions which were once considered against public policy are now being upheld by the courts and similarly where there has been a well recognized head of public policy, the courts have not shirked from extending it to new transactions and changed circumstances and have at times not even flinched from inventing a new head of public policy. There are two schools of thought “the narrow view” school and “the broad view” school. According to the former, courts cannot create new heads of public policy whereas the latter countenances judicial law-making in this area. The adherents of “the narrow view” school would not invalidate a contract on the ground of public policy unless that particular ground had been well-established by authorities. Hardly ever has the voice of the timorous spoken more clearly and loudly than in these words of Lord Davey in Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Gold Mines Ltd. (1902) AC 484: “Public policy is always an unsafe and treacherous ground for legal decision.” That was in the year 1902. Seventy-eight years earlier, Burrough, J. in Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 2 Bing 229 : (1824-34) All ER 258 described public policy as “a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.” The Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, however, was not a man to shy away from unmanageable horses and in words which conjure up before our eyes the picture of the young Alexander the Great taming Bucephalus, he said in Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football Assn. Ltd. (1971) Ch 591: “With a good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control. It can jump over obstacles.” Had the timorous always held the field, not only the doctrine of public policy but even the common law or the principles of Equity would never have evolved. Sir William Holdsworth in his History of English Law Vol. It can jump over obstacles.” Had the timorous always held the field, not only the doctrine of public policy but even the common law or the principles of Equity would never have evolved. Sir William Holdsworth in his History of English Law Vol. III, p. 55, has said: “In fact, a body of law like the common law, which has grown up gradually with the growth of the nation, necessarily acquires some fixed principles, and if it is to maintain these principles it must be able, on the ground of public policy or some other like ground, to suppress practices which, under ever new disguises, seek to weaken or negative them.” It is thus clear that the principles governing public policy must be and are capable, on proper occasion, of expansion or modification. Practices which were considered perfectly normal at one time have today become obnoxious and oppressive to public conscience. If there is no head of public policy which covers a case, then the court must in consonance with public conscience and in keeping with public good and public interest declare such practice to be opposed to public policy. Above all, in deciding any case which may not be covered by authority our courts have before them the beacon light of the Preamble to the Constitution. Lacking precedent, the court can always be guided by that light and the principles underlying the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles enshrined in our Constitution.” 13. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner has also relied on another Judgment rendered by the Learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. No. 23148 of 2018 dated 31.10.2018. Learned Counsel has placed reliance on Para No. 22 of the said Judgment to indicate that the proposition with regard to the equal treatment to pattadaras and assignees has already been settled in Mekala Pandu’s case (referred supra), and therefore, is no more a res integra. 14. At the time of admission, by an Interim Order dated 28.08.2020, this Court had directed the Respondents to respond on the Notice issued by the Writ Petitioner dated 09.08.2020. The subsequent events would indicate that in terms of the direction rendered by this Court dated 28.08.2020, the Respondents have issued their response on 25.01.2021 bearing Rc. No. B.238/2018 stating that the payment of compensation to the assignees on par with the pattadars is not applicable, for the reasons stated therein. The subsequent events would indicate that in terms of the direction rendered by this Court dated 28.08.2020, the Respondents have issued their response on 25.01.2021 bearing Rc. No. B.238/2018 stating that the payment of compensation to the assignees on par with the pattadars is not applicable, for the reasons stated therein. 15. The Counter Affidavit filed by the Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 dated 01.10.2020 would also indicate that the Writ Petitioner is not entitled to enhanced amounts of compensation. Along with the Counter Affidavit, a Proceeding bearing Letter No. 2314/PR-II(1)/2014 dated 25.02.2015 has been filed by the Respondents. This Proceeding would indicate that in order to expedite the process of acquiring the lands, the Government constituted a Committee for negotiating with the assignees to finalise the exgratia possible to the assigned lands. Submissions of the learned Counsel for the Respondent Nos.2 to 4 is also on the same lines that the Writ Petitioner is not entitled for the enhanced payment. 16. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner would submit in his Rejoinder that the present Writ Petitioner was not even called for negotiations. The Writ Petitioner is an illiterate person and she is not capable to give an “informed consent” for reduced compensation. That apart, the Officials of the Government made the assignees to believe that the amount paid to them is equal to the amount paid to the pattadars and that there is no discrimination. Learned Counsel would submit that there is an estoppel against the Writ Petitioner. DISCUSSION: 17. The facts are not in dispute to the effect that the Writ Petitioner was assigned Ac. 3.76 cents in Sy. No. 842-A1 of Gani Village, Gadivemula Mandal, Kurnool District in the year 2005. In the year 2015, the Notification for acquisition of land was issued. Name of the Writ Petitioner was not included in the Notification. The reason given by the Government for noninclusion of the name of the Writ Petitioner is that the Government has resumed the assigned lands, and therefore, there is no requirement of including the name of the Writ Petitioner and her land in the Notification. By Proceedings dated 02.01.2015 bearing R.C.A. 131/2014 (Ex.P.3), the Government has resumed the assigned land which includes the land of the Writ Petitioner as well for violation of the condition in D-form patta. The Writ Petitioner and several assignees have approached this Court. By Proceedings dated 02.01.2015 bearing R.C.A. 131/2014 (Ex.P.3), the Government has resumed the assigned land which includes the land of the Writ Petitioner as well for violation of the condition in D-form patta. The Writ Petitioner and several assignees have approached this Court. This Court directed the Officials to pass Orders according to law and pay the compensation to the assignees as well. A Larger Bench decision in Mekala Pandu’s case (referred supra) had attained finality when the Civil Appeals (before the Hon’ble Supreme Court) preferred against the Order of the Larger Bench of this Court were dismissed, thereby crystallising the law on the issue that the State cannot render differential treatment to the assignees vis-a-vis the pattadars. The so called negotiating team has fixed compensation to be paid to the assignees in a lumpsum manner of an amount of Rs. 4,20,000/- per acre, and the said amount stood paid and the Writ Petitioner has accepted it; whereas, admittedly, the pattadars, under the very same acquisition were paid Rs. 5,50,000/- per acre. 18. The submissions of the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner that when the law has crystallised as regards the prohibition on differential treatment between assignees and pattadars where the land is sought to be acquired and compensation is sought to be paid. The Government cannot conduct any negotiation to bring a distinction between assignees and pattadars. What is directly prohibited under law cannot indirectly be achieved by way of any negotiation by the Government. 19. Under these circumstances, this Court is in agreement with the submissions made by Sri A. Srinath, learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner to the effect that the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, cannot negotiate for any reduced terms, and it is contrary to law. The law laid down in Mekala Pandu’s case (referred supra) binds the State with full force and the negotiations for any reduced terms of payment is declared as irrational and illegal. 20. In the above premise, this Court is of the opinion that the Writ Petitioner is entitled for differential amount of Rs. 1,30,000/- per acre for an extent of Ac. 3.76 cents in Sy. No. 842-A1 of Gani Village, Gadivemula Mandal, Kurnool District. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed. 20. In the above premise, this Court is of the opinion that the Writ Petitioner is entitled for differential amount of Rs. 1,30,000/- per acre for an extent of Ac. 3.76 cents in Sy. No. 842-A1 of Gani Village, Gadivemula Mandal, Kurnool District. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed. The Respondents are directed to make differential payment within a period of 12 weeks from the date of uploading of this Order on the Website. Needless to state that the Writ Petitioner is also entitled to reasonable interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the due date till the date of payment. Under the circumstances, the Respondents shall pay costs of Rs. 25,000/- to the Writ Petitioner along with the enhanced compensation within four weeks from the date of uploading of this Order on the Website of this Court. 21. Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand closed in terms of this Order.