JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Mohan Singh, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Suresh Chandra Srivastava, learned counsel for opposite party no. 4, Sri Nirmal Kumar Pandey, learned A.G.A. for the State. 2. Instant application has been filed with prayer to quash the impugned proceedings of Computerized Case No. T201808620302227, State of U.P. Vs Akhtar & others U/s 145 Cr.P.C pending in the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate Jamunha, P.S. Malhipur, District Shravasti as well as the impugned order dated 05.08.2019 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court-II, Shravasti, in Crl. Revision No.70/2018, Furhe Khan & others Vs State of U.P. & others, and impugned orders dated 11.07.2018 (U/s 145 Cr.P.C.) & 11.07.2018 (U/ss-145/146 Cr.P.C.) passed by the opposite party no. 2. 3. The factual matrix of the case is that the land Gata No. 2 measuring area 1.5830 hectares situated in Patpar Ganj, Tehsil-Jamunaha District-Shravasti was recorded in the name of the applicant and the opposite party no. 5, in the revenue record. On 22.10.2016, the opposite party no. 5 transferred his share to opposite party no. 4 by way of executing a registered sale deed and thereafter, the same was mutated in favour of opposite party no. 4. On 27.10.2016 the opposite party no. 4 on the basis of sale deed, started creating hindrance in the possession of the other tenure holders including the present applicants and the applicant no. 1 filed a suit for division of holdings, under section 116 of U. P. Revenue Code 2006 before the Sub-Divisional Officer and after institution of the aforesaid suit, the Sub-Divisional Officer passed the order while directing the parties to maintain status-quo as was existed on 20.10.2016. The opposite party nos. 4 and 5 were also the parties in the aforesaid suit. On 11.05.2018 the partition suit was decided and on 14.05.2018, the applicants no. 1 and 3 filed an appeal under section 207 of the Code, 2006 before the Divisional Commissioner Devi Patan Mandal Gonda. The appeal was admitted and interim order was passed on 22.5.2018 that the parties shall maintain status quo regarding the property in question. On 07.06.2018, the opposite party no. 4 filed writ petition namely Miscellaneous Single No. 17523 of 2018 (Smt. Shakira Khan vs State of U.P.), wherein, this Court has passed the order on 07.06.2018, which is read as under:- "Heard Sri Alok Kumar Misra learned counsel for petitioner. On 07.06.2018, the opposite party no. 4 filed writ petition namely Miscellaneous Single No. 17523 of 2018 (Smt. Shakira Khan vs State of U.P.), wherein, this Court has passed the order on 07.06.2018, which is read as under:- "Heard Sri Alok Kumar Misra learned counsel for petitioner. Notice for opposite party Nos. 1 to 3 has been accepted by the office of learned Chief Standing Counsel. In view of the proposed order, notices to opposite party Nos. 4 to 9 are dispensed with. By means of this petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 22.5.2018 passed by Additional Commissioner, Devipatan Mandal, Gonda whereby the appeal of the opposite party Nos. 4 and 5 has been admitted and next date was fixed for 26.6.2018 directing that the status quo in respect of the property be maintained till the next date of listing. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that he has filed a recall application seeking recall of the aforesaid order dated 22.5.2018. He has submitted that the court concerned may be directed to decide the recall application on the date fixed i.e. 26.6.2018. Under these circumstances, it is hereby provided that if the petitioner has already provided the copy of his recall application dated 29.5.2018 to the appellants, the said application shall be disposed of by the appellate authority either on the date fixed i.e. 26.6.2018 or within a period of one month thereafter. In view of the aforesaid terms, the writ petition is disposed of." 4. Vide the aforesaid order, it was directed that the recall application submitted by the opposite party no. 4 shall be disposed of by the appellate authority either on the date fixed i.e. 26.06.2018 or within a period of one month thereafter. 5. After the aforesaid order, the appellate court decided the recall application of the opposite party no. 4, vide order date 26.10.2018 and upheld the earlier interim order dated 22.05.2018. The appeal was, ultimately, decided finally in favour of the opposite party no. 4 and being aggrieved the present applicant filed second appeal before the Board of Revenue, wherein, the opposite party no. 4 was also impleaded as a party and after hearing the parties, the order was passed on 05.01.2023, whereby, the parties were directed to maintain status quo over the land in question. 4 and being aggrieved the present applicant filed second appeal before the Board of Revenue, wherein, the opposite party no. 4 was also impleaded as a party and after hearing the parties, the order was passed on 05.01.2023, whereby, the parties were directed to maintain status quo over the land in question. The matter before the board of revenue is pending consideration and the interim order passed vide order dated 05.01.2023, is still operative. 6. In between the opposite party no. 4 instituted an application under section 145 of Cr.P.C., before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and considering the said application, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has passed the order and has attached the property vide order dated 11.07.2018. The applicants being aggrieved with the order dated 11.07.2018 filed the revision and the revisional court also upheld the order dated 11.7.2018 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. 7. Learned counsel for the applicants contends that the present applicants and the opposite party no. 5 are the co-sharers in property in question. The opposite party no. 5 sold out his share to the opposite party no. 4 by way of executing a registered sale deed and thereafter, the dispute in between the applicants and opposite party no. 4 arose. The matter goes to the Sub-Divisional Officer for partition, wherein, the interim order was passed and ultimately it was decided against the applicants and thereafter an appeal was filed which was also decided in favour of the opposite party nos. 4 and 5, ultimately, the second appeal has been instituted before the Board of Revenue, which is pending consideration and the interim order has been passed, thereby, directing the parties to maintain status quo, which is still running. 8. He further submits that from very beginning when the suit for partition was instituted before the Sub-Divisional Officer, the interim order was passed for maintaining status quo by the parties and time and again, when the matter went up to the appellate court, the interim order was granted while directing the parties to maintain status quo. Since, in the interregnum period, an application was moved by the opposite party no. 4 for attachment of the property and admitting the same, the property in question, which is also subject matter before the court of civil competence, i.e., Board of Revenue, was attached. 9. Since, in the interregnum period, an application was moved by the opposite party no. 4 for attachment of the property and admitting the same, the property in question, which is also subject matter before the court of civil competence, i.e., Board of Revenue, was attached. 9. He added that once a civil proceedings with respect to any land or property is pending before court of civil competence and there are some interim orders passed, no application under section 145 (1) of Cr.P.C. would be entertained. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant supported his contention while referring the judgment rendered in Mahant Ram Saran Dass V. Harish Mohan And Another reported in (2001) 10 SCC 758 and has referred paragraph 2. Paragraph 2 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereinunder:- "The short question that arises for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, a civil suit for declaration under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure being pending before the competent forum, the civil court, the respondent was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 145 CrPC, and the Magistrate was entitled to initiate the proceedings and pass any interim order of appointment of receiver therein. It is not disputed that in the civil suit itself the court has passed interim order of injunction, and put certain restrictions on the parties with regard to alienation of the property in question. It is true that the applicant before the Magistrate, has not been arrayed as party-defendant in the civil suit, but that will not alter the position in any manner since in our view the civil court being in seisin of the matter, any appropriate relief could be obtained from the civil court itself and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction in the case in hand to entertain the application under Section 145, and to pass any orders thereon. In the circumstances, the impugned order of the High Court as well as the proceedings initiated before the Magistrate under Section 145 CrPC stand set aside. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Needless to mention the status quo as of today to be maintained to enable the parties to move the civil court for appropriate orders." 11. In the circumstances, the impugned order of the High Court as well as the proceedings initiated before the Magistrate under Section 145 CrPC stand set aside. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Needless to mention the status quo as of today to be maintained to enable the parties to move the civil court for appropriate orders." 11. Further he has referred the judgment rendered in Mahar Jahan And Others v. State Of Delhi And Others reported in (2004) 13 SCC 421 and has referred paragraph 7 and 8 of the aforesaid judgment. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted hereinunder:- "7. We have simply noted the contentions raised by the parties. The civil court, in our opinion, would be the most appropriate forum to take care of such grievances and pass such interim order as would reasonably protect the interests of both the parties. The civil court may issue an ad interim injunction, may appoint a Commissioner or Receiver or may make any other interim arrangement as to possession or user of the property which is the subject-matter of proceedings in the civil court exercising the power conferred on it by Sections 94 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, the appeal is allowed. The proceedings under Section 145 CrPC are directed to be quashed. The parties may approach the civil court. We make it clear that looking to the relationship of the parties, the civil court shall feel free to make such ad interim order as it deems fit consistently with the facts and circumstances of the case without feeling embarrassed by the limited scope of the suit which is a suit for permanent injunction." 12. Placing reliance on the judgment of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant vs State Of U.P. And Ors. reported in (1985) 1 SCC 427 , he has referred paragraph 2 of the judgment. Paragraph 2 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereinunder:- "Challenge in this application is to the order of the Allahabad High Court refusing to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction against an order directing initiation of proceedings under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure ('Code for short), and attachment of the property at the instance of respondents 2-5. Paragraph 2 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereinunder:- "Challenge in this application is to the order of the Allahabad High Court refusing to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction against an order directing initiation of proceedings under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure ('Code for short), and attachment of the property at the instance of respondents 2-5. Indisputably, in respect of the very property there was a suit for possession and injunction being Title Suit No. 87 of 1975 filed in the Court of Civil Judge at Ballia wherein the question of title was gone into and by judgment dated February 28, 1981, the said suit was dismissed. The appellant was the defendant in that suit. According to the appellant close relations of respondents 2-5 were the plaintiffs and we gather from the counter-affidavit filed in this Court that an appeal has been carried from the decree of the Civil Judge and the same is still pending disposal before the appellate court. The assertion made in the petition for special leave to the effect that respondents 2 to 5 are close relations has not been seriously challenged in the counter-affidavit. When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 25 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil court, the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed. We accordingly allow the appeal and quash the order of the learned Magistrate by which the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code has been initiated and the property in dispute has been attached. We leave it open to either party to move the appellate Judge in the civil litigation for appropriate interim orders, if so advised, in the event of dispute relating to possession." 13. Further relying on the judgment of Ashok Kumar vs State Of Uttarakhand & Ors reported in (2013) 3 SCC 366 , has referred paragraphs 14 and 15. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the abovesaid judgment are quoted hereinunder:- "14. We find from this case there is nothing to show that an emergency exists so as to invoke Section 146(1) and to attach the property in question. A case of emergency, as per Section 146 of the Code has to be distinguished from a mere case of apprehension of breach of peace. When the reports indicate that one of the parties is in possession, rightly or wrongly, the Magistrate cannot pass an order of attachment on the ground of emergency. The order acknowledges the fact that Ashok Kumar has started construction in the property in question, therefore, possession of property is with the appellant -Ashok Kumar, whether it is legal or not, is not for the SDM to decide. 15. We also notice that the respondent herein has filed a civil suit for injunction before Civil Judge (J.D.) Haridwar on 02.09.2009 and an application for interim injunction is also pending, on which the civil court has issued only a notice. An Amin report was called for and Amin submitted its report on 21.11.2009. Civil suit was filed prior in point of time, it is for the civil court to decide as to who was in possession on the date of the filing of the suit. In any view, there is nothing to show that there was an emergency so as to invoke the powers under Section 146(1) to attach the property, specially, when the civil court is seized of the matter. In any view, there is nothing to show that there was an emergency so as to invoke the powers under Section 146(1) to attach the property, specially, when the civil court is seized of the matter. Under such circumstances, we are inclined to set aside the order passed by the SDM dated 25.11.2009 and the order of the High court dated 27.03.2012." 14. Referring the above said judgments, he submits that the case of the present applicants is squarely covered with the ratio of judgments aforesaid. Therefore, submission is that proceedings initiated under section 145 (1) of Cr.P.C. and the order passed while invoking the jurisdiction under section 146 of Cr.P.C., vitiate in the eyes of law and, thus, the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and by the revisional court, are unsustainable. 15. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no. 4 has vehemently opposed the contentions of learned counsel for the applicants. He submits that after the registered sale deed executed in favour of the opposite party no. 4, she inherits certain civil rights and once the applicants were started making disturbance in peaceful possession and there being apprehension of breach of peace, the opposite party no. 4 moved an application under section 145 (1) of Cr.P.C. He also added that the case of the applicants which were instituted before the Sub-Divisional Officer as well as the appellate authority were decided in favour of the opposite party no. 4 and 5, and now the matter is pending before the learned Board of Revenue and therefore, in case of apprehension of breach of peace, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has rightly passed the order and revisional court has rightly upheld the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. 16. After the aforesaid arguments, he submits that the first and foremost grievance of the opposite party no. 4 is that no one should alienate the property and make hindrance in a peaceful possession of the land in question or use thereof as was traditionally being done by the parties. He admitted that the Board of Revenue has passed the order while directing the parties on 05.01.2023, to maintain status-quo over the land in question and thus, his submission is that the parties may be directed to abide by the orders passed by the Board of revenue. 17. He admitted that the Board of Revenue has passed the order while directing the parties on 05.01.2023, to maintain status-quo over the land in question and thus, his submission is that the parties may be directed to abide by the orders passed by the Board of revenue. 17. Learned counsel appearing for the State has also supported the version of learned counsel for the opposite party no. 4 and contended that once an application was moved by opposite party no. 4 and the facts which were brought by her, that there is apprehension of breach of peace then, following the mandate of procedure, the report was called from the police and after receiving the report, the order was rightly passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. He added that once the matter went up to the revisional court, the revisional court in a very exhaustive manner decided the issue and has upheld the order passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Thus, submission is that there is no erroneousness or perversity in the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the revisional court. 18. Having heard learned counsels for the parties and after perusal of material placed on record, it emerges that at the very inception, the land in question was in the name of applicants and opposite party no. 5 and they were co-sharers in the property and once the property was sold out in favour of opposite party no. 4, by way of registered sale deed, the dispute arose with the apprehension that the applicants will make hindrance in the peaceful possession of opposite party no. 4. It is also a fact that suit for partition under section 116 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') was initially instituted by the applicants no. 1 and 3 before the Sub-Divisional Officer and the same decided in favour of the opposite party no. 4 and thereafter, the appeal was filed, that too was decided in favour of opposite party no. 4, though, the interim orders always were in existence to the effect that the parties shall maintain status-quo over the land in question. Now the matter is up to the stage of second appeal and is pending consideration before the Board of Revenue for hearing, wherein also, the interim order is continuing with the direction that the parties shall maintain status-quo. 19. Now the matter is up to the stage of second appeal and is pending consideration before the Board of Revenue for hearing, wherein also, the interim order is continuing with the direction that the parties shall maintain status-quo. 19. It is borne out from the arguments of learned counsel for the applicants that an application under section 145 (1) of Cr.P.C. was instituted and thereafter, the order was passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate invoking the jurisdiction under section 146 (1) of Cr.P.C. and the property in question was attached ignoring the fact that the case of partition suit and appeal was pending before the court of civil competence, the interim orders were running, whereby, the parties were directed to maintain status-quo, thus, moot question is that whether, while pendency of civil case and in existence of an interim order passed by the court of civil competence, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was empowered to pass any order, invoking it's jurisdiction under section 145 (1) and 146 (1) of Cr.P.C.? 20. It is trite law that if a civil dispute is pending before court of civil competence, with respect to any property, then there is no justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under section 145 of Cr.P.C. There is no doubt and dispute that the decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal courts. Further, in case of the civil proceedings pending and the order passed for maintaining status quo by the parties or any ad interim order is in existence, the jurisdiction under section 145 of Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked. 21. This Court is of considered opinion that the matter pertaining to the civil dispute can very well be dealt with, while exercising powers conferred on civil court under Sections 94 and 151 of C.P.C. The civil court is a proper forum to exhaust the civil grievances and for protecting the interest of the parties. For resolving the civil dispute, opening door for the criminal proceedings would not be justifiable as the same would lead not only multiplicity of the litigations but that would also amount to give colour of criminality to a civil dispute. 22. For resolving the civil dispute, opening door for the criminal proceedings would not be justifiable as the same would lead not only multiplicity of the litigations but that would also amount to give colour of criminality to a civil dispute. 22. It is also opinion of this Court that if the civil suit is pending between the parties and, prima facie, it seems that the dispute is civil in nature and no interim order is passed, even then the criminal proceedings under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C. cannot be permitted and in such event, civil court can exercise its power conferred under Sections 94 and 151 of C.P.C. 23. So far as the present case is concerned, the proceedings under section 145 (1) of Cr.P.C. was instituted during the pendency of the suit for division of holdings of the property in question, before the Sub-Divisional Officer and an interim order was passed with the direction to the parties to maintain status-quo over there. Further, the order for maintaining status quo was continuing in all the proceedings, pending before the trial court and the appellate court and now is also running in the second appeal pending before Board of Revenue. In such circumstances, the proceeding under section 145 (1) of Cr.P.C. is not maintainable. 24. Resultantly, the order dated 11.07.2018 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jamunaha dated, in Case No. T201808620302227 and order of the Revisional Court dated 05.08.2019, passed by Additional Sessions Judge/Fast Track-(II), Shravasti, are hereby set aside. 25. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the instant application is allowed. 26. Consequences shall be followed.