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2023 DIGILAW 177 (GUJ)

STATE OF GUJARAT v. VIJAYBHAI KASTHURBHAI RATHOD

2023-01-20

A.S.SUPEHIA

body2023
JUDGMENT : A.S. SUPEHIA, J. 1. In the present writ petition, the petitioner-State has assailed the order dated 31.08.2005 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (GRT/Tribunal) in Review Application No. TEN.C.A.17/2004, wherein and whereby the Tribunal has allowed the review application filed by the private respondent No. 1 and has set aside the order dated 21.09.1999 passed by the Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN.B.A.100/1997 and accordingly, has restored the order dated 16.01.1997 passed by the Deputy Collector (L.R.) Vadodara in Tenancy Revision Case No. 68 of 1996 and has declared that the respondent No. 2 is not a tenant of the suit land. FACTS: 2. The agricultural land bearing Revenue Survey No. 373/A situated at Village Savad, Taluka-Dist. Vadodara belonged to respondent No. 3-Education Trust. In the year 1985, the respondent No. 2 filed Tenancy Case No. 68 of 1985 before the Mamlatdar and ALT, Vadodara under Section 70-B of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short “the Tenancy Act”). After holding inquiry, the Mamlatdar and ALT, Vadodara declared the respondent No. 2 as the tenant of the suit property vide order dated 01.03.1996. 2.1 The order passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT, Vadodara was taken into suo motu revision by the Deputy Collector (L.R.) in Tenancy Revision Case No. 68 of 1996. After hearing the parties, the District Collector (L.R.) vide order dated 16.01.1997 quashed and set aside the order passed by the Mamlatdar, Vadodara. 2.2 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order dated 16.01.1997 passed by the Deputy Collector (L.R.) in Tenancy Revision Case No. 68 of 1996, the respondent No. 2 filed revision application before the GRT being Revision Application No. TEN.B.A.100 of 1997, which was allowed by holding that the respondent No. 2 is the tenant of the suit property. 2.3 In the meantime, the respondent No. 1 instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 121 of 2003 in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.) for declaration of his ownership over the suit land. The said suit was decreed in favour of the respondent No. 1 vide judgment and decree dated 05.04.2003. Pursuant to the said decree, Entry No. 3388 has been affected in the revenue record in favour of respondent No. 1. The said suit was decreed in favour of the respondent No. 1 vide judgment and decree dated 05.04.2003. Pursuant to the said decree, Entry No. 3388 has been affected in the revenue record in favour of respondent No. 1. When the petitioner-State came to know about the judgment and decree dated 05.04.2003, it instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 563 of 2004, inter alia, seeking a declaration that the judgment and decree dated 05.04.2003 is nullity and the same is not binding. 2.4 In the year 2004, the respondent No. 1 filed Review Application No. TEN.C.A.17 of 2004 before the GRT and contended that he is the owner of the suit property in view of the decree passed by the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.) in Regular Civil Suit No. 121 of 2003 and he came to know about the tenancy proceedings in the year 2004. The GRT, after hearing the parties, vide order dated 31.08.2005 allowed the review application filed by respondent No. 1 and quashed and set aside the order passed by the GRT in Revision Application No. TEN.B.A.100 of 1997 dated 21.09.1999 and restored the order passed by the Deputy Collector (L.R.) Vadodara in Tenancy Revision Case No. 68 of 1996 dated 16.01.1997 and declared that respondent No. 2 is not the tenant of the suit land on the ground that Section 70-B of the Tenancy Act is not applicable to the property belonging to an education trust. 2.5 Thereafter, the respondent no. 1 filed an application below Exh.29 in Regular Civil Suit No. 563 of 2004 for dismissing the said suit on the basis of the order dated 31.08.2005 passed by the GRT in Review Application No. TEN.C.A.17 of 2004. Civil Judge, after hearing the parties, rejected the plaint in view of the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 vide judgment and decree dated 05.04.2006. 2.6 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and decree dated 05.04.2006, the petitioner-State filed writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 16877 of 2007 before this Court, which came to be disposed of vide order dated 12.07.2007 as withdrawn with a liberty to prefer an appeal against the said judgment and decree. Thereafter, the State authority has filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2017 which is pending before the District and Session Court Vadodara. SUBMISSIONS OF STATE 3. Learned AGP Mr. Thereafter, the State authority has filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2017 which is pending before the District and Session Court Vadodara. SUBMISSIONS OF STATE 3. Learned AGP Mr. Kanara appearing for the petitioner-State has submitted that the Tribunal has committed a grave error in entertaining the review application, after a period of 04 years and such review application could not have been entertained at the behest of the private respondent, who was not a party to the original proceedings. It is submitted that the respondent No. 1 has filed the review application in the year 2004 against the order passed by the Tribunal dated 21.09.1999, which was not required to be entertained in view of the provisions of Section 17 of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 (for short “the Tribunal Act”) read with Section 76 of the Tenancy Act since the same is not maintainable. It is further submitted that the State Government will loose huge amount of revenue in the form of premium, if the impugned order dated 31.08.2005 passed by the Tribunal is not set aside and hence, the writ petition was filed. 3.1 In support of his submissions, learned AGP has placed reliance on the judgments and orders of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Revandas Ranchhodbhai Rathod vs. Jyotiben Wd/o Rameshbhai Madhusudan Thakar, 2011 (3) GLH 1 and in the case of Khodaji Vihaji Thakor vs. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, Ahmedabad, AIR 2021 CC 2528. It is further submitted that so far as Regular Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2017 is concerned, the same is still pending before the Court of District and Sessions Court, Vadodara. Thus, it is submitted that the impugned order may be set aside. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS: 4. A fortiori, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Anshin Desai with learned advocate Mr. Chudasama appearing for the respondent No. 1 at the outset has submitted that the writ petition may not be entertained since the same is filed after a period of four years from the date of passing the impunged order. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Postmaster General and Others vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 563 . In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Postmaster General and Others vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 563 . 4.1 It is contended that the impugned order does not require any interference since the Tribunal, while allowing the review application filed by the private respondent No. 1, has precisely observed that the order passed by the Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN.B.A.100/1997 was required to be quashed and recalled since the respondent No. 1 had instituted Regular civil Suit No. 121 of 2003 in the Court of Civil Judge for declaration of his ownership and, the suit was decreed in his favour declaring him the owner of the suit land and pursuant to the decree, Entry No. 3388 was mutated and certified in the revenue records. It is submitted that when the respondent No. 1 came to know about tenancy proceedings in the year of 2004, with the prayer of condonation of delay, has preferred the Review Application No. TEN.C.A.17/2004 before the Tribunal. 4.2 Learned Senior Advocate has submitted that the Tribunal, after considering the earlier order, has precisely held that the provisions of Section 17-B of the Tenancy Act will not be applicable to the land in question and the Deputy Collector was right in rejecting the claim of tenancy of the respondent No. 1 as a tenant. It is submitted that in the earlier order dated 21.09.1999, which was passed in the revision application since the Tribunal has not considered the aforesaid aspect and subsequently when the respondent No. 1 realized that error has been committed and review application has been filed, the same is precisely allowed by the impugned order. He has further submitted that ultimately, the State Government is only aggrieved with nonpayment of premium however, the private respondents are ready and willing to pay the same. It is submitted that admittedly Regular Civil Suit No. 121 of 2003 has been decreed in favour of the respondent No. 1 and an Entry No. 3388 has been mutated and certified in the revenue records of the land in question. It is submitted that admittedly Regular Civil Suit No. 121 of 2003 has been decreed in favour of the respondent No. 1 and an Entry No. 3388 has been mutated and certified in the revenue records of the land in question. It is submitted that the respondents have throughout succeeded before the Civil Court as well as before this Court and Regular Civil Suit No. 563 of 2004, which was instituted by the State, was not entertained and the plaint was rejected by the order dated 05.04.2006. 4.3 Learned senior advocate Mr. Desai has finally urged that in case, this Court is inclined to set aside the order passed by the Tribunal, liberty may be reserved in favour of the respondents to approach the State authorities for paying necessary premium. It is also submitted that liberty may also be reserved in favour of the private respondents to challenge the earlier order passed by the Tribunal before any forum. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Majmudar appearing for the respondent No. 4, who is a subsequent purchaser of the land in question, while supporting the submissions advanced by learned senior advocate Mr. Desai, has primarily raised objection on the ground of delay in filing the present writ petition challenging the impugned order of the Tribunal, which was passed in the year 2005. It is submitted that initially the order dated 21.09.1999, which was passed by the Tribunal was premised on totally wrong and incorrect assumption that the land in question belongs to the Educational Trust and the proceedings under Section 17-B of the Tribunal Act is not maintainable. It is submitted that the respondent No. 1 is declared as the owner of the land in question by the competent Civil Court vide judgment and decree dated 05.04.2003 passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 121 of 2003 and the said decree is not set aside. He has submitted that as on today, any interference with the present order passed by the Tribunal would disturb the settled position. He has further submitted that by setting aside the aforesaid order, resultant effect would be that the order dated 21.09.1999 passed by the Tribunal will get revived. It is submitted that the State has no locus to challenge the aforesaid order before this Court by filing the writ petition. He has further submitted that by setting aside the aforesaid order, resultant effect would be that the order dated 21.09.1999 passed by the Tribunal will get revived. It is submitted that the State has no locus to challenge the aforesaid order before this Court by filing the writ petition. It is also submitted that the State cannot press for collecting the premium for the purpose of establishing the locus. It is submitted that the aforesaid order dated 16.01.1997 was actually challenged by the respondent no. 2-tenant and therefore, also when he is not opposing the claim of the private respondents herein, the petitioner-State cannot have any locus to challenge the same. 5.1 Learned advocate Mr. Majmudar has further submitted that as per the provisions of Section 17 of the Tribunal Act, the Tribunal can pass order on the application filed for reviewing its own decision for any other sufficient reason and hence, the decree, which was passed in favour of the respondent No. 1 in the suit being Regular Civil Suit No. 121 of 2003 can be said to be a sufficient reason, which would empower the Tribunal to exercise the power under review and set aside the order passed by the Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN.B.A.100/1997. It is submitted that the respondent no. 4 has purchased the land in question vide registered sale deed dated 17.03.2008, at the relevant time when the respondent no. 1 was holding a decree dated 05.04.2003 in his favour, which has attained finality. 5.2 In support of his submissions, learned advocate Mr. Majmudar has placed reliance on the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Balubha Mohabatsinh vs. State of Gujarat and Others, 1996 (2) GLH 1005 . He has also placed reliance on the judgment dated 29.06.2018 passed in Special Civil Application No. 9067 of 1999. It is submitted that since the petitioner-State has already accepted the earlier order, which was passed by the Tribunal, the present writ petition could not have been filed challenging the impugned order. Thus, it is urged that the writ petition may not be entertained. CONCLUSION: 6. It is submitted that since the petitioner-State has already accepted the earlier order, which was passed by the Tribunal, the present writ petition could not have been filed challenging the impugned order. Thus, it is urged that the writ petition may not be entertained. CONCLUSION: 6. There are two prime issues which fall for deliberation in the present writ petitions which are as under: (a) whether the Tribunal could have exercised its powers of review by invoking the provisions of Section 17 of the Tribunal Act for setting aside its own order, after a period of 4 years and that too on an application filed by third party on the basis of subsequent event of filing a civil suit and obtaining a decree and judgment in his favour. (b) maintainability of the review application filed under section 17 of the Tribunal Act read with section 76 of the Tenancy Act. FIRST ISSUE: 7. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the provisions of Section 17 of the Tribunal Act, which reads as under: “SECTION 17: Review of orders of Tribunal (1) The Tribunal may, either on its own motion or on the application of any party interested, and where the State Government is heard under section 15 on the application by that Government, review its own decision or order in any case and pass in reference thereto such order as it thinks just and proper: Provided that no such application made by any party shall be entertained, unless the Tribunal is satisfied that there has been the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of such party or could not be produced by him at the time when its decision was made, or that there has been some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason: Provided further, that no such decision or order shall be varied or revised, unless notice has been given to the parties interested to appear and be heard in support of such order. (2) An application for review under sub-section (1) by any party or, as the case may be, by the State Government shall be made within 90 days from the date of the decision or order of the Tribunal: Provided that in computing the period of limitation, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, (IX of 1908), applicable to applications for review of a judgment or order of a Civil Court shall, so far as may be, apply to applications for review under this section.” 7.1 The aforenoted provision of Section 17 of the Tribunal Act mandates that the Tribunal on its own motion or on the application of any party interested and where the State Government is heard under Section 15 on the application by that Government can review its own decision or order in any case and pass in reference thereto such order as it thinks just and proper. 7.2 The Proviso of Section 17 of the Tribunal Act restricts entertaining of application seeking review. It stipulates that such application can be entertained only if the Tribunal is satisfied that there has been ‘discovery of new and important matter’ or ‘evidence’ which, after exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of such party or could not be produced by him at the time when the decision was made or there has been some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. 7.3 Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 of the Tribunal Act provides for limitation of 90 days in filing the review application. 7.4 Thus, the parameters, which are required to be kept in mind, while entertaining the review application by the Tribunal are that (a) discovery of new and important matter or evidence, which was not within knowledge of such party; or (b) such evidence could not be produced at the time when the decision was made; or (c) there has been some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and lastly; (d) for any other sufficient reason. 7.5 In the present case, the order, which was under review was passed on 21.09.1999 in Revision Application No. TEN.B.A.100/1997. The review application has been filed in the year 2004 i.e. after a period of almost 5 years by the respondent No. 1, who was not a party to the original proceedings before the Tribunal. 7.5 In the present case, the order, which was under review was passed on 21.09.1999 in Revision Application No. TEN.B.A.100/1997. The review application has been filed in the year 2004 i.e. after a period of almost 5 years by the respondent No. 1, who was not a party to the original proceedings before the Tribunal. The review application was filed solely on the ground of subsequent event i.e. on passing judgment and decree dated 05.04.2003 in his favour in Regular Civil Suit No. 121 of 2003. Thus, it cannot be said that there was discovery of new and important matter or evidence, which, after exercise of due diligence, was not in knowledge of “such party” or could not be produced at the time when the decision was made. “Such Party” would mean the party to the proceedings and the respondent No. 1 was not a party to the Revision Application No. 100 of 1997. 7.6 It also cannot be held that there has been some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or there was any other sufficient reason in filing the review application, after a period of 5 years. The only reason which has weighed on the Tribunal is of passing of the judgment and decree dated in favour of the respondent No. 1 in Regular Civil Suit No. 121 of 2003, which was an event which has occurred subsequently to the decision of the Tribunal dated 21.09.1999. It is pertinent to note that in the Revision Application No. TEN.B.A.100/1997, which was disposed of by the Tribunal vide order dated 21.09.1999, the respondent No. 1 was not a party to the proceedings. He was neither the applicant nor the respondent. Despite the aforesaid fact, the Tribunal has entertained his review application, after delay of 5 years by exercising its powers under Section 17 of the Tribunal Act. If such an approach of the Tribunal is allowed to be maintained, the same will set a dangerous precedent, since any party will seek a review of an order of a judgment which has become final, on a subsequent happening of passing any order, judgment/decree passed in other proceedings which was not in existence at the time of passing such order or judgment. When the tribunal has passed the order dated 21.09.1999, Regular Civil Suit No. 121 of 2003 was not in existence. When the tribunal has passed the order dated 21.09.1999, Regular Civil Suit No. 121 of 2003 was not in existence. The sole reason and cause for filing an application by the respondent no. 1 stems out of the judgment and decree dated 05.04.2003, from a suit instituted in the year 2003. It is also pertinent to note that the State was not made a party to the suit. The respondent no. 1 did not take any leave to challenge the order dated 21.09.1999 before any forum. Thus, in these circumstances, the review application itself was not maintainable at the behest of respondent no. 1, in wake of the fact that he was not a party to the original proceedings before the Tribunal. SECOND ISSUE: 8. There is yet another aspect which requires deliberation i.e. the maintainability of the review application filed under section 17 of the Tribunal Act read with section 76 of the Tenancy Act. 9. The review application has been filed under Section 17 of the Tribunal act and the original order, which was sought to be reviewed and the proceedings, which are restored from the Mamlatdar and ALT and also before the Deputy Collector, being Tenancy Revision Case No. 68 of 1996 emanate from the Tenancy Act. The entire case of the respondent No. 1 and the private respondent-Trust is premised on the provisions of the Tenancy Act. The Tribunal has also noted the aforesaid facts and the concerned provisions of the Tenancy Act. 10. It is also not in dispute that in the initial order dated 16.01.1997 passed by the Deputy Collector (L.R.) Vadodara in Tenancy Revision Case No. 68 of 1996, the Deputy Collector had exercised its power under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. The power of revision under the Tenancy Act is conferred below Section 76 of the Tenancy Act, which reads as under: “SECTION 76: Revision (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Revenue Revision Tribunal Act, 1957 (Bom. XXXI of 1958) an application for revision may be made to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the said Act against any order of the Collector except an order under section 32P or an order in appeal against an order under sub-section (4) of section 32G on the following grounds, only: (a) that the order of the Collector was contrary to law. (b) that the Collector failed to determine some material issue of law. (c) that there was a substantial defact in following the procedure provided by this Act or that there has been failure to take evidence or error in appreciating important evidence which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice. (2) in deciding applications under this section the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal shall follow the procedure which may be prescribed by rules made under this Act after consultation with the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal.” 10.1 Section 76 of the Tenancy Act provides for an application seeking revision to be filed before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Tribunal Act. The entire Act is absolutely silent conferring the powers of “review.” 10.2 In the present case, the Tribunal has entertained the review application, which is directly connected to the provision of the Tenancy Act. 11. At this stage, it would be apposite to the refer to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Khodaji Vihaji Thakor (supra), wherein, after undertaking necessary analysis of both the provisions i.e. Section 76 of the Tenancy Act as well as Section 17 of the Tribunal Act, the Division Bench has held thus: “9. This Court has taken the view that the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal exercising the powers of revision under Section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,1948 does not have the power of reviewing its own decision on the basis of any statutory provisions contained in the said Act or in the Bombay Land Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957. The tribunal does not have the inherent power of substantial review. 10. *** *** *** 11. *** *** *** 12. *** *** *** 13. *** *** *** 14. In such circumstances referred to above, we are of the view that if the review application itself cannot be said to be maintainable in law as the tribunal has no jurisdiction to undertake substantive review of its orders then the tribunal cannot be said to have jurisdiction even to pass an interim order pending the final disposal of the review application. We wonder whether this point was taken up before the learned single judge or not because we don't find any discussion in this regard in the impugned order passed by the learned single judge. We wonder whether this point was taken up before the learned single judge or not because we don't find any discussion in this regard in the impugned order passed by the learned single judge. However, the position of law being clear, we are of the view that the interim order of tribunal not being sustainable in law, the learned single judge ought not have declined to entertain the writ application and should have quashed the same.” 12. The aforesaid decision is followed again by the Division Bench in the case of Revandas Ranchhodbhai Rathod (supra), which is incorporated as under: “11. Now, so far as the above referred judgment is concerned, the ratio of the same makes it abundantly cleat that Gujarat Revenue Tribunal exercising the powers of revision under Section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 does not have the power of reviewing its own decision on the basis of any statutory provision contained in the said Act or in the Bombay Land Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, but the Tribunal does have inherent power of procedural review. We are in complete agreement with the principle laid down in the aforesaid judgment referred to above of this Court. 21. What can be deduced from catena of case law referred to above, that though Gujarat Revenue Tribunal may not be empowered to undertake substantive review on merits, in exercise of power under Section 17 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, nut, in cases of fraud, no Tribunal can be regarded as powerless to review/recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim. Therefore, as observed earlier in the judgment we have no doubt that the remedy to move for recalling/review of the order on the basis of the newly discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree cannot be foreclosed in such a situation.” 13. Thus, there is a consistent view of the Division Bench that “the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal exercising the powers of revision under Section 76 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 does not have the power of reviewing its own decision on the basis of any statutory provisions contained in the said Act or in the Bombay Land Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957. The Tribunal does not have the inherent power of substantial review.” The Division Bench has held that the power of review can be exercised in a very limited scope i.e. if the order is obtained through any fraud or misrepresentation or is premised on procedural defect. The Division Bench thus, has only confined the exercise of all the powers of review by the Tribunal under Section 17 of the Tribunal Act read with powers of revision under Section 76 of the Tenancy Act only with aspect to the “procedural review” and not a “substantive review.” It is also observed that when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justiciae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power is inherent in every Court or Tribunal. The respondent no. 1 did not seek review on any procedural defect, but sought the review of the order of the Tribunal on merits by raising substantial grounds. THE ASPECT OF DELAY: 14. With regard to delay in filing the present writ petition, the petitioner-State has explained the same by stating that the case papers were moved at different levels and the process commenced, after the order was passed by this Court dated 12.07.2007 in Special Civil Application No. 16877 of 2007 since related proceedings were pending before one or other Court. It is further mentioned that on 09.08.2009, the District Collector, Vadodara instructed the Mamlatdar and ALT, Vadodara to get the opinion from the Office of the Government Pleaders against the order dated 31.08.2005 and after seeking advice from the Revenue Department, on 24.09.2007, District Collector, Vadodara sent a detailed letter to the Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department and opined for filing the writ petition against the order dated 31.08.2005. Further correspondences are also referred in the writ petition in paragraph No. 3 and ultimately, after instructions of the Revenue Department and Legal Department, the present writ petition has been filed in the year 2009. Thus, looking to the explanation of delay and, it cannot be said the same is not effectively explained. 15. Further correspondences are also referred in the writ petition in paragraph No. 3 and ultimately, after instructions of the Revenue Department and Legal Department, the present writ petition has been filed in the year 2009. Thus, looking to the explanation of delay and, it cannot be said the same is not effectively explained. 15. Even if the aforementioned aspects explaining delay are ignored, in the present case, indubitably, the Tribunal, on a review application filed by the respondent No. 1, who was not a party to the original proceedings, has set aside its own order dated 21.09.1999 i.e. after a period of 5 years, while exercising its power under Section 17 of the Tribunal Act. The same respondent is opposing the filing of the present writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India on the ground of delay after the matter was admitted in the year 2009, and interim relief against the implementation of the impugned order is in operation since then. In the instant case, it is apparent that the Tribunal has grossly overstepped its jurisdiction by entertaining the review application, which was not maintainable under the law. The impugned order is absolute null and void, hence even it is assumed that the present writ petition is filed after a delay of four years, the aspect of delay cannot restrict the exercise of inherent power conferred to the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in setting aside a null and void order that too in wake of the fact that the writ petition has been admitted in the year 2009. The order sheets do not reflect that the contention of delay was left open at any point of time. It is well settled proposition of law that the issue with regard to challenging a void order passed in ignorance of statute can be raised at any time. The State, being the party to the proceedings before the Tribunal, cannot be a mute spectator to the illegality committed by it in entertaining the review application de hors the provision of statute. The State, being the party to the proceedings before the Tribunal, cannot be a mute spectator to the illegality committed by it in entertaining the review application de hors the provision of statute. The State has both the locus and the authority to challenge an illegal and void order even if the private respondents inter se have no dispute, since if such an order is allowed to be sustained, the same will have a direct impact on the well settled proposition of law, and in all probabilities such an order will be cited as a precedent. 16. It is contended by the private respondent no. 4, who is the subsequent purchaser that setting aside of the impugned order will revive the earlier order dated 21.09.1999 passed by the Tribunal, which is an illegal order, hence the writ petition may not be entertained. The respondent no. 2 had filed Revision Application No. TEN.B.A.100/1997 under Section 76 of the Tenancy Act before the Tribunal challenging the order dated 16.01.1997 passed by the Deputy Collector, which has been set aside by the Tribunal vide order dated 21.09.1999. The said contention, though appears to be attractive, does not merit acceptance, since the order dated 21.09.1999, was not challenged by and was accepted by the respective parties. It is only, the respondent no. 1, who was not a party to the proceedings has belatedly challenged after 5 years. Neither the respondent no. 1 nor the respondent no. 4 were the parties to the proceedings in Revision Application No. TEN.B.A.100/1997, hence they are estopped in questioning the legality and validity of the order dated 21.09.1999. Thus, the core issue is connected with the illegal action of the Tribunal in entertaining the review application filed by the respondent no. 1, which was not maintainable. This Court cannot delve into the legality of the order dated 21.09.1999 at this stage that too in a writ petition filed by the State-authority in wake of the fact that neither of the parties have questioned its correctness before any forum. Hence, the submission in this regard raised by the respondent no. 4 deserves to be rejected. 17. This Court cannot delve into the legality of the order dated 21.09.1999 at this stage that too in a writ petition filed by the State-authority in wake of the fact that neither of the parties have questioned its correctness before any forum. Hence, the submission in this regard raised by the respondent no. 4 deserves to be rejected. 17. There cannot be any cavil on the proposition of law as enunciated in the decisions on which the reliance is placed by the respective respondents, however, the ratio as well as the law enunciated in the respective decisions will not apply to the facts of the present case. None of the decision deal with the issue of exercise of powers by the Tribunal under the provisions of Section 17 of the Tribunal Act read with Section 76 of the Tenancy Act, which has been already given quietus by the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court. 18. The conspectus of the aforementioned analysis is that the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is required to be quashed and set aside on two counts as mentioned as below: (a) The Tribunal could not have exercised its power of Review under section 17 of the Tribunal Act after a period of 5 years on an application filed by a third party that too on the foundation of judgment and decree arising from the subsequent Civil suit proceedings, which were not in existence at the time when the proceedings before the Tribunal were already disposed and had attained finality. (b) The Tribunal does not have the power to review its order under section 17 of the Tribunal Act read with the provision of section 76 of the Tenancy Act which only prescribes the exercise of “revisional” powers and not the power of “review” unless the order of which the review is sought is obtained by fraud or misrepresentation or suffers from a procedural defect or an inherent error, which was not the case of the respondent no. 1. 19. Hence, the writ petition succeeds. The impugned order dated 31.08.2005 passed in Review Application No. TEN.C.A.17 of 2004 by the GRT is hereby quashed and set aside however, it is clarified that rights and contentions of both the respective parties are kept open. 1. 19. Hence, the writ petition succeeds. The impugned order dated 31.08.2005 passed in Review Application No. TEN.C.A.17 of 2004 by the GRT is hereby quashed and set aside however, it is clarified that rights and contentions of both the respective parties are kept open. It will be open for the parties to take all the available contentions in Regular Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2017, which is pending. It is further clarified that it will be open for the private respondents to take or agitate the issue with regard to locus of the State authorities and can also make their submissions with regard to the cause of action. 20. As referred in the writ petition as well as the connected civil application being Civil Application No. 5332 of 2013, it will be open for any of the private respondents to approach the State authorities for payment of premium. The respondent authorities are directed to pass appropriate order in accordance with law on the application made for the payment of premium preferably within a period of eight weeks. 21. The present writ petition succeeds and stands allowed. RULE made absolute. 22. As a sequel, the connected civil application also stands disposed of.