JUDGMENT : B. SYAMSUNDER, J. 1. The defendants No. 4 and 5 in O.S. No. 83 of 1997 on the file of Principal Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam are the appellants. The respondent No. 1 is the plaintiff in the suit, whereas respondents No. 2 to 4 are the defendants No. 1 to 3 in the suit. Originally, the suit was filed by respondent No. 1/plaintiff against the appellants and respondents No. 2 to 4 seeking partition of plaint schedule property into four equal shares and allot one such share to him and for possession. 2. The respondents No. 2 to 4 who are defendants No. 1 to 3 in the suit remained ex-parte before trial Court as well in the 1st Appellate Court. 3. The appellants and respondent No. 1 herein after referred to as defendants No. 4, 5 and plaintiff as arrayed before the trial Court. 4. The Plaintiff instituted the suit against defendants No. 1 to 5 for partition of plaint schedule properties into four equal shares and to allot one such share to him and for mesne profits. The plaint schedule properties consist of three items wherein terraced buildings and tiled house situated at Amadalavalasa town. It is the contention of the plaintiff that one Mr. K. Suryanarayana is the original owner of the plaint schedule property. He had two wives. Defendant No. 1 is the second wife of Late K. Suryanarayana through whom he got defendants No. 2 and 3 as his sons. He submits that first wife of Late K. Suryanarayana is no more, through her he got a son by name Mr. Muralidhararao and a daughter Smt. Jaya Lakshmi who also died and her husband is Mr. Narayana Murthy. The said Narayana Murthy’s sister is the wife of the plaintiff. He also stated that his mother-in-law is the sister of Mr. K. Suryanarayana. After the death of Mr. K. Suryanarayana, plaint schedule properties devolved upon defendants No. 1 to 3 and Mr. Muralidhararao in equal shares and said Mr. Muralidhararao was suffering from Asthma but defendants No. 1 to 3 refused to maintain Mr. Muralidhararao and they neglected to look after his welfare due to that said Mr. Muralidhararao has taken shelter with the plaintiff and lived with him for a period of five (5) years and died on 12.11.1995 at the house of the plaintiff. The main contention of the plaintiff is that Mr. Muralidhararao and they neglected to look after his welfare due to that said Mr. Muralidhararao has taken shelter with the plaintiff and lived with him for a period of five (5) years and died on 12.11.1995 at the house of the plaintiff. The main contention of the plaintiff is that Mr. Muralidhararao in a sound and disposing state of mind executed unregistered Will dated 11.02.1995 (Ex.A1) bequeathing his undivided one-fourth share in all his properties to the plaintiff which came into force after the death of Mr. Muralidhararao and then plaintiff said to be demanded defendants No. 1 to 3 for partition of plaint schedule properties, which they postponed and alienated items No. 1 and 2 of plaint schedule properties to defendants No. 4 and 5 under registered sale deeds (Ex.B1, Ex.B2) on 05.07.1997. Then plaintiff issued notice to the defendants, for which they gave reply notice. Exs.A2 to A6 are legal notice and exchange of the notices between plaintiff and defendants. Then plaintiff filed suit for partition basing on the Ex.A1 Will. 5. The defendants No. 4 and 5 have filed separate written statement resisting the claim of plaintiff stating that said Mr. Muralidhararao is an idiot and he has no worldly knowledge and he had no testamentary capacity to execute Ex.A1. They submit that Mr. Muralidhararao never suffered from Asthma and never stayed with the plaintiff who looked after by defendants No. 1 to 3 and he also died in the house of defendant No. 1. They pleaded that Ex.A1 Will is a forged one. They prayed to dismiss the suit. 6. The trial Court basing on the above pleadings, settled the following issues: 1. Whether the Will dated 11.02.1995 said to have been executed by Mr. Muralidhararao is true and valid and whether Mr. Muralidhararao had testamentary capacity? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition of plaint schedule properties and for possession as prayed for? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits as prayed for? 4. Whether the suit is barred for non-joinder of the necessary parties? 5. Whether the defendant No. 4 is entitled to ask for equities as prayed for? 6. To what relief? 7. The parties went to trial. On behalf of the plaintiff, he himself examined as PW-1 and examined attesters, scribe and his neighbours as PW-2 to PW-6 and marked Exs.A1 to A6. 5. Whether the defendant No. 4 is entitled to ask for equities as prayed for? 6. To what relief? 7. The parties went to trial. On behalf of the plaintiff, he himself examined as PW-1 and examined attesters, scribe and his neighbours as PW-2 to PW-6 and marked Exs.A1 to A6. On behalf of defendants No. 4 and 5, DWs. 1 to 8 were examined, Exs.B1 to B5 were marked and Exs.C1 and C2 and Exs.X1 to X4 were also marked. PW-5 and PW-6 are said to be elders in the village. 8. On the material and evidence, the trial Court held that plaintiff failed to prove Ex. A1 Will and dismissed the suit. 9. Against the Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court, plaintiff presented A.S. No. 116 of 2000 on the file of the 1st Additional District Judge, Srikakulam which was allowed by the 1st Appellate Court and decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff. 10. In these circumstances, the present Second Appeal is filed by defendants No. 4 and 5. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the Appellant Mr. K. N. Ram Mohan as well as learned counsel Mr. S. Krishna Vamshi representing on behalf of Mr. Karri Murali Krishna, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. 12. The learned counsel for the appellants mainly contended that a well reasoned trial Court judgment was set aside and reversed by First Appellate Court basing on surmises and conjectures which is not permissible under Section 96 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908. He would further submit that claim of plaintiff is based on unregistered Will which does not contain any schedule of the property and learned trial Judge rightly rejected Ex.A1 on the ground that execution of Will by a person at the age of 26 years anticipating the death is improbable which failed to consider by the First Appellate Court. He argued that Appellants have produced Ex.B3 mortgage deed dated 07.08.1996 which is subsequent to the alleged execution of Ex.A1 Will, wherein plaintiff is admittedly one of the attesters which itself shows that by the date of Ex.B3 mortgage deed, Ex. A1 Will was not available with the plaintiff which he created to falsely claim the property. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that plaintiff failed to prove Ex. A1 Will as he admittedly not related to Mr. A1 Will was not available with the plaintiff which he created to falsely claim the property. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that plaintiff failed to prove Ex. A1 Will as he admittedly not related to Mr. Muralidhararao and as contended by plaintiff Mr. Muralidhararao not died at the house of the plaintiff as defendants No. 4 and 5 have produced Ex. B5 which shows that Mr. Muralidhararao died at the house of defendant No. 1. He further argued that defendants also examined DW-5 Personal Officer where plaintiff was working in the Jute Mill who produced Ex. X1 attendance register of the plaintiff which shows that on the date of the death of Mr. Muralidhararao plaintiff attended the duties, which itself shows that Mr. Muralidhararao never resided at the house of plaintiff. He argued that plaintiff has not produced Ex. A1 Will before any authority till issuance of legal notice by defendants No. 4 and 5. He prays to allow the Second Appeal. 13. The Learned Counsel for the respondent would submit that the plaintiff who is legatee under the Will is a close relative of Mr. Muralidhararao who looked after him as he was suffering from ill health who neglected by defendants No. 1 to 3. He would further submit that both Courts gave concurrent finding that Late Mr. Muralidhararao got testamentary capacity and plaintiff examined attestors and scribe of the Ex.A1 Will thereby proved the execution of Will beyond suspicion which rightly considered by learned First Appellate Judge. He prays to dismiss the Second Appeal. 14. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants while submitting the arguments brought to the notice of this Court recent Judicial pronouncement by the Hon’ble Apex Court with regard to the duty of the First Appellate Court while dealing with first appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 in V. Prabhakara vs. Basavaraj K. by legal Representatives and Another, (2022) 1 SCC 115 Supreme Court Cases 115 at Para 22, 23 which reads as under: “22. The first appellate court while exercising power under Section 96 can re-do the exercise of the trial Court. However, such a power is expected to be exercised with caution. The reason being, the trial Court alone has the pleasure of seeing the demeanour of the witness. The first appellate court while exercising power under Section 96 can re-do the exercise of the trial Court. However, such a power is expected to be exercised with caution. The reason being, the trial Court alone has the pleasure of seeing the demeanour of the witness. Therefore, it has got its own advantage in assessing the statement of the witnesses which may not be available to the appellate Court. In exercising such a power, the appellate Court has to keep in mind the views of the trial Court. If it finds that the trial Court is wrong, its decision should be on the reasoning given. A mere substitution of views, without discussing the findings of the trial Court, by the appellate Court is not permissible. If two views are possible, it would only be appropriate to go with the view expressed by the trial Court. While adopting reasoning in support of its findings, the appellate Court is not expected to go on moral grounds alone.” “23. The aforesaid views expressed by us are nothing but a reiteration of the settled principle of law as could be seen through the following paragraphs of the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Jagdish Singh vs. Madhuri Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497 : [SCC pp. 504-508, Paras 27-37] “27. It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising power as first appellate court and hence it was open to the Court to enter into not only questions of law but questions of fact as well. It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a rehearing of the main matter and the appellate court can reappraise, re-appreciate and review the entire evidence - oral as well as documentary and can come to its own conclusion.” 28. At the same time, however, the appellate court is expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It should not forget that the trial court had an advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanor of witnesses and, hence, the trial court's conclusions should not normally be disturbed. No doubt, the appellate court possesses the same powers as that of the original court, but they have to be exercised with proper care, caution and circumspection. It should not forget that the trial court had an advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanor of witnesses and, hence, the trial court's conclusions should not normally be disturbed. No doubt, the appellate court possesses the same powers as that of the original court, but they have to be exercised with proper care, caution and circumspection. When a finding of fact has been recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial court in appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary to well-established principles of law or unreasonable. 29. Before more than a century, in Coghlan vs. Cumberland, (1898) 1 Ch 704 (CA) Lindley, M.R. pronounced the principle thus: “Even where the appeal turns on a question of fact, the Court of Appeal has to bear in mind that its duty is to rehear the case, and the Court must reconsider the materials before the Judge with such other materials as it may have decided to admit. The Court must then make up its own mind, not disregarding the judgment appealed from, but carefully weighing and considering it; and not shrinking from overruling it if on full consideration the Court comes to the conclusion that the judgment is wrong. When, as often happens, much turns on the relative credibility of witnesses who have been examined and cross-examined before the Judge, the Court is sensible of the great advantage he has had in seeing and hearing them. It is often very difficult to estimate correctly the relative credibility of witnesses from written depositions and when the question arises which witness is to be believed rather than another; and that question turns on manner and demeanour, the Court of Appeal always is, and must be, guided by the impression made on the Judge who saw the witnesses. But there may obviously be other circumstances, quite apart from manner and demeanour, which may shew whether a statement is credible or not; and these circumstances may warrant the Court in differing from the Judge, even on a question of fact turning on the credibility of witnesses whom the Court has not seen.” [See also observations of Lord Thankerton in Watt vs. Thomas, 1947 AC 484] 30. In Sara Veeraswami vs. Talluri Narayya, AIR 1949 PC 32 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, after referring to relevant decisions on the point, stated [Quoting from Watt vs. Thomas, (1947) 1 All ER 582, pp. 583 H-584 A]: “......but if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight. This is not to say that the Judge of first instance can be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration. Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a Judge of first instance, when estimating the value of verbal testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to courts of appeal) of having the witnesses before him and observing the manner in which their evidence is given.” 31. This Court also, before more than half a century in Sarju Pershad vs. Jwaleshwari, Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1951 SC 120 stated: (AIR p. 121, Para 7) “7. The question for our consideration is undoubtedly one of fact, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of oral evidence adduced in the case. In such cases, the appellate court has got to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in court. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. The rule is and it is nothing more than a rule of practice that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact.” 32. Referring to several cases on the point, the Court concluded: [Sarju Pershad Case, AIR p. 123, Para 15]: “15.......The duty of the appellate court in such cases is to see whether the evidence taken as a whole can reasonably justify the conclusion which the trial court arrived at or whether there is an element of improbability arising from proved circumstances which, in the opinion of the court, outweighs such finding.” (Emphasis supplied) 33. After about a decade, in Radha Prasad vs. Gajadhar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 115 , this Court reiterated: (AIR p. 123, Para 15) “14. The position in law, in our opinion, is that when an appeal lies on facts it is the right and the duty of the appeal court to consider what its decision on the question of facts should be; but in coming to its own decision it should bear in mind that it is looking at the printed record and has not the opportunity of seeing the witnesses and that it should not lightly reject the trial Judge's conclusion that the evidence of a particular witness should be believed or should not be believed particularly when such conclusion is based on the observation of the demeanor of the witness in court. But this does not mean that merely because an appeal court has not heard or seen the witness it will in no case reverse the findings of a trial Judge even on the question of credibility, if such question depends on a fair consideration of matters on record. But this does not mean that merely because an appeal court has not heard or seen the witness it will in no case reverse the findings of a trial Judge even on the question of credibility, if such question depends on a fair consideration of matters on record. When it appears to the appeal court that important considerations bearing on the question of credibility have not been taken into account or properly weighed by the trial Judge and such considerations including the question of probability of the story given by the witnesses clearly indicate that the view taken by the trial Judge is wrong, the appeal court should have no hesitation in reversing the findings of the trial Judge on such questions. Where the question is not of credibility based entirely on the demeanor of witnesses observed in court but a question of inference of one fact from proved primary facts the court of appeal is in as good a position as the trial Judge and is free to reverse the findings if it thinks that the inference made by the trial Judge is not justified.” 34. In T.D. Gopalan vs. Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, (1972) 2 SCC 329 , this Court said: (SCC p. 333, Para 9): “9. The High Court next proceeded to reproduce a summary of the statement of each of the witnesses produced by the defendants. No attempt whatsoever was made to discuss the reasons which the learned District Judge had given for not accepting their evidence except for a general observation here and there that nothing had been suggested in the cross-examination of a particular witness as to why he should have made a false statement. We apprehend that the uniform practice in the matter of appreciation of evidence has been that if the trial court has given cogent and detailed reasons for not accepting the testimony of a witness the appellate court in all fairness to it ought to deal with those reasons before proceeding to form a contrary opinion about accepting the testimony which has been rejected by the trial court. We are, therefore, not in a position to know on what grounds the High Court disagreed with the reasons which prevailed with the learned District Judge for not relying on the evidence of the witnesses produced by the defendants.” 35. We are, therefore, not in a position to know on what grounds the High Court disagreed with the reasons which prevailed with the learned District Judge for not relying on the evidence of the witnesses produced by the defendants.” 35. Yet in another decision in Madhusudan Das vs. Narayanibai, (1983) 1 SCC 35 , this Court said: (SCC pp. 39-40, Para 8): “8.........At this stage, it would be right to refer to the general principle that, in an appeal against a trial court decree, when the appellate court considers an issue turning on oral evidence it must bear in mind that it does not enjoy the advantage which the trial court had in having the witnesses before it and of observing the manner in which they gave their testimony. When there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the witnesses, the general rule is that the appellate court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial court to prevail unless it clearly appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace its opinion as to where the credibility lies. …The principle is one of practice and governs the weight to be given to a finding of fact by the trial court. There is, of course, no doubt that as a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on a misreading of the evidence or on conjectures and surmises the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact.” (Emphasis supplied) 36. Three requisites should normally be present before an appellate court reverses a finding of the trial court: (i) it applies its mind to reasons given by the trial court. (ii) it has no advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. (iii) it records cogent and convincing reasons for disagreeing with the trial court. 37. If the above principles are kept in mind, in our judgment, the decision of the High Court falls short of the grounds which would allow the first appellate court to reverse a finding of fact recorded by the trial court. (iii) it records cogent and convincing reasons for disagreeing with the trial court. 37. If the above principles are kept in mind, in our judgment, the decision of the High Court falls short of the grounds which would allow the first appellate court to reverse a finding of fact recorded by the trial court. As already adverted earlier, the High Court has ‘virtually’ reached a conclusion without recording reasons in support of such conclusion. When the court of original jurisdiction has considered oral evidence and recorded findings after seeing the demeanour of witnesses and having applied its mind, the appellate court is enjoined to keep that fact in mind. It has to deal with the reasons recorded and conclusions arrived at by the trial court. Thereafter, it is certainly open to the appellate court to come to its own conclusion if it finds that the reasons which weighed with the trial court or conclusions arrived at were not in consonance with law.” 15. This Court admitted the second appeal as per substantial question of law raised at point No. 8 in the grounds of appeal, which reads as under: (a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court is vitiated and its approach to the crucial issue i.e. regarding the testamentary capacity of the testator and genuineness and authenticity of Ex.A1 Will is essentially erroneous and proceeded on conjectures and surmises and no ordinary and prudent person would justify the reasoning it assigned for explaining away the various suspicious circumstances and inherent improbabilities surrounding the execution of Ex.A1 Will as pointed out by the learned trial Court? (b) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court is unsustainable and vitiated in that it did not come to close quarters with the reasons assigned by the trial court while reversing the finding on Ex.A1 and its approach to the issue regarding genuineness and authenticity of Ex.A1 is essentially erroneous and perverse? 16. The substantial question of law which has to be considered by this Court is whether the findings of the Courts below with regard to Ex.A1 are correct and whether those findings are in conformity with the evidence placed before it. 17. 16. The substantial question of law which has to be considered by this Court is whether the findings of the Courts below with regard to Ex.A1 are correct and whether those findings are in conformity with the evidence placed before it. 17. While considering the second appeal in terms of Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 this Court can only consider when there is substantial question of law and no more such question of law based on facts. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Narayan Sitharamji Badwaik vs. Bisaram and Others, AIR 2021 SC 2438 wherein it is held at Para 10 which reads as under: “It is a settled position of law that a second appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, lies only on a substantial question of law [Refer Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 ]. However, this does not mean that the High Court cannot, in any circumstance, decide findings of fact or interfere with those arrived at by the Courts below in a second appeal. In fact, Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure explicitly provides for circumstances under which the High Court may do so. Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure is as follows: Section 103. Power of High Court to Determine Issue of Fact In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal: (a) which has not been determined by the lower Appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and the lower Appellate Court. (b) which has been wrongly determined by such Court or Courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in section 100.” 18. The suit is filed by the plaintiff seeking partition and his claim is based on Ex.A1 unregistered Will said to be executed by Late Mr. Muralidhararao. It is disputed by defendant Nos. 4 and 5 who are admittedly purchasers of the plaint schedule property from defendants No. 1 to 3. 19. It is not in dispute that orginally plaint schedule property belonged to Mr. Suryanarayana who got one son by name Mr. Muralidhararao and a daughter Smt. Jaya Lakshmi, through his first wife and Mr. Suryanarayana died in the year 1981. The said Mr. 19. It is not in dispute that orginally plaint schedule property belonged to Mr. Suryanarayana who got one son by name Mr. Muralidhararao and a daughter Smt. Jaya Lakshmi, through his first wife and Mr. Suryanarayana died in the year 1981. The said Mr. Suryanarayana married defendant No. 1 after the death of his first wife through whom he got defendant Nos .2 and 3 (sons). It is also not in dispute that Mr. Muralidhararao died unmarried and Smt. Jaya Lakshmi though married Mr. Narayana Murthy died issueless in the year 1982. 20. The plaintiff is the husband of sister of Mr. Narayana Murthy. The plaintiff has examined scribe and attesters of Will who admittedly not relatives or neighbours of plaint schedule property. The trial Court at Para 13 of the judgment after considering the evidence adduced by the plaintiff came to the conclusion that Mr. Muralidhararao said to be the executant of the Ex.A1 Will not choose to select any such persons except PW-2 and PW-3 who are neither his friends nor confidents with whom he has no dealings at all since several years which is a suspicious circumstance, which is left unanswered. There is no plausible explanation on the part of the plaintiff attesting Ex.B3 mortgage deed dated 07.08.1996 executed by defendant Nos. 1 to 3 in favour of one Mr. Thaviti Raju. If plaintiff really got Ex.A1 Will which said to be executed by Mr. Muralidhararao, he would not have kept quiet when the defendants No. 1 to 3 mortgaging the plaint schedule properties to third person and even he attested the Ex.B3 document. 21. It is also not in dispute that Ex.A1 not came to light till the property has been sold to defendant Nos. 4 and 5 by defendants No. 1 to 3. The existence of the Will only came to light when plaintiff issued Ex.A2 registered legal notice to the defendants. It is also pertinent to note that description of the property is not mentioned in the Will and Ex.B5 Death Certificate issued by Executive Officer of Gram Panchayat supports the contention of defendant No. 4 and 5 that said Mr. Muralidhararao died at the house of defendant No. 1. 22. When plaintiff propounded the Will, burden of proving the Will that it has been validly executed and it is a genuine document is on the plaintiff. Muralidhararao died at the house of defendant No. 1. 22. When plaintiff propounded the Will, burden of proving the Will that it has been validly executed and it is a genuine document is on the plaintiff. The propounder has to remove any suspicion about the Will by leading sufficient and cogent evidence, if there exists any. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi vs. Mrudula Jyoti Rao, AIR 2007 SC 614 laid down the following guidelines while appreciating the evidence regarding the execution of a Will: “1. Section 68 of the evidence act, in unequivocal terms states that execution of a Will must be proved at least by one attesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. A Will is to prove what is loosely called as primary evidence, except where proof is promoted by leading secondary evidence. 2. While making attestation, there must be an animus attenstandi, on the part of the attesting witness, meaning thereby, he must intend to attest and extrinsic evidence on this point is receivable. 3. When a doubt is created in regard to the condition of the mind of the testator despite his signature on the Will, it is a suspicious circumstance. 4. It would be suspicious when the disposition appears to be unnatural or wholly unfair in the light of the relevant circumstances. 5. It is a suspicious circumstance, where the profounder himself takes prominent part in the execution of Will which confers on him substantial benefit.” 23. The Trial Court while considering the validity of Ex.A1 Will who got opportunity of observing the demeanour of witness came to conclusion that a man of 26 years may not anticipate death and execute the will which is improbable circumstances which plaintiff failed to remove the said suspicion due to that trial Court disbelieved Ex.A1 which finding is set aside by the learned 1st Appellate Judge, with a finding that Defendant No. 1 who is the step-mother of Mr. Muralidhararao neglected him and also observed at Para 23 of its judgment that late Mr. Muralidhararao was left as a destitute and learned 1st Appellate Judge placed burden on defendants to prove by observing that evidence of DWs. 1 to 8 is totally silent with regard to the affairs of late Mr. Muralidhararao neglected him and also observed at Para 23 of its judgment that late Mr. Muralidhararao was left as a destitute and learned 1st Appellate Judge placed burden on defendants to prove by observing that evidence of DWs. 1 to 8 is totally silent with regard to the affairs of late Mr. Muralidhararao and who looked after him since 1981 thereby learned 1st Appellate Judge totally ignored the evidence of DW-6, DW-5 Mr. Shankar Rao and also Ex.B3 and Ex.B5 which clearly shows that on the date of death of Mr. Muralidharrao, plaintiff attended the duties and document issued by Executive Officer Ex.B5 shows that Mr. Muralidharrao died at the house of defendant No. 1 which falsifies the contention of the plaintiff that on the date of death of Muralidhar Rao, he was residing at his house which failed to consider by the learned 1st Appellate Judge. As held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants that a mere substitution of views without discussing the findings of the trial Court by the Appellate Court is not permissible and if two views are possible it would only be appropriate to go with the view expressed by the Trial Court as Trial Court has got opportunity of observing the demeanour of the witness. It is also observed by Hon’ble Apex Court that the appellate Court is not expected to go on moral grounds alone. The 1st Appellate Court without any evidence and lack of reasoning came to conclusion that defendant No. 1 neglected Mr. Muralidhararao thereby believed that a man of 26 years said to be executed Ex.A1 Will anticipating his death due to Asthma disease, which is improbable and suspicious circumstance which is not explained by the plaintiff and removed suspicious circumstance surrounding Ex.A1 Will. 24. This Court is of the considered opinion that findings arrived by 1st Appellate Court are only based on surmises and conjectures which erroneously set aside the well reasoned judgment of trial court with regard to Ex.A1 Will. Therefore, in the circumstances and discussions supra, accepting the contention of the appellants, the second appeal has to be allowed setting aside the judgment and decree of the 1st Appellate Court restoring the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 25. Therefore, in the circumstances and discussions supra, accepting the contention of the appellants, the second appeal has to be allowed setting aside the judgment and decree of the 1st Appellate Court restoring the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 25. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed and consequently, the judgment and decree dated 29.08.2005 in A.S. No. 116 of 2000 on the file of the 1st Additional District Judge, Srikakulam are set aside. The judgment and decree dated 18.08.2000 in O.S. No. 83 of 1997 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Srikakulam is restored. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout. 26. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. The interim stay if any granted shall stand vacated.