JUDGMENT Chandra Kumar Rai, J. Heard Mr. Madan Mohan, Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Dwidendra Prasad, Counsel for respondent No.5, Mr. L.K. Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for State-respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Mr. Avinash Chandra Srivastav, Counsel for respondent No.4, Gram Panchayat. 2. The brief facts of the case are that khasra plot No. 266 area 0.191 hectare, situated in village-Chandrapur, Tahsil-Bah, District Agra was recorded as navin parti. An agriculture lease was executed in favour of respondent No.5, Roop Kishore Chaturvedi, S/o Chetan Das, R/O Village- Chandrapur, Tehsil - Bah, District-Agra (U.P.) and the same was approved also on 26.03.1992. Petitioner filed a complaint against the allotment of respondent No.5, which was registered as Case No. 64 of 1995-96, under Section 198(4) of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, respondent No.5 appeared in the proceedings and filed his reply also but subsequently absented from the proceedings, hence, the case was directed to be proceeded ex-parte. The Additional District Magistrate/ Additional Collector, vide order dated 31.12.1996, cancelled the allotment of respondent No.5. Against the order dated 31.12.1996, respondent No.5 filed a restoration application along with an application under Section 5 of Indian Limitation Act on 19.01.2010 i.e. after about 14 years. Petitioner filed his objection to the restoration application as well as delay condonation application. Additional Collector, vide order dated 30.05.2015, set aside the ex-parte order dated 31.12.1996, allowed the application dated 19.01.2010 and restored the case on its original number for decision afresh. Petitioner challenged the order dated 19.01.2010 through revision before Commissioner and the same was heard and dismissed by Additional Commissioner, vide order dated 11.08.2022, hence this writ petition. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that restoration application filed by respondent No.5 was highly time barred i.e. about 14 years but Additional Collector without recording proper finding on condonation of delay of 14 years, has allowed the application dated 19.01.2010 filed by respondent No.5 but there is no specific order for condonation of delay of 14 years. He further submitted that order dated 15.12.1996 to proceed ex-parte has not been challenged by respondent No.5, hence, the final order dated 31.12.1996 by which lease of respondent No.5 was cancelled, cannot be recalled. He further submitted that order dated 15.12.1996 to proceed ex-parte has not been challenged by respondent No.5, hence, the final order dated 31.12.1996 by which lease of respondent No.5 was cancelled, cannot be recalled. He further submitted that respondent No.5 has appeared in the proceeding under Section 198(4) of U.P.Z.A and L.R. Act through Counsel and filed his reply also but subsequently absented from the proceedings, as such, order dated 31.12.1996 was passed in accordance with law cancelling the allotment of respondent No.5. He further submitted that land in question was not vacant for allotment and no permission under Section 28-C of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act was obtained, as such, the allotment made in favour of respondent No.5 was illegal and irregular. He further submitted that impugned orders be set aside and writ petition be allowed. 4. On the other hand, Counsel for the respondent No.5 submitted that although restoration application filed by respondent No.5 was barred by limitation of 14 year but the delay was explained in the application under Section 5 of Indian Limitation Act supported by affidavit, as such, the order dated 31.12.1996 cancelling the allotment of respondent No.5 has been set aside after considering the delay condonation question also and case has been restored on its original number for decision afresh, as such, no interference is required against the discretion exercised by Additional Collector. He further submitted that argument advanced by the Counsel for the petitioner on merit can be raised before the Additional Collector where the case is to be decided afresh. He further submitted that petitioner has no locus to file complaint in the Courts below as well as to file writ petition before this Court, as such, writ-petition is liable to be dismissed. Counsel has placed the reliance upon the judgment reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag and Another v. Mst. Kantiji & Others in order to demonstrate that liberal view is to be taken in delay condonation matter. 5. I have considered the argument advanced by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the records. 6. There is no dispute about the fact that respondent No.5 was granted agriculture lease in the year 1991-92 and the same was approved also on 26.3.1992. 5. I have considered the argument advanced by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the records. 6. There is no dispute about the fact that respondent No.5 was granted agriculture lease in the year 1991-92 and the same was approved also on 26.3.1992. There is also no dispute about the fact that on private complaint, the lease of the respondent No.5 has been cancelled and restoration application filed by respondent No.5 with delay of about 14 year has been allowed and the case under Section 198(4) of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act has been restored to its original number, the orders allowing the restoration application of respondent No.5 has been maintained in revision also. 7. Since the lease granted in favour of petitioner in the year 1991-92 has been cancelled, vide order dated 31.12.1996 and the restoration application dated 19.1.2010 as well as delay condonation application dated 19.1.2010 filed by respondent No.2 has been allowed for deciding the case under Section 198(4) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act after opportunity of hearing to the respondent No.5, as such, the order restoring the case is in accordance with the principle laid down by Apex Court in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra), the paragraph No.3 of the judgment is as follows :- "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 1. may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides." 8. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides." 8. So far as delay part is concerned, it is correct that restoration application and delay condonation application both are of 19.1.2010, filed by respondent No.5, were delayed by 14 years but the same was explained in the application dated 19.1.2010 supported by an affidavit, the Court of Additional Collector has also taken the same into consideration and recorded finding also, the relevant portion of judgment dated 30.5.2015 passed by Additional Collector is as follows:- ^^esjs }kjk i=koyh dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA xzke pUniqj ds [kkrk la0 208 xkVk 2266 jdok 0-1910 dk vkoaVu :ifd'kksj prqoZsnh ds uke fd;k x;k tks Js.kh 1 [k esa ntZ gSA vkoaVu fuLrkjhdj.k dk nkok jkes'oj fnukad 23-05-1995 dks fd;k x;k] ftl ij uksfVl tkjh gksdj :i fd'kksj }kjk fnukad 11-07-1995 dks fyf[kr dFku nkf[ky fd;k x;kA oknh dh vksj ls iatkc flag iz/kku] jk/kkeksgu o lqjs'k ds C;ku ntZ djk;s x;sA vkns'k fnukad 31-12-96 esa izfroknh 24-09-96 ls vuqifLFkr n'kkZ;k x;k gS vkSj 21-12-96 dks ,d i{kh; dk;Zokgh izkjaHk dh xbZ vkSj 31-12-96 dks iz'uxr vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;k x;kA blls Li"V gS fd vkns'k vkcaVh :ifd'kksj ds fo:) ,d i{kh; gSA fookfnr Hkwfe catj ntZ gSA vkcaVh dk uke o"kZ 2009 rd ntZ [krkSuh jgk gSA vkns'k fnukad 31-12-96 dk veynjken fnukad 21-01-2009 dks 12 o"kZ ckn fd;k x;k gSA izkFkhZ }kjk ;g dguk fd mldks vkns'k dh tkudkjh 2009 esa gqbZ [krkSuh m)j.k ls feyrk gSA vkns'k esa vkoaVu i=koyh dh izkfIr vkSj ijh{k.k dk dksbZ mYys[k ugha gSA fcuk vkoaVu dk ijh{k.k fd;s vkoaVh dk lk{; xzg.k fd;s fcuk vkoaVu fujLr fd;k x;k gS] ftlls vkoaVh dk fgr izHkkfor gqvk gSA ekuuh; U;k;ky; dh uthjksa rFkk uSlfxZd U;k; ds fl)kuksa ds vuqlkj vkoaVh dks lqukokbZ dk volj nsus o lk{; izLrqr fd, tkus dk volj fn;k tkuk vko';d gSA mHk; i{k ds lk{; ds fo'ys"k.k ds ckn gh xq.k nks"k ij vkns'k ikfjr djuk fof/k ,oa U;k;laxr gSA vr% mijksDr fo'ys"k.k ds vk/kkj ij iz'uxr vkns'k 31-12-96 ,d i{kh; ikrs gq, fujLr gksus ;ksX; gS rFkk izkFkZuk i= :ifd'kksj prqoZsnh fnukad 19-01-2010 Lohdkj djus ;ksX; gSA rnuqlkj izkFkZuk i= fnukad 19-01-2010 Lohdkj djrs gq, ,d i{kh; vkns'k fnukad 31-12-96 fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA okn iqu% okftc uacj ij dk;e fd;k tkrk gSA i=koyh okLrs lk{; oknh fnukad 16-06-2015 dks is'k gksA fnukad%& 30-05-2015 ,lMh ¼gjuke flag½ vij dysDVj ¼iz'kklu½ vkxjkA** 9. Considering the averment made in the restoration as well as delay condonation application supported with affidavit and the finding recorded by Additional Collector while allowing the application dated 19.1.2010 i.e. restoration and delay condonation application, no interference is required against the order restoring the case to its original number. Since Court of Additional Collector has not imposed any condition upon the respondent No.5, as such, impugned order dated 30.5.2015 requires limited modification to the extent that respondent No.5 should pay cost in lieu of granting benefit of Section 5 of Indian Limitation Act in favour of respondent No.5. 10. Considering the finding recorded by the Courts below and ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag (Supra), this writ petition is finally disposed of with the following observations :- (i) The parties will appear before the respondent No.3 on 6.2.2023. (ii) The contesting respondent No.5 shall pay cost of Rs.10,000/- on 6.2.2023 to the petitioner in lieu of allowing the delay condonation application as well as restoration application filed by respondent No.5 and the respondent No.3 shall record the fact of payment in the order sheet and proceed with the case, the case will be decided in accordance with law on merit expeditiously preferably within a period of four months. (iii) Impugned order dated 30.5.2015 passed by respondent No.3 is modified to the aforementioned extent.