JUDGMENT : 1. By the present Appeal from Order, the appellant is challenging the order dated 24.01.2023 passed by the Civil Judge Senior Division, Aurangabad in Special Civil Suit No.1186 of 2022 in Exh.5 application, whereby the Civil Judge Senior Division clamped injunction against the present appellant – original defendant, directing the defendant not to create third party interest in the suit property during pendency of the Special Civil Suit No.1186 of 2022. Facts giving rise to the filing the present Appeal from Order can be briefly summarized as under: 2. The respondent – plaintiff is an agriculturist and deals in real estate. The appellant – defendant is the lawful owner and possessor of the land to the extent of 1 Hector 21 R. land out of Gat No.114/1 situated at village Nakshatrawadi, Aurangabad. The appellant – defendant entered and executed agreement to sell in favour of the respondent – plaintiff on 17.06.2002. As the defendant allegedly failed to perform her part of contract, the plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No.113/2014 for specific performance of contract and the said suit came to be dismissed. Against the said dismissal, Regular Civil Appeal No.287 of 2016 is filed and the same is still pending before the Ad-hoc District Judge-2, Aurangabad. 3. It is the case of the plaintiff that during the pendency of the said Appeal, the defendant and her husband approached to the plaintiff and offered to compromise the matter on payment of higher consideration amount for the suit land and to settle the matter once for all. The plaintiff considering his own old age and that of the defendant too and with a view to settle the old litigation agreed for the same. The defendant thereby entered into a new agreement with plaintiff vide notary registered agreement dated 07.05.2022 in presence of witnesses including her husband, her then lawyers and grand-son of the plaintiff for sale of the suit land. 4. It is further the case of the respondent – plaintiff that in terms of the agreement, the plaintiff has paid the defendant Rs.10,00,000/- vide cheque No.479446 drawn on Axis Bank on the very date of the agreement out of the agreed total consideration amount of Rs.1,11,00,000/- [One Crore and Eleven Lakh rupees only]. 4. It is further the case of the respondent – plaintiff that in terms of the agreement, the plaintiff has paid the defendant Rs.10,00,000/- vide cheque No.479446 drawn on Axis Bank on the very date of the agreement out of the agreed total consideration amount of Rs.1,11,00,000/- [One Crore and Eleven Lakh rupees only]. The total consideration amount was agreed to be fixed at Rs.1,11,00,000/- for the total land of 3 Acre under the agreement and the remaining consideration amount of Rs.1,01,00,000/- was to be paid by the plaintiff at the time of execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant. 5. It is further the case of the plaintiff that the initial payment of Rs.10,00,000/- was received and acknowledged by the defendant and that the plaintiff was required to pay the remaining amount within the period of four months from the date of execution of the said agreement. Thereafter, the plaintiff got prepared demand drafts of the remaining consideration amount. Thereafter the plaintiff and his grand son approached and contacted the defendant many times, but the defendant tried to avoid talking or meeting the plaintiff but assured the plaintiff to execute the registered sale deed in his favour, but avoided on several grounds to execute the sale deed. It is further the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff called upon the defendant by issuing legal notice through his advocate on 07.10.2022 to remain present on the given date before Sub Registrar Office and to perform her part of contract but the defendant failed to comply the notice duly served on the defendant so also the defendant did not reply to the said notice. The plaintiff had also registered lis pendence of the suit property vide deed No.1071/2014 dated 03.03.2014. 6. It is further the case of the plaintiff that the defendant with malafide intention and to deceive the lawful rights and interest of the plaintiff, transferred the odd amount of Rs.11,00,000/- in the account of the plaintiff’s daughter in law without his permission or consent. It is further the case of the plaintiff that the amount of consideration paid by the plaintiff was retained by the defendant from 07.05.2022 to 13.10.2022 and that it falsifies the claim of the defendant that she was made to enter into the agreement to sell by exerting coercion. It is further the case of the plaintiff that the amount of consideration paid by the plaintiff was retained by the defendant from 07.05.2022 to 13.10.2022 and that it falsifies the claim of the defendant that she was made to enter into the agreement to sell by exerting coercion. Thus, the defendant was avoiding to perform her part of the contract although the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property prior to the present agreement and that the defendant was trying to take possession of the property and that if the defendant succeeds in her illegal activity, then the plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss, which cannot be compensated in terms of money. 7. Due to non execution of the sale deed, the plaintiff was constrained to file Special Civil Suit No.1186 of 2022 for specific performance of the agreement to sell, dated 07.05.2022. Along with the suit, application below Exh. 5 is filed for interim relief of injunction against the defendant not to create third party rights over the suit property. 8. In the suit, the defendant appeared and filed its reply and the defendant denied all averments and pleadings of the plaint. It is the case of the defendant that the suit filed along with the application for temporary injunction by the plaintiff against the defendant is illegal, time barred and filed on the basis of unregistered document and by deceiving the defendant. The defendant further submitted that the agreement itself was cancelled by the defendant and as such no suit for specific performance of contract was maintainable without seeking declaration that the cancellation of the agreement at the instance of the defendant is unlawful and not binding on the plaintiff. 9. It is the case of the defendant that unregistered document does not create any right or interest in the property. It is further the case of the defendant that the plaintiff has not paid sufficient stamp duty as per the valuation of the suit property, therefore, the agreement to sell filed by the plaintiff is not admissible. 9. It is the case of the defendant that unregistered document does not create any right or interest in the property. It is further the case of the defendant that the plaintiff has not paid sufficient stamp duty as per the valuation of the suit property, therefore, the agreement to sell filed by the plaintiff is not admissible. It is further the case of the defendant that the suit is filed by the plaintiff through his power of attorney in respect of the suit property in respect of which since beginning there is dispute going on between the plaintiff and the defendant, the power of attorney has no knowledge about the suit property. 10. By order dated 24.01.2023, the injunction is granted in favour of the plaintiff, which is now challenged in the present Appeal from order. SUBMISSIONS : 11. Heard Mr. Mahesh Deshmukh, Advocate for the appellant – defendant. Mr. Deshmukh submits that it is the case of the appellant – defendant that by specific legal notice dated 10.10.2022, posted on 12.10.2022, which was refused to accept by the plaintiff on 13.10.2022, the defendant had cancelled agreement of sale dated 07.05.2022 and the plaintiff did not seek declaratory relief challenging the said notice of cancellation of agreement, as such, in the said suit there was no prayer for declaration of legal notice dated 10.10.2022, cancelling agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022, as void or bad in law. Consequently, the suit is not maintainable without seeking relief of declaration that the legal notice dated 10.10.2022 is void. The learned counsel for the appellant – defendant has relied upon the judgment in the case of I.S.Sikandar (Dead) By LRS. Vs. K.Subramani and others reported in (2013) 15 SCC 27 and in the case of Mohinder Kaur Vs. Sant Paul Singh reported in [2019] 9 SCC 358. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant – defendant has relied upon the judgment in the case of I.S.Sikandar (Dead) By LRS. Vs. K.Subramani and others reported in (2013) 15 SCC 27 and in the case of Mohinder Kaur Vs. Sant Paul Singh reported in [2019] 9 SCC 358. 12. It is the contention of the appellant – defendant that the agreement is determinable in terms of the provision of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act and that due to the contents of notice dated 10.10.2022, the agreement dated 07.05.2022 was cancelled for the reasons that the agreement was under coercion and market value of the property is more than 13 crores and that the agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 if continued, then it will entail a fine by the Income Tax Department which would be double the amount of consideration agreed to be paid. In view of the contents of notice dated 10.10.2022, it is crystal clear that the present case of the appellant falls within the ambit of Section 14 (1) (b) (c) of the Specific Relief Act whereby purported contract/agreement dated 07.05.2022 cannot be specifically enforced, as such, the present appellant – defendant is justified in cancelling/terminating the agreement dated 07.05.2022 vide legal notice dated 10.10.2022. 13. It is the case of the appellant - defendant that clause in the agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 indicates that Regular Civil Appeal No.287 of 2016 has to be withdrawn by the appellant i.e. original defendant, however, it is not possible for the appellant – original defendant to withdraw the appeal as the appeal is filed by the plaintiff and that the appellant in RCA No.287 of 2016 has not taken steps by taking recourse to Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act to rectify the instrument and as such the present appellant was entitled to terminate/cancel the agreement dated 07.05.2022 as it cannot be enforced as per Section 14 (1) (b) (c) of the Specific Relief Act. 14. It is the contention of the appellant – defendant that during the course of arguments of the application below Exh.5 in the suit, on 06.01.2023 the plaintiff filed an application seeking production of document together with list of documents, filed photocopy of purported agreement to sell dated 13.09.2022 and the appellant – original defendant had opposed the application for production of documents. However, the trial Court relying on the agreement to sell dated 13.09.2022 allowed the application for production of documents by order dated 24.01.2023. 15. The appellant – defendant contends that the amount of Rs.10 lac, which is transmitted in the account of the appellant – defendant by cheque and the present appellant defendant has returned the amount of Rs.10 lac along with Rs.1 lac interest on the said amount in the account of Smt. Namrata Desarada [daughter in law of the present respondent] through RTGS on 13.10.2022. It is the case of the appellant – defendant that the said amount was utilized by the aforesaid person, namely, Smt.Namrata Desarda, in whose account, the amount was transferred. 16. That, earlier purported agreement of sale dated 17.06.2002, on the basis of which, Regular Civil Suit No.113 of 2014 seeking specific performance was filed by the plaintiff after almost 12 years. While dismissing the said suit, the trial Court has held that the plaintiff failed to prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Against the said judgment and order, appeal is still pending and that in the Appeal, the application seeking production of document together with list of document, photocopies of 3 demand draft dated 12.08.2022 as well 01 cheque were presented. It is further the case of the appellant – defendant that the aforesaid three demand drafts were cancelled by the plaintiff and those were raised to make show about readiness and willingness and only photocopies were presented and original were not produced even before the appellate Court, as such, those demand drafts cannot be considered for the purpose of consideration of an application below Exh.5 in the present suit. 17. It is further contention of the appellant – defendant that purported agreement dated 13.09.2022 between defendant and some other person regarding suit property, purported photocopy of same was produced at the time of hearing on application below Exh.5 on 06.01.2023. There is no averment/pleading in plaint and/or in the application below Exh.5, the same cannot be considered for decision of an application below Exh.5. 18. There is no averment/pleading in plaint and/or in the application below Exh.5, the same cannot be considered for decision of an application below Exh.5. 18. It is the further contention of the appellant – defendant that the suit is filed through General Power of Attorney, who is grand-son of the plaintiff and 25 years old is not conversant and is acquainted with the facts of the case and there is no statement either in plaint or in application below Exh.5 to the effect that the GPA knows the facts of the case, as such, the suit as well as the application below Exh.5 is not entertainable. As per section 17 (1-A) read with 17 (2) (v) of the Registration Act, 1908, purported agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 contemplating consideration of Rs.1,11,00,000/-, the said purported agreement being compulsorily registerable and the same being not registered as per the mandate, the same cannot be read for consideration of an application under Order 39 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, while granting application in a suit for specific performance of contract. 19. In terms of the Maharashtra Stamp Act under Article 25 Schedule-1 and particularly explanation I thereto, purported agreement dated 07.05.2022 is “Conveyance” as such requires requisite stamp duty as leviable under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, however, the same being not paid as per the Schedule looking to purported agreement dated 07.05.2022, the said purported agreement dated 07.05.2022 cannot be considered even for collateral purposes, particularly while deciding an application for temporary injunction under order 39 Rule 1 of the CPC, however, the same being considered and relied, the learned trial Court has committed an error. In the case of M/s. N.N.Global Mercantile Private Limited Vs. M/s. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. & others reported in 2023 [6] SCALE 434 declares that an unstamped instrument cannot be taken notice of for any purpose and it remains unenforceable. No Public Officer nor Court nor Arbitrator, can permit any person to ask them to act upon it or receive it as evidence. In law such unstamped agreement is bereft of life and not enforceable in law, cannot exist in law and would be void. In view of the provisions of Section 2 (h) and 2 (j) of Contract Act unstamped instrument cannot be a contract and renders such contract ceases to be and are not enforceable and are void. 20. In law such unstamped agreement is bereft of life and not enforceable in law, cannot exist in law and would be void. In view of the provisions of Section 2 (h) and 2 (j) of Contract Act unstamped instrument cannot be a contract and renders such contract ceases to be and are not enforceable and are void. 20. Thus, the learned counsel for the appellant – defendant submits that purported agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 being typed on just Rs.100/- stamp paper for an agreement for consideration of Rs.1,11,00,000/-, it is crystal clear that the said agreement dated 07.05.2022 is not executed on payment of sufficient and requisite stamp duty as is required to be paid as per the Maharashtra Stamp Act and accordingly, agreement is unenforceable and receives no evidential value even for consideration of an application for injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 of the CPC in a civil suit for specific performance. 21. It is further the contention of the appellant defendant that purported agreement dated 13.09.2022 is for sale of the suit property and two names are mentioned therein i.e. Nitin Ashok Pagariya and Amit Vinayakrao Borse as vendee, however, in the bank statements produced by the present appellant before the trial Court, there is no entry in the name of the above referred 2 persons from whom the present appellant has received any amount. 22. Per contra, Mr.Bhandari, the learned counsel for the respondent – plaintiff submits as under : The judgment in the case of I.S.Sikandar (Dead) By LRS. Vs. K.Subramani and others reported in (2013) 15 SCC 27 is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The notice of cancellation of agreement to sell was not served on the respondent – plaintiff and that tracking report shows that the envelop was sent to the address of the plaintiff and it was returned back without being delivered/refused by the plaintiff. The legal notice being not served upon the plaintiff. There is no question of challenging the same. It is further contended by the respondent – plaintiff that in I.S.Sikandar [supra] the facts are entirely different and it was at final stage of the suit, that the Court had come to the conclusion that the agreement itself provided for termination of the agreement by one of the parties in particular contingencies. It is further contended by the respondent – plaintiff that in I.S.Sikandar [supra] the facts are entirely different and it was at final stage of the suit, that the Court had come to the conclusion that the agreement itself provided for termination of the agreement by one of the parties in particular contingencies. Contingency having occurred, the party was entitled to terminate the agreement and termination itself was undertaken by one of the parties to the agreement. Such termination being not challenged the Court came to the conclusion that the suit for specific performance could not have been filed. However, in the instant case, it is yet to be decided that whether there was a notice of termination served upon the plaintiff and there is no occasion to terminate the agreement of sale dated 07.05.2022. The plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The learned counsel for the respondent – plaintiff relies upon the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Brahm Dutt Vs. Sarabjit Singh in RSA No.2943 of 2017 (O&M), decided on 06.11.2017 and in the said judgment, case of I.S.Sikandar [supra] has been explained. . 23. The learned counsel for the respondent – plaintiff contends that in view of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, unilateral cancellation of instrument is not legal and that the appellant has to seek appropriate declaration from the Court. The learned counsel for the respondent – plaintiff submits that in the instant case the plaint does not admit any service of notice as was done in the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra]. The suit is at preliminary stage. Even the issues are not framed. The issue regarding service of notice and effect can be considered at the stage of trial. 24. As regards the submission of the appellantdefendant that the agreement is not sufficiently stamped, the respondent – plaintiff has relied upon the judgment in the case of The State Financial Corporation and another Vs. M/s. Jagdamba Oil Mills and another reported in AIR 2002 SC 834 , and submits that stamp duty is not payable on the instant agreement to sell. . 25. The learned counsel for the respondent – plaintiff also relies upon the judgment in the case of Wander Ltd. and another Vs. M/s. Jagdamba Oil Mills and another reported in AIR 2002 SC 834 , and submits that stamp duty is not payable on the instant agreement to sell. . 25. The learned counsel for the respondent – plaintiff also relies upon the judgment in the case of Wander Ltd. and another Vs. Antox India P. Ltd. Reported in 1990 [Supp] SCC 727 submits that this Court should not interfere with the discretionary order of the trial Court granting injunction. 26. Having considered the rival submissions, following points arise for consideration : [i] Whether the suit for specific performance of contract is maintainable in absence of the prayer to seek declaration that legal notice dated 10.10.2022 issued by the defendant to the plaintiff cancelling the agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 is illegal and bad in law, in view of the judgment in the case of I.S.Sikandar (Dead) By LRS. Vs. K.Subramani and others reported in (2013) 15 SCC 27 . a] In the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra], the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para nos. 32, 32.1, 37 and 38 has held as under : 32. After perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court and the questions of law framed by Defendant 5 in this appeal, the following points would arise for determination of this Court: 32.1. (i) Whether the original suit filed by the plaintiff seeking a decree for specific performance against Defendants 1-4 in respect of the suit schedule property without seeking the declaratory relief with respect to termination of the agreement of sale vide notice dated 28-3-1985, rescinding the contract, is maintainable in law? 37. As could be seen from the prayer sought for in the original suit, the plaintiff has not sought for declaratory relief to declare the termination of agreement of sale as bad in law. In the absence of such prayer by the plaintiff the original suit filed by him before the trial court for grant of decree for specific performance in respect of the suit schedule property on the basis of agreement of sale and consequential relief of decree for permanent injunction is not maintainable in law. 38. In the absence of such prayer by the plaintiff the original suit filed by him before the trial court for grant of decree for specific performance in respect of the suit schedule property on the basis of agreement of sale and consequential relief of decree for permanent injunction is not maintainable in law. 38. Therefore, we have to hold that the relief sought for by the plaintiff for grant of decree for specific performance of execution of sale deed in respect of the suit schedule property in his favour on the basis of non-existing agreement of sale is wholly unsustainable in law. Accordingly, Point (i) (see para 32.1) is answered in favour of Defendant 5. b] In the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra], the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para nos. 40 and 41 has further held as under : 40. This position of law is well settled by this Court in the Constitution Bench judgment in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani, wherein this Court has held that it is well-settled principle of law, that in a case of sale of immovable property, time is not the essence of the contract. However, if the parties agreed to a specified time in the agreement to perform their part of the contract, then time is the essence of the contract and parties shall adhere to the same. 41. To emphasise the fact that time is the essence of the contract before the High Court, the counsel for the fifth defendant has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Chand Rani case, the relevant portions of which are extracted below: (SCC pp. 525-28, paras 19-20 & 22) "19. It is a well-accepted principle that in the case of sale of immovable property, time is never regarded as the essence of the contract. In fact, there is a presumption against time being the essence of the contract. This principle is not in any way different from that obtainable in England. Under the law of equity which governs the rights of the parties in the case of specific performance of contract to sell real estate, law looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement. This principle is not in any way different from that obtainable in England. Under the law of equity which governs the rights of the parties in the case of specific performance of contract to sell real estate, law looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement. It has to be ascertained whether under the terms of the contract the parties named a specific time within which completion was to take place, really and in substance it was intended that it should be completed within a reasonable time. An intention to make time the essence of the contract must be expressed in unequivocal language. 20. .… 4. … Section 55 of the Contract Act which deals with the consequences of failure to perform an executory contract at or before the stipulated time provides by the first paragraph: "55. Effect of failure to perform at fixed time, in contract in which time is essential. - When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract." It is not merely because of specification of time at or before which the thing to be done under the contract is promised to be done and default in compliance therewith, that the other party may avoid the contract. Such an option arises only if it is intended by the parties that time is of the essence of the contract. Intention to make time of the essence, if expressed in writing, must be in a language which is unmistakable: it may also be inferred from the nature of the property agreed to be sold. conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances at or before the contract. Specific performance of a contract will ordinarily be granted. notwithstanding default in carrying out the contract within the specified period, if having regard to the express stipulations of the parties, nature of the property and the surrounding circumstances, it is not inequitable to grant the relief. conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances at or before the contract. Specific performance of a contract will ordinarily be granted. notwithstanding default in carrying out the contract within the specified period, if having regard to the express stipulations of the parties, nature of the property and the surrounding circumstances, it is not inequitable to grant the relief. If the contract relates to sale of immovable property, it would normally be presumed that time was not of the essence of the contract. Mere incorporation in the written agreement of a clause imposing penalty in case of default does not by itself evidence an intention to make time of the essence. In Jamshed Khodaram Irani v Burjorji Dhunjibhai the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed that the principle underlying Section 55 of the Contract Act did not differ from those which obtained under the law of England as regards contracts for sale of land." 22. In Hind Construction Contractors case' quoting Halsbury's Laws of England, this Court observed at pp. 1154-55 as under: (SCC pp. 76- 77, paras 7-8) 7.... In the latest 4th Edn. of Halsbury's Laws of England in regard to building and engineering contracts the statement of law is to be found in Vol.4, para 1179, which runs thus: "1179. Where time is of the essence of the contract. - The expression time is of the essence means that a breach of the condition as to the time for performance will entitle the innocent party to consider the breach as a repudiation of the contract. Exceptionally, the completion of the work by a specified date may be a condition precedent to the contractor's right to claim payment. The parties may expressly provide that time is of the essence of the contract and where there is power to determine the contract on a failure to complete by the specified date, the stipulation as to time will be fundamental. Other provisions of the contract may, on the construction of the contract, exclude an inference that the completion of the works by a particular date is fundamental; time is not of the essence where a sum is payable for each week that the work remains incomplete after the date fixed, nor where the parties contemplate a postponement of completion. Other provisions of the contract may, on the construction of the contract, exclude an inference that the completion of the works by a particular date is fundamental; time is not of the essence where a sum is payable for each week that the work remains incomplete after the date fixed, nor where the parties contemplate a postponement of completion. Where time has not been made of the essence of the contract or, by reason of waiver, the time fixed has ceased to be applicable, the employer may by notice fix a reasonable time for the completion of the work and dismiss the contractor on a failure to complete by the date so fixed." 8. It will be clear from the aforesaid statement of law that even where the parties have expressly provided that time is of the essence of the contract such a stipulation will have to be read along with other provisions of the contract and such other provisions may, on construction of the contract, exclude the inference that the completion of the work by a particular date was intended to be fundamental; for instance, if the contract were to include clauses providing for extension of time in certain contingencies or for payment of fine or penalty for every day or week the work undertaken remains unfinished on the expiry of the time provided in the contract such clauses would be construed as rendering ineffective the express provision relating to the time being of the essence of contract." (emphasis in original) c] In the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that normally in a contract for sale of immovable property, time is never the essence of the contract. However, in the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra], the Court after examination of the contract had concluded that time was the essence of the contract for completion of the sale transaction. d] In the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra], the Court had also noted that on completion of time stipulated in the agreement to sell, the agreement came to an end on account of non compliance of certain required formalities by the vendee and on non-payment of balance consideration, time being the essence of the contract and the vendor having validly terminated the agreement. In the same judgment, the Court had also noticed that in spite of non compliance of the agreement within stipulated time by the vendee, the vendor had granted further time for payment of balance consideration and on failure to comply with the same, the vendor had terminated the agreement to sell after the completion of extended period. e] In the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra] the agreement to sell became voidable at the instance of vendor on non-payment of balance consideration within the period mentioned in the agreement and although vendor had extended the period, the agreement was terminated after completion of the extended period. The Court had also held in the facts situation that the agreement did not exist on account of it being terminated after the extended period. Thus, in the judgment in the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra] the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that unless the declaration is sought to the extent that the termination of the agreement was bad in law, the suit for specific performance of contract was not maintainable. f] Thus, the action of the defendant in the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra] was within the realm of the Contract Act as provided under Section 55 of the Contract Act which provides that in case of the performance which was required of the plaintiff within a stipulated time is not performed by her then the contract becomes voidable at the option of the defendant if the intention of the parties was that time should be the essence of the contract and the defendant was not required to perform his part of the agreement. In the case of I. S. Sinkandar [supra] the contract had come to an end and was not enforceable under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act. g] In the instant case, it is to be noticed that the bare reading of the agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 of the suit land would prima facie indicate that the time is not the essence of the contract and that the agreement to sell does not automatically come to an end after the stipulated time or on account of non compliance of the conditions mentioned in the agreement to sell at the end of the period, mentioned in the agreement. h] Unilateral cancellation of agreement to sell by one party is not permissible in law except where the agreement is in it’s nature determinable and not enforceable in terms of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act. As such cancellation cannot be raised as a defence in a suit for specific performance. The bare perusal of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act shows that once a party claims the right of revocation or rescission of the agreement then such a party is required to seek a declaration from the Court regarding the validity of revocation or rescission as the case may be, as required under Sections 27 and 31 of the Specific Relief Act, or the party will have to demonstrate that it has validly terminated the agreement under the provisions of the Contract Act, if a suit for specific performance of agreement is brought against the party. i] Thus, in the instant case it is premature to rely upon the judgment in the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra] as the findings will have to be rendered in the final judgment whether the time was essence of the contract and that the contract was not enforceable in terms of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act and the defendant has validly terminated the contract under the relevant provisions of the Contract Act. Thus, at this stage the law laid down in the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra] cannot be relied upon. j] The principle laid down in the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra] cannot be relied upon also for the reason that the termination of the agreement will have to be proved and prima facie notices issued of termination of agreement were not served on the defendant. The issuance of the notice will have to be proved by the plaintiff and the legal effect of the notice being not accepted by the defendant. So also effect of termination whether the plaintiff is legally bound by the same will have to be considered at the final stage. Thus, the judgment relied upon in the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra] is not applicable to the facts of the present case. So also effect of termination whether the plaintiff is legally bound by the same will have to be considered at the final stage. Thus, the judgment relied upon in the case of I.S.Sikandar [supra] is not applicable to the facts of the present case. [ii] Now dealing with the second submission of the appellant that the agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 amounts to conveyance and that it is accessible to stamp duty under the Maharashtra Stamp Act under Article 25 Schedule-I read with Explanation No.1 thereto, and in absence of payment of stamp duty, the document cannot be used for any purpose unless stamp duty is paid thereon in terms of the provisions of the Stamp Act. a] The Constitution Bench judgment in the case of M/s. N.N.Global Mercantile Private Limited Vs. M/s. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. & others reported in 2023 [6] SCALE 434 has held at para 74 as under : 74. The aforesaid statement appears apposite in the context of an instrument which is unstamped or insufficiently stamped. This is for the reason that on the one hand as long as it is not stamped or is insufficiently stamped, it is both liable to be impounded under Section 33 of the Stamp Act and it cannot be used as evidence or registered. This is apart from the unambiguous bar against ‘acting upon’ such an instrument. On the other hand, if after such an instrument is impounded and duty and penalty is paid and a certificate is endorsed upon it within the meaning of Section 42 (2) signals that the instrument regains life, the bar in Section 35 of the Stamp Act is removed permanently. Equally, under Section 36 in the case of an instrument (not secondary evidence of the instrument) which is allowed to be let in evidence without objection, then it would qualify as evidence founding a right. But this is an exception to the rule which is found in Section 35 of the Stamp Act. Thus, an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument represents a case of an agreement which not being enforceable, in the sense that the sanctions in law through a civil action is impermissible, is in the said sense, invalid. It is not invalid or void in the sense of it being still born or null and void in the sense that life cannot be poured into it. We may sum up. It is not invalid or void in the sense of it being still born or null and void in the sense that life cannot be poured into it. We may sum up. An agreement which is unstamped or insufficiently stamped is not enforceable, as long as it remains in the said condition. Such an instrument would be void as being not enforceable [See Section 2 (g) of the Contract Act]. It would not in the said sense exist in law. It can be “validated” by only the process contemplated in Section 33 and other provisions of the Stamp Act. We find the expression ‘validation’ used in the decision of this Court in Hariom Agrawal v. Prakash Chand Malviya which we shall refer to in greater detail later. This necessarily means that the court would not view it as enforceable, and therefore, existing in law. In the sense explained, it would not be found as ‘not void’ and therefore ‘not invalid’. Thus, in the context of the Act, the Stamp Act and the Contract Act, we are of the view that the opinion of this Court in SMS Tea Estates (supra), in this regard as reiterated in Garware (supra) and approved in Vidya Drolia (supra) is correct. b] In the law laid down in the above case of M/s.N.N.Global Mercantile Private Limited [supra] is that the document on which the stamp duty is payable is not paid fully, the document cannot be used for any purpose unless the same is impounded and the stamp duty is paid on it. The document would be void for any purpose unless life is instilled into the document by paying the stamp duty as may be payable in compliance of Stamp Act. c] In the instant case, we have to examine whether the stamp duty is payable on the above agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 in terms of Article 25 Schedule-I read with Explanation No.1 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act which reads as under: Description of Instrument Proper Stamp Duty 25. c] In the instant case, we have to examine whether the stamp duty is payable on the above agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 in terms of Article 25 Schedule-I read with Explanation No.1 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act which reads as under: Description of Instrument Proper Stamp Duty 25. CONVEYANCE (not being a transfer charged or exempted under Article 59) - On the [true market value] of the property which is the subject matter of the Conveyance, - [(a) if relating to movable property 3 per cent, of the market value of the property;] [(b) if relating to immovable property situated, - (i) within the limits of any Municipal Corporation or any Cantonment area annexed to it or any urban area not mentioned in sub-clause (ii). 5 per cent, of the market value of the property. (ii) within the limits of any Municipal Council or Nagar Panchayat or Cantonment area annexed to it, or any rural area within the limits of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority, or the Influence Areas as per the annual statement of rates published under the Bombay Stamp [Determination of True Market Value of Property] Rules, 1995. [5 per cent,] of the market value of the property. (iii) within the limits of any Grampanchayat area or any such area not mentioned in sub-clause (ii). [4 per cent,] of the market value of the property. (c) if relating to both movable and immovable property The same duty as is payable under clauses (a) and (b). [5 per cent,] of the market value of the property. (iii) within the limits of any Grampanchayat area or any such area not mentioned in sub-clause (ii). [4 per cent,] of the market value of the property. (c) if relating to both movable and immovable property The same duty as is payable under clauses (a) and (b). [(d) ***] [(da) if relating to the order of the High Court under Section 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 or the order of the National Company Law Tribunal under sections 230 to 234 of the Companies Act, 2013 or confirmation issued by the Central Government under sub-section (3) of section 233 of the Companies Act, 2013 in respect of the amalgamation, merger, demerger, arrangement or reconstruction of companies (including subsidiaries of parent company) or order of the Reserve Bank of India under section 44A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 in respect of amalgamation or reconstruction of Banking Companies [and every order made by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction under section 18 or 19 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, in respect of sanction of Scheme specified therein or every order made by the National Company Law Tribunal under section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, in respect of approval of resolution plan.]] 10 per cent, of the aggregate of the market value of the shares issued or allotted in exchange or otherwise and the amount of consideration paid for such amalgamation : Provided that, the amount of duty, chargeable under this clause shall not exceed, - (i) an amount equal to [5 per cent,] of the true market value of the immovable property located within the State of Maharashtra of the transferor company; or (ii) an amount equal to 0.7 per cent, of the aggregate of the market value of the shares issued or allotted in exchange or otherwise and the amount of consideration paid, for such amalgamation, whichever is higher : Provided further that, in case of reconstruction or demerger the duty chargeable shall not exceed, - (i) an amount equal to [5 per cent,] of the true market value of the immovable property located within the State of Maharashtra transferred by the Demerging Company to the Resulting Company; or (ii) an amount equal to 0.7 per centum of the aggregate of the market value of the shares issued or allotted to the Resulting Company and the amount of consideration paid for such demerger, whichever is higher.] Exemption Assignment of copyright under the Copyright Act, 1957 (IXV of 1957). [Explanation I.] - For the purposes of this article, where in the case of agreement to sell an immovable property, the possession of any immovable property is transferred [or agreed to be transferred] to the purchaser before the execution, or at the time of execution, or after the execution of, such agreement [***] then such agreement to sell shall be deemed to be a conveyance and stamp duty thereon shall be leviable accordingly: Provided that, the provisions of section 32A shall apply mutatis mutandis to such agreement which is deemed to be a conveyance as aforesaid, as they apply to a conveyance under that section : Provided further that, where subsequently a conveyance is executed in pursuance of such agreement of sale, the stamp duty, if any, already paid and recovered on the agreement of sale which is deemed to be a conveyance, shall be adjusted towards the total duty leviable on the conveyance.] [Provided also that where proper stamp duty is paid on a registered agreement to sell an immovable property, treating it as a deemed conveyance and subsequently a conveyance deed is executed without any modification then such a conveyance shall be treated as other instrument under section 4 and the duty of the one hundred rupees shall be charged.] d] The relevant portion of the agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 relating to transfer of possession of the suit land reads as under : e] The true translation of the aforesaid portion of the agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 reads as under: That, Manisha Balkrishna Kode, the vendor shall withdraw the R.C.S.No. 287/2016 after receiving the payment of the entire amount of Rs.1,01,00,000/- [Rs.One crore and one lakh only] from Madanlal Desarda, the vendee, and shall execute the sale-deed so also possession of the property will be given on the same day. f] On the bare reading of the aforesaid agreement to sell, in order to attract the above article 25 and more particularly the explanation thereto and to ascertain whether stamp duty is required to be paid on the document, it is necessary that under the agreement to sell, the purchaser has to be put in possession of the immovable property before the agreement or at the time of agreement or at a subsequent date. However, possession of the property has to be transferred or agreed to be transferred by the vendor to the purchaser in pursuance of the agreement to sell. If the possession of the immovable property is already with the purchaser, then the possession of the immovable property should be continued to be held by the purchaser under the agreement to sell. g] Above relevant portion quoted from the agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 would indicate that the possession of suit land is not parted in pursuance of the agreement to sell but it is stipulated in the said agreement to sell that on payment of balance amount of Rs.1,01,00,000/-, the sale deed would be executed and the purchaser would be put in possession of the property on the same date. Thus, prima facie possession of land is not given in pursuance to the agreement to sell but would be given under the sale deed which would be executed on payment of balance consideration. h] I am of the view that the above article is not applicable to the present document and the transaction under the agreement to sell dated 07/5/2022 is not a ‘conveyance’ as stipulated within the said article and thus stamp duty is not payable in terms of Article 25 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act on the above agreement to sell. As such, the law laid down in the case of M/s. N.N.Global Mercantile Private Limited Vs. M/s. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. & others [supra] is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. i] It is also held in the cases of Balasaheb Sahebrao Jadhav Vs. Hanumant Bhaurao Deshmukh reported in 1995 (1) Mh.L.J. 473 and Pitamber Kanhayalal Khattar & another Vs. Sadanand Harishchandra Honawar reported in 2007 (1) Mh.L.J. 816 that the stamp duty is applicable under Article 25 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act only in cases where the property is handed over to the purchaser in pursuance of the agreement to sell. [iii] Now coming to the next submission of the appellant that agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 ought to have been compulsorily registered under the provisions of Section 17 (1-A) and 17 (2) (v) of the Indian Registration Act. Relevant part of Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act reads as under : 17. Documents of which registration is compulsory. [iii] Now coming to the next submission of the appellant that agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 ought to have been compulsorily registered under the provisions of Section 17 (1-A) and 17 (2) (v) of the Indian Registration Act. Relevant part of Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act reads as under : 17. Documents of which registration is compulsory. – (1) the following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force, namely :- (a) ... (b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property; (c) … (d) … (e) ... [(1-A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, shall be registered if they have been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001, and if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement then, they shall have no effect for the purposes of the said section 53- A.] (2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) applies to - (v) [any document other than the documents specified in sub-section (1-A)] not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property, but merely creating a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest; or a] The law on the subject i.e. when the document becomes compulsorily registerable under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act is discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following case : b] The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tehmi P. Sidhwa and others V. Shib Bannerjee and sons Pvt. Ltd. & another reported in AIR 1974 SC 1912 at para no.5 held as under : 5. It would be noticed that the award itself does not purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards in respect of the immoveable property, as contemplated under Section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act. It merely creates a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest. The award directs Shib Banerjee and Sons Private Ltd. to execute such documents as may be necessary for declaring the one-fourth share of the appellants in the said property and also to execute such documents as may be necessary for transferring the said property and the lease from the Delhi Improvement Trust to the Joint names of themselves and the appellants. It, therefore, squarely falls under Section 17 (2) (v) of the Registration Act. c] In the case of K. Arumuga Velaiah Vs. P. R. Ramasamy and another reported in (2022) 3 SCC 757 at para no.45 has held as under: 45. ………… The test in such a case is whether the document itself creates an interest in a specific immovable property or merely creates a right to obtain another document of title. If a document does not by itself create a right or interest in immovable property, but merely creates a right to obtain another document, which will, when executed create a right in the person claiming relief, the former document does not require registration and is accordingly admissible in evidence vide Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyar. d] In the instant case, perusal of agreement to sell would indicate that it only gives right in favour of the party to get sale deed executed of the immovable property, on payment of balance consideration and thus in terms of the law laid down in the case of Tehmi P. Sidhwa [supra] and K. Arumuga Velaiah [supra] the document i.e. the agreement to sell merely creates a right to obtain another document of title. Since the agreement to sell does not by itself create a right or interest in immovable property, but merely creates a right to obtain another document, which will, when executed creates a right in the person claiming relief, the agreement to sell does not require registration and is accordingly admissible in evidence and will be covered with the scope of Section 17(2)(v). [iv] Coming to the next submission of the appellant with respect to the amended Section 17 (1) (1-A) of the Registration Act. a] The amended provisions of Section 17 (1-A) came to be inserted by Act No.48 of 2001 with effect from 24.09.2001 by which the documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property for the purpose of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act shall be registered. b] For applicability of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the property has to be put in possession of the transferee in part performance of the contract and if the transferee is already in possession of the property, the transferee should continue to hold the property in part performance of the contract, and should have done some act in furtherance of the contract. c] The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R.Hemalatha Vs. Kashthuri [Civil Appeal No.2535/2023 @ SLP © No.14884/2002, decided on April 10, 2023] reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 304 at para nos.12 and 13 held as under : 12. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the proviso to Section 49 came to be inserted vide Act No. 21 of 1929 and thereafter, Section 17 (1A) came to be inserted by Act No. 48 of 2001 with effect from 24.09.2001 by which the documents containing contracts to transfer or consideration any immovable property for the purpose of Section 53 of the Transfer of Properties Act is made compulsorily to be registered if they have been executed on or after 2001 and if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then there shall have no effect for the purposes of said Section 53A. So, the exception to the proviso to Section 49 is provided under Section 17 (1A) of the Registration Act. Otherwise, the proviso to Section 49 with respect to the documents other than referred to in Section 17 (1A) shall be applicable. 13. So, the exception to the proviso to Section 49 is provided under Section 17 (1A) of the Registration Act. Otherwise, the proviso to Section 49 with respect to the documents other than referred to in Section 17 (1A) shall be applicable. 13. Under the circumstances, as per proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by Registration Act or the Transfer of Property Act to be registered, may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under chapter-II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument, however, subject to Section 17 (1A) of the Registration Act. It is not the case on behalf of either of the parties that the document/Agreement to Sell in question would fall under the category of document as per Section 17 (1A) of the Registration Act. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has rightly observed and held relying upon proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act that the unregistered document in question namely unregistered Agreement to Sell in question shall be admissible in evidence in a suit for specific performance and the proviso is exception to the first part of Section 49. d] Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R.Hemalatha Vs. Kashthuri [supra] has held that the amended Section 17 (1A) of the Registration Act makes the document containing a contract to transfer for consideration any immovable property for the purpose of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act compulsory to be registered. If the document is executed on or after 2001 and if such document is not registered then the document shall be of no effect for the purpose of said Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Thus, exception to the proviso to Section 49 is provided under Section 17 (1A) of the Registration Act. However, in the instant case possession of the immovable property/suit land is not transferred to the purchaser under the agreement to sell and thus the agreement to sell is also not compulsorily registerable under the amended provision of Section 17 (1) (1-A) of the Indian Registration Act. However, in the instant case possession of the immovable property/suit land is not transferred to the purchaser under the agreement to sell and thus the agreement to sell is also not compulsorily registerable under the amended provision of Section 17 (1) (1-A) of the Indian Registration Act. [v] Coming to the next submission raised by the appellant that there is impossibility in performance of the part of the agreement to sell and unless the agreement is rectified by following process as available under the Specific Relief Act, the defendant is entitled to resile from the said agreement. a] Clause of the agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 indicates that on receipt of payment of Rs.1,01,00,000/-, the appellant – defendant would withdraw the Regular Civil Suit No.287 of 2016 and registration of the sale deed would be done on the same date and possession will also been given on the same date. b] Apparent error in the clause of the said agreement is that Regular Civil Suit No.287 of 2016 is filed by the plaintiff and that it is the plaintiff, who would be making the payment of Rs.1,01,00,000/- to the defendant and relevant clause in the agreement to sell would indicate that it is the defendant, who would withdraw Regular Civil Suit No.287 of 2016, as such, it is impossible to comply with the above term of the agreement and it cannot be executed. c] Bare reading of the agreement would indicate that on payment of balance consideration, sale deed would be executed and possession of the suit land would be given to the plaintiff/vendor. The concern of the plaintiff/vendor is that there should not be any surviving litigation of the suit land thereafter. Thus, the obvious interpretation of the above clause would mean that the plaintiff will withdraw the suit and the defendant would unconditionally allow the plaintiff to withdraw the suit. However, even if there is error in drafting the above clause, the clause is not such that it would frustrate the contract or make the defendant liable for action and that the agreement cannot be frustrated on account of minor error in the agreement, which would not fasten any liability on the defendant. d] The aspect of withdrawing the suit cannot be held against the defendant apparently because appeal is filed by the plaintiff, so also the payment would be done by the plaintiff himself towards balance consideration. d] The aspect of withdrawing the suit cannot be held against the defendant apparently because appeal is filed by the plaintiff, so also the payment would be done by the plaintiff himself towards balance consideration. Thus it is not possible for defendant to withdraw the appeal and the same will have to be done by the plaintiff without any objection by the defendant. Error of such nature cannot frustrated the entire agreement to sell. The intention of the parties is that the person making the payment does not wish to have Regular Civil Appeal continue and as such Regular Civil Appeal will have to be withdrawn as on the date of balance payment being made and defendant would not contest the same before the appellate Court at the stage of withdrawal in any manner. [vi] Now dealing with the next submission of the plaintiff that agreement to sell dated 13.09.2022 produced during the course of hearing of Exh.5 application that the defendant is attempting to sell the suit property to a third person and the said fact could not have been relied upon by the trial Court to clamp injunction on the defendant. However, even before this Court the defendant is not submitting that the defendant would not create third party interest in the property. 27. Thus, the trial Court was well within its jurisdiction to pass order of injunction as apprehension of the plaintiff that the appellant/defendant is likely to create third party interest is not ill-founded. 28. All other submission raised by the appellant is not germane to the decision of Exh.5 application and has to be considered at final stage of the suit. 29. In the case of Wander Ltd. and another Vs. Antox India P. Ltd. reported in 1990 [Supp] SCC 727, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the jurisdiction of the appellate court in interfering with the discretion exercised by the trial court in granting or refusing injunction and has held as under : 13. On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the appellate bench fell into error on two important propositions. The first is a misdirection in regard to the very scope and nature of the appeals before it and the limitations on the powers of the appellate court to substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a discretionary order. On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the appellate bench fell into error on two important propositions. The first is a misdirection in regard to the very scope and nature of the appeals before it and the limitations on the powers of the appellate court to substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a discretionary order. The second pertains to the infirmities in the ratiocination as to the quality of Antox’s alleged user of the trademark on which the passing-off action is founded. We shall deal with these two separately. 14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of direction. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. V. Pothan Joseph : “….These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton. ‘….the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case.”. The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle. 30. ‘….the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case.”. The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle. 30. The discretion exercised by the trial Court in granting injunction is a discretionary remedy and the appellate Court would not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Court. Interference in the discretion exercised by the trial Court would be only, if it is perverse or that discretion should not be exercised at all on the material produced. 31. In the instant case, the defendant has not denied the execution of the agreement to sell dated 07.05.2022 but has contended that the agreement to sell was entered into under coercion. However, the defendant had kept the money received under the agreement of Rs.10 lakh in her account for more than 5 months. Thus, prima facie agreement cannot be said to be under coercion as there is no steps taken by the defendant to return the amount, rather the defendant has kept money in her account and effect thereto is to be examined before the trial court and thus no interference is called for at this stage, in the order passed by the trial Court. 32. The plaintiff in the course of submission had submitted that she is ready and willing to deposit the entire amount if so directed by this Court. Since the defendant has not responded to the same, it is open for the defendant to move an appropriate application to seek direction to deposit the consideration amount before the trial Court. 33. In the fact situation, the trial Court is directed to decide the suit as expeditiously as possible and in any event within a period of one year from the date of receipt of the order of this Court. Parties to cooperate with Court and not seek adjournments in the matter. The trial Court to decide the suit on its own merits without being influenced by any observations of this Court. 34. In view of above, the Appeal from Order is disposed of accordingly. 35. In view of disposal of the Appeal from Order, pending Civil Application does not survive and the same stands disposed of.