JUDGMENT Dr. V.R.K. Krupa Sagar, J. - Having lost his defence in the two Courts below, the defendant in a suit for specific performance preferred this second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. questioning the correctness of the judgments of the Courts below. Respondent herein is the plaintiff. 2. There is a partnership firm called as Sri Anjaneya Enterprises consisting of three partners. All three partners are cousins to one another. One of the partners in his individual capacity with reference to his own private transaction filed O.S.No.253 of 2004 as against another partner, who is his own cousin. The suit was filed before learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Narasaraopet on the premise that the defendant being owner of plaint schedule property offered it for sale and the plaintiff agreed to purchase it. The agreed sale consideration was Rs.25,000/- and the entire sale consideration was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant and to this effect defendant executed an agreement for sale dated 31.05.1990. The property that was agreed to be transacted was in fact under a mortgage with Andhra Bank Chilakaluripet and the loan was raised by the partnership firm referred above. In the agreement for sale it is agreed upon between parties that the defendant should discharge the mortgage debt and thereafter execute registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff at the expenses of plaintiff. For a long time defendant failed to discharge the debt and failed to get the property relieved of from the mortgage. In those circumstances, the plaintiff and the other partner together paid the entire debt to Andhra Bank on 30.03.2001 and got the property discharged from the mortgage. Since the defendant, who is the other partner in the firm, was not contributing his share of the money to repay the debt, it was only plaintiff and the other partner discharged the debt and to get back for recovery of share that was supposed to be contributed by the defendant, the other two partners filed O.S.No.45 of 2001 before the same Court as against the present suit defendant. Subsequent thereto, plaintiff got issued a legal notice dated 26.04.2001 demanding the defendant to come forward and execute the registered sale deed. Denying the version of the plaintiff, the defendant got issued a reply notice dated 07.05.2001. Subsequent thereto, plaintiff got issued a legal notice dated 26.04.2001 demanding the defendant to come forward and execute the registered sale deed. Denying the version of the plaintiff, the defendant got issued a reply notice dated 07.05.2001. In this reply notice, the defendant denied the entire transaction of agreement for sale and thereby refused to concede to the request made by the plaintiff. Thereafter, plaintiff presented his plaint on 27.04.2004 and the suit was instituted and the defendant was summoned. 3. Raising a contest defendant filed his written statement and denied the entire case set up in the plaint. He denied receipt of Rs.25,000/- towards full sale consideration and denied execution of agreement for sale. It is then stated that this defendant entrusted Rs.5,50,000/- to the plaintiff and the other partner and when he was demanding for repayment of it, they created a web of false story and filed false suit O.S.No.45 of 2001 and they also filed a criminal case in C.C.No.25 of 1999 and filed the present suit for specific performance. In his written statement defendant denied about mortgage debt with Andhra Bank. At para No.3 defendant alleged that the plaintiff as well as the defendant are chronic litigants. It is pleaded that plaintiff came to the Court with unclean hands and no one would have paid the entire sale consideration without taking possession of the property. The stamp paper on which the projected agreement for sale is prepared itself indicates the falsity of the case. For all these reasons he sought for dismissal of the suit. 4. Learned trial Court took the suit for trial on the following issues: 1) Whether the suit agreement of sale dt.31.5.90 is true, valid and binding on the defendant? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale dt.31.5.90 as prayed for? 3) To what relief? 5. Plaintiff testified as PW.1 and one of the attestors and the scribe of agreement for sale deposed as PW.2 and PW.3 respectively. The agreement for sale is Ex.A.1. The rest of the documents in Ex.A.2 to Ex.A.6 are the correspondence between the parties. Defendant testified as DW.1. The other suit for recovery of money and the criminal case in which he was made an accused at the hands of the plaintiff are sought to be sustained through Exs.B.1 to B.4 documents. The agreement for sale is Ex.A.1. The rest of the documents in Ex.A.2 to Ex.A.6 are the correspondence between the parties. Defendant testified as DW.1. The other suit for recovery of money and the criminal case in which he was made an accused at the hands of the plaintiff are sought to be sustained through Exs.B.1 to B.4 documents. After hearing the arguments and after considering the entire evidence, the learned trial Court found established the case of the plaintiff and observed that Ex.A.1-agreement for sale is true and genuine and is a valid transaction and the evidence of PW.1 found full support from two neutral and independent witnesses, who witnessed the transaction and preparation of Ex.A.1 in the form of PWs.2 and 3 and it was found that between PWs.2 and 3 on one hand and the defendant on the other hand there were no disputes at all. Therefore, learned trial Court agreed with the case set up by the plaintiff. All the contentions raised by the defendant in his written statement were addressed and the learned trial Court recorded a finding that the defendant was not truthful and was changing his version from time to time and his version could not be believed and his evidence did not raise any probabilities to discard the evidence led by plaintiff. It was in those circumstances, it decreed the suit directing the defendant to execute registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within three months from the date of decree. 6. Dissatisfied defendant appealed to learned XIII Additional District Judge, Narasaraopet in A.S.No.281 of 2010. He contended there that in the context of bitter enmity between parties, Ex.A.1-agreement for sale should have been disbelieved and there was utter failure on part of plaintiff in filing the suit at least soon after their filing of O.S.No.45 of 2001 and the agreement is of the year 1990, but the stamp paper on which it was prepared was of the year 1986 and the plaintiff refused to have Ex.A.1 examined by handwriting expert. It is also stated that under Ex.B.2 in the year 1995 he had already sold out the property but the trial Court failed to give proper decision in that regard despite of the pitfalls in the case, the learned trial Court decreed the suit and that error shall be rectified in the appeal. It is also stated that under Ex.B.2 in the year 1995 he had already sold out the property but the trial Court failed to give proper decision in that regard despite of the pitfalls in the case, the learned trial Court decreed the suit and that error shall be rectified in the appeal. Both sides went into contest and argued the matter and the learned first appellate Court went into all the details of evidence independently and on all the aspects it recorded its approval for the findings rendered by the trial Court. Answering the contention of the defendant about his alienation of suit schedule property under Ex.B.2 in the year 1995, the learned first appellate Court stated that in Tirumalasetty Santhamma v. Enuganti Venkaiah 2013 (6) ALT 664 , it was held that in a suit for specific performance the vendor was precluded from pleading absence of title. The Courts below in fact recorded an observation that the alleged sale under Ex.B.2 was never pleaded by the defendant in his written statement. While dealing with the aspect of non-filing of the suit soon after 2001, the learned trial Court stated that parties to the litigation are cousins and did business in partnership firm and traded with tobacco and there was nothing positive that remained to be done by the plaintiff and in those circumstances, lapse of some amount of time has absolutely no relevance. It observed that the enmity projected between the parties was only since 1997 and Ex.A.1-agreement for sale is of the year 1990 and by the evidence of DW.1 it was made more clear that by the time of Ex.A.1 the relationship between the parties to the agreement was very cordial. It was in those circumstances, all the contentions raised in the appeal were found to be without merit. The learned first appellate Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment that decreed the suit for specific performance passed by the learned trial Court. 7. On 06.01.2022 a learned Judge of this Court admitted this second appeal on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the suit filed in 2004 for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 31.05.1990 could be decreed when the same was initiated beyond reasonable time? 2. 7. On 06.01.2022 a learned Judge of this Court admitted this second appeal on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the suit filed in 2004 for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 31.05.1990 could be decreed when the same was initiated beyond reasonable time? 2. Whether the Courts below are justified in decreeing the suit for specific performance when the plaintiff failed to prove his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act? 8. Arguing on the above points, learned counsel for appellant challenged the correctness of judgments of both the Courts below, which passed a judgment despite the fact that there was long lapse of time between the agreement for sale and filing of the suit. It is also argued that as per the evidence on record, plaintiff was never ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and there was failure of Courts below in considering that aspect. 9. Learned counsel for appellant cited Kolli Satyanarayana v. Valuripalli Kesava Rao Chowdary 2022 (6) ALD 119 (SC). That was also a case of suit for specific performance. Finally, judgment was that in the facts and circumstances the plaintiff/intending purchaser was entitled for refund of money and not entitled for registration of sale deed. In that case the advance sale consideration paid was Rs.15,000/-. Finally their Lordships directed the executant of the agreement to pay Rs.15,00,000/- to the plaintiff. It was hundred times more than what was received by the executant of the agreement/defendant. The facts of that case indicates certain serious time limits prescribed between parties whereunder the owner of the property agreed to obtain permission for sale from Urban Land Ceiling Authorities within that particular time and failing which certain conditions were prescribed. Similarly, plaintiff was to pay the entire balance sale consideration of about Rs.30,315/- within particular time limits failing which the amount stood forfeited. There were mutual obligations recorded between the parties and forfeiture of the contract itself is one of the terms. Similarly, plaintiff was to pay the entire balance sale consideration of about Rs.30,315/- within particular time limits failing which the amount stood forfeited. There were mutual obligations recorded between the parties and forfeiture of the contract itself is one of the terms. It was in the context of such complex terms between parties, looking at the conduct of both sides and after deep analysis of the evidence, their Lordships found that the owner of the property having sent a letter to the plaintiff cancelling the agreement and refunding the balance sale consideration should have been the time at which plaintiff ought to have commenced his suit and he did not do it and thereafter for two years he remained silent and only then he filed the suit. On analyzing the terms of the contract between parties, their Lordships refused to grant specific performance. At para No.12, their Lordships reiterated the law stating that time limits prescribed in the agreement for sale should not be ignored even if it is considered that time is not the essence of the contract. 10. Learned counsel for respondent submits that all the disputed facts were tested on evidence and the two Courts below concurrently decided those facts and it is only on those facts this Court shall proceed and decide the substantial questions of law and the facts established naturally resulted in decreeing the suit appropriately and there is no merit in this appeal. The precedent cited has absolutely no occasion for the facts on record and is not relevant for consideration in this case since in the case at hand there are no time limits prescribed in Ex.A.1-agreement for sale and finally learned counsel sought for dismissal of the appeal. 11. Ex.A.1-agreement for sale is dated 31.05.1990. It is prepared on one sheet of paper, which is on a stamp of Rs.100/-. It is unregistered and it is non-possessory. The stamp paper shows that it was purchased by the plaintiff on 11.06.1986. 11. Ex.A.1-agreement for sale is dated 31.05.1990. It is prepared on one sheet of paper, which is on a stamp of Rs.100/-. It is unregistered and it is non-possessory. The stamp paper shows that it was purchased by the plaintiff on 11.06.1986. About use of a stamp that was four years old contest emanated before the Courts below and on evidence it was found that the plaintiff intended to purchase a Cinema Theatre and for that purpose he wanted to have an agreement and in that regard he purchased that stamp on 11.06.1986, but that transaction did not go further and the stamp remained unused and therefore, he preserved it and when the occasion arose for the deal between him and the defendant he used it. It was on that evidence both the Courts below held that to have an unregistered agreement for sale prepared there was no rule that it should be on a stamp that was purchased on the date when the agreement was executed. They further held that nothing was brought to their notice that a stamp that was four years old could never be used, under law, for preparation of an unregistered agreement for sale. Added to it, one may also record that if really someone wanted to create a false agreement for sale concerning immovable property one would have normally used a latest purchased stamp paper instead of an old one. Moreover, when the agreement itself shows that it was executed in the year 1990 one could not say that such a date is either ante-dated or post-dated. Therefore, nothing turns on the date on which stamp paper was purchased while deciding a suit for specific performance. 12. Ex.A.1 was executed by the defendant. A reading of it indicates that he received the entire sale consideration of Rs.25,000/- from the plaintiff. It further mentions that the property bargained was under mortgage with Andhra Bank and the appellant wrote his promise that he would discharge the debt and then he would register the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and then put the plaintiff in possession of the property. It further mentions that the property bargained was under mortgage with Andhra Bank and the appellant wrote his promise that he would discharge the debt and then he would register the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and then put the plaintiff in possession of the property. It is in the context of this mortgage there is a clear recital in this agreement executed by the defendant that time has no relevance for this bargain between them and as and when he discharged the debt and released the property from mortgage, he would execute the registered sale deed. In the suit and in the first appeal both the Courts held that this appellant denied execution of this document, but its execution is proved by virtue of evidence of PW.1, and the evidence of attestor/PW.2 and the evidence of scribe/PW.3. The signatures of appellant as available on his vakalat and as available on his written statement were compared by both the Courts below in terms of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act and they found that they did not find any variation between those set of signatures as against the signature available on Ex.A.1. The Courts below also recorded that this appellant was prone to speak all lies as he denied his own signatures on Ex.A.3-postal acknowledgment. They said that Ex.A.3-postal acknowledgment pertains to Ex.A.2-notice received by the defendant. Having received that notice only the defendant issued Ex.A.6-reply notice. Learned first appellate Court made it on record that while cross-examining DW.1, he was asked about offering Ex.A.1-agreement for sale for handwriting expert for his opinion and he did not agree or disagree with that proposal and said that he would consult his counsel and would take a decision. Thereafter at the fag end of the trial he seemingly made an attempt to have this document examined by an expert, but what he did was he did not produce any contemporary signatures of him. It was in those circumstances, his application was dismissed by the trial Court. The purport of this discussion on part of the Courts below do indicate the sincere efforts of plaintiff and evasive nature of the appellant. 13. While the agreement is dated 31.05.1990, the suit was filed in the year 2004. It is on this aspect, learned counsel for appellant submits that the suit was not initiated within reasonable time. The purport of this discussion on part of the Courts below do indicate the sincere efforts of plaintiff and evasive nature of the appellant. 13. While the agreement is dated 31.05.1990, the suit was filed in the year 2004. It is on this aspect, learned counsel for appellant submits that the suit was not initiated within reasonable time. Be it noted that it is not a contention concerning limitation as prescribed by the Limitation Act, but it is a contention based on theory of laches. As is clear, Ex.A.1 has no stipulation of time lines. On the other hand, defendant himself made it clear that one should not think about time and he would discharge the debt and then only he would execute the registered sale deed. Be it noted, it is not his case that he ever discharged the debt and ever got the property relieved of mortgage. The respondent/plaintiff after waiting for a decade took upon himself and he along with his another partner discharged the debt and sued the defendant for recovery of his portion of liability by filing O.S.No.45 of 2001. On evidence Courts below recorded that plaintiff and another partner discharged the debt on 30.03.2001. Thus, it was from 31.03.2001 there was every possibility for the defendant to execute the registered sale deed. He did not do it. He did not serve any notice to the plaintiff concerning Ex.A.1-agreement for sale. He did not refund Rs.25,000/- which he received towards total sale consideration. He did nothing. On discharge of mortgage debt the obligation was on the shoulders of the defendant and not on the shoulders of the plaintiff. As per the terms of Ex.A.1, plaintiff is not in possession of the property and has no title over the property and he has parted with the entire sale consideration and the defendant while owning and possessing the property is also keeping in his pocket the entire sale consideration. Thus, what was there with the plaintiff was only anxiety. Therefore, soon after discharge of debt on 30.03.2001 he served a notice on the defendant under Ex.A.2 dated 26.04.2001. Till the time he issued such notice, the defendant by his words spoken, by his words written or by his conduct ever gave out any suspicion to the plaintiff about any breach of Ex.A.1-agreement for sale. Therefore, soon after discharge of debt on 30.03.2001 he served a notice on the defendant under Ex.A.2 dated 26.04.2001. Till the time he issued such notice, the defendant by his words spoken, by his words written or by his conduct ever gave out any suspicion to the plaintiff about any breach of Ex.A.1-agreement for sale. The refusal on part of defendant was intimated by the defendant by his reply notice dated 07.05.2001/Ex.A.6. From that date within three years the suit was filed and it was filed precisely on 27.04.2004. Why it was not filed soon after exchange of notices is the only question that is raised in this appeal. The doctrine of laches apply on equitable considerations and whether someone's conduct suffers from such laches is to be inferred from the totality of facts and circumstances. Here is a case where the plaintiff and defendant bargained the property for Rs.25,000/-and the plaintiff had paid the whole of it. Then he had to pay loan money in discharge of mortgage debt and had to sue this very appellant for his contribution. Thus, more money was expended by him. First he thought of suing this appellant for refund of that contribution money because that is related to partnership business. It is only thereafter he made his own assessment and went for filing the suit. When there was nothing more positive that was required to be performed on part of the plaintiff, it was rightly recorded by both the Courts below that the readiness and willingness of plaintiff is always visible. Some delay between notices and institution of suit is understandable because the defendant himself has mentioned in his written statement that he is a chronic litigant. As one could see from Ex.B.1 there was already a criminal case between parties. In the light of these inhibiting factors, one would not venture to rush to Court for another set of litigation. Forbearance on part of respondent/plaintiff cannot be called as lapse on his part. It is in the context of all the facts and circumstances when the contention of appellant is considered, this Court finds that there is no merit in this contention and both the Courts below properly appreciated all the facts and circumstances and reached to accurate conclusions. Forbearance on part of respondent/plaintiff cannot be called as lapse on his part. It is in the context of all the facts and circumstances when the contention of appellant is considered, this Court finds that there is no merit in this contention and both the Courts below properly appreciated all the facts and circumstances and reached to accurate conclusions. Because the plaintiff has to plead and prove that he has been ready and willing to perform his own part of the contract, it is easier for the man holding obligation under Ex.A.1 to say that the intending purchaser is not ready and willing. The pleadings and the evidence and findings of the Courts below are categorical in showing that the plaintiff was never lacking in his readiness and willingness. In fact before the Courts below this appellant, with a view to sustain his theory of plaintiff not being ready and willing, raised a contention that the plaintiff had no capacity to purchase this property. Learned trial Court observed that on evidence it was already proved that the full sale consideration was paid and further the plaintiff was in trade of tobacco and therefore, such small amount could never be considered as not within the competence of plaintiff. This Court has nothing to discard. On a total reading of the entire record, it has to be recorded that both the Courts below considered only the evidence and nothing beyond evidence and reached to most logical conclusions and the approach adopted is in accordance with law. The ruling cited for the appellant in the context of the terms of Ex.A.1 and the established findings of facts would show that he could not take any help from such ruling. For all these reasons, this Court records that both the substantial questions raised here are without any merit and they are held against the appellant. 14. In the result, this Second Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.