JUDGMENT Jaspreet Singh, J. The Insurance Company has come up in Appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 assailing the award dated 07.08.2019 passed in Claim Petition No. 81 of 2018 by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No. VI, District Barabanki solely assailing the quantum. 2. Sri Anchal Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that upon the death of Smt. Sunita on 01.11.2016, a Claim Petition bearing No. 81 of 2016 came to be filed. The averments of the claim petition indicated that Smt. Sunita being the pillion rider was traveling along with her husband Anil Kumar on his motorcycle bearing No. UP 32HF 8507. While the said couple had reached near Makarpur Petrol Pump, P.S. Loni Katra, District Barabanki, the offending truck bearing No. UP 83 H 9611 being driven rashly and negligently hit the motorcycle, as a result, Smt. Sunita received grievous injuries and she died on the spot. 3. It was further pleaded that Smt. Sunita was a proficient housewife and was also running a Tea Stall and was able to earn Rs. 6,000/- per month from the said Tea Stall and she contributed towards the household work and that was valued at Rs. 3,000/- per month and consequently the loss was indicated as Rs. 9,000/- per month. The deceased was survived by her husband Anil Kumar, son Pramod Kumar and a daughter Ms. Priya. 4. The claim petition came to be contested and upon exchange of the pleadings, the Tribunal framed six issues. After considering the evidence both oral and documentary, the Tribunal returned a finding that the accident which caused the death of Smt. Sunita was on account of rash and negligent driving of a truck bearing No. UP 83 H 9611. It also held that the truck was duly insured with the New India Assurance Company Ltd. and its driver had a valid and subsisting driving license, however, while computing the compensation, the Tribunal adopted a notional income of Rs. 3,000/-per month upon which 25% was added for future prospects and considering that the age of the deceased as 40 years, a multiplier of 15 was adopted and thereafter a sum of Rs. 70,000/- towards loss of consortium, loss of estate, funeral expenses was added and thus a total sum of Rs. 3,000/-per month upon which 25% was added for future prospects and considering that the age of the deceased as 40 years, a multiplier of 15 was adopted and thereafter a sum of Rs. 70,000/- towards loss of consortium, loss of estate, funeral expenses was added and thus a total sum of Rs. 7,45,000/- has been awarded in favour of the claimants-respondents along with 7% interest by means of the award dated 07.08.2019 which is under challenge. 5. The learned counsel for the Insurance Company has submitted that the Tribunal has erred on two counts:- (i) No deductions towards personal expenses has been made which is apparent from the manner in which the issue no. (vi) has been decided. (ii) The Tribunal has also erred in adopting an incorrect multiplier of 15 rather a multiplier of 14 ought to have been adopted. 6. It is further elaborated that since no proof was furnished for proving any income of the deceased, hence, even the notional income which has been taken is on the higher side and consequently the award is inflated and necessarily needs to be modified. 7. Sri Ravindra Pratap Singh, learned counsel appearing for the claimants-respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 has opposed the aforesaid submissions and has urged that the primary requirement in a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act casts a duty on the Tribunal to ascertain a just and fair compensation. 8. It is urged that specific evidence was led on behalf of the claimants to indicate that the deceased was running a Tea Stall from where she earned Rs. 6,000/- per month. It is further pointed out that she was also a proficient housewife who contributed to the household and this was specifically pleaded in the claim petition including in the evidence and despite the same, the Tribunal has merely taken a notional income of Rs. 3,000/-per month without any basis and has completely ignored the fact that the deceased was running a Tea Stall and the income generated therefrom. 9. 3,000/-per month without any basis and has completely ignored the fact that the deceased was running a Tea Stall and the income generated therefrom. 9. It is further submitted that the age of the deceased has been taken to be 40 years which was specifically stated in the claim petition as well as corroborated from the postmortem report and there was no contradictory material against the same and thus at the age of 40 years as per the dictum of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma and Others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Others, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , the appropriate multiplier to be adopted is 15 which has been noted by the Claims Tribunal and therefore it cannot be said that the Tribunal has erred in adopting an incorrect multiplier. 10. It is further submitted that this fact apart since Smt. Sunita had died in the accident and she was survived by her husband and two children, accordingly, consortium should have been awarded in terms of the decision of the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram, 2018 SCC Online SC 1546 i.e. to say that the husband would be entitled to spouse consortium and the two children were entitled to parental consortium and this aspect has been ignored by the Tribunal. 11. It is also pointed out that in the aforesaid circumstance if the appropriate income of the deceased was taken, coupled with the fact that appropriate consortium is awarded then amount as granted by the Tribunal will be just and appropriate and then even if an adjustment for personal expenses is made then there would not be much of a difference in the quantum to persuade the Appellate Court to intervene where substantial justice has been done and a fair and adequate compensation has been awarded. Hence, the award may not be disturbed only on account of mathematical calculations or for technical reasons. 12. In reply, the learned counsel for the Insurance Company has pointed out that it is the appeal of the Insurance Company which is assailing the quantum of award on the aforesaid counts. Hence, the award may not be disturbed only on account of mathematical calculations or for technical reasons. 12. In reply, the learned counsel for the Insurance Company has pointed out that it is the appeal of the Insurance Company which is assailing the quantum of award on the aforesaid counts. The claimants-respondents have not filed any appeal nor any cross objections and thus they are precluded from making any submission for enhancement of the award on the ground that the Tribunal has not taken the appropriate income of the deceased and the consortium has also not been granted appropriately. Moreover, the respondent do not dispute that the Tribunal ought to have made adjustments towards personal expenses, which has not been done, consequently, the appeal deserves to be allowed. 13. The Court has considered the rival submissions and also perused the material on record. 14. In light of the rival submissions, the issues which arise for the consideration of this Court in the present appeal is:- (i) Whether in absence of any cross appeal under Order 41, Rule 22 C.P.C. filed by the claimants, this Court can consider the submissions regarding enhancement of the award at the behest of the claimants, whereas it is the Insurance Company who has challenged the award on the ground of quantum being high?. (ii) Whether the quantum as determined by the Tribunal is just and fair compensation? 15. In order to answer the aforesaid two issues, it will be necessary to notice certain statutory provisions as contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 16. section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for constitution of a Claims Tribunal and section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 relates to how an application for compensation is to be made. 17. section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 of the aforesaid Act provides for the procedure and powers of the Claims Tribunal and it specifically provides that in holding an inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit and it shall have all the powers of Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and for enforcing the attendance of witness and for compelling the discovery of production of documents. 18. 18. section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 specifically provides that on receipt of an application for compensation made under Section 166 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal after giving notice to the insurer and the parties concerned and after affording any opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to be just and specify the person or persons to whom the compensation shall be payable and shall also specify the amount which shall be paid by the owner or the insurer or the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all, as the case may be. 19. An appeal against the award is provided under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to the High Court. In the State of U.P., the Government has formulated the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 and matters relating to the claims have been covered in Chapter 9 from Rules 204 to 222. 20. It will also be seen that the primary duty of the Claims Tribunal is to hold an inquiry in order to ascertain and arrive at a just and fair compensation. In order to arrive at such a finding, the inquiry is held and it is open for the parties to lead their evidence to help the Tribunal to arrive at a just compensation. Once, a compensation has been determined by the Tribunal, it is open for either of the parties either to accept or to challenge the award by filing an appeal. 21. The award passed by the Tribunal can be assailed by an aggrieved party on various counts including the quantum. If an appeal has been filed by any party, (other than the claimant) on any ground then if the claimants are dissatisfied with the amount as awarded, they always have a right of seeking enhancement of the award by either filing a separate appeal or by filing cross objections under Order 41, Rule 22 C.P.C. 22. The complexion would change where a party (other than the claimant) assails the award solely on the ground of quantum of compensation before the Appellate Court and the claimant who has a right of filing a cross objection but he does not file any cross-objection or cross appeal. The complexion would change where a party (other than the claimant) assails the award solely on the ground of quantum of compensation before the Appellate Court and the claimant who has a right of filing a cross objection but he does not file any cross-objection or cross appeal. In such a situation whether the Appellate Court is only required to assess and examine the appeal within the limited parameters as urged by the appellants assailing the award on quantum or is it open for the Appellate Court, if during hearing of the appeal, It finds that the compensation has not been appropriately granted by the Tribunal then whether it can grant such higher compensation than the one which has been granted by the Tribunal and which is already assailed and under challenge before it in appeal. 23. In order to find an answer to the said question, it will be appropriate to take a glance at few decisions on the subject. A Division Bench of this Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Risha Devi and others; 2017 (3) ADJ 685 considered the issue in context with provisions of Order 41, Rule 33 C.P.C. and the relevant portion of the said decision reads as under:- ".18.The other argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that amount of compensation cannot be increased in an appeal filed by the Insurance Company in the absence of cross-appeal by the claimant, is also without any force. 19.Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribing the power of court of appeal clearly provides that the Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made as the case may require, and this power may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties though they may not file any appeal or objection. Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code reads as under: "33. Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code reads as under: "33. Power of Court of Appeal - The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection [any may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees] [Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under Section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order. 20.The provisions of Order XLI Rule 33 C.P.C. was explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mahant Dhangir v. Madan Mohan, 1987 Supp SCC 528 : AIR 1988 SC 54 in following words: "The sweep of the power under Rule 33 is wide enough to determine any question not only between the appellant and respondent, but also between respondent and co-respondents. The appellate Court could pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. The appellate court could also pass such other decree or order as the case may require. The words "as the case may require" used in Rule 33 Order 41 have been put in wide terms to enable the appellate Court to pass any order or decree to meet the ends of justice. What then should be the constraint? We do not find many. We are not giving any liberal interpretation. The rule itself is liberal enough. The only constraint that we could see, may be these : That the parties before the lower Court should be there before the appellate Court. The question raised must properly arise out of the judgment of the lower Court. We do not find many. We are not giving any liberal interpretation. The rule itself is liberal enough. The only constraint that we could see, may be these : That the parties before the lower Court should be there before the appellate Court. The question raised must properly arise out of the judgment of the lower Court. If these two requirements are there, the appellate Court could consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower Court. It may be urged by any party to the appeal. It is true that the power of the appellate Court under Rule 33 is discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. The Court should not refuse to exercise that discretion on mere technicalities." 21. The same view has again been reiterated in a later decision by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v. Basanti Devi, (1999) 8 SCC 229 : AIR 2000 SC 43 . 22.We are of the considered view that the conditions as laid down in provisions of Order XLI Rule 33 are satisfied in the present case. In Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (Supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that when circumstances exist which necessitate the exercise of discretion conferred by Rule 33, the court cannot be found wanting when it comes to exercise its powers. 23.Thus the argument in this regard made by the learned counsel for the appellant has no legs to stand and is not liable to be sustained." 24. A similar issue was raised before this Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Neelam Jaiswal and others; 2020 SCC Online (All.) 85 wherein the issue was whether in an appeal preferred by the Insurance Company on a ground other than the quantum and in absence of any cross appeal by the claimants whether the court would be justified in enhancing the amount in terms of powers conferred under Order 41, Rule 22 C.P.C. and Order 41, Rule 33 C.P.C. This was considered in detail by the Court with the aid of the decisions of the Apex Court and finally it was held as under:- "28. There is another angle to look at the aforesaid situation. There is another angle to look at the aforesaid situation. In the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in the case of Resha Devi ( supra) it would be seen that the appeal had been preferred by the Insurance Company. The submission of the learned counsel for the Insurance Company is noted in paragraph-4 of the judgment of the Division Bench and from the perusal whereof, it would indicate that the question before Hon'ble the Division Bench as raised by the Insurance Company was on quantum; inasmuch as it had been contended that the multiplier as adopted by the tribunal was on the higher side and the compensation accordingly was excessive. 29. It is in the aforesaid circumstance, where the question of quantum was before the Division Bench and in such circumstance considering the fact that the Division Bench found that the award was on the lower side had applied the power under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC and has enhanced the award by adding non-pecuniary damages. Thus, it would be seen that the facts before the Division Bench were completely different; inasmuch as the issue of quantum was before the High Court specifically raised by the Insurance Company and as an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings and the tribunal is required to hold an inquiry to ascertain the compensation which is just and fair, hence in the aforesaid circumstances where the Division Bench came to be conclusion that the Insurance Company was contending that the award was excessive, but it found that it was on the lower side, hence in order to do substantial justice despite the claimants did not file a cross appeal the Division Bench exercised its power under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC and enhance the same." 25. This Court would be failing in its duty if it did not notice a recent decision of the Apex Court in context with the powers conferred on the Appellate Court under Order 41, Rule 22 C.P.C. and Order 41, Rule 33 C.P.C. in Saurav Jain v. A.B.P. Design; 2021 SCC Online 552 wherein the issue was whether the superior Court could consider an adverse finding even where a cross objection has not been filed and it was held as under:- "27. On a perusal of the above authorities, it is evident that the principle stipulated in Order XLI Rule 22 of CPC can be applied to petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution because of this Court's wide powers to do justice under Article 142 of the Constitution. Since the principle in Order XLI Rule 22 of the CPC furthers the cause of justice by providing the party other than the "aggrieved party' to raise any adverse findings against them, this Court can draw colour from Order XLI Rule 22 CPC and permit objections to findings. 28. From the above it has been established that it not necessary that a challenge to the adverse findings of the lower court needs to be made in the form of a memorandum of cross-objection. In the present case, we note that the appellant had raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court for entertaining the suit on the ground that an injunction and declaratory relief could not have been given. Although the Trial Court passed a decree in favour of the appellant, it had decided against the appellant on the question of jurisdiction. This finding was not challenged by the appellant before the High Court in the form of a memorandum of cross-objection. The judgment of the High Court makes no mention that a plea of lack of jurisdiction was taken by either the appellant or the MDA. Before this Court, the appellant has not filed the counter-affidavit it had filed before the High Court. Thus, the conclusion that emanates from the record before us is that the ground of jurisdiction was only raised by the appellant before the Trial Court and not before the High Court. In effect then, this Court would have to adjudicate on a plea, which did not form a part of the decision of the High Court in challenge before us. 29. With regard to new grounds being raised before this Court in a special leave petition under Article 136, we note that under Order 21, Rule 3 (c) of the Supreme Court Rules 2013, SLPs are to be confined to the pleadings before the court whose order is challenged. However, with the leave of the Court, additional grounds can be urged at the time of the hearing. *******--------*******------****---------*** 32. In Most Rev. However, with the leave of the Court, additional grounds can be urged at the time of the hearing. *******--------*******------****---------*** 32. In Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma as well, a three Judge bench of this Court entertained an objection as to maintainability of the suit under section 9 of the CPC, despite the plea not having been raised before the courts below. The Court observed that the plea of a bar or lack of jurisdiction can be entertained at any stage, since an order or decree passed without jurisdiction is nonest in law. *******--------*******------****---------*** .....34. Based on the position of law, we find it just to allow the appellant to raise the ground of jurisdiction before us. Allowing the ground to be raised would not require the submission of additional evidence since it is a pure question of law and strikes at the heart of the matter. We shall now turn to the merits of this argument. " 26. From a gainful reading of the propositions as has been noticed in the decisions considered hereinabove, apparently, what can be culled out is the fact that once the issue of compensation/quantum has been raised by any party before the Appellate Court, then the Appellate Court becomes duty bound to ascertain as to whether the compensation has been adequately and justly awarded or not. The entire ethos behind consideration of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act is grant of just and fair compensation. This is to be seen in the context that in the given facts and circumstance, the compensation should not be meager but at the same time it should not also be a bonanza for the claimants. Within these two outer perimeter, it is the duty of the Tribunal and so also for the Appellate Court to adjudge the issue of quantum with a correct lens and perspective so that the claimants are awarded just and fair compensation which is pragmatic and close to reality. 27. Within these two outer perimeter, it is the duty of the Tribunal and so also for the Appellate Court to adjudge the issue of quantum with a correct lens and perspective so that the claimants are awarded just and fair compensation which is pragmatic and close to reality. 27. In the spotlight of the above considered decisions, this Court is of the clear opinion that where an appeal is preferred by any party, other than the claimants, assailing the quantum on whatever ground, in such a case, even though, the claimant may not have filed a cross objection or a separate appeal for enhancement, yet, it is the duty of the Appellate Court to see that the compensation as awarded by the Tribunal is just and fair. While determining the same, even if, the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the amount granted by the Tribunal is less, it has all the jurisdiction to grant fair and just compensation by enhancing the award even in absence of any cross objection for the reason that the appellant who is before the Court has already raised the issue of quantum and considering the arguments/contentions of the appellant, the Appellate Court is to arrive at its own independent finding regarding quantum which may then even grant a higher sum than granted by the Tribunal. In such situation, it is not open for the appellant to state that the amount cannot be enhanced as no challenge has been made to the award. What needs to be seen is the fact that it is the quantum of award which is under challenge and that has to be decided and in a befitting case, the Appellate Court can invoke the powers in its repository to pass such orders to grant just and fair compensation. 28. Thus, the Appellate Court would be justified in adopting such a course. 28. Thus, the Appellate Court would be justified in adopting such a course. However, it would be a different situation altogether where the award is assailed on any other ground, other than quantum, then while the claimants have not filed any cross objection then during the course of argument the issue regarding enhancement of compensation if made at the behest of the claimants, the Appellate Court may decline to consider it unless a clear case is made out by the claimant, who had failed to file any appeal or cross appeal, by bringing in their case within the parameters of Order 41, Rule 33 C.P.C. as discussed above with the aid of the decision in Saurabh Jain (Supra), Risha Devi (supra) and Neelam Jaiswal (supra). 29. This issue can be seen from another lens, inasmuch as, where the Insurance Company files an appeal assailing the grant of compensation, the claimant without filing a cross appeal or cross objection also possesses the right to defend the amount which has already been granted by the Tribunal. In case if in the given facts and circumstances, the claimant is able to justify that the compensation granted by the Tribunal is just and appropriate, it is not necessary for the claimant to file a cross appeal or cross objections. This aspect has also been considered by the Apex Court in Ranjana Prakash and others v. Divisional Manager and Another; (2011) 14 SCC 639 wherein in paragraphs no. 6 to 8, it was held as under:- "6. We are of the view that the High Court committed an error in ignoring the contention of the claimants. It is true that the claimants had not challenged the award of the Tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal had failed to take note of the future prospects and add 30% to the annual income of the deceased. But the claimants were not aggrieved by Rs 23,134 being taken as the monthly income. There was therefore no need for them to challenge the award of the Tribunal. But the claimants were not aggrieved by Rs 23,134 being taken as the monthly income. There was therefore no need for them to challenge the award of the Tribunal. But where in an appeal filed by the owner/insurer, if the High Court proposes to reduce the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the claimants can certainly defend the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, by pointing out other errors or omissions in the award, which if taken note of, would show that there was no need to reduce the amount awarded as compensation. Therefore, in an appeal by the owner/insurer, the appellant can certainly put forth a contention that if 30% is to be deducted from the income for whatsoever reason, 30% should also be added towards future prospects, so that the compensation awarded is not reduced. The fact that the claimants did not independently challenge the award will not therefore come in the way of their defending the compensation awarded, on other grounds. It would only mean that in an appeal by the owner/insurer, the claimants will not be entitled to seek enhancement of the compensation by urging any new ground, in the absence of any cross-appeal or cross-objections. 7. This principle also flows from Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables an appellate court to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the trial court and to make such further or other order as the case may require, even if the respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections. This power is entrusted to the appellate court to enable it to do complete justice between the parties. Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. For example, where the claimants seek compensation against the owner and the insurer of the vehicle and the Tribunal makes the award only against the owner, on an appeal by the owner challenging the quantum, the appellate court can make the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, along with the owner, even though the claimants had not challenged the non-grant of relief against the insurer. Be that as it may. 8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum of compensation, irrespective of who files the appeal, the appropriate course for the High Court is to examine the facts and by applying the relevant principles, determine the just compensation. If the compensation determined by it is higher than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if it is by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer. Similarly, if the compensation determined by the High Court is lesser than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will dismiss any appeal by the claimants for enhancement, but allow any appeal by the owner/insurer for reduction. The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an appeal by the owner/insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation." 30. Having seen the light through the legal prism, this Court is inclined to examine the quantum of the award as to whether the amount granted by the Tribunal is just and fair and in case if it is found that the amount is lower then the Court would be justified in enhancing the same and in case if the contention of the appellant appears to be correct then the Court also has the power to reduce the compensation and in case if the compensation is just and appropriate, the Court can also refuse to interfere. Thus, the first issue is answered in the affirmative. 31. In the aforesaid backdrop, if the facts of the instant case are seen in contrast to the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, it would be found that the sole ground for assailing quantum by the Insurance Company is that there has been no deductions towards personal expenses and that the multiplier is on the higher side and instead of 14 the Tribunal has erred in adopting a multiplier of 15. 32. On the other hand, the submissions of learned counsel for the claimants is that the deceased was engaged in running a Tea Stall and was earning a sum of Rs. 6,000/- per month from the said venture and was also contributing to the household as a proficient homemaker. 32. On the other hand, the submissions of learned counsel for the claimants is that the deceased was engaged in running a Tea Stall and was earning a sum of Rs. 6,000/- per month from the said venture and was also contributing to the household as a proficient homemaker. The Tribunal found that there was no documentary evidence regarding the running of the Tea Stall by the deceased and noticing that the claimant-witness had stated that the Tea Stall was being run by the husband of the deceased namely Anil Kumar, consequently, it adopted merely a notional income of Rs. 3,000/- per month. 33. At the outset, as a principle it is true and correct that a Tribunal while determining the compensation is also required to make a deduction towards personal expenses. Now, having said that, it will be worthwhile to examine as to whether the Court has rightly appreciated the material evidence available on record to arrive at the figure of Rs. 3,000/- per month as notional income. 34. From the perusal of the claim petition, it would indicate that it has clearly been pleaded that the deceased was running a Tea Stall and was earning around Rs. 6,000/- per month from the said venture. Rs. 3,000/- has been taken as her contribution being a proficient home maker and thus the amount claimed in the petition is on the basis of Rs. 9,000/- per month. 35. On behalf of the claimants, Pramod Kumar son of the deceased was examined and in his examination-in-chief, he clearly stated and reiterated that his mother was a proficient homemaker and used to run a tea stall from where she was earning Rs. 6,000/- per month and was also the bread earner for the family. In his cross-examination, a specific question was put to him wherein he reiterated and positively affirmed his statement that his mother was running the Tea Stall and earned Rs. 6,000/- from the same. 36. This would indicate the factum of the running of the Tea Stall by the deceased and earning of a sum of Rs. 6,000/- per month from the same stood sufficiently proved as no contrary evidence was led. 6,000/- from the same. 36. This would indicate the factum of the running of the Tea Stall by the deceased and earning of a sum of Rs. 6,000/- per month from the same stood sufficiently proved as no contrary evidence was led. However, the Tribunal fell in error in recording in the award that it has been admitted by the claimant-witness that the father i.e. Anil Kumar is running the aforesaid Tea Stall and therefore it came to the conclusion that the deceased was not running the Tea Stall and adopted a notional income of Rs. 3,000/- per month to compute the compensation. 37. At this stage, it will also be relevant to notice the statement given in the cross-examination by the claimant-witness Pramod Kumar to the effect that his mother was running a Tea Stall and she was earning Rs. 6,000/- per month and that his father is alive and now the Tea Stall is being run by his father. The relevant portion of the statement for better appreciation is being re-produced for ready reference:- 38. This above quoted statement would indicate that the accident had occurred in the year 2016 where Smt. Sunita expired but the statement was given in the year 2019. In this perspective, the evidence of the claimant-witness reflects that the mother of the claimant-witness was a good home maker and was running a Tea Stall. The father of the witness was alive. He stated, now (emphasis supplied) my father runs the Tea Stall. This statement indicates that prior to the accident the deceased was running the Tea Stall and after her death it was the father Anil Kumar who was running the Tea Stall. There is nothing on record to discredit the testimony or contradict the fact that Sunita was running the Tea Stall and she was able to earn Rs. 6,000/- per month from it. 39. Now, in so far as the contribution of a homemaker is concerned, this aspect of the matter has been very well elucidated by the Apex Court in Kirti and Another v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. 2021 (2) SCC 166 . In the supplementing but concurring opinion authored by His Lordship N.V. Ramana, and the relevant portion thereof reads as under:- 17. There are two distinct categories of situations wherein the court usually determines notional income of a victim. In the supplementing but concurring opinion authored by His Lordship N.V. Ramana, and the relevant portion thereof reads as under:- 17. There are two distinct categories of situations wherein the court usually determines notional income of a victim. The first category of cases relates to those wherein the victim was employed, but the claimants are not able to prove her actual income, before the court. In such a situation, the court "guesses" the income of the victim on the basis of the evidence on record, like the quality of life being led by the victim and her family, the general earning of an individual employed in that field, the qualifications of the victim, and other considerations. 18.The second category of cases relates to those situations wherein the Court is called upon to determine the income of a non-earning victim, such as a child, a student or a homemaker. Needless to say, compensation in such cases is extremely difficult to quantify. *******--------*******------****---------*** .....20.One category of non-earning victims that courts are often called upon to calculate the compensation for are homemakers. The granting of compensation for homemakers on a pecuniary basis, as in the present case, has been considered by this Court earlier on numerous occasions. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar [Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197 ], while dealing with compensation for the victims of a fire during a function, granted compensation to housewives on the basis of the services rendered by them in the house, and their age. This Court, in that case, held as follows: (SCC pp. 209-10, para 10) "10. So far as the deceased housewives are concerned, in the absence of any data and as the housewives were not earning any income, attempt has been made to determine the compensation on the basis of services rendered by them to the house. On the basis of the age group of the housewives, appropriate multiplier has been applied, but the estimation of the value of services rendered to the house by the housewives, which has been arrived at Rs 12,000 p.a. in cases of some and Rs 10,000 for others, appears to us to be grossly low. On the basis of the age group of the housewives, appropriate multiplier has been applied, but the estimation of the value of services rendered to the house by the housewives, which has been arrived at Rs 12,000 p.a. in cases of some and Rs 10,000 for others, appears to us to be grossly low. It is true that the claimants, who ought to have given data for determination of compensation, did not assist in any manner by providing the data for estimating the value of services rendered by such housewives. But even in the absence of such data and taking into consideration the multifarious services rendered by the housewives for managing the entire family, even on a modest estimation, should be Rs 3000 per month and Rs 36,000 p.a. (emphasis supplied) *******--------*******------****---------*** .....25. The sheer amount of time and effort that is dedicated to household work by individuals, who are more likely to be women than men, is not surprising when one considers the plethora of activities a housemaker undertakes. A housemaker often prepares food for the entire family, manages the procurement of groceries and other household shopping needs, cleans and manages the house and its surroundings, undertakes decoration, repairs and maintenance work, looks after the needs of the children and any aged member of the household, manages budgets and so much more. In rural households, they often also assist in the sowing, harvesting and transplanting activities in the field, apart from tending cattle [see Arun Kumar Agrawal [Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 9 SCC 218 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 664 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1313] ; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepika [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepika, 2009 SCC Online Mad 828] ]. However, despite all the above, the conception that housemakers do not "work" or that they do not add economic value to the household is a problematic idea that has persisted for many years and must be overcome. *******--------*******------****---------*** ....30. The issue of fixing notional income for a homemaker, therefore, serves extremely important functions. It is a recognition of the multitude of women who are engaged in this activity, whether by choice or as a result of social/cultural norms. It signals to society at large that the law and the courts of the land believe in the value of the labour, services and sacrifices of homemakers. It is a recognition of the multitude of women who are engaged in this activity, whether by choice or as a result of social/cultural norms. It signals to society at large that the law and the courts of the land believe in the value of the labour, services and sacrifices of homemakers. It is an acceptance of the idea that these activities contribute in a very real way to the economic condition of the family, and the economy of the nation, regardless of the fact that it may have been traditionally excluded from economic analyses. It is a reflection of changing attitudes and mindsets and of our international law obligations. And, most importantly, it is a step towards the constitutional vision of social equality and ensuring dignity of life to all individuals. 31. Returning to the question of how such notional income of a homemaker is to be calculated, there can be no fixed approach. It is to be understood that in such cases the attempt by the court is to fix an approximate economic value for all the work that a homemaker does, impossible though that task may be. Courts must keep in mind the idea of awarding just compensation in such cases, looking to the facts and circumstances. [See R.K. Malik v. Kiran Pal [ See R.K. Malik v. Kiran Pal, (2009) 14 SCC 1 , para 9 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 265 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1265] .] *******--------*******------****---------*** ....38. The rationale behind the awarding of future prospects is therefore no longer merely about the type of profession, whether permanent or otherwise, although the percentage awarded is still dependent on the same. The awarding of future prospects is now a part of the duty of the court to grant just compensation, taking into account the realities of life, particularly of inflation, the quest of individuals to better their circumstances and those of their loved ones, rising wage rates and the impact of experience on the quality of work. 39. Taking the above rationale into account, the situation is quite clear with respect to notional income determined by a court in the first category of cases outlined earlier, those where the victim is proved to be employed but claimants are unable to prove the income before the court. 39. Taking the above rationale into account, the situation is quite clear with respect to notional income determined by a court in the first category of cases outlined earlier, those where the victim is proved to be employed but claimants are unable to prove the income before the court. Once the victim has been proved to be employed at some venture, the necessary corollary is that they would be earning an income. It is clear that no rational distinction can be drawn with respect to the granting of future prospects merely on the basis that their income was not proved, particularly when the court has determined their notional income. *******--------*******------****---------*** ......41. Therefore, on the basis of the above, certain general observations can be made regarding the issue of calculation of notional income for homemakers and the grant of future prospects with respect to them, for the purposes of grant of compensation which can be summarised as follows: 41.1. Grant of compensation, on a pecuniary basis, with respect to a homemaker, is a settled proposition of law. 41.2. Taking into account the gendered nature of housework, with an overwhelming percentage of women being engaged in the same as compared to men, the fixing of notional income of a homemaker attains special significance. It becomes a recognition of the work, labour and sacrifices of homemakers and a reflection of changing attitudes. It is also in furtherance of our nation's international law obligations and our constitutional vision of social equality and ensuring dignity to all. 41.3. Various methods can be employed by the court to fix the notional income of a homemaker, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. 41.4. The court should ensure while choosing the method, and fixing the notional income, that the same is just in the facts and circumstances of the particular case, neither assessing the compensation too conservatively, nor too liberally. 41.5. The granting of future prospects, on the notional income calculated in such cases, is a component of just compensation. 40. The issue regarding the computation of compensation in cases where a person is a home maker or such other similar persons where there are no measures for establishing the proved income, was also considered by the Apex Court in Rajendra Singh and Others v. National Insurance Company Ltd. And Others 2020 (7) SCC 256 and the relevant portion reads as under:- 9. The first deceased was a housewife aged about 30 years. In Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar [Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197 ], this Court had observed that considering the multifarious services rendered by housewives, even on a modest estimation, the income of a housewife between the age group of 34 to 59 years who were active in life should be assessed at Rs 36,000 p.a. A distinction was also drawn with regard to elderly ladies in the age group of 62 to 72 who would be more adept in discharge of housewife duties by age and experience, and the value of services rendered by them has been taken at Rs 20,000 p.a. 10. In Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 9 SCC 218 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 664 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1313], the Tribunal assessed the notional income of the housewife at Rs 5000 per month, but without any rationale or reasoning concluded that she was a non-earning member and reduced the same to Rs 2500, which was affirmed [Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., FAFO No. 2408 of 2003, order dated 30-4-2004 (All)] by the High Court. Disapproving the same and restoring the assessed income, this Court observed at paras 26 and 27 as follows : (SCC pp. 237- 38) "26. In India the courts have recognised that the contribution made by the wife to the house is invaluable and cannot be computed in terms of money. The gratuitous services rendered by the wife with true love and affection to the children and her husband and managing the household affairs cannot be equated with the services rendered by others. A wife/mother does not work by the clock. She is in the constant attendance of the family throughout the day and night unless she is employed and is required to attend the employer's work for particular hours. She takes care of all the requirements of the husband and children including cooking of food, washing of clothes, etc. She teaches small children and provides invaluable guidance to them for their future life. She takes care of all the requirements of the husband and children including cooking of food, washing of clothes, etc. She teaches small children and provides invaluable guidance to them for their future life. A housekeeper or maidservant can do the household work, such as cooking food, washing clothes and utensils, keeping the house clean, etc., but she can never be a substitute for a wife/mother who renders selfless service to her husband and children. 27. It is not possible to quantify any amount in lieu of the services rendered by the wife/mother to the family i.e. the husband and children. However, for the purpose of award of compensation to the dependants, some pecuniary estimate has to be made of the services of the housewife/mother. In that context, the term "services" is required to be given a broad meaning and must be construed by taking into account the loss of personal care and attention given by the deceased to her children as a mother and to her husband as a wife. They are entitled to adequate compensation in lieu of the loss of gratuitous services rendered by the deceased. The amount payable to the dependants cannot be diminished on the ground that some close relation like a grandmother may volunteer to render some of the services to the family which the deceased was giving earlier." ......12.The second deceased was a school-going child aged about 12 years. She had a whole future to look forward in life with all normal human aspirations. She died prematurely due to the accident at a very tender age for no fault of hers even before she could start to understand the beauty and joys of life with all its ups and downs. The loss of a human life untimely at childhood can never be measured in terms of loss of earning or monetary loss alone. The emotional attachments involved to the loss of the child can have a devastating effect on the family which needs to be visualised and understood. Grant of non-pecuniary damages for the wrong done by awarding compensation for loss of expectation in life is therefore called for. 13. Undoubtedly the injury inflicted by deprivation of the life of the child is very difficult to quantify. The future also abounds with uncertainties. Grant of non-pecuniary damages for the wrong done by awarding compensation for loss of expectation in life is therefore called for. 13. Undoubtedly the injury inflicted by deprivation of the life of the child is very difficult to quantify. The future also abounds with uncertainties. Therefore, the courts have used the expression "just compensation" to get over the difficulties in quantifying the figure to ensure consistency and uniformity in awarding compensation. This determination shall not depend upon financial position of the victim or the claimant but rather on the capacity and ability of the deceased to provide happiness in life to the claimants had she remained alive. The compensation is for loss of prospective happiness which the claimant would have enjoyed had the child not died at the tender age. Since the child was studying in a school and opportunities in life would undoubtedly abound for her as the years would have rolled by, compensation must also be granted with regard to future prospects. It can safely be presumed that education would have only led to her better growth and maturity with better prospects and a bright future for which compensation needs to be granted under non-pecuniary damages. (See R.K. Malik v. Kiran Pal [R.K. Malik v. Kiran Pal, (2009) 14 SCC 1 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 265 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1265] .) 41. Applying the dictum of the aforesaid decisions in context with the facts and the evidence on record of the instant case, this Court is of the clear opinion that the Tribunal erred in taking Rs. 3,000/- per month as notional income as this Court finds that the fact regarding earning through a Tea Stall was clearly established by the evidence of the witnesses who were cross-examined but nothing adverse could be elicited from the testimony to cast a doubt over their depositions. However, even if the notional income in case of a homemaker was to be assessed and noticing that the accident occurred in the year 2016 even then a sum of Rs. 6,000/- per month was a better figure to adopt as the base as in the case of Rajendra Singh (supra) wherein the Apex Court also took the notional income in case of a homemaker at Rs. 6,000/- also related to an accident which occurred in the year 2012. 42. 6,000/- per month was a better figure to adopt as the base as in the case of Rajendra Singh (supra) wherein the Apex Court also took the notional income in case of a homemaker at Rs. 6,000/- also related to an accident which occurred in the year 2012. 42. Assessing the overall situation in a holistic fashion with a moderate approach this Court finds that the notional income of the deceased should have been safely taken at Rs. 5,000/- per month. The claimants were also entitled for providing future prospects at the rate of 25%. It is true that even in case where notional income is assessed the Tribunal is required to make adjustments for the personal expenses and in this case where there were three dependents, accordingly, 1/3rd ought to have been deducted. 43. To this extent, the submission of learned counsel for the Insurance Company is justified and this Court too finds that the Tribunal erred in not making deductions for the personal expenses despite the same the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 70,000/- towards the head for consortium, loss of estate and funeral expenses and finally granted a total sum of Rs. 7,45,000/- to the claimants. 44. However, if this Court computes the compensation taking Rs. 5,000/- per month as income (income from the Tea Stall and computation as a homemaker, of the deceased) and adding 25% towards the future prospects which would be Rs. 1,250/- per month would make the income @ Rs. 6,250/- per month. From this, if 1/3rd is deducted towards the personal expenses and rounding it off to Rs. 2, 100/- per month, then the net income would be [Rs. 6,250-2,100] Rs. 4,150/- per month. Adopting a multiplier of 15 as per decision of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma (supra), the compensation amount would be Rs. 7,47,000/- to which the amount towards consortium and loss of estate and funeral expenses, if added at Rs. 70,000/-, would finally rest the award at 8,17,000/-. 45. Once again if it is recapitulated, it would be found that the Tribunal without making deduction for personal expenses yet awarded a sum of Rs. 7,45,000/-. If deduction would have been made then the amount of the Tribunal would get de-escalated to around Rs. 5,20,000/-. On the other hand upon re-computation on the enhanced income, the amount determined is Rs. 8,17,000/-. 46. 7,45,000/-. If deduction would have been made then the amount of the Tribunal would get de-escalated to around Rs. 5,20,000/-. On the other hand upon re-computation on the enhanced income, the amount determined is Rs. 8,17,000/-. 46. Now, this Court is poised to determine the delicate task of assessing the just and fair compensation. Whether mathematical calculations should be preferred or considering the facts and overall circumstances including the evidence and adopting the correct and settled methodology with a pragmatic and realistic approach and also keeping in mind that the difference between the amount already awarded and which could be awarded is only about Rs. 72,000/- Whereas the respondents did not seek enhancement of the award and upon accepting the contention of the appellant and at the given base income adopted by the Tribunal and if deduction is made the amount would be hugely disproportionate. 47. Thus, in the aforesaid facts and circumstances and for the detailed discussions and reasons, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the quantum of the award as awarded by the Tribunal but for different reasons as recorded hereinabove. The award dated 07.08.2019 passed in Claim Petition No. 81 of 2018 is affirmed. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Any amount deposited before this Court or before the Tribunal in pursuance of the order of this Court, if any, shall be remitted to the Claims Tribunal expeditiously to be released in favour of the claimants-respondents.