ORDER : 1. This writ petition in the nature of habeas corpus has been filed by the petitioner-mother of the detenue Vickey Fighter @ Ricky questioning the validity of orders of detention passed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 2006 (‘the Act’) dated 30.11.2022 (Annex.2) and 08.12.2022 (Annex.3). 2. It is, inter-alia, indicated in the petition that the Deputy Commissioner of Police (West), Jodhpur sent a communication dated 18.10.2022 (Annex.1) to the District Magistrate, Jodhpur, inter-alia, requesting to order for preventive detention of petitioner’s son under Section 3(1) & (2) of the Act as he is a dangerous person as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act. 3. Based on the said communication, the District Magistrate passed an order on 30.11.2022 (Annex.2) ordering for preventive detention of Vickey Fighter @ Ricky. The order dated 30.11.2022 (Annex.2) was approved by the State Government on 08.12.2022 (Annex.3) as required under Section 3(3) of the Act. Whereafter, the matter was referred to the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board in its meeting dated 11.01.2023 (Annex.R/12) came to the conclusion that detention was in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 4. Pursuant to the said opinion of the Advisory Board, the State Government passed order dated 01.02.2023 under Section 13(1) of the Act ordering for preventive detention of the detenue for a period of one year i.e. till 03.12.2023. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, at the outset, stated that though several grounds have been raised in memo of writ petition, based on the reply of the State, he is confining his submissions on the issue that the son of the petitioner does not fall within the definition of ‘dangerous person’ as indicated under Section 2(c) of the Act. It was submitted that the respondents have relied on registration of 23 cases against the detenue during the period 2006 to 2022, out of which, he has been acquitted in 07 cases, convicted in 03 cases and 13 matters are still pending before the competent criminal courts, wherein the detenue has been enlarged on bail and therefore, the allegations made in the communication sent by the Deputy Commissioner of Police alleging the detenue as a dangerous person and the consequential orders passed by the District Magistrate and the State Government, cannot be sustained. 6. 6. Learned counsel emphasized that the nature of cases, which have been registered against the detenue, the same pertains to ‘law and order’ and has nothing to do with ‘public order’ which is sine qua non for the purpose of preventive detention as laid down in several pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and therefore, the orders impugned deserve to be quashed and set-aside. 7. Reliance has been placed on Mangi Kumari vs. State of Rajasthan and Others in D.B. Habeas Corpus Petition No. 3/2023, decided on 25.05.2023 and Chandrashekhar vs. State of Rajasthan and Others in D.B. Habeas Corpus Petition No. 50/2017, decided on 22.05.2017. 8. Learned AAG appearing for the respondents vehemently opposed the submissions. It was submitted that the conduct of the detenue over a period of time has been such that he has become a threat to the public order, which fact was emphasized by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (West) in his communication dated 18.05.2022 made to the District Magistrate enumerating in detail, the actions of the detenue in threatening the public order. The District Magistrate after due scrutiny, passed the order dated 30.11.2022, ordering for preventive detention of the detenue which order came to be approved by the State Government on 08.12.2022 and based on the opinion by the Advisory Board, the State Government passed order for preventive detention of the detenue for a period of one year w.e.f. 04.12.2022 till 03.12.2023. 9. Learned counsel emphasized that a comprehensive view has to be taken with regard to various cases registered/pending against the detenue and the overall conduct has to be seen for coming to a conclusion whether the issue pertains to ‘law and order’ or ‘public order’. It was submitted that the present is a case, wherein the detenue has become synonymous with terror in a particular area, wherein he has indulged in criminal activities unabated and with each incarceration on indulging in offence, on coming out on bail, he has indulged in more grievous crime and therefore, the satisfaction arrived at by the authorities regarding the detenue being a dangerous person is well justified. It was submitted that the definition under Section 2(c) of the Act is comprehensive and as the petitioner had indulged in offences punishable under Chaper-XVI or Chapter-XVII of the IPC and offences punishable under Chapter-V of the Arms Act, 1959, the same answers the definition of the dangerous person. It was submitted that the definition under Section 2(c) of the Act is comprehensive and as the petitioner had indulged in offences punishable under Chaper-XVI or Chapter-XVII of the IPC and offences punishable under Chapter-V of the Arms Act, 1959, the same answers the definition of the dangerous person. It was also submitted that as the Advisory Board after thorough consideration has given its opinion affirming the preventive detention, the petition deserves dismissal. 10. We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 11. As noticed, learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his submissions to the ground that the detenue does not fall within the definition of ‘dangerous person’ the definition under Section 2(c) of the Act reads as under: “2. Definitions - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: .................................... (c) “dangerous Person” means a person, who either by himself or as member or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or a attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959 or any of the offences punishable under first proviso to sub-section (1) and sub-section (1A), of section 51 of the Wild life (Protection) Act, 1972 or any offence punishable under section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.” 12. The definition is widely worded and the term has been defined to mean a person, who either by himself or as member or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable, inter-alia, under Chapter-XVI or Chapter-XVII of the IPC or any offences punishable under Chapter-V of the Arms Act etc. 13. 13. The schedule annexed to the communication dated 18.10.2022, inter-alia, indicates offences against the detenue FIRs-wise as under: Sections (1) 323, 341, 427 IPC (2) 4/25 Arms Act (3) 323, 324, 427, 451/34 IPC (4) 4/25 Arms Act (5) 341, 323/34 IPC (6) 323, 342, 365, 327, 394/34 IPC (7) 323, 324 IPC (8) 323, 324, 325, 327, 341, 427, 307 IPC (9) 435, 342, 427/34 IPC (10) 323, 341, 324/34 IPC (11) 341, 323, 325, 327/34 IPC (12) 323, 452, 341/34 IPC (13) 323, 341, 392/34 IPC (14) 384, 387/34 IPC (15) 147, 149, 436, 120-B IPC (16) 323, 341 IPC (17) 323, 341/34 IPC (18) 323, 341, 336, 379, 327/34 IPC (19) 13 RPGO (20) 325/34 IPC (21) 435/34 IPC (22) 143, 160, 279, 336, 307, 120-B IPC and 3/25 (1B)(A), 5/27(1) Arms Act (23) 385, 504, 120-B IPC 14. From the above, it would be seen that the offences for which FIRs have been lodged, for which the petitioner has been termed as ‘dangerous person’ are all part of Chapter-XVI and Chapter-XVII of the IPC and offences punishable under Chapter-V of the Arms Act and as the definition takes with in its sweep, a person who either by himself or as member or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the above offences, the alleged actions of the detenue answers the said definition and therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has wrongly been found to be a ‘dangerous person’. 15. However, mere answering of the description contained in the definition of ‘dangerous person’ under the Act is not sufficient to order preventive detention as the power to make orders for detention has been circumscribed by Section 3 of the Act, which requires a satisfaction of the State Government that with a view to prevent a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, an order for detention has to be passed. 16. Under sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act, a person is deemed to be acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order when such person is engaged in or is making or engaging in criminal activities, inter-alia, as ‘dangerous person’ which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 17. 16. Under sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act, a person is deemed to be acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order when such person is engaged in or is making or engaging in criminal activities, inter-alia, as ‘dangerous person’ which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 17. The explanation to Section 3 of the Act further provides that Public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely if any of the activities of any person is directly or indirectly causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the public at large or any section thereof. 18. The provisions of preventive detention, which exist in various enactments of various States have been repeatedly dealt with by Hon’ble Supreme Court and recently in Pesala Nookaraju vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, 2023 INSC 734 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring to several previous judgments pointing out the distinction between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ came to the following conclusion: “65. Thus, from the various decisions referred to above, it is evident that there is a very thin line between the question of law and order situation and a public order situation, and some times, the acts of a person relating to law and order situation 70 can turn into a question of public order situation. What is decisive for determining the connection of ground of detention with the maintenance of public order, the object of detention, is not an intrinsic quality of the act but rather its latent potentiality. Therefore, for determining whether the ground of detention is relevant for the purposes of public order or not, merely an objective test based on the intrinsic quality of an act would not be a safe guide. The potentiality of the act has to be examined in the light of the surrounding circumstances, posterior and anterior for the offences........” 19. Therefore, for determining whether the ground of detention is relevant for the purposes of public order or not, merely an objective test based on the intrinsic quality of an act would not be a safe guide. The potentiality of the act has to be examined in the light of the surrounding circumstances, posterior and anterior for the offences........” 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that sometimes the acts of a person relating to law and order situation can turn into a question of public order situation and that what is decisive for determining the connection of ground of detention with the maintenance of public order, the object of detention, is not an intrinsic quality of the act but rather its latent potentiality and that the potentiality of the act has to be examined in the light of the surrounding circumstances, posterior and anterior. 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to and relied on observations made in Ashok Kumar vs. Delhi Administration, (1982) 2 SCC 403 , which, inter-alia, reads as under: “13. The true distinction between the areas of ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’ lies not in the nature or quality of the Act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.......” (Emphasis supplied) 21. Similarly, reference was also made to judgment in Commissioner of Police vs. C. Anita, (2004) 7 SCC 467 , which reads as under: “7..........The crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While the expression ‘law and order’ is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order. ‘Public order’ has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. While the expression ‘law and order’ is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order. ‘Public order’ has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting ‘public order’ from that concerning ‘law and order’. The question of ask is: “Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?” (Emphasis supplied) 22. From the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is apparent that in case the potentiality of the act is to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community, the same would make it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 23. In the present case, a perusal of the various criminal cases filed/pending against the petitioner would reveal that the area of activity of various offences, which fall within the definition of dangerous person is in and around Pratap Nagar and Nagori Gate, wherein the detenue, has committed repeated offences and as submitted, the frequency of such acts by each passing year has increased with much more grievous offences and therefore, it cannot be said that the present is a case of ‘law and order’ situation only. As explanation to Section 3 of the Act clearly creates deeming fiction pertaining to adverse effect on public order in case the activities are causing or likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the public at large or any section thereof, which aspect is clearly available in the present case and therefore, the action of the respondents in terming the detenue as a dangerous person and seeking his preventive detention and the orders passed by the State Government after the Advisory Board upheld the detention, cannot be faulted. 24. So far as judgments in the case of Mangi Kumari (supra) and Chandrashekhar (supra) are concerned, in the case of Mangi Kumari (supra), the Court besides coming to the conclusion that the cases were in the nature of ‘law and order’ issue and not of ‘public order’ also found violation of principles of natural justice, which are sacrosanct insofar as cases of preventive detention are concerned and as such, the said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. Similarly in the case of Chandrashekhar (supra) also on facts, it was found to be a case of ‘law and order’ and not ‘public order’ which judgment also has no application to the facts of the present case. 25. In view of the above discussion, there is no substance in the writ petition, the same is, therefore, dismissed.