JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Nitin Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Rahul Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel for the State. 2. The petitioner was granted a licence for storage under Uttar Pradesh Minerals (Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage) Rules, 2018 (hereinafter referred to as 2018 Rules') for a period starting from 11.06.2020 and ending on 15.10.2020 over Gata no.333 area 0.5990 hectare and Gata no.330 area 0.5307 hectare totaling 1.1257 hectares for the storage of 20,000 cubic meter sand/morang. The 2018 Rules' provides that if a licence is provided under Rule 7, the licensee shall prominently display the sale price at sale points; shall deploy CCTV cameras and shall provide check gates for proper monitoring of the stocks. Licensee shall also maintain a correct and intelligible account of minerals procured and transported daily to different destinations in the format prescribed in e-form 'C'/ Form 'C'/ Form 'G' which will be corresponding to the quality of valid transit pass by which licensee had received the minerals. 3. For convenience, the Rule 7 of the 2018' Rules is reproduced hereinunder; "7. General conditions for grant of Storage licence. -The licence shall be granted in Form B subject to the following conditions: (i) The licensee shall prominently display the sale price at the storage point. (ii) The licensee shall deploy CCTV camera and check gates for proper monitoring of the stocks (iii) The licensee shall maintain a correct and intelligible account of minerals procured and transported daily to different destinations in the format prescribed in e-Form 'C' / Form 'C' /Form 'G' which will be corresponding to the quantity of valid transit pass by which licensee has received the mineral. (iv) The licensee shall submit the monthly return in Form 'E' of the accounts maintained under clause (ii) and (iii) respectively for every month within the first week of the succeeding month to the District Officer; (v) All the reports, returns and registers shall be maintained by the licensee and kept in the place of business and be made available to the inspecting officer; (vi) The licensee shall not pollute the environment by storing the minerals or while utilizing them in the processing plant or beneficiation' plant or the factory. (vii) The licensee shall allow the Inspecting Officers of the Directorate of Mines to inspect the store, factory, processing plant, beneficiation plant to verify the stock of minerals and to take samples and extract of records. (viii) The District Officer may impose such further condition as may be necessary in the interest of the public." 4. The lincensee on 05.09.2020 on the basis of the inspection made on 04.09.2020 got a notice that he had not installed CCTV cameras and had also not displayed the sale price at the storage point. 5. In reply to the notice, on 07.09.2020 the petitioner submitted his reply along with CD of the footages of the CCTV cameras. He had also submitted that display board of sale price was also there at the storage point. Not satisfied with the reply, the petitioner's licence was cancelled under Rule 10 of 2018 Rules' by the District Magistrate on 10.09.2020 after recording a finding that the CD which was supplied by the petitioner did not provide the date and time of the recording. He had also given a finding that no loading and unloading of sand/morang was found and therefore after disbelieving the reply given by the petitioner, the licence of the petitioner was cancelled. Also the security as was deposited by the petitioner of Rs.15,00,000/-was forfeited. 6. Aggrieved by the order dated 10.09.2020, the petitioner filed an appeal under Rule 15 of the 2018 Rules' and upon dismissal of the appeal, the instant writ petition has been filed. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that when the petitioner had submitted the CD of the recording of the CCTV camera which was installed as per the Rule 7 of 2018 Rules' then no punishment ought to have been given to the petitioner. The display board was also very much there. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, with regard to the forfeiture of the security, has submitted that there was absolutely no reason given in the order for forfeiting the security money. He submits that if the security amount had to be forfeited then a definite finding ought to have been given as to what was the financial loss which had occurred to the State which necessitated the forfeiture of the security amount. 9. He submits that if the security amount had to be forfeited then a definite finding ought to have been given as to what was the financial loss which had occurred to the State which necessitated the forfeiture of the security amount. 9. Relying upon Rule 10 of the 2018 Rules', the counsel for the petitioner submits that the punishment as was provided in Rule 10 states that not only the licence could be cancelled, but the District Officer could also forfeit the security deposit along with the interest accrued thereon. He, therefore, submits that the word 'forfeit' did not compulsorily mandate the forfeiture of the security amount. It was optional for the District Officer to order for the forfeiture of the security amount and for exercising this option, he should have given reasons. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments in the cases of Style (Dress Land) vs. Union Territory Chandigarh and another 1999 (7) SCC 89 , Ranveer Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and 7 others 2017 (1) ADJ 240 (DB) and Oryx Fisheries Ltd. vs U.O.I reported in 2010 (13) SCC 427 . 11. While relying on 1999 (7) SCC 89 , learned counsel submitted that when the statute is silent with regard to when the forfeiture ought to be done and when it ought not to be done then the State should act with prudence and should not impose the penalty of forfeiture arbitrarily. Since learned counsel relied on paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment reported in 1999 (7) SCC 89 they are being reproduced here as under; "10. In the absence of the rules, the action of the respondents regarding imposition of the terms and conditions of the lease including the enhancement of rent is required to be fair and reasonable and not actuated by considerations which could be termed as arbitrary or discriminatory. The Government cannot act like a private individual in imposing the conditions solely with the object of extracting profits from its lessees. Governmental actions are required to be based on standards which are not arbitrary or unauthorised. This Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India while agreeing with the observations of Mathew, J. held: (SCC) pp.505-06, para 12) "12. Governmental actions are required to be based on standards which are not arbitrary or unauthorised. This Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India while agreeing with the observations of Mathew, J. held: (SCC) pp.505-06, para 12) "12. We agree with the observations of Mathew, J., V. Punnen Thomas v. State of Kerala that: 'The Government is not and should not be as free as an individual in selecting the recipients for its largesse. Whatever its activity, the Government is still the Government and will be subject to restraints, inherent in its position in a democratic society. A democratic Government cannot lay down arbitrary and capricious standards for the choice of persons with whom alone it will deal.' The same point was made by this Court in Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B. where the question was whether blacklisting of a person without giving him an opportunity to be heard was bad? Ray, C.J., speaking on behalf of himself and his colleagues on the Bench pointed out that blacklisting of a person not only affects his reputation which is, in Popundian terms, an interest both of personality and substance, but also denies him equality in the matter of entering into contract with the Government and it cannot, therefore, be supported without fair hearing. It was argued for the Government that no person has a right to enter into contractual relationship with the Government and the Government, like any other private individual, has the absolute right to enter into contract with anyone it pleases. But the Court, speaking through the learned Chief Justice, responded that the Government is not like a private individual who can pick and choose the person with whom it will deal, but the Government is still a Government when it enters into contract or when it is administering largesse and it cannot, without adequate reason, exclude any person from dealing with it or take away largesse arbitrarily. The learned Chief Justice said that when the Government is trading with the public, 'the democratic form of government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness... The activities of the Government have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality. The State need not enter into any contract with anyone, but if it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure'. The activities of the Government have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality. The State need not enter into any contract with anyone, but if it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure'. This proposition would hold good in all cases of dealing by the Government with the public, where the interest sought to be protected is a privilege. It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largesse, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norms which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largesse including award of jobs, contracts, quotas licences, etc. must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory." 11. Even the administrative orders and not (sic only) quasi-judicial are required to be made in a manner in consonance with the rules of natural justice, when they affect the rights of the citizens to the property or the attributes of the property. While exercising the powers of judicial review the court can look into the reasons given by the Government in support of its action but cannot substitute its own reasons. The Court can strike down an executive order, if it finds the reasons assigned were irrelevant and extraneous. The courts are more concerned with the decision-making process than the decision itself." 12. The Court can strike down an executive order, if it finds the reasons assigned were irrelevant and extraneous. The courts are more concerned with the decision-making process than the decision itself." 12. Sri Rahul Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel opposed the writ petition and submitted that when it was found that the petitioner had not installed the CCTV Camera and also had not displayed the sale price at the storage point then it was mandatory for the District Officer to impose the punishment as has been given in Rule 10 of 'Rules 2018'. He submits that word 'may' also had to be interpreted in such a manner that if licence had been cancelled then the forfeiture of the security had to follow. 13. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Rahul Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel, we are of the view that the order of the District Magistrate dated 10.09.2020 and the order of the appellate court dated 18.12.2020 cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Even if it was found that the CD was not to the satisfaction to the authority, there was no finding at all with regard to the fact that there was any financial loss to the State. In such view of the matter, we are of the view the authorities erred in forfeiting the security amount. 14. Under such circumstances though we uphold the order of the District Magistrate dated 10.09.2020 and order of the Commissioner of appellate court dated 18.12.2020 so far as they cancel the license of the petitioner, we set aside the orders to the extent they forfeit the security amount. 15. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is partly allowed.