JUDGMENT : ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. No one turns up on behalf of the respondent no. 1 inspite of repeated calls. Hence, this appeal is heard ex-parte against the respondent no. 1. 3. This miscellaneous appeal is directed against the judgment and award dated 28.02.2019 passed by the learned District Judge-cum-Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunal, Hazaribagh in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 09 of 2014 by which the learned Tribunal under Section 166 of Motor Vehicle Act has awarded a compensation of Rs. 3,32,500/- to the claimants-appellants along with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum. 4. The brief facts of the case is that on 12.04.2013 when the deceased Binay Kumar Singh along with others was travelling in a Scorpio vehicle, the said vehicle was dashed by a Hywa vehicle as a result of which the deceased received severe injuries and died in course of his treatment. In connection with the said accident, an FIR has been registered bearing no. 29 of 2013 for the offences punishable under Sections 279/304A of Indian Penal Code. 5. In his written statement, the owner of the Scorpio vehicle challenged the maintainability of the claim petition on various technical grounds and further pleaded that the vehicle was insured by the opposite party no. 2-insurance company, being Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Limited, hence, the insurance company is to pay the compensation amount if any to be awarded. 6. The insurance company in its written statement also challenged the maintainability of the claim petition and pleaded that the Hywa vehicle was at fault and not the driver of the Scorpio vehicle and the police submitted charge sheet only against the Hywa vehicle, hence, the insurer of the Hywa vehicle is liable to pay the compensation. It is then pleaded that the owner of the vehicle did not take insurance cover for the passengers of the said vehicle and as the deceased was not the 3rd party and the insurance was only for a 3rd party liability, therefore, the insurance company is not liable to pay the compensation and the claim application is not maintainable and thus fit to be dismissed. 7. 7. On the basis of the rival pleadings of the parties, the learned Tribunal framed the following three issues which reads as under: “(I) Whether an accident occurred on 12.04.2013 at about 08:40 PM at Village-Heth Nagar, P.S. Nimiaghat, District-Giridih due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of Scorpio bearing No. JH-05AP-7700 resulting in the death of deceased Binay Kumar Singh? (II) Whether the claimants are entitled to any compensation amount, if so, from whom and to what extent? (III) Whether the claimants are entitled to any interest, if so, at what rate?” 8. The learned Tribunal considered the oral testimony of four witnesses examined by the claimants and the documents which have been marked as Ext.1 and 2 as well as the documents which have been marked X to X/7. 9. The learned Tribunal first took up issue no. (I) and after considering the evidence in the record including the depositions of CW-1/Premlata Devi who is the wife of the deceased wherein she has stated that her husband was a driver and he used to earn Rs. 10,000/- per month. She however, in her cross-examination has stated that she has not seen the accident and at the time of accident one Subodh Kumar Singh-who is a different person than the deceased was driving the Scorpio vehicle. She further stated that truck-Hywa dashed the Scorpio vehicle and she has not made the owner of the truck a party to the claim application. CW-2/Rajesh Kumar Singh is the employer of the deceased. He has stated that Bijay Kumar Singh was his driver. He has further stated that Bijay Kumar Singh got injured on motor vehicle accident and died on 13.04.2013 in course of his treatment. CW-3/Manoj Bharti is an eyewitness to the occurrence. He has deposed that on 12.04.2013 he saw that the Scorpio vehicle met with an accident causing injuries to the occupants of the said vehicle and the said accident occurred because of the Scorpio vehicle being dashed by the Hywa. CW-4/Bipul Kumar Singh is the son of the deceased and he has inter alia stated that his father and four others were travelling in a Scorpio vehicle and the Scorpio vehicle met with an accident due to rash and negligent driving of the driver as a result of which several passengers were injured including the deceased. CW-4/Bipul Kumar Singh is the son of the deceased and he has inter alia stated that his father and four others were travelling in a Scorpio vehicle and the Scorpio vehicle met with an accident due to rash and negligent driving of the driver as a result of which several passengers were injured including the deceased. In his cross-examination, he has stated that he has lodged an FIR. The learned Tribunal after considering the evidence in the record came to the conclusion that all the witnesses have stated that it was fault on the part of the driver of the Scorpio vehicle besides the fault of the driver of the unknown Hywa which caused the accident. Hence, it is a case of composite negligence involving the driver of the Hywa as well as Scorpio by which the deceased was travelling. The learned Tribunal also considered the documents in the record and ultimately held that the Scorpio vehicle was also negligently and rashly driven. Hence, this is a case of composite negligence. Hence, the negligence of the unknown hywa and the driver of the Scorpio appears to be 75:25 and decided the issue no. (I) in favour of the claimants and against the opposite parties. Thereafter, the learned Tribunal took up issue no. (II) and assessed the age of the deceased to be 42 years at the time of accident and the deceased has five dependents. The learned Tribunal assessed the income of the deceased to be Rs. 8,000/- i.e. Rs. 96,000/- per annum and gave future prospects of Rs. 24,000/-. So the net income came out to Rs. 1,20,000/-. Deducting 1/4th towards his personal expenses annually, the contribution came out to Rs. 30,000/-. The Tribunal applied the multiplier 14 and arrived at a figure of Rs. 12,60,000/- and adding Rs. 70,000/- under the conventional head, the total amount came out to Rs. 13,30,000/-. It is next held that since it is a case of composite negligence, hence, with Hywa having 75% negligence and Scorpio having 25% negligence, the insurance company is liable to pay 25% of the said amount of Rs. 13,30,000/- and as the Scorpio vehicle was insured by the insurance company who was the opposite party no. 13,30,000/-. It is next held that since it is a case of composite negligence, hence, with Hywa having 75% negligence and Scorpio having 25% negligence, the insurance company is liable to pay 25% of the said amount of Rs. 13,30,000/- and as the Scorpio vehicle was insured by the insurance company who was the opposite party no. 2 in the claim application, the Tribunal did not accept the contention of the insurance company that the driver of the Scorpio vehicle was having absolutely no negligence and as the Scorpio was covered by a package policy, so, the incidence policy of the Scorpio vehicle covered the liability of the passengers also. The learned Tribunal relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Khenyei vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 2015 (2) T.A.C. 677 (SC) but as the major offending vehicle being Hywa vehicle cannot be traced, the learned Tribunal directed payment of Rs. 3,32,500/- to the appellants by the opposite party no. 2-insurance company. 10. Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Tribunal has misconstrued the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Khenyei vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra). Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Khenyei vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 2015 AIR SCW 3169, paragraph no. 18 of which reads as under: “18. This Court in Challa Upendra Rao (2004) 8 SCC 517 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 357 and Nanjappan (2004) 13 SCC 224 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 148, has dealt with the breach of policy conditions by the owner when the insurer was asked to pay the compensation fixed by the Tribunal and the right to recover the same was given to the insurer in the executing court concerned if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of determination for the Tribunal and the issue has been decided in favour of the insured. The same analogy can be applied to the instant cases as the liability of the joint tortfeasor is joint and several. In the instant case, there is determination of inter se liability of composite negligence to the extent of negligence of 2/3rd and 1/3rd of respective drivers. The same analogy can be applied to the instant cases as the liability of the joint tortfeasor is joint and several. In the instant case, there is determination of inter se liability of composite negligence to the extent of negligence of 2/3rd and 1/3rd of respective drivers. Thus, the vehicle-trailer-truck which was not insured with the insurer, was negligent to the extent of 2/3rd. It would be open to the insurer being insurer of the bus after making payment to the claimant to recover from the owner of the trailer truck the amount to the aforesaid extent in the execution proceedings. Had there been no determination of the inter se liability for want of evidence or other joint tortfeasor had not been impleaded, it was not open to settle such a dispute and to recover the amount in execution proceedings but the remedy would be to file another suit or appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as follows: (i) In the case of composite negligence, the plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tortfeasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and several. (ii) In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tortfeasors vis-a-vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. (iii) In case all the joint tortfeasors have been impleaded and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/Tribunal to determine inter se extent of composite negligence of the drivers. However, determination of the extent of negligence between the joint tortfeasors is only for the purpose of their inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the other after making whole of the payment to the plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied the liability of the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the apportionment/extent of their negligence has been determined by the court/Tribunal, in the main case one joint tortfeasor can recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings. (iv) It would not be appropriate for the court/Tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tortfeasors. (iv) It would not be appropriate for the court/Tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tortfeasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tortfeasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tortfeasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award.” (Emphasis supplied) Submits that therein, it has categorically been held by a three judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that in case of composite negligence, the claimants are entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tort feasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tort feasors being joint and several and in case of composite negligence, the apportionment of compensation between two tort feasors vis-a-vis the claimant is not permissible and he can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. Hence, it is submitted that the impugned judgment and award be modified by directing the opposite party no. 2-insurance company to pay a sum of Rs. 13,30,000/- with interest thereon from the date of filing of the petition to till the date of actual realization. 11. Mr. Ashutosh Anand, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 submits that in view of the settled principle of law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ranjana Prakash vs. Divisional Manager, (2011) 14 SCC 639 , paragraph no. 7 of which reads as under: 7. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables an appellate court to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the trial court and to make such further or other order as the case may require, even if the respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections. This power is entrusted to the appellate court to enable it to do complete justice between the parties. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. For example, where the claimants seek compensation against the owner and the insurer of the vehicle and the Tribunal makes the award only against the owner, on an appeal by the owner challenging the quantum, the appellate court can make the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, along with the owner, even though the claimants had not challenged the non-grant of relief against the insurer. Be that as it may. It is submitted that even though the insurance company has not filed any appeal still, the insurance company is at liberty to challenge the finding of the learned Tribunal in respect of the issue no. (I) which was answered in favour of the claimants by holding that the driver of the Scorpio vehicle was also rashly and negligently driving the said vehicle resulting in the accident. Relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Premlata Shukla and Others, (2007) 13 SCC 476 , it is submitted by Mr. Anand that since the CW-4 has himself lodged the FIR and in the charge sheet which has been submitted against an unknown person wherein, it has been submitted that the allegation against him is true but there is no clue. Hence, it is submitted that the amount of compensation payable by the insurance company ought not to be enhanced. 12. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going through the materials in the record, the sole point for determination which crop up in this appeal is: “Whether the amount of compensation awarded by the claimants be enhanced?” 13. The fact remains that the learned Tribunal has in no uncertain terms answered the issue no. (I) in favour of the claimants by holding that the driver of the Scorpio vehicle was certainly negligent and rash in driving the said Scorpio vehicle. The fact remains that the learned Tribunal has in no uncertain terms answered the issue no. (I) in favour of the claimants by holding that the driver of the Scorpio vehicle was certainly negligent and rash in driving the said Scorpio vehicle. Such finding of fact by the learned Tribunal is based on the oral testimony of CW-4 wherein he has categorically stated that the Scorpio vehicle turned turtle on being rashly and negligently driven by its driver and there is absolutely no cross-examination of CW-4 in this regard. 14. It is a settled principle of law that if a party wishes to raise any doubt as regards the correctness of the statement of a witness, the said witness must be given an opportunity to explain his statement by drawing his attention to that part of it, which has been objected to by the other party, as being untrue and without this, it is not possible to impeach his credibility. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxmibai (Dead) through LRs. and Another vs. Bhagwantbuva (Dead) through LRs. and Others, AIR 2013 SC 1204 in Para-31 in this respect held as under: “31. Furthermore, there cannot be any dispute with respect to the settled legal proposition, that if a party wishes to raise any doubt as regards the correctness of the statement of a witness, the said witness must be given an opportunity to explain his statement by drawing his attention to that part of it, which has been objected to by the other party, as being untrue. Without this, it is not possible to impeach his credibility. Such a law has been advanced in view of the statutory provisions enshrined in Section 138 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which enable the opposite party to cross-examine a witness as regards information tendered in evidence by him during his initial examination in chief, and the scope of this provision stands enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act, which permits a witness to be questioned, inter-alia, in order to test his veracity. Thereafter, the unchallenged part of his evidence is to be relied upon, for the reason that it is impossible for the witness to explain or elaborate upon any doubts as regards the same, in the absence of questions put to him with respect to the circumstances which indicate that the version of events provided by him, is not fit to be believed, and the witness himself, is unworthy of credit. Thus, if a party intends to impeach a witness, he must provide adequate opportunity to the witness in the witness box, to give a full and proper explanation. The same is essential to ensure fair play and fairness in dealing with witnesses. [See: Khem Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1994 SC 226 : 1993 AIR SCW 3675, State of U.P. vs. Nahar Singh (Dead) and Others, AIR 1998 SC 1328 : 1998 AIR SCW 1200, Rajinder Pershad (Dead) by LRs. vs. Darshana Smt. Devi, AIR 2001 SC 3207 : 2001 AIR SCW 3042 and Sunil Kumar and Another vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2005 SC 1096 : 2005 AIR SCW 589].” (Emphasis given) 15. Under such circumstances, in the absence of any appeal being filed by the opposite party no. 2-insurance company challenging the finding of the learned Tribunal, this Court is of the considered view that there is no justifiable reason to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Tribunal by answering the issue no. (I) in favour of the claimants. 16. Now coming to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Khenyei vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) is concerned, in that case, the three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has in no uncertain manner has held that the claimants are entitled to sue any one of the joint tort-feasors as he desires; as the liability of the joint tort-feasors is joint and several and the claimants can recover at his option from any of them. In view of this settled principle of law the learned Tribunal has erred by only saddling the liability of 25% of the compensation amount upon the opposite party no. 2- insurance company, more so when the owner or insurer of the other Hywa vehicle was not made the party to the claim application. Hence, amount of compensation awarded to the claimants be enhanced to Rs. 2- insurance company, more so when the owner or insurer of the other Hywa vehicle was not made the party to the claim application. Hence, amount of compensation awarded to the claimants be enhanced to Rs. 13,30,000/- with interest thereon as awarded by the learned Tribunal, as the said amount has been assessed as the total quantum of compensation by the tribunal itself and there is no appeal filed in respect of such finding by the opposite party before the tribunal. The sole point of determination is answered accordingly. 17. In view of the discussions made above, the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Tribunal is modified by enhancing the amount of compensation to be paid by the opposite party no. 2-insurance company to Rs. 13,30,000/- less the amount already paid by the insurance company. 18. The opposite party no. 2-insurance company if so desire may sue the owner/insurer of the Hywa vehicle involved in the said accident in an independent proceeding after passing of the decree and order. 19. In the result, this appeal is allowed but under the circumstances without any costs. 20. Let a copy of this Judgment along with the Lower Court Records be sent back to the learned court below forthwith.