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2023 DIGILAW 1636 (CAL)

Binika Thapa (nee Rai) v. Damber Kumari Mukhia

2023-12-20

SHAMPA SARKAR, SIDDHARTHA ROY CHOWDHURY

body2023
JUDGMENT : Shampa Sarkar, J. 1. These civil revisional applications from the Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri, have been referred to this Bench at the principal seat at Calcutta, in view of the divergent opinions of two learned Single Judges of this Court. The moot question involved in the applications is whether the Court can extend the time for depositing the admitted arrear rent together with statutory interest as provided in Section 7(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), upon condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Hon’ble Chief Justice constituted this Bench to answer the reference. The points for reference are thus:- a) Whether the High Court, be it Single or Division Bench, can take a decision which runs counter to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, which is binding on all Courts including the High Court by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. b) Whether the Single Bench can take a different view to the view of the Hon’ble Apex Court, where it is clearly laid down that the tenant cannot take recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act in relation to the provision contained under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act, 1997. 2. The points for reference being inter-linked with the facts of the present eviction suits, are answered together. The brief analysis of the facts in each of the eviction suits giving rise to the revisional application, is necessary. 3. CO No.64 of 2023 arises out of an order dated May 30, 2023 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Darjeeling in O.C. (Eviction) Suit No.05 of 2022. The learned judge held that in view of the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Bijay Kumar Singh and anr. Vs. Amit Kumar Chamariya and anr. reported in (2019) 10 SCC 660 and followed by the High Court at Calcutta in Papiya Sengupta and ors. Vs. Sri Suvasis Ghosh, reported in 2020 SCC Online Cal 3267, it could be concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not have any application and the Court could not condone the delay in filing the applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act. Vs. Sri Suvasis Ghosh, reported in 2020 SCC Online Cal 3267, it could be concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not have any application and the Court could not condone the delay in filing the applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act. Upon coming to such finding, the learned trial judge allowed the application under Section 7(3) of the said Act filed by the landlord/plaintiff, thereby striking out the defence of the defendant/tenant, against delivery of possession. The defendant/tenant filed the civil revisional application challenging the said order on the grounds that the word ‘shall’ appearing in Section 7(1) of the said Act was directory and not mandatory. That the averments in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act ought to have been appreciated and the delay should have been condoned on the causes that were shown. The severity of the illness of the petitioner No.1, who had to undergo a surgery and the difficulty faced by the petitioner No.2, who was the constant care-giver, were sufficient reasons for the delay in filing the applications. The delay in filing the said application should be condoned. 4. CO No. 65 of 2023 has been filed challenging the order dated May 30, 2023 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Darjeeling in O.C. (Eviction) Suit No.15 of 2022. By the order impugned, the learned Court rejected the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed in connection with a belated application under Section 7(1) of the said Act. Being aggrieved, the tenant filed a revisional application on similar grounds as in CO No.64 of 2023. 5. The revisional applications came up before a learned Single Judge of this Court and His Lordship was of the opinion that in view of the order passed in Amit Kumar Chamariya (Supra), delay in either depositing arrear rent with the statutory interest of 10% or in filing the applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act, could not be condoned. In His Lordship’s view the Hon’ble Apex Court had laid down the law that courts could not extend the time for compliance of the provisions of Section 7(1) or 7(2) of the said Act, upon condoning the delay, by applying the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In His Lordship’s view the Hon’ble Apex Court had laid down the law that courts could not extend the time for compliance of the provisions of Section 7(1) or 7(2) of the said Act, upon condoning the delay, by applying the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, when a dissenting view of another coordinate Bench in the case of Bahadur Singh Kathotia vs. Smt. Purabi Basu decided in CO 2575 of 2022, was placed before the learned Single Judge, the learned Single Judge was persuaded to disagree with the said view, which ran contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. The matters were referred, with a direction that the records be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench in view of His Lordship’s dissent. The points for reference were framed by the learned Judge. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant urged this Bench to consider Section 40 of the said Act. It was submitted before us that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 were made applicable to all proceedings and appeals under the said Act. As no period of limitation had been prescribed under Section 7 of the said Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply by virtue of the provisions of Section 40. Reference was made to the decision of Bahadur Singh Kathotia (supra) and the relevant paragraphs thereof. It was submitted that the learned Single Judge had rightly arrived at a conclusion that the provisions of Section 40 of the said Act had not been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra). That the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) was silent on the applicability of Section 40 of the said Act and the doctrine of sub silentio would be applicable in such case. The learned Single Judge held that a decision was an authority for what was decided and not everything that was said in the said decision, would constitute a binding precedence. The decision would take its colour from the question involved in the case in which it was rendered. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations in the judgment had to be considered in the light of the questions which were before the Court. The decision would take its colour from the question involved in the case in which it was rendered. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations in the judgment had to be considered in the light of the questions which were before the Court. One additional or a different fact would make a world of difference between the conclusions in two cases. On these principles, the learned Judge concluded that Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) was silent on the applicability of Section 40 of the said Act. The said decision would not stand in the way for a court to condone the delay, under exceptional circumstances. 7. Mr. Das submitted that applying the ratio in Bahadur Singh Kathotia (supra), the period of one month prescribed under Section 7(1) of the said Act, could be extended. He relied on the hypothetical situation discussed in the said decision that the ground reality with regard to the procedure followed by subordinate courts could not be ignored. When summons were issued by a civil court in any suit, a date was fixed for the defendant to appear and file written statement in support of his defence. The dates were usually fixed as per the diary of the Court. Although, Section 7(1) of the said Act provided one month’s time for payment or deposit of arrear rent from the date of receipt of summons, but when a date of appearance was fixed on a particular mentioned day in the summons, the defendant would be of the impression that he was required to appear on that day. Thus, it would not be unnatural that the defendant/tenant appears on the returnable day, which could be after a month from the date of receipt of summons. An ordinary man would follow the summons, and take steps as per advice of the learned advocate. The defendant/tenant being ignorant of law could fail to take steps within the time period prescribed by the said Act. 8. The learned Judge held in Bahadur Singh Kathotia (supra) that the object of Section 7 of the said Act was to grant benefit of protection to a tenant against eviction on compliance of certain conditions. Thus, reasonable opportunity should be granted to the tenant to comply with such conditions. A provision in a statute should not be construed to defeat its purpose. Thus, reasonable opportunity should be granted to the tenant to comply with such conditions. A provision in a statute should not be construed to defeat its purpose. The decision in Amal Baral vs. Debasis Paul reported in (2019) 3 CLT 659 was relied upon by the learned Judge. It was held that when there was no willful default or failure or volitional non-performance on the part of the tenant to deposit arrear rent together with the monthly rent within the time specified by the statute, a tenant should be given an opportunity to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in support of such applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act. Reliance was also placed on the decision of Subrata Mukherjee vs. Bishakha Das reported in 2012 3 CHN (Cal) 423. The view taken was that the time limit fixed for deposit of admitted rent was directory and not mandatory and by virtue of Section 40 of the said Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable. Thus, the learned Judge, relying upon the aforementioned decisions, held that a deviation could be made from the time period fixed under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act, in exceptional circumstances and the three exceptional circumstances were chalked out by the learned Judge as follows:- “…Firstly where the date of appearance of defendant as fixed in the summons is such that it exceeds one month from the date of receipt of summons by the defendant/tenant/ Secondly where the defendant/tenant is unable to appear on the date fixed in the summons due to unavoidable circumstances. Thirdly where in the opinion of the Court refusal of condone delay will result in miscarriage of Justice.” 9. Mr. Bhutia, learned Advocate referred to the provisions of Section 40 of the said Act and submitted that the provisions of Limitation Act would only apply to those provisions of the said Act in which there were no in-built period specified for performance of certain acts. Section 7 mandated deposit of rent or deposit of admitted rent along with an application for determination of rent, within the time specified. He relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Debasish Paul and Anr. Section 7 mandated deposit of rent or deposit of admitted rent along with an application for determination of rent, within the time specified. He relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Debasish Paul and Anr. vs. Amal Boral reported in 2023 INSC 925 and submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court had agreed with the ratio laid down in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) and followed the same. 10. The learned Single Judge who referred these revisional applications disagreed with the above discussion in Bahadur Singh Kathotia (supra) and also the hypothetical situation discussed therein. His Lordship observed that an identical point as to whether the special period of limitation under the aforementioned provisions of Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act could be extended by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, had been raised in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra). The Apex Court held that the Court could not extend the time for compliance of Sections 7(1) or 7(2) of the said Act. The ratio which could be culled out from the above judgment, had equal applicability to both Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act. Quoting the relevant portions, His Lordship, by order dated August 10, 2022, observed that the hypothetical example given in Bahadur Singh Kathotia (supra) was not convincing and Section 5 of the Limitation Act had no manner of application in case of either belated deposit of the arrear rent along with statutory interest or belated filing of applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act. 11. What falls for decision before us is whether the decision in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra), operates as a binding precedent. The facts in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra), were not fundamentally different. When the High Court set aside the order of the trial court which allowed a belated application under Section 7(2) of the said Act and permitted belated deposit of rent, the tenant approached the Hon’ble Apex Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court, upon quoting the facts in paragraphs 1 to 4 of the judgment, framed the issue to be decided in paragraph 5 as thus:- “The question to be decided by this Court is to bring certainty in respect of scope of Section 7 of the Act.” 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court, upon quoting the facts in paragraphs 1 to 4 of the judgment, framed the issue to be decided in paragraph 5 as thus:- “The question to be decided by this Court is to bring certainty in respect of scope of Section 7 of the Act.” 12. Thus, there is no room for any doubt that the Hon’ble Apex Court proposed to bring a certainty/finality to the scope and ambit of Section 7 of the said Act, which included Sections 7(1), 7(2), and 7(3). 13. The facts of the case in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) was that the rent was not deposited by the tenant. A belated application was filed for determination of the rate of rent. Such application was allowed by the trial court, which allowed the tenant to pay the arrears of rent. When the order was challenged before the High Court, the High Court reversed the order of the trial court which gave rise to the said civil appeal. On such fact, the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the scope and ambit of Section 7 of the said Act and categorically held that the period of one month as mentioned in Section 7 (1) of the said Act, for deposit/payment of the admitted arrears along with 10% statutory interest was mandatory. In case of dispute, the requirement for the tenant to file an application for determination of the amount of rent within such period, was also mandatory. Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not have any applicability in case of belated deposit/payment of rent and/or belated filing of applications under Sections 7(1) and 7 (2) of the said Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court also held that not only filing of applications under Section 7 (1) and 7 (2) within the time prescribed by the said sections was mandatory, but so was the requirement to deposit/payment of the arrear rent with 10% statutory interest. 14. The ratio decided in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) applies to all situations, when the tenant fails to comply with the provisions of Section 7 (1) and 7 (2) of the said Act, within the time frame as prescribed under Section 7 (1), itself. The law declared in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) extends to such point and the subsequent decision in Debasish Paul (supra) agrees with the ratio of the decision in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra). The law declared in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) extends to such point and the subsequent decision in Debasish Paul (supra) agrees with the ratio of the decision in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra). The decision is a binding precedent upon all courts, be it the trial court as well as High Court. 15. Section 7 was interpreted in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) and the entire mechanism by which a tenant could seek benefit from eviction on the ground of default, was considered to be mandatory and inter-related. The provisions of the said section were discussed in the following paragraphs thereof:- “19. Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act relieves the tenant from the ejectment on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent if he pays to the landlord or deposits it with the Civil Judge all arrears of rent, calculated at the rate at which it was last paid and up to the end of the month previous to that in which the payment is made together with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum. Such payment or deposit shall be made within one month of the service of summons on the tenant or, where he appears in the suit without the summons being served upon him, within one month of his appearance. 20. Therefore, sub-section (1) deals with the payment of arrears of rent when there is no dispute about the rate of rent or the period of arrears of rent. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act comes into play if there is dispute as to the amount of rent including the period of arrears payable by the tenant. In that situation, the tenant is obliged to apply within time as specified in sub-section (1) that is within one month of the receipt of summons or within one month of appearance before the court to deposit with the Civil Judge the amount admitted by him to be due. The tenant is also required to file an application for determination of the rent payable. Such deposit is not to be accepted, unless it is accompanied by an application for determination of rent payable. Therefore, sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act requires two things, deposit of arrears of rent at the rate admitted to be due by the tenant along with an application for determination of the rent payable. Such deposit is not to be accepted, unless it is accompanied by an application for determination of rent payable. Therefore, sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act requires two things, deposit of arrears of rent at the rate admitted to be due by the tenant along with an application for determination of the rent payable. If the two conditions are satisfied then only the court having regard to the rate at which rent was last paid and for which tenant is in default, may make an order specifying the amount due. After such a determination the tenant is granted one month's time to pay to the landlord the amount which was specified. The proviso of the Act, limits the discretion of the court to extend the time for deposit of arrears of rent. The extension can be provided once and not exceeding two months. 21. Sub-section (3) provides for consequences of non-payment of rent i.e. striking off the defence against the delivery of the possession and to proceed with the hearing of the suit. Such provision is materially different from sub-sections (2-A) and (2B) which was being examined by this Court in B.P. Khemka [B.P. Khemka (P) Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, (1987) 2 SCC 407 ] . Sub-sections (2-A) and (2-B) of Section 17 of the 1956 Act confer unfettered power on the court to extend the period of deposit of rent, which is circumscribed by the proviso to Section 7(2) and sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of sub-section (2) are mandatory and required to be scrupulously followed by the tenant, if the tenant has to avoid the eviction on account of non-payment of arrears of rent under Section 6 of the Act. There is an outer limit for extension of time to deposit of arrears of rent in terms of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act. The consequences flowing from non-deposit of rent are contemplated under sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Act. There is an outer limit for extension of time to deposit of arrears of rent in terms of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act. The consequences flowing from non-deposit of rent are contemplated under sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, if the tenant fails to deposit admitted arrears of rent within one month of receipt of summons or within one month of appearance without summons and also fails to make an application for determination of the disputed amount of rate of rent and the period of arrears and the subsequent non-payment on determining of the arrears of rent, will entail the eviction of the tenant. Section 7 of the Act provides for a complete mechanism for avoiding eviction on the ground of arrears of rent, provided that the tenant takes steps as contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act and deposits the arrears of rent on determination of the disputed amount. The deposit of rent along with an application for determination of dispute is a precondition to avoid eviction on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. In view thereof, tenant will not be able to take recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act as it is not an application alone which is required to be filed by the tenant but the tenant has to deposit admitted arrears of rent as well.” 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court took note of the decisions rendered in B.P. Khemka (P) Ltd. vs. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick reported in (1987) 2 SCC 407 , Shibu Chandra Dhar vs. Pasupati Nath Auddya reported in (2002) 3 SCC 617 and Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577 , and arrived at the conclusion that the tenant would not be able to take recourse to the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court noticed the decisions in the above cases and still arrived at the conclusion that filing of the applications and deposit/payment of the admitted arrears with statutory interest, within the aforementioned period, were both mandatory pre-conditions to be complied with by a tenant, in order to avoid eviction. 17. We proceed to discuss the ratio in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra). 17. We proceed to discuss the ratio in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra). On institution of a suit by the landlord for eviction on any of the grounds referred to in Section 6 of the said Act, the tenant, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of the Section 7, was liable to pay to the landlord or deposit with the civil judge all arrears of rent calculated at the rate at which it was last paid and upto the end of the month previous to that in which the payment was made, together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum. Such payment or deposit was to be made within one month from the service of summons on the tenant or when the tenant appeared in the suit without summons being served, within one month from his appearance. Thereafter, the tenant was enjoined by law, to continue to pay to the landlord or deposit with the civil judge a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate, month by month within 15th of each succeeding month. In case of any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the tenant was liable to deposit with the civil judge, within the time specified in the sub-section, the amount admitted by him to be due from him together with an application for determination of the rent payable. No such deposit could be accepted unless it was accompanied by an application for determination of the rent payable. On receipt of the application, the civil judge, having regard to the rate at which the rent was last paid and the period for which default may have been made by the tenant, determine the dispute and pass an order within a period not exceeding one year, specifying the amount, if any, due from the tenant and thereupon the tenant was liable to pay to the landlord within one month from the date of such order, the amount so specified in the order along with the monthly rent at the rate so determined. 18. Moreover, the decision in Bahadur Singh Kathotia (supra) was rendered without consideration of the decision of the Division Bench in Calcutta Gujarati Education Society versus Sri Ajit Naraya Kapoor passed in C.O.175 of 2017, the Hon’ble Division Bench answered the reference in view of conflicting decisions of the Hon’ble Division Benches of this Court. 18. Moreover, the decision in Bahadur Singh Kathotia (supra) was rendered without consideration of the decision of the Division Bench in Calcutta Gujarati Education Society versus Sri Ajit Naraya Kapoor passed in C.O.175 of 2017, the Hon’ble Division Bench answered the reference in view of conflicting decisions of the Hon’ble Division Benches of this Court. The question formulated by the then Acting Chief Justice was as follows:- “Does the view of the Division Bench of this court that section 5 of the Limitation Act can be applied to condone delay in making applications under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 7 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, as held in the Subrata Mukherjee case (supra), survive in view of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Nasiruddin case (supra), the Ashoke Kumar Mishra case (supra), Manjushree Chakraborty case (supra).” 19. The reference was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be applied to condone delay in filing an application under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the said Act and whether the decision in Subrata Mukherjee’s case survived in view of the decision in Nasiruddin’s case, Ashok Kumar Mishra’s case and Manjushree Chakraborty’s case. Upon taking note of the judgment of the Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) the Division Bench held that the Limitation Act, 1963 had no application in respect of an application by a tenant made under Section 7 of the said Act, for determining the arrear rent, as the Act of 1997 mandated that deposit of rent or where there is dispute regarding quantum of rent, deposit of admitted rent along with application for determination of rent must be made by the tenant within the time specified under the said section. In relation to a suit for eviction, where compliance with the deposit mandate would enable the tenant to seek protection against delivery of possession, compliance with the deposit mandate was essential. No assertive right of the tenant could be enforced. Section 6 of the said Act had a non-obstante clause on application of other laws regarding eviction and Section 40 of the said Act would be applicable, subject to the limitations provided in the said Act. No assertive right of the tenant could be enforced. Section 6 of the said Act had a non-obstante clause on application of other laws regarding eviction and Section 40 of the said Act would be applicable, subject to the limitations provided in the said Act. The deposit of admitted rent, raising a dispute regarding quantum of rent, and filing an application for determination of rent, were to be made by the tenant within the specified time and could only be extendable as per the proviso to Section 7(2) of the said Act and the deposit mandate had to be followed by the tenant for protection from eviction. 20. If for any reason the tenant failed to pay/deposit rent month by month as laid down under Clause (c) of Sub-Section 1 of Section 7 of the Act or as directed by the court under Sub-Section 2 of Section 7, the tenant could get further extension of time for two months, to make such deposit. 21. In Debasish Paul (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the Limitation Act, could not be used to expand the time prescribed by the legislation and the reasoning in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) could not be doubted. More so, the requirement for the tenant to file an application and to deposit the admitted arrear rents as well, were binding, which had not done in the said case. 22. The decision in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra), is the law governing the scope of Section 7 of the said Act. The question was framed in Paragraph 5 thereof. The same is binding on all courts. The facts of the case do not make an iota of difference with the points of reference. In Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court finally interpreted Nasiruddin (supra), in paragraph 16 thereof. B.P. Khemka (supra) was also considered and distinguished in paragraph 18 and the Hon’ble Apex Court arrived at the conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply in case the benefit of protection from eviction was sought by the tenant under Section 7 of the said Act. A conjoint reading of the paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) would categorically reflect such finding. 23. Section 40 of the said Act makes the Limitation Act applicable to the provisions of the said Act, subject to other inbuilt periods of limitation prescribed. A conjoint reading of the paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) would categorically reflect such finding. 23. Section 40 of the said Act makes the Limitation Act applicable to the provisions of the said Act, subject to other inbuilt periods of limitation prescribed. The Hon’ble Apex Court discussed the provision of law and held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply if the tenant failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 7. 24. According to the ratio in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra), the period of one month as mentioned in paragraph 7(1)(b) was treated to be the inbuilt period of limitation making Section 40 of the said Act inapplicable. 25. Thus, the decision in Bahadur Kathotia (Supra) cannot be accepted as good law. The decision was rendered without considering paragraphs 19 to 21 of the Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra). The decision in Subrata Mukherjee (supra), had been distinguished in the Calcutta Gujarati Education Society (supra) in which Section 40 of the said Act was considered, but negated upon discussing the decision of Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra). The law was declared by the Apex Court, and it was the duty of the High Court to act in accordance with Article 141 of the Constitution of India and to apply the same. The High Court could not overrule the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court on the ground that the Hon’ble Apex Court had laid down the legal position, without considering Section 40 of the said Act. It is not only a matter of discipline for the High Court, but also a mandate of the Constitution as provided in Article 141 that the law declared by the Apex Court should be binding on all courts within the territory of India. All subordinate Courts to the Hon’ble Apex Court are bound by all declarations of law made by the Hon’ble Apex Court, even when the facts of the case, decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court, is distinguishable. 26. The decision in Amit Kumar Chamariya (supra) was a case decided on similar facts which arise in these revisional applications. We agree with the opinion of His Lordship who referred the matters. 27. We answer the reference as above. 28. Let the records be sent back for disposal of the revisional applications before the Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri, along with this judgment.