ORDER : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The petitioners are convicts and undergoing sentences for commission of offence in Central Jail, Bilaspur and they were admitted to the privilege of parole in accordance with the Chhattisgarh Prisoner’s Leave Rules, 1989 (for short “the Rules of 1989”) on 29.03.2020 and they were required to surrender on 22.04.2020, on completion of their period of parole, however, in the meanwhile, corona pandemic stepped in and the period of parole was extended by the order of this Court passed in W.P. (PIL) No.27/2020. During the extended period of parole, the respondent No.6 herein Keshav Prasad Rathor filed W.P.(CR) No.488/2020 before this Court seeking cancellation of parole granted to the petitioners herein, which petition was disposed off by this Court giving liberty to the said respondent to move an application for cancellation of parole before the concerned District Magistrate and the concerned District Magistrate was directed to consider the application in accordance with law by order dated 04.11.2020 and accordingly, the application for cancellation of parole was filed by the petitioner therein before the District Magistrate, Gourela-Pendra-Marwahi, respondent No.3 herein and by the impugned order dated 26.11.2020, the parole granted to the petitioners herein was cancelled and the petitioners were sent to Jail in accordance with Sections 31-A(8) and 31-E(2)(e) of the Prisoners Act, 1900 [as amended by the Prisoners (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1985]. 2. The aforesaid impugned order dated 26.11.2020 has been called in question in the instant writ petition and the respondent officers as well as private respondent both have filed returns opposing the writ petition to which the petitioners have also filed rejoinder. 3. Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that by the impugned order, the petitioners have been deprived of the benefit of privilege to be admitted on parole for the remaining period of sentence, which is punitive in nature, therefore, reasonable opportunity of hearing ought to have been granted to the petitioners and in that view of the matter, it is liable to be set aside. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. Afroz Khan, learned State counsel would submit that the petitioners have violated the conditions of order by which they were granted leave and therefore, Section 31-A(8) has rightly been exercised by the learned District Magistrate, which has been done after seeking report of the Superintendent of Police and concerned S.H.O. Pendra and statement of the respondent No.6 and other villagers have been recorded and thereafter the impugned order is strictly in accordance with law. 5. Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, learned counsel for the respondent No.6 would adopt the stand taken by the State/ respondents No.1 to 5. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 7. It is correct to say that the petitioners were admitted to the privilege of parole in accordance with the Rules of 1989 and they were required to surrender on 22.04.2020, but, in the meanwhile in view of Corona pandemic situation and pursuant to the order passed in W.P.(PIL) No.27/2020, their period of parole was extended from time to time and during the continuance of their parole, complaint was made by the respondent No.6 and in the writ petition filed before this Court, direction was made to the District Magistrate to look into the grievance of the respondent No.6 herein and in turn, the impugned order has been passed forfeiting their right to be enlarged on parole during remaining period of sentence, which has been challenged in this writ petition. 8. A careful perusal of the impugned order would show that two petitioners were found guilty of abusing the complainant/respondent No.6 and further found that the commission of cognizable offence is very likely and therefore in exercise of Section 31-A(8) and 31-E(2)(e) of the Prisoners Act, 1900 read with Rule 14 of the Rules of 1989, they were directed to be arrested and sent to jail and ultimately they have been sent to jail and they have been held to be not entitled for parole during their remaining period of sentence. 9. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 31-A(8) of the Prisoners Act, 1900 [as amended by the Prisoners (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1985]. 9. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 31-A(8) of the Prisoners Act, 1900 [as amended by the Prisoners (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1985]. “31-A. Grant of leave to Prisoners – (1) Subject to the provisions to this part and to such conditions as may be prescribed, the State Government or any authority to which the State Government may delegate its powers in this behalf may grant have to any prisoner who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than three years, for a period not exceeding twenty one days in a year, excluding the time required for journeys to the first place of his visit immediate after departure from the prison and from the place of last visit to the person back. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to a prisoner who has been classified as a habitual criminal for the purpose of the rules for the time being in force made under the prisons Act, 1894 (IX of 1894) and who has more than three previous convictions. (3) Leave shall not be admissible to a prisoner during a year under sub-section (1) – (i) for more than two occasions; (ii) for a period of less than ten days; and (iii) unless a period of three months has elapsed since the expiration of leave has availed of during the year and commencement of the leave applied for. (4) No prisoner shall be granted leave under subsection (1), unless,– (a) he has at the time of the grant of leave served one-half of his sentence including remission, or a period of not less than two years of his sentence, including remission, whichever is less; (b) he has not been punished for a prison offence under section 46 of the Prison Act, 1894 (IX of 1894) during twelve months preceding the date of commencement of the leave applied for. (5) The period of leave of a prisoner under subsection (1) shall count towards the total period of his sentence. (6) The authority directing the grant of leave to any prisoner under sub-section (1) may require him to enter into a bond with or without sureties for due observance of conditions specified in the direction. (5) The period of leave of a prisoner under subsection (1) shall count towards the total period of his sentence. (6) The authority directing the grant of leave to any prisoner under sub-section (1) may require him to enter into a bond with or without sureties for due observance of conditions specified in the direction. (7) If any prisoner granted leave under sub-section (1) fails to fulfill any of the conditions imposed upon him under the said sub-section or in the bond entered into by him, the bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any person bound thereby shall be liable to penalty thereof. (8) If a prisoner has violated the condition of leave or bond, he shall not be entitled to leave under subsection (1) during the remaining period of his sentence. 10. Section 31-A(8) of the Prisoners Act, 1900 (as amended by State of Madhya Pradesh by Act of 1985) is a penal provision and if the prisoner violates the conditions of leave or bond, the consequence that has to ensue is that the prisoner shall not be entitled to leave under sub-section (1) during the remaining period of his sentence. As such, it is a penal provision and that has to be construed strictly and therefore before invoking this provision, reasonable opportunity of being heard must be provided to the prisoner consistent with the principle of natural justice, as it will take away his privilege of leave, which he is otherwise entitled in accordance with Section 31-A of the Act of 1985 as well as, as per the Rules of 1989 as opportunity of hearing is implicit in Section 31-A(8) of the Act of 1985. 11. The Supreme Court (Constitution Bench) in the matter of Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494 has clearly held that prisoners are entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberties have been constitutionally curtailed. 12. 11. The Supreme Court (Constitution Bench) in the matter of Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494 has clearly held that prisoners are entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberties have been constitutionally curtailed. 12. The Madhya Pradesh High Court considered the issue of affording opportunity of hearing being given to the prisoner while forfeiting his earned remission in the matter of Anand Rao v. Inspector General of Prisons, Bhopal, 1982 MPLJ 73 (DB) and followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Sunil Batra (supra) and in paragraph 5 of the judgment, it has clearly been held that the prisoner is entitled to opportunity to explain his conduct and the material appearing against him in the enquiry before he is found guilty of a prison offence. The Division Bench speaking through G.P. Singh, C.J. pertinently observed as under :- “5. It is now well settled that there exists no iron curtain between the prisoners and the Constitution and that a prisoner is not denuded of his fundamental rights except to the extent lawful incarceration by its own compulsion has the effect of withdrawing or limiting these rights. So even a prisoner is entitled to the right guaranteed under Art. 21 that he shall not be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law and the law establishing the procedure must be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive (Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675 at pp. 1793, 1798)). Penalty of forfeiture of remission earned by a prisoner affects his right of personal liberty because that would result in continuing his incarceration for a longer time and would deprive him of the right of early release on the basis of remission. Procedure for imposition of the penalty of forfeiture must, therefore, meet the requirements of Art. 21 in that it must be just and fair and not arbitrary and oppressive. It is in this background that the procedure prescribed by R. 734 must be interpreted. Procedure for imposition of the penalty of forfeiture must, therefore, meet the requirements of Art. 21 in that it must be just and fair and not arbitrary and oppressive. It is in this background that the procedure prescribed by R. 734 must be interpreted. It must be taken to be implicit that the enquiry contemplated by the rule, subject to the requirements of prison security and discipline, must be consistent with the principles of natural justice and the prisoner concerned must be given opportunity to explain his conduct and the material appearing against him in the enquiry before he is found guilty of a prison offence. It will appear from the facts stated earlier that the petitioner at no stage was asked to explain his conduct or the material appearing against him in the enquiry. He was not heard at all before imposition of penalty. This lends a serious infirmity to the impugned order.” 13. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the principle of law laid down by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Anand Rao (supra), it is quite vivid that the petitioners have been found guilty of abusing the complainant/ respondent No.6 and further found the commission of cognizable offence is very likely and the penalty under Section 31-A(8) of not granting parole for the remaining period of sentence has been imposed upon the petitioners but they have not been afforded reasonable opportunity of hearing before imposing penalty under Section 31-A(8) of the Act of 1985, otherwise they could have explained their conduct and taken a stand that they have not abused the complainant and on account of previous dispute and enmity, false complaint has been made and therefore reasonable opportunity of hearing ought to have been given to the petitioners before passing the impugned order, which was absolutely necessary for coming to a right conclusion. 14. 14. However, from the careful perusal of the return, it is quite vivid that only statement of respondent No.6 and other family members were taken and the report from the Superintendent of Police, District Gaurela-Pendra-Marwahi and concerned Station House Officer have been requisitioned, which they have adversely reported the matter against the petitioners, but nowhere it appears from the return that copy of such reports have been supplied to the petitioners before taking final decision in the matter and as such, unilaterally the impugned decision has been taken by the learned District Magistrate. Therefore, the impugned order dated 26.11.2020 (Annexure P-1) is in violation of principles of natural justice and also in teeth of judgment rendered by Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Anand Rao (supra). Consequently, the impugned order dated 26.11.2020 (Annexure P-1) deserves to be and is accordingly quashed. Since the petitioners have already availed their period of parole granted by order dated 29.03.2020, no further order is required. However, the petitioners will be at liberty to avail the leave in future in accordance with the Rules of 1989. 15. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. No order as to cost(s).