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2023 DIGILAW 1642 (AP)

A. M. Arunachalam v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2023-12-28

B.KRISHNA MOHAN

body2023
JUDGMENT 1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Government Pleader for Mines and Geology for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 and the learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent. 2. This writ petition is filed questioning the order of the 1st respondent in the revision application filed by the 4th respondent dtd. 29/3/2023 allowing the revision application by dismissing the claim of the petitioner. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that at the outset, the impugned memo dtd. 29/3/2023 of the 1st respondent is contrary to the Rule 35 (A) of Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 and as the revision was filed by the 4th respondent with abnormal delay, the same was not condoned by showing the sufficient reason in the impugned revisional order and as such it is defective and not sustainable under law. Initially, the petitioner was given Letter of Intent in the matter of grant of quarry lease for Black Granite over an extent 3.000 Hectares in Sy.No.885 of Kanipakam Village, Irala Mandal, Chittoor District by the 2nd respondent. The said Letter of Intent was extended first time in favour of the petitioner vide proceedings of the 2nd respondent dtd. 29/12/2020 and the similar extension was made by the 2nd respondent in favour of the petitioner vide proceedings dtd. 11/1/2022. The Form-"P" application submitted by the petitioner dtd. 20/1/2012 discloses at the Column of the name of the applicant as Sri A.M. Arunachalam represented by Jalakam Murali, Managing Director M/s. TAM Granites & Marbles Private Limited. 4. He further submits that the petitioner came out of the company in the year, 2014 and when the revision was filed against the grant of Letter of Intent in favour of the petitioner there was an abnormal delay on the part of the 4th respondent, which was also brought to the notice of the revisional authority by way of defence by the petitioner stating that the impugned revision application was submitted after 29 months from the date of Letter of Intent, 18 months from the date of 1st extension and 7 months from the date of 2nd extension of the Letter of Intent, which is contrary to Rule 35 A of APMMC Rules as the revision should have been submitted by the aggrieved party within 3 months as per the Rules. 5. 5. Though the said defence was recorded by the revisional authority in the impugned order dtd. 29/3/2023 there was no further discussion on that aspect and the revision applicant also did not show the sufficient cause for the above said delay and there is no specific finding to condone the delay of such filing of the revision upon satisfaction of the reasons mentioned by the revision applicant in the impugned order of the 1st respondent dtd. 29/3/2023. In the Form-"P" application of the 4th respondent herein also at column 7 they have mentioned that there is no delay in filing the revision by mentioning it as "yes". 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decisions of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh reported in Karusala Nageswara Rao Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, 2011 (6) ALD 31 . and the relevant portion of the said order in W.P.No.12844 of 2009 and WPMP.No.16632 of 2009 and WVMP.No.3872 of 2009 dtd. 28/6/2011 is as under:- 6. At the hearing, Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner, advanced the following contentions -(1) the revision petition filed by respondent No.4 under Rule 35-A of the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 (for short 'the Rules') is barred by limitation, as neither the said revision was filed within the stipulated time of 90 days nor a request was made for condonation of delay nor respondent No.1 has specifically condoned the delay in filing the revision petition. 9. As regards the first submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, I find merit therein. Rule 35-A of the Rules prescribes filing of revision within 90 days of passing of the order. Under proviso to Rule 35-C, if the revisional authority is satisfied that the petitioner had made out sufficient cause for not filing the revision within the specified time, it can entertain the same by condoning the delay and dispose of the revision. As noted above, even though Column No.7 of Form-J referred to delay of one year and with the further statement that the reasons for such delay were mentioned in the grounds of revision, no specific reasons were given, except the plea that respondent No.4 shifted his family from Nellore to Bangalore and that the order under revision passed by respondent No.2 was not served on him. On its part, respondent No.1 also failed to address this aspect even though the petitioner has raised specific objection, which was religiously incorporated by respondent No.1 in Paragraph 18 of the impugned order. Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent No.1 has committed a procedural illegality in disposing of the revision on merits before condoning the delay occurred in filing the revision petition by respondent No.4. 7. In the other decision reported in Sakku Granites, Chittoor, A.P. Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, 2015 (3) ALD 707 . the relevant portion of the said order in W.P.No.4169 of 2008 dtd. 29/10/2014 is as under: 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the revision application filed by the fourth respondent is hopelessly barred by time and contrary to Rule 35-A of the Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 (for short, the Rules), and the same should not have been entertained by the first respondent. If the application of the fourth respondent is rejected on the ground of limitation, the application of the petitioner could be entitled for consideration and they would be eligible to get the quarry lease. Learned Counsel for the fourth respondent, on the other hand, contends that the fourth respondent came to know about the mischief committed by the Mandal Revenue Officer in rejecting the No Objection Certificate earlier in respect of the fourth respondent whereas granting No Objection Certificate in respect of M/s. Hanuman Granites and M/s. Bharath Granites. The said fact came to be known only when the Mandal Revenue Officer addressed a letter on 22/1/2004, and when the fourth respondent came to know that the application of the M/s. Alex Granites is being processed for grant, the revision was filed. 7. The said fact came to be known only when the Mandal Revenue Officer addressed a letter on 22/1/2004, and when the fourth respondent came to know that the application of the M/s. Alex Granites is being processed for grant, the revision was filed. 7. Rule 35-A of the Rules reads as follows: "35-A. Revision :- The Government may either suo motu at any time or on an application made within ninety days, call for and examine the record relating to any order passed or proceeding taken by the Director, Joint Director, Deputy Director or Assistant Director under these rules for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality or propriety of such order or as the regularity of such proceedings and pass such order in reference thereto as they think fit : Provided that no order adversely affecting any person shall be passed under this rule unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his representation." 8. Proviso to Rule 35-C of the Rules enables the filing of an application if the applicant satisfies the Director/State Government that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the specified time, and it reads as follows: "Provided that any such application may be entertained after the said period of two months/ninety days specified in Rule 35-A, if the applicant satisfies the Director/State Government that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the specified time." 9. In Noharlal Verma v. District Cooperative Central Bank Limited, (2008) 14 SCC 445 , the Supreme Court held as follows: "32. Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation, a Court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits. 33. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: "(3) Bar of limitation.-(1) Subject to the provisions contained in Ss. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation, a Court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits. 33. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: "(3) Bar of limitation.-(1) Subject to the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence." (Emphasis supplied) Bare reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for doubt that if a suit is instituted, appeal is preferred or application is made after the prescribed period, it has to be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or defence has been set up. In other words, even in absence of such plea by the defendant, respondent or opponent, the Court or authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is satisfied that the suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation. 34. As stated earlier, Sec. 55 allows an aggrieved party to approach the Registrar within a period of thirty days. There is no provision analogous to Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 allowing the Registrar to condone delay if "sufficient cause" is shown. In view of this fact, in our opinion, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Bank is well founded that the application submitted by the appellant was barred by time." 10. In the said case there was no provision for condoning the delay. But even though a provision is available for condoning the delay, such delay can be condoned only on an application showing sufficient cause. 11. The Supreme Court in Prakash H. Jain v. Marie Fernandes, (2003) 8 SCC 431 , held that there is no such thing as any inherent power of Court to condone delay in filing proceedings before Court/ Authority concerned, unless the law warrants and permits it. 11. The Supreme Court in Prakash H. Jain v. Marie Fernandes, (2003) 8 SCC 431 , held that there is no such thing as any inherent power of Court to condone delay in filing proceedings before Court/ Authority concerned, unless the law warrants and permits it. It was held that a competent authority under the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, is merely a statutory authority created for a definite purpose and to exercise, no doubt, powers in a quasi judicial manner but its powers are strictly circumscribed by the very statutory provisions which conferred upon it those powers and the same could be exercised in the manner provided therefor and subject to such conditions and limitations stipulated by the very provision of law under which the competent authority itself has been created. 12. The fourth respondent did not state anything against Column No.7 of proforma of revision filed in Form-J. The revision petition of the fourth respondent was considered on the ground that the Mandal Revenue Officer did not consider the facts properly at the time of consideration of the fourth respondent's application and the later application of M/s. Alex Granites is being considered. There is no whisper with regard to the delay or the grounds on which such delay could have been condoned. In fact, the fourth respondent submitted a letter to the second respondent on 12/7/1999 seeking 10 days time for submitting the clarification from the D.F.O., but the application of the fourth respondent was rejected on 5/7/2000 by the Joint Director of Mines and Geology. Even then the fourth respondent did not take immediate steps. 13. The fourth respondent waited till 12/3/2007. The alleged ground of knowledge of later events at a later point of time put forward by the learned Counsel for the fourth respondent is not found anywhere in record. Hence, in view of the ratio held by the Supreme Court in the above decisions, the consideration of the revision application filed by the fourth respondent in the year 2007 against the order of the Joint Director of Mines and Geology passed in the year 2000 without an application seeking condonation of delay by showing sufficient cause is clearly not maintainable. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Karusala Nageswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2011 (6) ALD 31 , also took the same view. 14. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Karusala Nageswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2011 (6) ALD 31 , also took the same view. 14. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs. "8. On the other hand the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 submits that in the Form-"P" application of the petitioner though the above said particulars at Column Nos. i, ii and iii (b) are mentioned but he has enclosed the certification of incorporation of TAM Granites and Marbles Private Limited. But it is true that the respondent authorities issued Letter of Intent in favour of the petitioner which is contrary to the rules. The 1st respondent while considering the matter on merits rectified the mistake committed earlier in grant of LOI and as such, the revision was allowed by the impugned order dtd. 29/3/2023. 9. The learned counsel for the 4th respondent also submits that in the grounds of revision, the 4th respondent explained the reasons for non-filing of the revision within 90 days, but the same was not reflected in the impugned order while discussing the case on it's own merits. 10. In view of the above said facts and circumstances, as the impugned proceedings of the 1st respondent dtd. 29/3/2023 is silent with regard to the condonation of delay in filing the revision application as it is ex facie contrary to the rules and decisions of the erstwhile High Court reported in 2011 (1) ALD 31 and 2015 (3) ALD 707 , this Court is constrained to set aside the impugned order of the 1st respondent dtd. 29/3/2023 by remanding the matter to the 1st respondent to consider afresh to deal with the aspect of delay in filing the revision also and appropriate orders shall be passed in revision on it's own merits afresh uninfluenced by the earlier impugned order dtd. 29/3/2023 which is set aside herewith. The Revisional authority can dispose of the revision application pursuant to the remand as expeditiously as possible by giving due opportunity to all the parties concerned within a period of three (03) months from the date of receipt of this order." 15. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. 16. The Revisional authority can dispose of the revision application pursuant to the remand as expeditiously as possible by giving due opportunity to all the parties concerned within a period of three (03) months from the date of receipt of this order." 15. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. 16. As a sequel, Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.