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2023 DIGILAW 177 (TS)

Gopularam Mallesh v. B. Jalaja Rani

2023-02-28

A.SANTHOSH REDDY

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. The present appeal, under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “C.P.C.”), is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 23.06.2016 in A.S.No.7 of 2015 on the file of the Judge, Family Court-cum-VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Medak District at Sangareddy, wherein and whereunder, the said appeal was allowed, while setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Sanga Reddy in O.S.No.15 of 2008. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter referred to as they were arrayed in the original suit. 3. The case of the plaintiff is, briefly, stated as under : The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants for perpetual Injunction restraining them from causing interference into her peaceful possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property i.e. Plot No.61 in Sy.No.168/Part, admeasuring 500 square yards respectively, situated at Kollur Village, Ramachandrapuram Mandal, Medak District (hereinafter referred to as “suit schedule property”). 4. According to the plaintiff, the suit schedule property was purchased by her from its original owner by name Gopularam Chinnna Lachaiah through his G.P.A. holder G.Jitender Reddy on 06.06.1987 under registered sale deed vide doc.No.4692/1987. Since then, she has been in possession and enjoyment of the same. During the third week of January, 2009, when the plaintiff started digging trenches by engaging labour to construct a compound wall to the suit schedule property, the defendants, without having any manner of right, tried to interfere with her peaceful possession and enjoyment over the same. Hence, the present suit. 5. The defendants filed written statement inter alia contending that Sy.No.168 consists of large extent of land and there are so many share holders in it. Originally, the grandfather of the defendants by name Chakali Pedda Veeraiah was the owner, pattedar and possessor of the land in Sy.No.168. After his death, the land was partitioned in between the family members including the father of defendant Nos.1 to 3 and husband of defendant No.4. In the said partition, the father of defendant Nos.1 to 3 and husband of defendant No.4 by name Lachaiah got an extent of Ac.1-15 guntas in Sy.No.168, which was denoted as Sy.No.168/E1 and he was in possession and enjoyment till his death. In the said partition, the father of defendant Nos.1 to 3 and husband of defendant No.4 by name Lachaiah got an extent of Ac.1-15 guntas in Sy.No.168, which was denoted as Sy.No.168/E1 and he was in possession and enjoyment till his death. After his death, having inherited, the defendants are in possession of Ac.1-15 guntas and the said land was mutated in the name of defendant No.4 in the revenue records and she was issued pattadar passbook and title deed. 6. It is also stated that father of defendant Nos.1 to 3 and husband of defendant No.4 never appointed any person as G.P.A holder in respect of land fell to his share and he was personally cultivating the same till his death. There are no plots existing in Sy.No.168/E1 as alleged by the plaintiff, since it is an agricultural land and under cultivation of the defendants. The alleged G.P.A. is created for the purpose of this case by the plaintiff. The plaintiff in collusion with the enemies of the defendants filed false suit with wrong boundaries. There is no cause of action to file the suit. Hence, prayed to dismiss the suit. 7. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Sanga Reddy, basing on the aforesaid pleadings, settled the following issues for trial: “i) Whether the plaintiff is in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit property as absolute owner? ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief prayed for? iii) To what relief? The following Additional issue was also framed: 1. Whether the suit schedule plot cannot be identified on the ground, as contended by defendant in his additional written statement? 8. To substantiate their respective cases, the plaintiff, besides examining herself as PW.1, also examined PWs.2, 4 and 5 on her behalf and got marked Exs.A1 to A.18. Mainly, Ex.A.1 is original sale deed dated 06.06.1987, Ex.A.2 is certified copy of GPA document, Exs.A.3 to A-7 are certified copy of pahanies for the years from 1985-86 to 1989-90 respectively. 9. On behalf of the defendants, the first defendant was examined himself as DW.1 and also examined DWs.2 and 3 on their behalf and got marked Exs.B.1 to B.25. Ex.B.1 is the certified copy of Khasra pahani for the year 1954-55. Exs.B.2 to 9 are certified copy of pahani for the years from 1982-83 to 1990-91. 9. On behalf of the defendants, the first defendant was examined himself as DW.1 and also examined DWs.2 and 3 on their behalf and got marked Exs.B.1 to B.25. Ex.B.1 is the certified copy of Khasra pahani for the year 1954-55. Exs.B.2 to 9 are certified copy of pahani for the years from 1982-83 to 1990-91. Ex.B.10 is the certified copy of pahani for the year 1991-92 and Exs.B.11 to B.21 are the certified copies of pahanies for the year 1991-92 to 20052006 respectively. Ex.B.22 is the certified copy of pahani of 1420 Fasli. Ex.B.23 is the certified copy of pahani of 1420 Fasli of Sathaiah, Ex.B.24 is the pattadar passbook of Anthamma and Ex.B.25 is the title deed of Anthamma. 10. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, elaborately dealt with the documentary evidence and the oral evidence let in by the parties, respectively on issue Nos.1 and 2 and on additional issue held that the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of the suit schedule plot, her purchase and possession over the same as on the date of filing of the suit and held that she is not entitled for perpetual Injunction and held issue Nos.1 and 2 and additional issue against the plaintiff. On issue No.3, in view of the findings given on issue Nos.1 and 2 and on additional issue, held that the suit was dismissed. 11. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S.No.7 of 2015 before the Judge, Family Court-cum-VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Medak at Sanga Reddy. The learned appellate Court, having elaborated the pleadings once again, the issues and the findings recorded by the trial Court, formulated the following points for consideration: 1. Whether the plaintiff purchased the schedule property under a registered sale deed with document No.4692/1987, dated 06.06.1987 executed by Jitender Reddy being General Power of Attorney Holder of Gopularam Chinna Lachaiah? 2) Whether the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property as on the date of the suit being purchaser? 12. On re-appreciation of the material evidence, oral and documentary, the appellate Court allowed the appeal vide judgment and decree, dated 23.06.2016 setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied thereby, the present second appeal is preferred. 13. 12. On re-appreciation of the material evidence, oral and documentary, the appellate Court allowed the appeal vide judgment and decree, dated 23.06.2016 setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied thereby, the present second appeal is preferred. 13. The following substantial questions of law have been formulated at the time of admitting the present Second Appeal: i) Whether the appellate Court has properly applied the principles laid under Sections 37 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 in granting the relief of Perpetual Injunction in favour of the respondent? ii) Whether the appellate Court rightly applied the principles in granting the relief of perpetual Injunction based on possession and incidental title? 14. Heard learned counsel for the appellants, and learned counsel for the respondent. Perused the record. 15. Learned counsel for the appellants-defendants would submit that the appellate Court erroneously set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court, wherein the plaintiff failed to prove possession over the plaint schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit with any valid title and, therefore, the appellate Court was not justified in allowing the appeal of the plaintiff basing on the evidence on record. He has placed reliance on the following decisions in this appeal along with connected S.A.No.682 of 2016. i) M.Krishna Murthy v. M.Anantharam, 2003 (4) ALD 123 (DB) ii) Mohammed Ibrahim v. Mohammed Abdul Razzak iii) Man Kaur (Dead) By LRs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 Supreme Court Cases 512 iv) Karuppanna Thevar (died) v. Rajagopala Thevar, Appeal No.390 of 1968, dated 30.01.1974 v) Shenbagam v. K.K.Rathinavel, 2022 (3) ALD 306 (SC) vi) Smt.Rekha Rana v. Smt.Ratnashree Jai, AIR 2006 Madhya Pradesh 107. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff submits that the appellate Court has rightly set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court, as the trial Court failed to consider that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit schedule property basing on valid title, inspite of evidence that the plaintiff’s right was infringed by the defendants by interfering with her peaceful possession. Therefore, he prays to dismiss the second appeal. He has placed reliance on the following decisions in this appeal along with connected S.A.No.682 of 2016. Therefore, he prays to dismiss the second appeal. He has placed reliance on the following decisions in this appeal along with connected S.A.No.682 of 2016. i) Garlapati Venkateswarlu (died) per LRs v. Divi Appalacharyulu, 2014 (1) ALD 634 ii) Ananthula Sudhakar v. P.Buchi Reddy (dead ) by Lrs, (2008) 4 SCC 594 iii) Kayalulla Parambath Moidu v. Namboodiyil Vinodan, Civil Appeal Nos.5575-5576 of 2021, dated 07.09.2021 iv) Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) by Lrs, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 965 v) Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 545 vi) Govindaraju v. Mariamman, (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 500. 17. The plaintiff filed suit for bare injunction claiming to be the absolute owner and exclusive possession of the suit schedule property having purchased the same by her under Ex.A.1 registered sale deed. The defendants refuted the claim of the plaintiff and contend that originally, their grandfather by name Chakali Pedda Veeraiah was the owner, pattedar and possessor of the land in Sy.No.168. After his death, the land was partitioned in between the family members including the father of defendant Nos.1 to 3 and husband of defendant No.4. In the said partition, the father of defendant Nos.1 to 3 and husband of defendant No.4 by name Lachaiah got an extent of Ac.1-15 guntas in Sy.No.168, which was denoted as Sy.No.168/E1 and he was in possession and enjoyment till his death. After his death, having inherited, the defendants are in possession of Ac.1-15 guntas and the said land was mutated in the name of defendant No.4 in the revenue records and she was issued pattadar passbook and title deed. The father of defendant Nos.1 to 3 and the husband of defendant No.4 never appointed any person as G.P.A holder in respect of land fell to his share and he was personally cultivating the same till his death. There are no plots existing in Sy.No.168/E1 as alleged by the plaintiff, since it is an agricultural land and under cultivation of the defendants. As such, the question of plaintiff purchasing the suit schedule property does not arise. The defendants are in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. 18. It is well settled legal position that a suit for injunction based on possession without title can also be maintained. Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1968 deals with the grant of Perpetual Injunction. The defendants are in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. 18. It is well settled legal position that a suit for injunction based on possession without title can also be maintained. Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1968 deals with the grant of Perpetual Injunction. According to sub-section (2) of said Section, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff, when the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff’s right to, or enjoyment of, property, where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief and where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings. It is well settled that in a suit for injunction the primary question to be considered relates to possession, though the question of title also may be gone into incidentally. A person in possession, though without title, can resist interference from another who has no better title than him and get injunction. 19. In the light of the above principles, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff has proved possession over the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit by oral and documentary evidence. The plaintiff seeks to rely mainly on Ex.A.1 sale deed dated 06.06.1987 to show that she has purchased the suit schedule property under the said document and she is in possession of the same from the date of purchase. The said sale deed was allegedly executed by G.P.A holder of Gopularam Chinna Lachaiah by name G.Jitender Reddy in respect of the suit schedule property. A perusal of Ex.A.1, apparently, there is no reference that the G.P.A holder, in pursuance of G.P.A alleged executed in his favour by late Chinna Lachaiah obtained permission for layout and converted the said land into plots, though it is the case of the plaintiff that after obtaining layout, the G.P.A holder sold the plots to various persons. The plaintiff filed Ex.A.8 layout plan of Sy.Nos.160 and 168. It does not disclose as to who approved the said layout. A perusal of the Ex.A.8 layout discloses that there is no mention of total extent of land, survey numbers and plot numbers. Basing on Ex.A.8 layout plan, it is difficult to conclude that the plot No.61 is situated in Sy.No.168/Part. It does not disclose as to who approved the said layout. A perusal of the Ex.A.8 layout discloses that there is no mention of total extent of land, survey numbers and plot numbers. Basing on Ex.A.8 layout plan, it is difficult to conclude that the plot No.61 is situated in Sy.No.168/Part. The recitals of Ex.A.1 further disclose that G.P.A was executed in favour of Jitender Reddy for Ac.0-30 guntas of land in Sy.No.168. There is no mention of sub-division numbers of Sy.No.168. Ex.A.2 is only certified copy of G.P.A. The plaintiff could have produced the original G.P.A before the Court to prove that defendant No.1 had attested as witness to the said document. So also, the GPA holder was also not examined. The appellate Court has not considered the oral and documentary evidence in proper perspective about the proof of purchase of the suit schedule property and it has not duly considered the recitals of Ex.A.2. Admittedly, there is no proof of oral or documentary evidence to substantiate the contention of the plaintiff that the land in above survey number was converted from agriculture to non-agriculture land by obtaining proper layout by the alleged G.P.A holder. Apart from the above, going by the other documents filed by the plaintiff i.e. Ex.A.3 is the certified copy of pahani for the year 1985-86 and Ex.A.4 is the certified copy of pahani for the year 1986-87, which reflect the name of Chakali Lachaiah as pattadar and possessor of Ac.1-10 guntas of land in Sy.No.168/AA. Ex.A.5 is the certified copy of pahani for the year 1987-88, Ex.A.6 is the certified copy of pahani for the year 1988-89 and Ex.A.7 is the certified copy of pahani for the year 1989-90 reflect the name of Chakali Lachaiah as pattadar and possessor of Ac.1-0 guntas of land in Sy.No.168/AA. In Exs.A.5 to A.7, the land is shown as agricultural land. There is no mention of existence of plots in the said pahanies, though they are subsequent to Ex.A.1 sale deed. 20. Coming to the documentary evidence filed by the defendants, Ex.B.1 is the certified copy of Khasra Pahani for the years 1954-55 reflects the name of Chakali Chinna Veera Lachaiah and Chakali Pedda Veera Lachaiah as pattadars of land in Sy.No.168. 20. Coming to the documentary evidence filed by the defendants, Ex.B.1 is the certified copy of Khasra Pahani for the years 1954-55 reflects the name of Chakali Chinna Veera Lachaiah and Chakali Pedda Veera Lachaiah as pattadars of land in Sy.No.168. Exs.B2 to B.5 and B.7 to B.23 are the certified copies of pahanies for the years 1982-83, 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1988-89, 1989-90, 1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93, 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97, 1999-2000, 2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06 and for 1420 to 1423 Fasli for the years 2010 to 2013 respectively. In Ex.B.2 and B.3 the name of Chakali Lachaiah was shown as pattadar and possessor of Ac.1-16 guntas of land in Sy.No.168/AA. In Exs.B.4, B5, B.7 and B.8 to B.10, the name of Chakali Lachaiah was shown as pattadar and possessor of Ac.1-10 guntas of land in Sy.No168/AA. In Exs.B.11 to B.16 certified copies of pahanies, the name of Gopularam Lachaiah is shown as pattadar and possessor of Ac.1-16 guntas of land in Sy.No.168/A. In Exs.B.17 to B.21 certified copies of pahanies, Gopularam Anthamma, wife of Lachaiah, who is defendant No.4 was shown as pattadar and possessor of Ac.1-15 guntas of land in Sy.No.168/E1. Exs.B.22 and B.23 certified copies of pahanies for 1420 Fasli for the year 2010 show the name of defendant Nos.1 and 3 as pattadars and possessors of the land in Sy.No.168/E1. As per Ex.B.6 certified copy of ROR for 1979-80, Chakali Lachaiah is pattadar of Ac.1-10 guntas of land in Sy.No.168. Exs.B.24 and B.25 are the pattadar passbook and title deed of defendant No.4 in respect of Ac.1-15 guntas of land in Sy.No.168/E1 along with other lands. Therefore, the above documents shows that the land in Sy.No.168, admeasuring Ac.1-15 guntas is an agricultural land and after demise of said Lachaiah, it was mutated in the name of defendant No.4 and after her demise, it was mutated in the name of other defendants. Therefore, the entries in revenue records establish the possession of the defendants over the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit. 21. Learned counsel for the appellants-defendants submits that the appellate Court has misread the principles for granting of perpetual Injunction. Therefore, the entries in revenue records establish the possession of the defendants over the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit. 21. Learned counsel for the appellants-defendants submits that the appellate Court has misread the principles for granting of perpetual Injunction. He further submits that though Exs.A.1 and A.2 were held to be not proved by the trial Court, the appellate Court held that the plaintiff proved her possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property without any documents and decreed the suit. 22. As contended by the learned counsel for the defendants, basing only on Exs.A.1 and A.2, without there being any supporting documents about the lawful possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property, the appellate Court erroneously held that the plaintiff is in exclusive possession of the same. 23. In the judgment of Hero Vinoth’s case (supra 10), the Apex Court while considering the scope of second appeal under Section 100 of C.P.C, at para No.24 held as under: “An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to 'decision based on no evidence', it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 24. Since the substantial questions of law have been formulated in view of reversal findings recorded by the appellate Court, it is necessary to look into the findings recorded by the appellate Court. The trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and at para No.39 of its judgment held that the certified copies of pahanies produced by the plaintiff are subsequent to Ex.A.1 sale deed and Ex.A.2 G.P.A, which reflect the name of father of defendant Nos.1 to 3 by name Gopularam Chinna Lachaiah, as pattadar and possessor of the land in Sy.No.168/AA. The contention of the plaintiff that land in suit survey number was converted from agriculture to non-agriculture and it was divided into plots under layout obtained by GPA holder Jitender Reddy remained unproved, as the said contention was not supported by any reliable evidence. But, the appellate Court has misinterpreted Exs.A.1 and A.2 documents and held that the plaintiff purchased the suit schedule property from Chinna Lachaiah represented by his G.P.A. holder Jitender Reddy and she is in possession and enjoyment of the same by virtue of sale deed executed in her favour, without looking into the other important aspects considered by the trial Court. 25. 25. In Ananthula Sudhakar’s case (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the principle is that ‘possession follows title’. At para Nos.12 and 14 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court held as under: “We may however clarify that a prayer for declaration will be necessary only if the denial of title by the defendant or challenge to plaintiff's title raises a cloud on the title of plaintiff to the property. A cloud is said to raise over a person's title, when some apparent defect in his title to a property, or when some prima facie right of a third party over it, is made out or shown. An action for declaration, is the remedy to remove the cloud on the title to the property. On the other hand, where the plaintiff has clear title supported by documents, if a trespasser without any claim to title or an interloper without any apparent title, merely denies the plaintiff's title, it does not amount to raising a cloud over the title of the plaintiff and it will not be necessary for the plaintiff to sue for declaration and a suit for injunction may be sufficient. Where the plaintiff, believing that defendant is only a trespasser or a wrongful claimant without title, files a mere suit for injunction, and in such a suit, the defendant discloses in his defence the details of the right or title claimed by him, which raises a serious dispute or cloud over plaintiff's title, then there is a need for the plaintiff, to amend the plaint and convert the suit into one for declaration. Alternatively, he may withdraw the suit for bare injunction, with permission of the court to file a comprehensive suit for declaration and injunction. He may file the suit for declaration with consequential relief, even after the suit for injunction is dismissed, where the suit raised only the issue of possession and not any issue of title. “But what if the property is a vacant site, which is not physically possessed, used or enjoyed? In such cases the principle is that possession follows title. If two persons claim to be in possession of a vacant site, one who is able to establish title thereto will be considered to be in possession, as against the person who is not able to establish title. In such cases the principle is that possession follows title. If two persons claim to be in possession of a vacant site, one who is able to establish title thereto will be considered to be in possession, as against the person who is not able to establish title. This means that even though a suit relating to a vacant site is for a mere injunction and the issue is one of possession, it will be necessary to examine and determine the title as a prelude for deciding the de jure possession. In such a situation, where the title is clear and simple, the court may venture a decision on the issue of title, so as to decide the question of de jure possession even though the suit is for a mere injunction. But where the issue of title involves complicated or complex questions of fact and law, or where court feels that parties had not proceeded on the basis that title was at issue, the court should not decide the issue of title in a suit for injunction. The proper course is to relegate the plaintiff to the remedy of a full-fledged suit for declaration and consequential reliefs.” 26. It is true that if there is cogent and convincing evidence about the title of the property, which is vacant site, it can be safely accepted principle that ‘possession follows title’. But, in the instant case, the title of the plaintiff itself is in dispute. As already noted, Exs.A.1 and A.2 documents have not clinchingly proved about the transfer of title and possession of the property in favour of the plaintiff. But, the defendants could able to establish with revenue records that they are in possession of lands including the suit schedule property. As per the judgment of Ananthula Sudhakar’s case (supra), when the issue of title involves complicated or complex questions of fact and law, the Court should not decide the issue of title in a suit for injunction. The plaintiff, necessarily, has to sue for declaration of title and consequential relief of injunction. 27. The appellate Court, while deciding on the point that whether the plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of suit, erroneously held that she is in possession over the same by virtue of Exs.A.1 and A.2 documents. 27. The appellate Court, while deciding on the point that whether the plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of suit, erroneously held that she is in possession over the same by virtue of Exs.A.1 and A.2 documents. Apparently, there was no document in favour of the plaintiff to prove the existence of the suit schedule property within the boundaries in suit survey number and her possession over it as on the date of filing of the suit or at any point of time, which is the cardinal principle for grant of perpetual Injunction. As discussed above, the appellate Court has not seriously gone into the findings of the trial Court with regard to the admissibility and with regard to defects pointed out in not relying and not accepting the genuineness of Exs.A.1 and A.2. 28. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the land in suit survey number was converted into agriculture to non-agriculture land and it was divided into plots under lay out by the GPA holder G.Jitender Reddy. Apart from that, the certified copies of pahanies under Exs.A.3 to A.7 reflect the name of father of defendant Nos.1 to 3 as pattadar and possessor of Ac.1-10 guntas in Sy.No.168/AA. There is no convincing evidence to accept the contention of the plaintiff that the land was converted into plots under layout obtained from the concerned authorities and by virtue of Exs.A.1 and A.2, she was put in possession of the suit schedule property. Ex.A.9 are the proceedings issued by Tahsildar, Ramachandrapuram, dated 09.06.2019 mutating the name of plaintiff in respect of Ac.0-06 ½ guntas of land in Sy.No.168. In the said proceedings, there is no mention of subject plot numbers. Therefore, there is no evidence to prove that the plaintiff was inducted into possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit and also the factum of existence of plots in suit survey number. As such, the principle ‘possession follows title’ as held in Ananthula Sudhakar’s case (supra) cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 29. In a suit for injunction, a person in lawful possession of the property will be entitled to the relief of perpetual Injunction till he is dispossessed or evicted by original owner may be in accordance with law. 29. In a suit for injunction, a person in lawful possession of the property will be entitled to the relief of perpetual Injunction till he is dispossessed or evicted by original owner may be in accordance with law. After having perused the evidence as already discussed above, the defendants proved that they are in possession of the suit schedule property, whereas, the plaintiff failed to establish her lawful possession over the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit and she is entitled to injunction to resist the action of the defendants. Even then, the appellate Court gave finding that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property and allowed the appeal. 30. On a careful consideration of the judgment of the appellate Court and the entire evidence, oral and documentary, available on record, the legality of the findings arrived at by the trial Court appears to be satisfactory and the appellate Court has not properly appreciated the evidence available on record. Therefore, the findings recorded by the appellate Court are based on improper appreciation of evidence warrants interference of this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of C.P.C. 31. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court in A.S.No.7 of 2015 and confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in O.S.No.15 of 2008. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall stand closed.