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2023 DIGILAW 169 (CHH)

Ajay Kumar Dwivedi S/o Shri B. P. Dwivedi v. State of Chhattisgarh

2023-03-22

NARENDRA KUMAR VYAS

body2023
ORDER : 1. The petitioner, who is a practicing lawyer having enrolled in Chhattisgarh State Bar Association in the Year 2001 and member of Chhattisgarh High Court Bar Association has filed the instant petition challenging the order dated 09.02.2023 (Annexure P/1) passed by respondent No. 2/Under Secretary, Food Civil Supply and Consumer Prevention Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District-Raipur (C.G.) by which candidature of the petitioner for appointment on the post of Member, District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Korba (C.G.) has been rejected on the count that the petitioner has not submitted 15 years experience certificate. The petitioner has also challenged paragraph 11(4) of the advertisement dated 02.08.2023 (Annexure P/2) issued by respondent No. 2 by which the working experience certificate should have been issued by District Legal Authority or District Judge or any authorized person by the District Judge after issuance of advertisement and it should not be three months prior to issuance of advertisement. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that rejection of the candidature of the petitioner on the pretext that experience certificate submitted by the petitioner is not as per the norms and is erroneous one as the petitioner is continuously work practicing in the High Court of Chhattisgarh and having certificate issued by the High Court Bar Association, therefore, he fulfilled the requisite qualification and accordingly submitted the requisite certificate, as such, rejection of the candidature is erroneous one and would pray for quashing of the order (Annexure P/1) and clause 11(4) of the advertisement. He would further submit that since the State Government has adopted the rules framed by the Central Government known as Consumer Protection (Qualification for Appointment, Method or Recruitment, Procedure for Appointment, Terms of Office, Resignation and Removal of the President and Member of the State Commission and District Commission) Rule, 2020 (for short “the Rule, 2020”) vide notification dated 08.02.2021, wherein, as per Rule 4 Qualification for appointment of President and Member of District Commission has been prescribed. Rule 4(2) deals with the appointment of Member provides that (a) is of not less than 35 years of age, (b) possessed a bachelor degree from a recognized university, (c) if a person of ability, integrity and standing and having special knowledge and professional experience of less than 15 years in consumer affairs, law public affairs administration, economic, commerce, industry, finance, management, engineering, technology, public health or medicine. 3. He would further submit that from bare perusal of the rule, there is no restriction provided that certificate should have been issued by the District Legal Authority or District Judge or his nominee, therefore, providing Clause 11(4) of the advertisement, is beyond the competency of the respondent, as such, it is erroneous and would pray for allowing the petition. 4. On the other hand, learned State counsel would submit that Section 29 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (for short “the Act 2019”) provides qualification, allowances and other terms and condition of service of president and member of District Commission and Section 43 deals with qualification etc. of president and member of State Commission. Section 101 of the Act, 2019 provides power of the Central Government to make rules and in exercise of power conferred by virtue of Section 101 of the Act, 2019 has framed rules and Rule 6 provides procedure for appointment which reads as under: “6. Procedure of appointment: (1) The President and members of the State Commission and the District Commission shall be appointed by the State Government on the recommendation of a Selection Committee, consisting of the following persons, namely: (a) Chief Justice of the High Court or any Judge of the High Court nominated by him Chairperson (b) Secretary in charge of Consumer Affairs of the State Government Member (c) Nominee of the Chief Secretary of the State Member (2) The Secretary in charge of Consumer Affairs of the State Government shall be the convener of the Selection Committee. (3) No appointment of the President, or of a member shall be invalid merely by reason of any vacancy or absence in the Selection Committee other than a vacancy or absence of the Chairperson. (4) The process of appointments shall be initiated by the State Government at least six months before the vacancy arises. (3) No appointment of the President, or of a member shall be invalid merely by reason of any vacancy or absence in the Selection Committee other than a vacancy or absence of the Chairperson. (4) The process of appointments shall be initiated by the State Government at least six months before the vacancy arises. (5) If a post falls vacant due to resignation or death of a member or creation of a new post, the process for filling the post shall be initiated immediately after the post has fallen vacant or is created, as the case may be. (6) The advertisement of a vacancy inviting applications for the posts from eligible candidates shall be published in leading newspapers and circulated in such other manner as the State Government may deem appropriate. (7) After scrutiny of the applications received till the last date specified for receipt of such applications, a list of eligible candidates along with their applications shall be placed before the Selection Committee. (8) The Selection Committee shall consider all the applications of eligible applicants referred to it and if it considers necessary, it may shortlist the applicants in accordance with such criteria as it may decide. (9) The Selection Committee shall determine its procedure for making its recommendation keeping in view the requirements of the State Commission or the District Commission and after taking into account the suitability, record of past performance, integrity and adjudicatory experience. (10) The Selection committee shall recommend a panel of names of candidates for appointment in the order of merit for the consideration of the State Government. (11) The State Government shall verify or cause to be verified the credentials and antecedents of the recommended candidates. (12) Every appointment of a President or member shall be subject to submission of a certificate of physical fitness as indicated in the annexure appended to these rules, duly signed by a civil surgeon or District Medical Officer. (13) Before appointment, the selected candidate shall furnish an undertaking that he does not and will not have any such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially his functions as a President or member.” 5. (13) Before appointment, the selected candidate shall furnish an undertaking that he does not and will not have any such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially his functions as a President or member.” 5. In exercise of power conferred by Rule 6, the State Government has constituted a Committee for appointment, which consists of Hon’ble Judge of High Court as President, Secretary, Consumer Department and a Member nominated by the Chief Secretary as Member vide notification dated 26.10.2021. The Committee constituted by the State Government vide Minutes of Meeting dated 18.06.2022 (Clause 2.2) has fixed the criteria for appointment of President and Member of State Commission and as per Clause 2.2(b), the criteria for appointment of President and Member have been prescribed and as per Clause 2.2(b)(4), in case of legal profession, the experience certificate should be dated after issuance of advertisement and not prior to three months of issuance of advertisement and the same shall be issued by District Legal Authority or District Judge or Judge nominated by the District Judge. This clause has been inserted with an object that the person who has practiced regularly in the District Court can be acquaintance with the procedures prevailing in the trial Court, which is required for deciding the consumer dispute. Thus, there is reasonable requirement of the certificate issued by the District Legal Authority, District Judge or his nominee, therefore, petitioner has no ground to challenge the same and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. He would further submit that the petitioner has participated in the selection process, therefore, he is estopped from challenging the same and would rely upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Madras Institute of Development Studies and Another vs. S. Sivasubramaniyan and Others, (2016) 1 SCC 454 . 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction. 7. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction. 7. To examine the controversy raised in this petition, it is expedient for this Court to consider the decision taken by the Committee on 26.10.2021 by which the experience certificate, which is required at the time of submission of application for appointment has to be extracted, which is as under: ^^2-2 vkosnu i= ds lkFk fuEu nLrkost layXu fd;k tkosxk%& ¼v½ v/;{k ,oa lnL; NRrhlxढ+ jkT; miHkksDrk vk;ksx%& 1- vk;q ds leFkZu esa Áek.k@vadlwphA 2- 'kS{kf.kd ;ksX;rk ds leFkZu esa vadlwphA 3- fu/kkZfjr o"kksZ ds dk;Z vuqHko ds laca/k esa l{ke Ákf/kdkjh }kjk tkjh Áek.k i=A 4- ;fn iwoZ esa lsokjr gSa rks vuqHko ds leFkZu esa Áek.k i= rFkk lsokfuo`fRr vkns'k dh ÁfrA 5- vkosnu ÁLrqr fd;s tkus dh frfFk dks lsok esa gksus ij fu;ksDrk dk vukifRr Áek.k i=A ¼c½ v/;{k ,oa lnL; ftyk miHkksDrk vk;ksx%& 1- vk;q ds leFkZu esa gkbZLdwy@gk;j lsds.Mjh dh vadlwph ftlesa tUefrfFk dk mYys[k gksA 2- 'kS{kf.kd ;ksX;rk gsrq Lukrd dh vadlwphA 3- dk;Z{ks= ds Kku ,oa lacaf/kr {ks= esa fu;e esa fu/kkZfjr o"kksZ ds dk;Z vuqHko ds laca/k esa l{ke Ákf/kdkjh }kjk tkjh Áek.k i=A 4- ;fn fof/k O;olk; ds {ks= esa dk;Z dk vuqHko mYysf[kr fd;k tkrk gS rks ,slk Áek.k i= foKkiu tkjh gksus dh frfFk ds i'pkr~ ftyk fof/kd Ákf/kdj.k vFkok ftyk U;k;k/kh'k ;k ftyk U;k;k/kh'k }kjk vf/kd`r U;k;k/kh'k }kjk tkjh gksuk pkfg, ,slk Áek.k i= foKkiu tkjh gksus ds rhu ekg iwoZ dk gksus ij Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk;sxkA 5- ;fn lkekftd {ks= esa dk;Z fd;s tkus dk vuqHko Áek.k i= layXu fd;k tkrk gS rks ,sls laLFkk iathd`r gksuk pkfg, rFkk miHkksDrk ekeys] fof/k] yksd ekeys] Á'kklu] vFkZ'kkL=] okf.kT;] m|ksx] foRr] Áca/ku] vfHk;kaf=dh] ÁkS|ksfxdh;] yksd LokLF; vFkok vkS"kf/k esa lacaf/kr inks ds fy;s fu/kkZfjr vof/k rd dk;Zjr gksA 6- dk;Z dk vuqHko ftl {ks= esa gS mldk Áek.k i= tkjh djus okyh laLFkk }kjk Li"V :i ls vafdr fd;k tkuk vko';d gSA 7- ;fn iwoZ esa lsokjr gSa rks vuqHko ds leFkZu esa Áek.k i=A 8- vkosnu ÁLrqr fd;s tkus dh frfFk dks lsok esa gksus ij fu;ksDrk dk vukifRr Áek.k i=A** 8. Thus, calling of certificate issued by Legal Service Authority, District Judge or any Judge authorized by District Judge has some reasonable classification and nexus attached to the objective sought to be achieved by demanding the said certificate as these certificates issued by the District Legal Authority or District Judge, who will be in a position to have ascertain the performance, conduct, credential, legal knowledge of the candidate, who is appearing before the District Judge. Similarly, the District Legal Service Authority which has been constituted under the Act, of 1987 can very well ascertain the credential of candidate towards his attitude providing legal aid to the common people. Thus, calling for the certificate from these authorities have some rational reason and have nexus for which the appointment has to be made, whereas, the certificate issued by the High Court Bar Association cannot achieve the object for which the appointment is to be made as the President, High Court Bar Association is not the competent authority to ascertain the legal knowledge and conduct of the candidate, therefore, rejection of candidature of the petitioner, is legal and justify. Similarly, Clause 11(4) of the advertisement, is also valid and have nexus with the object intent to be achieved. Thus, it is validly incorporated in the advertisement and does not suffer from illegality, which warrants any interference by this Court. 9. Even otherwise, law has been well settled by Hon’ble the Supreme Court that the State, as employer, may legitimately bear in mind several features including the nature of the job, the aptitudes requisite for the efficient discharge of duties, the functionality of a qualification and the content of the course of studies which leads up to the acquisition of a qualification. The State is entrusted with the authority to assess the needs of its public services. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank and Another vs. Anit Kumar Das (Civil Appeal No. 3602 of 2020) decided on 03.11.2020 has held as under: “That thereafter it is observed in Para 27 as under: 27. While prescribing the qualifications for a post, the State, as employer, may legitimately bear in mind several features including the nature of the job, the aptitudes requisite for the efficient discharge of duties, the functionality of a qualification and the content of the course of studies which leads up to the acquisition of a qualification. While prescribing the qualifications for a post, the State, as employer, may legitimately bear in mind several features including the nature of the job, the aptitudes requisite for the efficient discharge of duties, the functionality of a qualification and the content of the course of studies which leads up to the acquisition of a qualification. The State is entrusted with the authority to assess the needs of its public services. Exigencies of administration, it is trite law, fall within the domain of administrative decision-making. The State as a public employer may well take into account social perspectives that require the creation of job opportunities across the societal structure. All these are essentially matters of policy. Judicial review must tread warily. That is why the decision in Jyoti K.K. vs. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664 must be understood in the context of a specific statutory rule under which the holding of a higher qualification which presupposes the acquisition of a lower qualification was considered to be sufficient for the post. It was in the context of specific rule that the decision in Jyoti K.K. vs. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664, turned. 7.3 Thus, as held by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, it is for the employer to determine and decide the relevancy and suitability of the qualifications for any post and it is not for the Courts to consider and assess. A greater latitude is permitted by the Courts for the employer to prescribe qualifications for any post. There is a rationale behind it. Qualifications are prescribed keeping in view the need and interest of an Institution or an Industry or an establishment as the case may be. The Courts are not fit instruments to assess expediency or advisability or utility of such prescription of qualifications. However, at the same time, the employer cannot act arbitrarily or fancifully in prescribing qualifications for posts. In the present case, prescribing the eligibility criteria/educational qualification that a graduate candidate shall not be eligible and the candidate must have passed 12th standard is justified and as observed hereinabove, it is a conscious decision taken by the Bank which is in force since 2008. In the present case, prescribing the eligibility criteria/educational qualification that a graduate candidate shall not be eligible and the candidate must have passed 12th standard is justified and as observed hereinabove, it is a conscious decision taken by the Bank which is in force since 2008. Therefore, the High Court has clearly erred in directing the appellant Bank to allow the respondent-original writ petitioner to discharge his duties as a Peon, though he as such was not eligible as per the eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in the advertisement.” 10. The State Government in view of the power conferred under the Act, 2019 has constituted the Committee who has taken policy decision directing the candidate to submit experience certificate issued by District Legal Authority or District Judge has applied though out for whole State and have some object behind the same and it is a policy decision wherein this Court’s power to interfere has been well defined in catena of decisions by Hon’ble the Supreme Court. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Vasavi Engineering College Parents Association vs. State of Telangana and Others, (2019) 7 SCC 172 has held as under: “Judicial review, as is well known, lies against the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. If the decision-making process is flawed inter-alia by violation of the basic principles of natural justice, is ultra-vires the powers of the decision maker, takes into consideration irrelevant materials or excludes relevant materials, admits materials behind the back of the person to be affected or is such that no reasonable person would have taken such a decision in the circumstances, the court may step in to correct the error by setting aside such decision and requiring the decision maker to take a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The court, in the garb of judicial review, cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the decision maker and make the decision itself. Neither can it act as an appellate authority of the TFARC. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) Sindri vs. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568 , it was observed: “35.........We certainly agree that judicial interference with the administration cannot be meticulous in our Montesquien system of separation of powers. The court cannot usurp or abdicate, and the parameters of judicial review must be clearly defined and never exceeded. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) Sindri vs. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568 , it was observed: “35.........We certainly agree that judicial interference with the administration cannot be meticulous in our Montesquien system of separation of powers. The court cannot usurp or abdicate, and the parameters of judicial review must be clearly defined and never exceeded. If the directorate of a government company has acted fairly, even if it has faltered in its wisdom, the court cannot, as a super auditor, take the Board of Directors to task. This function is limited to testing whether the administrative action has been fair and free from the taint of unreasonableness and has substantially complied with the norms of procedure set for it by rules of public administration.” 18. Judicial restraint in exercise of Judicial review was considered in the State of (NCT) of Delhi vs. Sanjeev, (2005) 5 SCC 181 as follows: “16.........One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is “illegality” the second “irrationality” and the third “procedural impropriety.” These principles were highlighted by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for the Civil Service (commonly known as CCSU case). If the power has been exercised on a non-consideration or non-application of mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated.” 19. It needs no emphasis that complex executive decisions in economic matters are necessarily empiric and based on experimentation. Its validity cannot be tested on any rigid principles or the application of any straitjacket formula. The court while adjudging the validity of an executive decision in economic matters must grant a certain measure of freedom or play in the joints to the executive. Not mere errors, but only palpably arbitrary decisions alone can be interfered with in judicial review. The recommendation made by a statutory body consisting of domain experts not being to the satisfaction of the State Government is an entirely different matter with which we were not concerned in the present discussion. Not mere errors, but only palpably arbitrary decisions alone can be interfered with in judicial review. The recommendation made by a statutory body consisting of domain experts not being to the satisfaction of the State Government is an entirely different matter with which we were not concerned in the present discussion. The court should therefore be loath to interfere with such recommendation of an expert body, and accepted by the government, unless it suffers from the vice of arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity or violates any provisions of the law under which it is constituted. The court cannot sit as an appellate authority, entering the arena of disputed facts and figures to opine with regard to manner in which the TAFRC ought to have proceeded without any finding of any violation of rules or procedure. If a statutory body has not exercised jurisdiction properly the only option is to remand the matter for fresh consideration and not to usurp the powers of the authority. In Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. vs. Reserve Bank of India, (1992) 2 SCC 343 , it was observed: “31. The function of the court is to see that lawful authority is not abused but not to appropriate to itself the task entrusted to that authority. It is well settled that a public body invested with statutory powers must take care not to exceed or abuse its power. It must keep within the limits of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith and it must act reasonably. Courts are not to interfere with economic policy which is the function of experts. It is not the function of the courts to sit in judgment over matters of economic policy and it must necessarily be left to the expert bodies. In such matters even experts can seriously and doubtlessly differ. Courts cannot be expected to decide them without even the aid of experts.” 20. In the context of Indian jurisprudence, the Constitution is the supreme law. All executive or legislative actions have to be tested on the anvil of the same. Such actions will have to draw their sustenance as also their boundaries under the same. Any action falling foul of the constitutional guarantees will call for corrective action in judicial review to ensure adherence to the constitutional ethos. All executive or legislative actions have to be tested on the anvil of the same. Such actions will have to draw their sustenance as also their boundaries under the same. Any action falling foul of the constitutional guarantees will call for corrective action in judicial review to ensure adherence to the constitutional ethos. But so long as the fabric of the constitutional ethos is not set asunder, the court will have to exercise restraint, more particularly in matters concerning domain experts, else the risk of justice being based on individual perceptions which may render myths as realities inconsistent with the constitutional ethos. Courts often adjudicate disputes that raise the question of how strictly should they scrutinise executive or legislative action. Therefore, courts have identified certain questions as being inappropriate for judicial resolution or have refused on competency grounds to substitute their judgment for that of another person on a particular matter.” 11. From the above stated discussion and considering the law that the fixing of criteria for appointment lies within the domain of the State Government which has been taken in pursuance of policy decision and the said policy decision does not suffer from arbitrariness or competency of the Committee constituted by the State Government, I do not find any reason to interfere in order dated 09.02.2023 (Annexure P/1) by which candidature of the petitioner has been rejected and Clause 11(4) of the advertisement by which criteria has been laid down. The writ petition sens merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 12. The interim order passed by this Court on 23.02.2023 stands vacated.