JUDGMENT : P.G. Ajithkumar, J. The appellant filed O.P.No.400 of 2019 before the Family Court, Kannur. The relief claimed is damages for defamation. The respondents are her husband and father-in-law. Respondents filed I.A.No.1070 of 2019 contending that the Family Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the original petition. The Family Court heard the question of maintainability and allowed I.A.No.1070 of 2019. The petition was accordingly returned to the appellant for being presented before the proper court. Aggrieved thereof the appellant has filed this appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. 2. Pursuant to notice, the respondents appeared through their learned counsel. Delay of 70 days in filing the appeal was condoned as per order dated 22.12.2022 in C.M.Appl.No.1 of 2021. 3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 4. O.P.No.400 of 2019 was filed claiming damages. It was contended that the 1st respondent-husband and the 2nd respondent-father-in-law described the appellant in public as a mentally ill person. Statements were made in the pleadings submitted before the Family Court and uttered in the presence of others. Her reputation and image in the society was thereby tarnished. The appellant would allege that the respondents with a malicious intention hurled such allegations. The appellant based on such pleadings claimed an amount of Rs.50 lakhs as compensation. The question arises for consideration is whether the Family Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition claiming compensation on account of defamation. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that when the claim is by a party to a marriage against the other party and the cause of action has a nexus to the marriage, the Family Court is competent to decide it. The petition was filed before the Family Court invoking the provisions of Explanation (a) and (c) to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, would submit that the petition comes under Explanation (d) to Section 7(1) of the Act and that the order of the Family Court refusing to entertain O.P.No.400 of 2019 is incorrect. 6. Explanation (a) to Section 7(1) of the Act relates to grant of a decree of nullity of marriage, restitution of conjugal right, judicial separation or dissolution of marriage. 6. Explanation (a) to Section 7(1) of the Act relates to grant of a decree of nullity of marriage, restitution of conjugal right, judicial separation or dissolution of marriage. Explanation (c) relates to suits or proceedings between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or either of them. A claim for compensation for a tortious act is a chose in action and it is not a property upon which the claimant has a vested right. Therefore, the view taken by the Family Court that the present petition being one claiming compensation for slanderous statements is not covered by either clause (a) or clause (c), is correct. 7. Explanation (d) of Section 7(1) reads,- “(d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out a marital relationship.” If the suit or proceedings is for an order in circumstances arising out of the marital relationship, the Family Court has jurisdiction. The allegation of the appellant is that she was depicted as a mentally ill person in front of others by her husband and father-in-law, causing her defamation. The marriage subsists. Such a malicious statement was made in the petition in O.P.No.100 of 2018 filed by the 1st respondent for custody of the child. Slanderous statements were made by the respondents before public officers and in public. It is to be considered whether the petition claiming compensation on account of such statements partakes the nature of a proceedings within the purview of Explanation (d) to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act. 8. In K.A. Abdul Jaleel v. T.A. Shahida [ AIR 2003 SC 2525 ] the Apex Court considered the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Family Court. It was held that it is now a well-settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of a court created specially for resolution of disputes of certain kinds should be construed liberally and if restricted meaning is ascribed to Explanations appended to Section 7 of the Family Courts Act would frustrate the object wherefor the Family Courts were set up. 9. Therefore, as far as possible, jurisdiction of the Family Court has to be inferred. It has to be considered, however, whether the dispute involved has a proximate connection with the marital relationship. What is relevant is not the identity of the parties, but the nature of dispute involved. 10. 9. Therefore, as far as possible, jurisdiction of the Family Court has to be inferred. It has to be considered, however, whether the dispute involved has a proximate connection with the marital relationship. What is relevant is not the identity of the parties, but the nature of dispute involved. 10. Explanation (d) to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act came up for consideration before this Court in Mini and others v. Sivaraman and another [ 2020 (5) KHC 629 ]. The dispute there was regarding a suit for mandatory and prohibitory injunction. The suit was filed by the father-in-law and mother-in-law. Husband was no more. Wife along with her children allegedly trespassed into the residential building in the property of the father-in-law, the 1st plaintiff. The jurisdiction of the Family Court to entertain such a suit was in question. This Court observed, after referring to various decisions on the point, that the parameters for deciding the jurisdiction in the light of Explanation (d) to Section 7(1) are,- “13. With the broad propositions of law laid down in the above case, it is necessary to answer the following questions in our quest to identify the forum for adjudicating the lis under consideration. (1) Is there a suit or a proceeding? (2) Is the relief sought for in the suit or proceeding one for an injunction or order? (3) Has the suit or proceeding stemmed from circumstances arising out of a marital relationship? If the answer to the above questions are all in the affirmative, then the Family Court alone has the jurisdiction.” 11. Therefore, the pertinent question is whether the issue stems up from the circumstances arising out of the marriage. The question considered in Leby Issac v. Leena M. Ninan [ 2005 (3) KLT 665 ] was whether a petition by the husband claiming compensation from the wife and father-in-law for the reason that they conspired to solemnise the marriage by suppressing the pre-marital relationship of the wife with another person could be entertained by the Family Court. The wife refused to cohabit with the husband also. This court considered the question with reference to the words in Explanation (d) that “in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship”. The wife refused to cohabit with the husband also. This court considered the question with reference to the words in Explanation (d) that “in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship”. It was explained that the said words encompass occurrences or things which stand around or about, which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify the principal event of a marriage or marital relationship. 12. A similar question was considered by this Court in Anilkumar v. Sheela [ 2011 (4) KLT 120 ]. There the question was a claim by the wife against the brother of her husband. The wife happened to be a surety for the brother of the husband to avail a loan. The wife contended that only on account of her marital relationship with her husband, she agreed to be a surety for the brother of the husband. The court held that such a dispute has a proximate connection with the marital relationship and therefore the Family Court can entertain a petition for realisation of money from the brother of the husband. 13. What emerges from the principles laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions is that the dispute must have a nexus with the marital relationship. Here, the husband and the father-in-law allegedly described the appellant as a mentally ill person. There was libel as well as slander. The cause of action for the appellant to claim compensation is the injury allegedly caused to her reputation on account of such libel and slander. It is an action for tort. A tort is a civil wrong and that by itself constitutes cause of action. Whether or not she is married to the 1st respondent, the alleged statements made by the respondents if defamatory, is a sufficient cause of action. When the sole reason for claiming compensation is such statements, the marital relationship between the appellant and the 1st respondent does not have any relevance or role in resolving such a dispute. The relationship between the appellant and the respondents would not make any impact in the ultimate decision. In that view of the matter it cannot be said that the dispute involved in O.P.No.400 of 2019 has any nexus to the marital relationship or is a dispute in the circumstances arising out of the marital relationship. 14. The relationship between the appellant and the respondents would not make any impact in the ultimate decision. In that view of the matter it cannot be said that the dispute involved in O.P.No.400 of 2019 has any nexus to the marital relationship or is a dispute in the circumstances arising out of the marital relationship. 14. Therefore, we are of the view that the claim O.P.No.400 of 2019 shall not come within the purview of Explanation (d) of Section 7(1) of the Family Court Act. The impugned order of the Family Court, Kannur dated 06.12.2019 does not have any infirmity. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed.