JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Vivek Mishra, learned counsel for petitioner as well as Sri Mudit Agarwal, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 and learned Standing Counsel for respondent No. 2. 2. The grievance raised by the petitioner is with regard to order dated 05.12.2000 passed by Dy. Labour Commissioner, Lucknow Region, Lucknow thereby declining to refer the dispute raised by the petitioner for adjudication before the Labour Court in exercise of powers under Section 4 (K) of U.P. Industrial disputes Act, 1947. 3. The facts in brief of the present case are that petitioner was working with respondent No. 1 on the post of Supervisor w.e.f. 1993 and claims to be covered within the definition of workman as provided under Section 2(Z) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 4. The grievance of the petitioner is that he was dismissed from service on 04.02.1998 illegally and arbitrarily and in violation of provisions of Section 6(N) of the Act of 1947. Being aggrieved by his dismissal, the petitioner had moved an application before the Prescribed Authority/Conciliation Board on 15.04.1998. On the basis of the said application, conciliation proceedings were initiated and the matter was referred to the Conciliation Officer. 5. It is submitted that no settlement was arrived at between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 in conciliation proceedings and consequently the Assistant Labour Commissioner by means of order dated 26.06.1999, it was recorded that there were several allegations against the petitioner with regard to financial misappropriation and for being negligent in discharging of his duties consequent to which disciplinary proceedings were initiated and after giving adequate opportunity of hearing he was dismissed from service and the Conciliation Officer recorded that there was no ground on which he can be reinstated in service. The said order dated 26.06.1999 has been annexed by the petitioner in supplementary rejoinder affidavit as Annexure No. 4. It seems that the said report of the Conciliation Officer was sent to the State Government for proceedings in terms of Section 4(K) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but by means order dated 05.12.2000, the Dy. Labour Commissioner, Lucknow in a very cryptive manner has stated that the case of the petitioner has not been found to be suitable to be referred to the Dy. Labour Commissioner, Lucknow. 6. Labour Commissioner, Lucknow in a very cryptive manner has stated that the case of the petitioner has not been found to be suitable to be referred to the Dy. Labour Commissioner, Lucknow. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner has submitted that the said order is illegal and arbitrary as no reasons have been assigned for declining to refer the matter for adjudication to the Labour Court. He further submits that the petitioner being a workman and the respondent No. 1 being an industrial undertaking and the matter pertaining to the dismissal of the petitioner is squarely covered under the provisions of Section 6(N) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and consequently once it is seen that all the ingredients as stated above are fulfilled then there is no discretion with the respondents except the matter refer the dispute for adjudication before the Labour Court. Despite repeated opportunities, the State has not filed any counter affidavit. The employer, namely Tata Engineering & Locomotive Company Limited contested the matter by filing a counter affidavit. 7. It has been submitted that power under Section 4(K) of the Act of 1947 is an administrative power and is subjected to limited judicial scrutiny. It has also been submitted that the petitioner was a Supervisor and consequently his claim would not be entertainable before the Labour Court inasmuch as he does not fall in the definition of workman and hence there is no infirmity in the impugned order dated 29.08.1990 of the State Government declining to refer the matter for adjudication to the Labour Court. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for has relied upon the judgment of Prem Kakkar Vs. State of Haryana 1976 (3)SCC 433 . 8. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 9. The petitioner claiming himself to be an workman having been illegally and arbitrarily dismissed from services by the respondents on 04.02.1998. He invoked the provisions of the Act of 1947 and accordingly conciliation proceedings were commenced between the petitioner and respondent No. 1. The conciliation proceedings did not conclude in a settlement. The Conciliation Officer instead of forwarding the failure report, proceeded to pass an order dated 26.06.1999 holding that the petitioner was not entitled to any benefits. On the face of it the order dated 26.06.1999 is illegal and arbitrary and without jurisdiction. 10. The conciliation proceedings did not conclude in a settlement. The Conciliation Officer instead of forwarding the failure report, proceeded to pass an order dated 26.06.1999 holding that the petitioner was not entitled to any benefits. On the face of it the order dated 26.06.1999 is illegal and arbitrary and without jurisdiction. 10. The Conciliation Officer has only to make efforts to see that the dispute between the employer and the employee is amicably settled. In case he succeeds then the same result therein a settlement between the parties and in case the parties are unable to arrive at settlement then only a failure report can be prepared by him and forwarded to the STate Government/Prescribed Authority. 11. A perusal of the Act of 1947, It is clear that there is no provision conferring him with any powers of adjudication to determine of the lis between the employer and the employee. In the present case he has proceeded to pass an order dated 26.06.1999 delving upon the merits of the claim made by the workman and returned a finding that no ground for granting any relief to the petitioner is made out. Such an order cannot be passed by him, taking upon the lis between the parties. 12. Such an order is without jurisdiction and in excess of the authority vested in the Conciliation Officer and consequently nonest and cannot be relied upon in any proceedings. 13. The impugned order declining to refer the matter for adjudication by the Dy. Labour Commissioner, Lucknow on 05.12.2000 is a cryptic order. No reasons have been assigned as to why the dispute raised by the petitioner could not be referred for adjudication by the Labour Court. 14. Needless to say that the said order deprived the petitioner valuable rights for having this dispute adjudicated by the Labour Court and by declining to refer the matter the valuable rights which have been vested in the petitioner by means of the Act of 1947 he has been deprived. It was incumbent upon the respondents to give adequate reasons for not referring the matter for adjudication. 15. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. It was incumbent upon the respondents to give adequate reasons for not referring the matter for adjudication. 15. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. 16. Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donoughmore Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. While considering this aspect the Donoughmore Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. The Committee expressed the opinion that "there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise" and that "where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity". (p. 80) Prof. H.W.R. Wade has also expressed the view that "natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice". (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th edn. p. 548.) In Siemens Engineering Co. case [ (1976) 2 SCC 981 : 1976 Supp SCR 489] Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the same view when it observed that "the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process". This decision proceeds on the basis that the two well known principles of natural justice, namely (i) that no man should be a judge in his own cause, and (ii) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision-making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice. This view is in consonance with the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [ (1969) 2 SCC 262 : (1970) 1 SCR 457 ] wherein it has been held : (SCR pp. 468-69 : SCC p. 272, para 20) "The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. 468-69 : SCC p. 272, para 20) "The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely : (i) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must he held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice." 17. A similar trend is discernible in the decisions of English courts wherein it has been held that natural justice demands that the decision should be based on some evidence of probative value. (See : R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex p. Moore [ (1965) 1 QB 456 : (1965) 1 All ER 81] ; Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd. [1984 AC 648 : (1984) 3 All ER 201]) 18. The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fair play in action". As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. 19. It is noticed that in absence of giving any reasons the respondents have acted in most illegal and arbitrary manner and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 20. In light of the above, the order dated 05.12.2000 is quashed. The matter is remitted to the State Government to pass a fresh order in accordance with law without being influenced by the order dated 26.06.1999 passed by the Conciliatory Authority/Assistant Labour Commissioner, Lucknow. Considering that the matter is pending for the last more than two decades, let an appropriate order be passed by the State Government within a period of four weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before it. 21. With the above observations/directions, the writ petition is allowed.