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2023 DIGILAW 1642 (CAL)

Mahesh Lall v. Union Of India

2023-12-22

I.P.MUKERJI, SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL)

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JUDGMENT : I. P. Mukerji, J. BACKGROUND FACTS : 1. The petitioner Mahesh Lall was posted as Policeman in Police Station Aberdeen. On 4th July, 2011 allegedly while on duty, between 5 PM and 8 PM near Ayyanar temple, South Point, he along with the other co-accused abducted a minor girl V. Rama Devi, raped her between 4th and 7th July, 2011 repeatedly in a hotel, in a rented room and in the Corbyn’s Cove area. Later they left her near the government press building. 2. The above finding was made on preliminary enquiry by the respondents. The petitioner’s conduct was found to be “grossly immoral, indisciplined and detrimental to the reputation and discipline of the force”. Applying rules 8.39, 8.40, 8.42, 8.45 and 8.45 of the Andaman and Nicobar Police Manual, 1963, it was alleged that the above conduct made the petitioner unworthy of being a member of the force and liable to receive punishment under rule 9.3. 3. A disciplinary proceeding under rule 9.3 was initiated against the petitioner. On 11th July, 2011 he was suspended. 4. Meanwhile, on the self same accusation a criminal case (Sessions Case No. 106 of 2011) was started against the petitioner in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Andaman and Nicobar Islands. At the trial, the victim and her mother turned hostile. The victim stated that she made the section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure statement at the instigation of the police. She also said that in the T.I. Parade she identified the accused on the basis of training received by her from the police which inter alia included showing the photographs of the accused in the police station. The mother also did not make any accusation against the accused. In fact she said that she had no idea about the contents of the first information report. 5. I shall deal with this criminal proceeding in detail later on in this judgment. 6. By the judgment and order dated 30th July, 2013, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the accused. 7. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 17th April, 2014 to which the charged employee submitted his reply. On 5th November, 2014 the Disciplinary Authority made a decision dismissing the petitioner from service. 8. On 12th May, 2015 his appeal to the Appellate Authority was also dismissed. 9. 7. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 17th April, 2014 to which the charged employee submitted his reply. On 5th November, 2014 the Disciplinary Authority made a decision dismissing the petitioner from service. 8. On 12th May, 2015 his appeal to the Appellate Authority was also dismissed. 9. Being aggrieved, he approached the Central Administrative Tribunal in its Circuit Bench at Port Blair by way of an Original application. On 1st October, 2015, the tribunal quashed the orders of the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities. It directed a fresh enquiry. 10. Consequential to the order of the tribunal on 27th January, 2016, the petitioner was reinstated in service but was to be treated as in deemed suspension with effect from 5th November, 2014. 11. On 2nd February, 2016 a fresh enquiry was commenced. 12. The Enquiry Officer concluded that there was not sufficient material to pronounce the charged officer as guilty. 13. This was not accepted by the Disciplinary Authority. It entered a finding that the evidence against the charged officer was sufficient. It relied upon the test identification parade where the victim minor girl had identified the charged employee. It also relied upon the statements made by the victim before the Magistrate under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code implicating the charged officer. 14. The Disciplinary Authority by its decision dated 4th January, 2018 reiterated that the guilt of the petitioner had been proved, he was unfit to be in the force and affirmed the proposed penalty of dismissal from service. 15. The appeal from the decision of the Disciplinary Authority was dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 18th May 2018. 16. Being aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority, once again, the petitioner approached the tribunal. It was able to dispose of the original application on 5th January, 2021. It set aside the order of the Appellate Authority and remanded the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority to adjudicate the case afresh. 17. On 6th July, 2021 the Disciplinary Authority reaffirmed the order of the dismissal of the petitioner. Once more the petitioner availed of his remedy of statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority. 18. On 9th July 2022 the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal. Before the Appellate Authority the contention that the criminal court had honourably acquitted the accused was raised. 17. On 6th July, 2021 the Disciplinary Authority reaffirmed the order of the dismissal of the petitioner. Once more the petitioner availed of his remedy of statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority. 18. On 9th July 2022 the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal. Before the Appellate Authority the contention that the criminal court had honourably acquitted the accused was raised. It was also urged that when the prosecution was found to have not proved their case against the petitioner, he was entitled to be exonerated in the disciplinary proceeding. However, on 9th July 2022 by its order, the Appellate Authority did not accept this plea. The appeal was dismissed. 19. The petitioner once again approached the tribunal which by its judgment and order dated 24th May, 2023 upheld the decision of the disciplinary proceeding and that before the Appellate Authority dismissing the writ petitioner from service. PRESENT WRIT AND DISCUSSION : 20. This writ application challenging the said order of the tribunal dated 24th May, 2023 is sought to be maintained by the writ petitioner on a solitary ground. It is this. When the criminal court, on the self same charges as were the grounds for dismissal of the writ petitioner from service, has acquitted him, should the Disciplinary Authority have followed the findings of the criminal court and returned a decision exonerating him from the charges? In the alternative, how relevant were the findings of the criminal court before the Disciplinary Authority? How, the tribunal ought to have dealt with the matter in view of the said order of the acquittal of the writ petitioner? 21. Right at the beginning it needs to be reiterated that a disciplinary proceeding is civil in nature as opposed to a criminal proceeding. The standard of proof in a civil proceeding is on a balance of probabilities. In criminal proceedings it is very high. The guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. There are cases galore where side by side with disciplinary proceedings, criminal proceedings on the same charges have commenced and have proceeded. Criminal courts have exonerated the accused during the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding. 22. The question is what weight has to be given to the decision of the criminal court in the disciplinary proceedings? 23. The authorities on the subject need to be analyzed. 24. Criminal courts have exonerated the accused during the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding. 22. The question is what weight has to be given to the decision of the criminal court in the disciplinary proceedings? 23. The authorities on the subject need to be analyzed. 24. The principles of law laid down in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and others reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 are well settled. The Court in its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall not investigate into the adequacy of evidence in the departmental enquiry, provided, there is some credible evidence on which the authority has acted. Neither the Court shall investigate into the correctness of the fact finding by the disciplinary authority unless it is based on no evidence or has been arrived at in breach of the rules of natural justice. 25. In Deputy Inspector General of Police vs. S. Samuthiram reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 the Supreme Court made it clear that there was no rule of law or principle by which acquittal in a criminal proceedings whether honourable or not would result in a decision in a departmental proceeding, on the selfsame charges, favourable to the delinquent. Moreover it noted that the standard of proof in a criminal case where the prosecution had to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt was different from that in a civil case where the decision had to be reached on a balance of probabilities. Whilst in the absence of “higher level of proof” an accused may be acquitted by a criminal court, on similar amount of evidence a Disciplinary Authority, a civil authority could come to a conclusion on a balance of probabilities, holding the accused guilty. 26. State of Rajasthan and other vs. Heem Singh reported in (2021) 12 SCC 569 , while reiterating that there was no principle of criminal law defining “honourable acquittal”, reiterated that an order of dismissal could be passed against the employee who had been acquitted of the criminal charge. When an accused is discharged or acquitted on the prosecution witness or witnesses turning hostile then the acquittal cannot be called honourable. 27. When an accused is discharged or acquitted on the prosecution witness or witnesses turning hostile then the acquittal cannot be called honourable. 27. The Supreme Court in Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and others reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1618 opined: “The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used. 28. Here I note the observation of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. B.C. Chaturvedi reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 . The Disciplinary Authority or Appellate Authority “is invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct”. If the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is so disproportionate that it “shocks the conscience” of the High Court or the tribunal, it has the power to either direct the authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or in exceptional cases itself impose the appropriate punishment. 29. At this stage it is very important to know the manner in which the trial proceeded before the learned Sessions Court. 30. 16 witnesses including the victim and her mother were examined. The statement of the victim under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was tendered in court and marked as an exhibit. So were the recording and results of the TI parade, the medical report of the victim and the accused persons. 31. It is absolutely true that the victim and her mother who were prosecution witnesses 1 and 2 turned hostile and had to be crossexamined by the prosecution. They deposed that the victim had not been kidnapped or confined or raped by any of the accused persons. They denied having made any statement to this effect. Any statement if at all had been made at the instigation of the police. The victim went on to say the identification made by her at the T.I. parade was at the instigation of the police and that she was tutored by the police to make the identification by them. 32. They denied having made any statement to this effect. Any statement if at all had been made at the instigation of the police. The victim went on to say the identification made by her at the T.I. parade was at the instigation of the police and that she was tutored by the police to make the identification by them. 32. The respondents seek to brush aside this testimony by asserting that the victim and her mother had been intimidated or bribed by the accused persons. 33. Now even if the version of the respondents is believed, was there any evidence before the court to establish the culpability of the accused? 34. The prosecution witness No. 6 was one Doctor Amitabha Mukhopadhyay who had examined the victim. According to him the victim’s hymen was absent. His examination revealed that she was accustomed to “habitual sex”. There was no trace of violence or inflammation in her relevant physical parts. 35. The learned Judge has remarked that the evidence of all witnesses except the prosecution witness no. 16 was unsatisfactory. He went on to observe that even the forensic report revealed that the blood group found in the seized items and the blood group of the accused did not match. 36. The learned Judge came to the ultimate conclusion that the prosecution had been unable to prove its case. CONCLUSIONS 37. Now if the entire evidence of the parties rested on the testimony of the victim and her mother, and thereafter their turning hostile, accompanied by the allegation that they were intimidated or bribed, then perhaps an inference could have been drawn that the acquittal of the accused petitioner was not honourable due to failure of the prosecution’s case on the ground that its witnesses had turned hostile at the instigation of the accused petitioner. 38. Here there was a large scale trial where apart from their witnesses turning hostile, the other witnesses including the doctor gave evidence which did not support the prosecution case at all. If we take into account the original evidence of the victim and her mother, on appraisal of the entire evidence it is difficult to come to a view that the case of the prosecution could have been maintained even if the standard of proof was on a balance of probabilities. 39. If we take into account the original evidence of the victim and her mother, on appraisal of the entire evidence it is difficult to come to a view that the case of the prosecution could have been maintained even if the standard of proof was on a balance of probabilities. 39. Therefore, on the above facts and circumstances, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority ought to have taken into account the finding and the judgment and order of the learned District and Sessions Court dated 30th July, 2013 in adjudicating the proceedings against the petitioner. Furthermore, the decision of the Disciplinary Authority had to also consider the principle of proportionate punishment as laid down in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and others reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 . 40. I accept the view of the respondents that being a disciplined force a strict standard has to be maintained for members of the force. Further, being such a force, on whatever allegation has been proved against the petitioner, strict action is necessary. 41. In those circumstances, I modify the final judgment and order dated 24th May, 2023 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta bench, the order dated 6th July, 2021 of the Disciplinary Authority and the order dated 9th July, 2022 of the Appellate Authority only to the extent that the punishment to be imposed on the writ petitioner shall not include dismissal or removal from service. Any other punishment may be imposed. All consequential benefits are to be released to the writ petitioner. The petitioner is to be reinstated in service immediately if not already reinstated provided he has not crossed the retirement age. This order is to be complied with within eight weeks of communication of this order. 42. The writ application is accordingly disposed of. SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J. (concurring) – I am in respectful agreement with all the findings and conclusions reached by my learned senior brother I. P. Mukerji, J. 1. But this concurring note is being put on record considering certain conducts of a Disciplinary Authority which prima facie show abuse of power, when the Disciplinary Authority do not abide by the rules and the principles of natural justice. But this concurring note is being put on record considering certain conducts of a Disciplinary Authority which prima facie show abuse of power, when the Disciplinary Authority do not abide by the rules and the principles of natural justice. Circumstance in the present case, required this Court to interfere, when it found that the findings are based on absolutely no evidence and suffer from clear perversity, when total disregard of materials on record is found and the final decision of a Disciplinary Authority is made only on the basis of his wish, position and power. 2. The Supreme Court in the State of Rajasthan and others vs. Heem Singh in Civil Appeal No. 3340 of 2020 decided on 29th October, 2020 held : “33. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy – deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges’ craft is in vain. 3. On careful reading of the Judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Court in Sessions Case No. 106 of 2011 dated 30th July, 2013, the following relevant findings of the learned Sessions Judge on appreciation of the evidence on record is reproduced here ; “Therefore, considering the entire evidence on record, it is found that the prosecution side could not prove by any satisfactory evidence the charges against any of the accused persons. The prosecution side failed to prove that the accused persons kidnapped the victim or wrongfully confined or raped, or threatened, or intimidated her in any manner so that the accused persons can be found guilty of any of the charges against them.” These findings and conclusion of the learned Sessions Court meets the requirement of an honourable acquittal. 4. The prosecution side failed to prove that the accused persons kidnapped the victim or wrongfully confined or raped, or threatened, or intimidated her in any manner so that the accused persons can be found guilty of any of the charges against them.” These findings and conclusion of the learned Sessions Court meets the requirement of an honourable acquittal. 4. The said findings of the learned Sessions Judge was based on the following evidence other than the fact that the complainant (mother of the victim and the victim herself) turned hostile. (i) The evidence of the doctor, PW-6, who found no marks of violence or inflammation in and around the vagina and opined that the victim was habituated to sex. (ii) PW-16, the Investigating Officer, arrested the principal accused Laxman Rao (also acquitted) and went to M.S.M. Hotel and interrogated the staffs and found that one Narayan Rao had brought the victim to the hotel. She arrested the Manager and staff of the hotel and one Auto Driver, Narayan Sarkar. The names of the other accused persons including that of the petitioner herein allegedly transpired from the statement of witnesses, none of whom on dock supported this fact. (iii) PW-16, as per the statement of accused Prabashish Golder, recovered blood stained bed cover, red colour top and other materials from the hotel. (iv) Exhibit 15, the forensic report also did not support the prosecution case. As per the forensic report, the blood group in the seized materials was found to be “blood group A”. Whereas, the blood group of the accused persons were found to be either O+ve or B+ve and the blood group of the victim was found to be O+ve. As such the forensic report did not prove that the blood on the seized alamat from the hotel was in any way connected to either the victim or the accused persons. 5. On a preliminary inquiry by the respondents, the petitioner was suspended on 11th July, 2011. 6. After the judgment of acquittal passed on 30th July, 2013, the respondents issued a show cause notice and proceeded with the disciplinary proceedings. 7. By an order dated 5th November, 2014, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the petitioner from service, though the primary witnesses (the victim and her mother) were not even examined. 8. Vide an order dated 12th May, 2015 his appeal was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority. 9. 7. By an order dated 5th November, 2014, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the petitioner from service, though the primary witnesses (the victim and her mother) were not even examined. 8. Vide an order dated 12th May, 2015 his appeal was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority. 9. The Central Administrative Tribunal (Circuit Bench) at Port Blair on 1st October, 2023 quashed the orders of the disciplinary and appellate authority and directed a fresh inquiry on the observations : “12. The ld. Counsel for the respondents would try to explain and expound by pointing out that the whereabouts of the said, B. Kausalamma and her daughter the victim girl Rama Devi were not known and that was why they could not be examined before the disciplinary authority. It is a shocking news for CAT that Police Department itself which is conducting the disciplinary proceedings could not secure the presence of the complainant as well as the victim girl. 13. We are of the considered view that no stones should be left unturned for securing the presence of the complainant as well as the victim girl at the expense of the State and even if they are in the Mainland their presence should be secured at the cost of the State and they should be examined, otherwise it would be presumed that the department concerned did not take appropriate action in conducting the departmental proceedings. “14.................Here we would like to point out that because some of the officers in the departmental proceedings, did not take appropriate steps in conducting the departmental proceedings, the justice should not be the victim.” 10. Then as per direction of the learned Tribunal in para 16, the petitioner was reinstated in service on 27th January, 2016, but was treated in deemed suspension with effect from 5th November, 2014. 11. As directed by the learned Tribunal, a fresh inquiry was conducted and the victim and her mother were examined as PW-5 and PW-6 by the Inquiry Officer. Before the Inquiry Officer also the victim and her mother whose evidence was duly recorded, did not support the case against the petitioner. Both the mother and daughter have denied the alleged allegations against the petitioner. The fresh statements made before the Inquiry Officer again supported the petitioner. 12. Before the Inquiry Officer also the victim and her mother whose evidence was duly recorded, did not support the case against the petitioner. Both the mother and daughter have denied the alleged allegations against the petitioner. The fresh statements made before the Inquiry Officer again supported the petitioner. 12. On completion of the inquiry, in respect of the petitioner, a 12 page inquiry report dated 7th May, 2016 was submitted on the basis of evidence recorded with the conclusion as follows : “CONCLUSION : On assessment of evidence based on examination of witnesses, analyzing of documents during departmental (Common) proceeding as well as after going through the facts and circumstances of the entire case, the article of charge against the charged officer (PC 1310 Mahesh Lall and PC 1354 Prabir Kumar Mazumdar) has not stand prove due to insufficient evidence.” 13. The disciplinary authority vide a memorandum dated 28th September, 2016 on perusal of the findings submitted by the Inquiry Officer together with the statement of the complainant and the victim relied upon statements under Section 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure, held that the complainant and the victim girl who turned hostile might have been won over by the Charged Officer as they come from a poor background. The authority held that the acquittal of the Charged officer was not an honourable acquittal as initially the victim girl had identified the Charged Officer during Test Identification Parade. The authority further held that the Charged Officers managed to influence the complainant and the victim during the de-novo inquiry and finally held as follows : “I am therefore in disagreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer that the evidence collected during the enquiry is insufficient to prove the charge framed against the charged officer. In view of the circumstantial and oral evidences on record, I hold that the charged officers cannot be exonerated from the charges levelled against them and as such, I disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer to the above given context.” 14. In view of the circumstantial and oral evidences on record, I hold that the charged officers cannot be exonerated from the charges levelled against them and as such, I disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer to the above given context.” 14. By Order No. 38 dated 4th January, 2018, the Disciplinary Authority finally held that : “AND WHEREAS, tentatively disagreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, a disagreement note along with the findings vide Memorandum No. SP(D)/SA/DE-21/2014- 16/6295 dated 28/09/2016, the Charged Officers PC/1310 Mahes Lall (U/S) and PC/1354 Prabir Kumar Mazumder (U/S) were called upon to submit their replies in response to the above by giving them an opportunity to appear in person before the Disciplinary Authority for explaining their position, after submitting their written replies…………... It is also significant to mention that during the Test Identification Parade, the victim minor girl had rightly identified the Charged Officers PC/1310 Mahes Lall (U/S) and PC/1354 Prabir Kumar Mazumder (U/S) as accused persons. Furthermore, while recording the victim’s statement made before Ld. Magistrate u/s 164 Cr.PC, she had also stated about heinous offence committed by the Charged officers. The evidences collected during the enquiry is sufficient to prove the charges framed against the Charge Officers on the basis of the circumstantial and oral evidences on record. The Charged Officers cannot be exonerated from the charges levelled against them and as such, the undersigned is in a disagreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, the charges levelled against the Charge Officers have been found to be substantial on the principle of preponderance of probability…........................……….. 15. And, finally, made the proposed penalty of “Dismissal from Service, from A & N Police with immediate effect” absolute, for poor misconduct on their part. 16. The Appellate Authority dismissed an appeal on 18th May, 2018. 17. The Tribunal by an order dated 2nd August, 2023 dismissed the original application filed by the petitioner. 18. In B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of Indian and others [(1995) 6 Supreme Court Cases 749 in Civil Appeal No. 9830 of 1995], the Supreme Court held that : “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. 23. It deserves to be pointed out that the mere fact that there is no provision parallel to Article 142 relating to the High Courts, can be no ground to think that they have not to do complete justice, and if moulding of relief would do complete justice between the parties, the same cannot be ordered. Absence of provision like Article 142 is not material, according to me. This may be illustrated by pointing out that despite there being no provision in the Constitution parallel to Article 137 conferring power of review on the High Court, this Court held as early as 1961 in Shivdeo Singh case that the High Courts too can exercise power of review, which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction. I would say that power to do complete justice also inheres in every Court, not to speak of a court of plenary jurisdiction like a High Court. Of Course, this power is not as wide as which this Court has under Article 142. That, however, is a different matter. 24. What has been stated above may be buttressed by putting the matter a little differently. The same is that in a case of a dismissal, Article 21 gets attracted, and, in view of the interdependence of fundamental rights, which concept was first accepted in the case commonly known as Bank Nationalisation case, which thinking was extended to cases attracting Article 21 in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, the punishment/penalty awarded has to be reasonable; and if it be unreasonable, Article 14 would be violated. That Article 14 gets attracted in a case of disproportionate punishment was the view of this Court in Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P. also. Now if Article 14 were to be violated, it cannot be doubted that a High Court can take care of the same by substituting, in appropriate cases, a punishment deemed reasonable by it.” 19. In Civil Appeal No. 5848 of 2021 (Union of India & Ors. vs. Dalbir Singh) the Supreme Court held (relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein):- “25. This Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 764 held that the degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. It was held as under:- “11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.” (Emphasis Supplied) 26. This Court in Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA & Ors. (2007) 10 SCC 385 , held that the criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public, whereas, the departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It was held as under: “11. A bare perusal of the order which has been quoted in its totality goes to show that the same is not based on any rational foundation. The conceptual difference between a departmental inquiry and criminal proceedings has not been kept in view. Even orders passed by the executive have to be tested on the touchstone of reasonableness. [See Tata Cellular v. Union of India [ (1994) 6 SCC 651 ] and Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh [ (2004) 2 SCC 130 ] .] The conceptual difference between departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings have been highlighted by this Court in several cases. Reference may be made to Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. T. Srinivas [ (2004) 7 SCC 442 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1011], Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Reference may be made to Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. T. Srinivas [ (2004) 7 SCC 442 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1011], Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry [ (2005) 10 SCC 471 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1605] and Uttaranchal RTC v. Mansaram Nainwal [ (2006) 6 SCC 366 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1341] . “8. … The purpose of departmental inquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offense for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in the criminal cases against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental inquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offense generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When the trial for a criminal offense is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offense as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [in short ‘the Evidence Act’]. The converse is the case of departmental inquiry. The inquiry in a departmental proceeding relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. … Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental inquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defense at the trial in a criminal case. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. … Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental inquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defense at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances.” 27. This Court in Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya & Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 699 , held that in the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment. It was held as under: “7. …There is yet another reason. The approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Penal Code, 1860, if any) are established and, if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings, to repeat, should not be a matter of course but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly delayed.” (Emphasis Supplied) 28. Mr. Yadav, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted that during the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court, 9 (1997) 2 SCC 699 the appellants were given opportunity to produce the registers of the entrustment of S.L.R. to the writ petitioner. But it was stated that record was not available being an old record as the incident was of 1993. The enquiry was initiated in 2013 after the acquittal of the writ petitioner from the criminal trial. Therefore, in the absence of the best evidence of registers, the oral evidence of use of official weapon stands proven on the basis of oral testimony of the departmental witnesses. 29. The enquiry was initiated in 2013 after the acquittal of the writ petitioner from the criminal trial. Therefore, in the absence of the best evidence of registers, the oral evidence of use of official weapon stands proven on the basis of oral testimony of the departmental witnesses. 29. The burden of proof in the departmental proceedings is not of beyond reasonable doubt as is the principle in the criminal trial but probabilities of the misconduct. The delinquent such as the writ petitioner could examine himself to rebut the allegations of misconduct including use of personal weapon. In fact, the reliance of the writ petitioner is upon a communication dated 1.5.2014 made to the Commandant through the inquiry officer. He has stated that he has not fired on higher officers and that he was out of camp at the alleged time of incident. Therefore, a false case has been made against him. His further stand is that it was a terrorist attack and terrorists have fired on the Camp. None of the departmental witnesses have been even suggested about any terrorist attack or that the writ petitioner was out of camp. Constable D.K. Mishra had immobilized the writ petitioner whereas all other witnesses have seen the writ petitioner being immobilized and being removed to quarter guard. PW-5 Brij Kishore Singh deposed that 3-4 soldiers had taken the Self-Loading Rifle (S.L.R.) of the writ petitioner in their possession. Therefore, the allegations in the chargesheet dated 25.2.2013 that the writ petitioner has fired from the official weapon is a reliable finding returned by the Departmental Authorities on the basis of evidence placed before them. It is not a case of no evidence, which alone would warrant interference by the High Court in exercise of power of judicial review. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that there was any infraction of any rule or regulations or the violation of the principles of natural justice. he best available evidence had been produced by the appellants in the course of enquiry conducted after long lapse of time.” 20. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that there was any infraction of any rule or regulations or the violation of the principles of natural justice. he best available evidence had been produced by the appellants in the course of enquiry conducted after long lapse of time.” 20. From the said series of events as noted above it is evident that : (i) On full consideration of the prosecution evidence on record, before the Sessions Court, (even if the complainant and the victim had not turned hostile, and on careful reading of the entire judgment, it appears that acquittal of the petitioner/accused was inevitable, as the other evidences on record being the medical and forensic report also did not support the prosecution case, nor did the other witnesses. The said materials on record has thus given the petitioner an honourable acquittal. (ii) The Inquiry report dated 7th May, 2016 also found that there was no evidence to establish the guilt or misconduct on the part of the petitioner. (iii) Inspite of such findings (of the Court and Inquiry Officer) being on record, the Disciplinary Authority was of the opinion that inspite of the victim not supporting the Test Identification Parade and her statement under Section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure, before a Court of Law, the fact that she had initially identified and made the statement, the petitioners’ punishment was to be dismissal of service being unfit for the force. 21. There is absolutely no other observation or finding against the petitioner in the said order of the disciplinary authority. 22. If such actions are accepted, then no person would be safe from just the words of another. 23. The said/conduct of the disciplinary authority is clearly an abuse of power and totally against the principles of natural justice. 24. The total disregard of the order of a competent Court and the report of the Enquiry Officer, inspite of there being no independent, specific findings of the disciplinary authority against the petitioner, goes to show that the disciplinary authority was hell bent on dismissing the petitioner from service. And as such, no reasoning nor the principles of natural justice was followed. 25. And as such, no reasoning nor the principles of natural justice was followed. 25. Using the excuse of being a disciplined service, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the petitioner in the most unjust and perverse manner, by clear abuse of power without following any rules or the principles of natural justice. 26. Finally, in the present case, it is found that neither the disciplinary authority/nor the appellate authority followed the rules of natural justice. The findings of Disciplinary Authority is based on ‘no evidence’ and has been passed without considering the vital evidence on record which is a clear perverse determination of fact [State of Rajasthan vs. Heem Singh (Supra)].