JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri N.K. Seth, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank. 2. At the very outset, Sri Alok Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, states that though in pursuance to the order of this Court dated 27.04.2023, a supplementary counter affidavit dated 18.05.2023 has been filed by the Bank but he does not intend to file any objections thereto. 3. The aforesaid statement of Sri Alok Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, is recorded. 4. Instant petition has been filed praying for the following reliefs:- "i) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing impugned order dated 17.5.2013 passed by the opposite party no. 6 as contained in Annexure No.1 to the writ petition. ii) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to the impugned order dated 17.5.2013 passed by the opposite party no. 6 as contained in Annexure No.1 to the writ petition. iii) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing impugned Circular letter dated 20.7.2010 only to the extent provides a condition of having achieved 60% target during financial year 2009-2010 for absorption in the services of the Bank, as contained in Annexure No.6 to the writ petition. iv) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to the impugned Circular letter dated 20.7.2010 only to the extent same provides a condition of having achieved 60% target during financial year 2009-2010 for absorption in the services of the Bank, as contained in Annexure No. 8 to the writ petition. v) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned Circulars dated 18.8.2010 as well as 8.3.2011 to the extent the same provide/restrict the benefit of suitable revision of the business target only in case of OMRS and not in the matter of other contractual staff including Customer Relationship Executive (Medium Enterprises) for the purposes of permanent absorption in the services of the bank. vi) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to the impugned Circulars dated 18.8.2010 as well as 8.3.2011 to the extent the same provide/restrict the benefit of suitable revision of the business target only in case of OMRS and not in the matter of other contractual staff including Customer Relationship Executive (Medium Enterprises) for the purposes of permanent absorption in the services of the Bank. vii) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the Notice dated 30.8.2010 issued by the opposite party no. 7 as contained in Annexure No. 2 to the writ petition. viii) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to consider the case of petitioner for absorption as Specialist Officer in Junior Management Grade Scale-I within a stipulated period ignoring the impugned condition of Circular dated 20.7.2010 and after giving benefit of revision of Budget. achievement as per Circular letter dated 18.8.2010, with all consequential benefits. ix) to pass any other suitable order or direction which is deemed just and proper in the circumstances of the case may also be passed. x) to allow the writ petition with costs." 5. Both learned counsels for the parties agree that the facts of the case have already been set forth in detail by this Court in the order dated 27.04.2023. For the sake of convenience, the order dated 27.04.2023 is reproduced as under:- "1. Heard Sri Alok Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank. 2. Sri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank files a supplementary counter affidavit on behalf of respondents no. 2 to 7. 3. Sri Srivastava states that though the affidavit is dated 27.09.2018, yet a copy of the same had already been served upon the learned counsel for the petitioner in September, 2018 itself but inadvertently the same could not be filed. 4. Considering the aforesaid, the supplementary counter affidavit be kept on record. 5. Instant writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 17.05.2013, a copy of which is annexure 1 to the writ petition whereby the representation of the petitioner has been rejected. 6. 4. Considering the aforesaid, the supplementary counter affidavit be kept on record. 5. Instant writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 17.05.2013, a copy of which is annexure 1 to the writ petition whereby the representation of the petitioner has been rejected. 6. The case set forth by the petitioner is that the petitioner was initially appointed on 01.09.2008 for a period of two years as Customer Relationship Executive-Medium Enterprises (CREME) for the period from 01.09.2008 to 30.08.2010. Copy of the appointment order is annexure 3A to the writ petition. 7. The respondents had issued a circular dated 20.07.2010, a copy of which is annexure 6 to the writ petition whereby a policy of Permanent Absorption of Officers Marketing and Recovery (rural), Technical Officers (Farm Sector), Micro Finance Marketing Officers, Customers Relationship Executive (PB) and Customer Relationship Executive (ME) in Junior Management Grade Scale-I (JGMS-I) as specialist officer was issued. 8. As per Clause 2.1 of the aforesaid circular, those officers who were in service of the Bank on 14.07.2010 were eligible for absorption subject to having achieved minimum 60 % target during the year 2009-2010. The performance of the officers was to be assessed as per the performance evaluation matrix advised by the concerned SBU. 9. Through an order dated 30.08.2010, a copy of which is annexure 2 to the writ petition the petitioner was informed that his contractual period of two years of appointment is to expire on 30.08.2010 and as such, he was required to liquidate his liabilities towards the bank and surrender the laptop. 10. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that this was the termination order that had been issued by the respondent-Bank terminating his services at the end of the contractual period. 11. The petitioner, upon finding that his performance was 55.91 percent of his budgeted target viz-a-viz certain other persons whose performance was simply 0 % and certain other persons whose target was lower than the petitioner yet had been absorbed in terms of the circular dated 20.07.2010 filed Writ-A No. 57034 of 2010 Inre; Yogesh Kumar and Ors Vs. Union of India and Ors and this Court disposed of the writ petition vide judgment and order dated 28.01.2013 permitting the petitioners to submit a fresh representation which was directed to be decided by the respondent-Bank in accordance with law and the relevant circular in this regard. 12. Union of India and Ors and this Court disposed of the writ petition vide judgment and order dated 28.01.2013 permitting the petitioners to submit a fresh representation which was directed to be decided by the respondent-Bank in accordance with law and the relevant circular in this regard. 12. In pursuance thereof, the petitioner claims to have submitted a representation on 12.02.2013 which has been rejected by means of the impugned order dated 17.05.2013 and hence the writ petition. 13. Raising a challenge to the order impugned, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that (a) various persons whose target was lower than the benchmark of 60 % have been absorbed by the bank in terms of the policy dated 20.07.2010 including one Sri A.P.S. Verma whose target was 0 % (b) while rejecting the representation of the petitioner, the respondents have indicated that the specific contention of the petitioner that his percentage could be more than 100 % has been negated by the bank as preposterous yet with respect to one Sri Manish Kumar Singh whose format has been annexed as part of annexure 10 to the writ petition, his performance and percentage terms have been indicated as 108.33% i.e more than 100 % and thus the contention of the respondents is belied from records and (c) different target have been given to persons who were working in the same region which is patently discriminatory. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has elaborated the ground of persons with 0% recovery having been absorbed in terms of the circular dated 20.07.2010 by giving the example of one Sri A.P.S. Verma. 15. Attention has also been invited towards an order passed in the case of a person similarly circumstanced namely Sri Ajay Kumar Sonkar in Writ Petition No. 1271 (SB) of 2013 wherein a Division Bench of this Court noticing that certain persons with lower target had been absorbed had required the respondents to file an affidavit indicating the action which has been taken with respect to one Sri A.P. S. Verma who has been absorbed despite having 0 % achievement in the year 2009-2010. 16. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited the attention to the Court towards the specific averment made in paragraph 27 of the writ petition wherein it has categorically been stated that Sri A.P.S. Verma despite having 0 % achievement has been absorbed in the services of the bank. He contends that reply to paragraph 27 of the counter affidavit has been given in paragraph 20 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent-bank wherein it has been contended that Sri A.P.S.Verma and three other persons have been found to have been permanently absorbed erroneously in the bank service without confirming to parameters of achievement of 60 % of the targets as mentioned in the corporate center letter dated 20.07.2010 and that further steps are being initiated by the bank and show cause notice has been issued to them. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that despite the said averment having been made in paragraph 20 of the counter affidavit, no further action has been taken against Sri A.P.S.Verma and other three persons rather the action which was sought to be initiated against the aforesaid four persons namely Sri A.P.S.Verma and three others has been held back by the bank. 18. Responding to the same, Sri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent-bank states that in terms of the circular dated 20.07.2010, those persons like the petitioner could only be absorbed in the services of the respondent-bank who met 60 % of the target. He contends that as the petitioner has only achieved 55.91 % of the budgeted target consequently, taking into consideration the provisions of the scheme, his services have not been absorbed rather he has been terminated vide order dated 30.08.2010 and thus there is no infirmity in the action taking by the respondent-bank. 19. Further responding to the allegations made in the writ petition of Sri A.P.S. Verma and three other persons whose target was 0 % and also lower than the target of 55.91 % as achieved by the petitioner, the contention of Sri Anurag Srivastava, Advocate is that despite the bank having initiated action against the four officers as per the specific averment made in paragraph 20 of the counter affidavit yet the said action has been held back. Sri Anurag Srivastava, Advocate, however, has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P Vs. Sri Anurag Srivastava, Advocate, however, has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P Vs. Raj Kumar Sharma reported in (2006) 3 SCC 330 to contend that even if certain candidates have been granted benefit wrongly there cannot be any question of grant of negative parity to the petitioner i.e. even if some appointment has been made by mistake or wrongly that would not confer any right of appointment to the petitioner as Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not envisage negative equality and if the State has committed a mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuate the said mistake. 20. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the contesting parties and having perused the records what emerges is that the petitioner who had been appointed as Customer Relationship Executive (ME) vide order dated 01.09.2008 for a period of two years was terminated through an order dated 30.08.2010 on the ground that as per the policy dated 20.07.2010 he has failed to meet the target of 60 %. The representation filed by the petitioner in this regard has also been rejected by the respondents vide order dated 17.05.2013 on various grounds. 21. Without entering into the other grounds as have been raised by the petitioner what needs to be thrashed out first by the Court is the specific averment as made by the petitioner that four persons of which one is Sri A.P.S.Verma, who had only 0 % achievement to his credit along with the three others whose achieved target was much lower than the benchmark of 60 %, have been absorbed/appointed in the bank in terms of the policy dated 20.07.2010 and despite action having been initiated by the respondent-bank against the four persons, the said action has been held back. Further, as per Sri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent-bank, though action has been initiated against the said four persons, the action has been held back as categorically admitted by Sri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent-bank. However, his argument is that even if the four persons have been appointed or absorbed erroneously despite having achieved 0 % percent target, this Court cannot compel the respondent-bank to commit the same mistake. 22. In the instant case, it is not a matter of the writ Court requiring the respondent-bank to commit a mistake. However, his argument is that even if the four persons have been appointed or absorbed erroneously despite having achieved 0 % percent target, this Court cannot compel the respondent-bank to commit the same mistake. 22. In the instant case, it is not a matter of the writ Court requiring the respondent-bank to commit a mistake. The reason is not far to seek inasmuch as the initially the respondent-bank has admitted that it has committed a mistake in having absorbed persons like Sri A.P.S.Verma who are having only 0 % target and a specific averment has been made in paragraph 20 of the counter affidavit filed by the responsible officer of the bank namely the Chief Manager of the State Bank of India, Ashok Nagar, Kanpur wherein it has been indicated that necessary steps are being initiated in this regard and show cause notices have been issued to them. Later, the action has been held back. Of course, there cannot be any negative parity meaning thereby that the respondent-bank cannot be allowed to repeat the same mistake if any, which has been committed in the absorption of persons who are having a lower target than the benchmark as specified in the circular dated 20.07.2010. However, in the instant case, the bank initially stated that it has committed a mistake but after initiation of action against the said four persons, it has held back the action meaning thereby that it has exercised some power as is vested in the bank whereby despite the persons having lower target having been absorbed yet have been retained in the service of the bank and that too despite the writ Court having been informed as per the specific averment made in paragraph 20 of the counter affidavit of the action being proposed. Thus, it would not be a case of negative parity and consequently, the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Raj Kumar Sharma (supra) may prima facie have no applicability in the facts of the instant case. 23. Accordingly, keeping in view the aforesaid discussion and before proceeding further with the matter, this Court would require the General Manager, Network-II, Local Head Office, Moti Mahal Marg, Lucknow i.e respondent no. 23. Accordingly, keeping in view the aforesaid discussion and before proceeding further with the matter, this Court would require the General Manager, Network-II, Local Head Office, Moti Mahal Marg, Lucknow i.e respondent no. 6 at this stage to file his personal affidavit indicating the reasons as to why despite the writ Court having been informed in paragraph 20 of the counter affidavit filed by Sri Amit Kumar, Chief Manager, State Bank Of India, Kanpur that action is being proposed against Sri A.P.S.Verma and three others of having been absorbed in the bank despite not having met the target of 60 % rather having 0% recovery the action against the said persons has been held back. While filing the personal affidavit, the power which has been exercised while holding back the action against the said four persons would also be indicated in the affidavit to be filed by the respondent no. 6. 24. Let the said affidavit be filed within three weeks failing which the respondent no. 6 shall appear in person along with records to assist the Court. 25. List this case on 23.05.2023." 6. From perusal of the order dated 27.04.2023, it emerges that the grounds of challenge as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner have been set forth in paragraph 13 of the order dated 27.04.2023, which were namely (a) various persons whose target was lower than the benchmark of 60 % have been absorbed by the bank in terms of the policy dated 20.07.2010 including one Sri A.P.S. Verma whose target was 0 % (b) while rejecting the representation of the petitioner, the respondents have indicated that the specific contention of the petitioner that his percentage could be more than 100 % has been negated by the bank as preposterous yet with respect to one Sri Manish Kumar Singh whose format has been annexed as part of annexure 10 to the writ petition, his performance and percentage terms have been indicated as 108.33% i.e more than 100 % and thus the contention of the respondents is belied from records and (c) different targets have been given to persons who were working in the same region which is patently discriminatory. 7. 7. This Court vide order dated 27.04.2023 had itself indicated that supplementary counter affidavit is required to be filed only on ground (a) as raised by learned counsel for the petitioner, which was that various persons whose target was lower than the benchmark of 60 % have been absorbed by the bank in terms of the policy dated 20.07.2010 including one Sri A.P.S. Verma whose target was zero percent. The other grounds are still to be considered by this Court. 8. In pursuance to the order dated 27.04.2023, a supplementary counter affidavit dated 18.05.2023 has been filed by the respondent Bank. 9. So far as the ground (a) which was that various persons whose target was lower than the benchmark of 60 % have been absorbed and consequently the petitioner whose achievement was only 55.91% of the budgeted target should also be absorbed more particularly when a person with zero percent target namely one Sri A.P.S. Verma has been absorbed and as such the petitioner is also entitled for similar benefit, Sri N.K. Seth, learned Senior Advocate, explained the circumstances in which Sri A.P.S. Verma and three others whose achievement was much below the target of 60% were absorbed. 10. He states that upon discovering that four persons namely Sri Anrudh Prakash Singh Verma (A.P.S. Verma), Sri Arvind Kumar Pal, Sri Ram Anuj Singh and Sri Vijay Kushwaha have been appointed on the post of Marketing & Recovery Officer (Rural) in violation of terms of the relevant circulars, their records were scrutinized and it was found that they did not fulfill the criteria for permanent absorption as per aforesaid scheme and consequently notices dated 23.02.2013 were issued to them requiring them to show cause as to why their appointment should not be cancelled. Copies of the said show cause notices dated 23.02.2023 have been filed as Annexure SCA-1 to the supplementary counter affidavit. Sri Seth argues that all four officers submitted their reply which have been filed as Annexure SCA-2 to the supplementary counter affidavit. Upon scrutiny of the entire records and their reply, it was found that all four persons had been appointed in December 2009 and in the relevant financial year 2009-2010, no target was assigned to them and despite having been appointed on contract basis on the post of Marketing & Recovery Officer (Rural) only other work was taken. Upon scrutiny of the entire records and their reply, it was found that all four persons had been appointed in December 2009 and in the relevant financial year 2009-2010, no target was assigned to them and despite having been appointed on contract basis on the post of Marketing & Recovery Officer (Rural) only other work was taken. Considering this aspect of the matter and the fact that since all the officers were working satisfactorily since absorption in the service of the bank in 2010 and in their case the question of target not being involved consequently the said officers have been continued in service. 11. So far as the other ground as raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned namely that while rejecting the representation of the petitioner, the respondents have indicated that the specific contention of the petitioner that his percentage could be more than 100 % has been negated by the bank as preposterous yet with respect to one Sri Manish Kumar Singh whose format has been annexed as part of Annexure 10 to the writ petition, his performance and percentage terms have been indicated as 108.33% i.e more than 100%, Sri Seth argues that even if 108.33% as recorded against the name of Sri Manish Kumar Singh is to be ignored and re-calculation is to be done, his overall percentage of budget achieved would be approximately 62.46% which would be above the target of 60% and consequently when admittedly the percentage of the petitioner was less than 60% and even if it has been erroneously indicated that the target of Sri Manish Kumar Singh is above 100% the same would not make any difference as the percentage of budget achieved by Sri Manish Kumar Singh being more than 60% no error has been committed with his absorption. Even otherwise it is contended that even if above 100% target of the petitioner is to be considered the same would not make his budgeted target more than 60% so as to enable him to swim within the ambit of 60% target which was required to be completed by all Customer Relationship Executive (Medium Enterprises). 12. Even otherwise it is contended that even if above 100% target of the petitioner is to be considered the same would not make his budgeted target more than 60% so as to enable him to swim within the ambit of 60% target which was required to be completed by all Customer Relationship Executive (Medium Enterprises). 12. Responding to the third ground as raised by learned counsel for the petitioner i.e. different targets have been given to persons who were working in the same region, placing reliance on the averments contained in paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit dated 01.05.2015 the argument of Sri Seth is that the targets of the officers were fixed differently in different areas of operation depending upon the potentiality of business in the area. 13. Elaborating the same, the argument of Sri Seth is that targets were fixed depending upon the areas in which the officers were required to serve. As an example, it is stated that in case an officer is required to serve in an area in which the branch is having large business it would be easier to achieve the target and hence the target was fixed higher while in an area in which the bank was having a lower business, a lower target was fixed and such fixation of target cannot be said to be discriminatory. 14. Another argument of Sri Seth is that even if for the sake of arguments it is accepted that four persons to whom a show cause notice had been issued by the respondent Bank on the ground of they not having achieved the target is taken at the face value and the said persons were wrongly absorbed even then as the petitioner has failed to meet the target of 60% consequently no mandamus can be issued for grant of parity with those who may have been wrongly absorbed as there cannot be any negative parity. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Arup Das and others vs. State of Assam and others - (2012) 5 SCC 559 and Pankjeshwar Sharma and others vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others - (2021) 2 SCC 188 . 15. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Arup Das and others vs. State of Assam and others - (2012) 5 SCC 559 and Pankjeshwar Sharma and others vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others - (2021) 2 SCC 188 . 15. Sri Seth also argues that the petitioner had earlier filed Writ-A No.57034 of 2010 along with Yogesh Kumar and others which writ petition was disposed of vide judgment and order dated 28.01.2023 as per order passed in Writ-A No.6084 of 2011 in re: Rajeev Kumar Pushkar vs. S.B.I. and others. Copies of the said orders have been filed as Annexure-8 to the writ petition. 16. Sri Seth argues that circulars dated 20.07.2010, 26.07.2010 and 18.08.2010 were required to be considered while deciding the representation of the petitioner. It is contended that once the petitioner has already been given the benefit by the writ Court of the circulars dated 20.07.2010, 26.07.2010 and 18.08.2010 consequently by means of the instant writ petition, the petitioner cannot be allowed to challenge the validity of the said circulars as the principles of constructive res-judicata would be applicable. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others - (2014) 5 SCC 75 . Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of Delhi High Court passed in L.P.A. No.260 of 2015 in re: State Bank of India and another vs. Dharmendra Prasad Singh and others decided on 30.04.2015. 17. It is also argued that the circulars are only policy decisions and the Bank being a financial entity, is perfectly empowered and entitled to issue such circulars for its own business working and in order to consider the cases of the persons who are working and there would not be any question of raising a challenge to the same as the said circulars have been issued in normal working of the Bank and the same being only a policy decision they cannot be made subject to challenge by means of writ petitions. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and others vs. Gopinath Dash and others - (2005) 13 SCC 495 and Col. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and others vs. Gopinath Dash and others - (2005) 13 SCC 495 and Col. I.V.S. Gahlot vs. Union of India and others - (2018) 17 SCC 564 . 18. Responding to the said arguments, Sri Alok Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner argues that despite the detailed order of this Court dated 27.04.2023 the respondents while filing the supplementary counter affidavit have failed to indicate the reasons which prevailed upon them to appoint those persons, as indicated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, whose target was zero percent. He also contends that in the show cause notice which had been issued to four persons, copies of which have been annexed along with the supplementary counter affidavit, it has been indicated that their absorption was against the policy but in the reply which has been given by all four persons it was only indicated that as they have already been absorbed in service there is no question of any show cause notice which fact has not been considered by the respondent Bank while deciding to continue those four persons in service. It is also contended that as four persons have been absorbed without having achieved the targets set for them consequently the petitioner should also be absorbed in service on the same analogy. 19. No other ground has been raised by learned counsel for the petitioner neither any case law has been cited. 20. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the records, what emerges is that three grounds, as already indicated above, have been urged by learned counsel for the petitioner in challenging the order impugned. As such the Court proceeds to deal with the three grounds. 21. The first ground as urged by learned counsel for the petitioner is that various persons whose target was lower than the benchmark of 60%, as fixed by the Bank, have been absorbed by the bank in terms of the policy dated 20.07.2010 including one Sri A.P.S. Verma whose target was zero percent, while discriminating against the petitioner whose target was also below the benchmark and in not absorbing the petitioner. 22. 22. From a perusal of the supplementary counter affidavit which has been filed by the respondent Bank to which learned counsel for the petitioner has waived off his right of filing a reply, it is apparent that all the four persons who failed to meet the target of 60% as specified in various circulars for the purpose of absorption, were absorbed. The reason for their absorption, as emerges, is that no target was assigned to them despite they having been appointed on contract basis and only other work was taken from them. Accordingly, once no target was assigned to the said four persons and other work was assigned to them consequently no error is found in those persons having been absorbed and as such there would not be any occasion for treating the said persons to have zero percent performance which might entail the petitioner to claim a similar relief. 23. Needless to mention that even if aforesaid four persons had been absorbed wrongly even then the petitioner cannot claim a similar benefit inasmuch there cannot be a negative parity or equality. 24. In this regard, the Apex Court in the case of Arup Das (supra) has held as under:- "This Court went on to observe further that even if in some cases appointments had been made by mistake or wrongly, that did not confer any right of appointment to another person, as Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality and if the State had committed a mistake, it cannot be forced to perpetuate the said mistake." (emphasis by the Court) 25. Likewise, the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P Vs. Raj Kumar Sharma - (2006) 3 SCC 330 has held as under:- "Even if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly that does not confer any right on another person. Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality, and if the State committed the mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake. (See: Snehprabha v. State of U.P. & Ors. ( AIR 1996 SC 540 ), Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, v. Daulat Mal Jain & Ors. ( 1997 (1) SCC 35 ), State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ram Kumar Mann ( 1997 (3) SCC 321 ), Faridabad C.T. Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services & Ors. (See: Snehprabha v. State of U.P. & Ors. ( AIR 1996 SC 540 ), Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, v. Daulat Mal Jain & Ors. ( 1997 (1) SCC 35 ), State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ram Kumar Mann ( 1997 (3) SCC 321 ), Faridabad C.T. Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services & Ors. ( 1997 (7) SCC 752 ), Jalandhar Improvement Trust, V. Sampuran Singh ( AIR 1999 SC 1347 ), State of Punjab and Others v. Dr. Rajeev Sarwal ( 1999 (9) SCC 240 ), Yogesh Kumar and Ors. v. Govt. of NCT, Delhi and Ors. ( 2003 (3) SCC 548 ), Union of India and Anr. v. International Trading Co. and Anr. ( 2003 (5) SCC 437 ) and Kastha Niwarak G.S.S. Maryadit, Indore v. President, Indore Development Authority (JT 2006 (2) SC 259)." (emphasis by the Court) 26. Likewise, the Apex Court in the case of Pankjeshwar Sharma (supra) has held as under:- "This Court further held that even if in some cases appointments had been made erroneously or by mistake, that did not confer any right of appointment to another person as Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality and if the State or its authority had committed a mistake at any given stage, it cannot be forced to perpetuate the said mistake under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution." (emphasis by the Court) 27. When the impugned action on the part of the respondents is seen in the context of law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments, it clearly emerges that even if four persons, as referred to above, did not meet the criteria specified for their absorption i.e. 60% performance and they were absorbed wrongly yet there cannot be any extension of a similar benefit to the petitioner inasmuch as there cannot be any negative parity. The Court hastens to add that the reasons indicated by the respondent Bank in its supplementary counter affidavit pertaining to absorption of those four persons is found satisfactory pertaining to they having been absorbed as no specific target had been fixed for them. Thus, the first ground is rejected. 28. The Court hastens to add that the reasons indicated by the respondent Bank in its supplementary counter affidavit pertaining to absorption of those four persons is found satisfactory pertaining to they having been absorbed as no specific target had been fixed for them. Thus, the first ground is rejected. 28. So far as the second ground taken by learned counsel for the petitioner that while rejecting the representation of the petitioner, the respondents have indicated that the specific contention of the petitioner that his percentage could be more than 100% has been negated by the bank as preposterous yet with respect to one Sri Manish Kumar Singh whose format has been annexed as part of annexure 10 to the writ petition, his performance and percentage terms have been indicated as 108.33% i.e. more than 100 % and thus the contention of the respondents is belied from records, the argument of Sri Seth, learned Senior Advocate that even if the said averment is to be ignored pertaining to the petitioner yet in case the achievements of Sri Manish Kumar Singh are to be seen and calculation is to be done by ignoring the percentage of 108.33% even then the percentage of Sri Manish Kumar Singh would be 62.46%. It is not the case of the petitioner that in case his performance is seen over and above 100% the same would entail he meeting the performance of 60%. Thus, keeping in view the aforesaid, the second ground taken by the petitioner is also not found tenable in the eyes of law and accordingly rejected. 29. So far as the third ground is concerned i.e. different targets having been given to the persons who were working in the same region which gives rise to discrimination, suffice to state here that as per averments made in paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit it has been categorically stated by the respondent Bank that targets of the officers were fixed differently in different areas of operations depending upon the potentiality of the business in the area. The respondent is a Bank. It is within its powers to fix targets for the officers. The respondent is a Bank. It is within its powers to fix targets for the officers. It is for the officers to meet the said targets of a commercial entity like a Bank and in case the petitioner failed to meet the target or the standard fixed by the Bank, he has to thank himself for not having met the said criteria and consequently there cannot be any discrimination in fixing the targets in different areas of operations depending upon the potentiality of the business of the Bank it being a financial entity. The said ground is thus rejected. 30. So far as the challenge as raised by the petitioner to the circulars dated 18.08.2010 and 20.07.2010 as emerges from perusal of reliefs (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) and (viii) is concerned, admittedly the petitioner had earlier filed Writ-A No.57034 of 2010 in re: Yogesh Kumar and others vs. Union of India and others, which was disposed of by this Court at Allahabad vide order passed in Writ-A No.6084 of 2011. In Writ-A No.6084 of 2011, the writ Court observed that respondent Bank while passing the order of termination/discharge from service had not considered the circulars dated 20.07.2010, 26.07.2010 and 18.08.2010 and thus directed the Bank that while deciding the representation of the petitioner the respondent Bank shall not be influenced by the order of termination/discharge from service. It is not the case of the petitioner that the said judgment has been set-aside and thus, admittedly, the judgment has attained finality between the parties. Thus, once the petitioner himself was required to be given the benefit of the circulars dated 20.07.2010, 26.07.2010 and 18.08.2010 in the earlier petition consequently there cannot be any occasion for the petitioner to resile from earlier reliefs/petition and to now challenge the validity of the circulars dated 20.07.2010 and 18.08.2010 as per the reliefs prayed in the petition as the said action of the petitioner would clearly be hit by the principles of res-judicata. 31. In this regard, it would suffice to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy (supra) where it has been held as under:- 39. The scope of application of doctrine of res judicata is in question. 31. In this regard, it would suffice to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy (supra) where it has been held as under:- 39. The scope of application of doctrine of res judicata is in question. The literal meaning of “res” is “everything that may form an object of rights and includes an object, subject-matter or status” and “res judicata” literally means “a matter adjudged a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgments”. “Res judicata pro veritate accipitur” is the full maxim which has, over the years, shrunk to mere “res judicata”, which means that res judicata is accepted for truth. The doctrine contains the rule of conclusiveness of the judgment which is based partly on the maxim of Roman jurisprudence “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (it concerns the State that there be an end to law suits) and partly on the maxim “nemo debet bis vexari pro uno et eadem causa” (no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause). 40. Even an erroneous decision on a question of law attracts the doctrine of res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as res judicata. (Vide: Shah Shivraj Gopalji v. ED-, Appakadh Ayiassa Bi & Ors., AIR 1949 PC 302 ; and Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 65 ).... 42. This Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Smt. Deorajin Debi & Anr., AIR 1960 SC 941 explained the scope of principle of res-judicata observing as under: “7. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation, When a matter whether on a question of fact or a question of law -has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where S. 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct.” A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Daryao & Ors. v. The State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1457 ; Greater Cochin Development Authority v. Leelamma Valson & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 952 ; and Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 626 . 43. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. & Anr. v. Janapada Sabha Chhindwara & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1013 , considered the issue of res judicata applicable in writ jurisdiction and held as under: “…Therefore, there can be no doubt that the general principle of res judicata applies to writ petitions filed under Article 32 or Article 226. It is necessary to emphasise that the application of the doctrine of res judicata to the petitions filed under Art. 32 does not in any way impair or affect the content of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of India. It only seeks to regulate the manner in which the said rights could be successfully asserted and vindicated in courts of law.” 44. In Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade & Anr., (1999) 5 SCC 590 , this Court has explained the scope of finality of the judgment of this Court observing as under: “One important consideration of public policy is that the decision pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction should be final, unless they are modified or reversed by the appellate authority and other principle that no one should be made to face the same kind of litigation twice ever because such a procedure should be contrary to consideration of fair play and justice. Rule of res judicata prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over again even though the determination may even be demonstratedly wrong. Rule of res judicata prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over again even though the determination may even be demonstratedly wrong. When the proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by the judgment and are estopped from questioning it.” (See also: Burn & Co., Calcutta v. Their Employees, AIR 1957 SC 38 ; G.K. Dudani & Ors. v. S.D. Sharma & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 1455 ; and Ashok Kumar Srivastav v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 2046 ). 45. A three-Judge Bench of this court in The State of Punjab v. Bua Das Kaushal, AIR 1971 SC 1676 considered the issue and came to the conclusion that if necessary facts were present in the mind of the parties and had gone into by the court, in such a fact-situation, absence of specific plea in written statement and framing of specific issue of res judicata by the court is immaterial. 46. A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Union of India v. Nanak Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1370 observing as under: “This Court in Gulabchand Chhotalal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153 observed that the provisions of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not exhaustive with respect to all earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit, and on the general principle of res judicata, any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject-matter. There is no good reason to preclude, such decisions on matters in controversy in writ proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the principle of the finality of decisions after full contest.” 48. Even otherwise, a different view on the interpretation of the law may be possible but the same should not be accepted in case it has the effect of unsettling transactions which had been entered into on the basis of those decisions, as reopening past and closed transactions or settled titles all over would stand jeopardized and this would create a chaotic situation which may bring instability in the society. 50. In Madan Mohan Pathak & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 803 , a seven-Judge Bench of this Court dealt with a case wherein the question arose as to whether the order passed by the Calcutta High Court issuing writ of mandamus directing the Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as L.I.C.) to pay cash bonus for the year 1975-76 to its class 3 and 4 employees in terms of the settlement between the parties was allowed to become final. Immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment, the Parliament enacted the LIC (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976. The appeal filed against the judgment of Calcutta High Court was not pressed by LIC and the said judgment was allowed to become final. This Court rejected the contention of the LIC that in view of the intervention of legislation, it was not liable to meet the liability under the said judgment. The Court held that there was nothing in the Act which nullifies the effect of the said judgment or which could set at naught the judgment or take away the binding character of the said judgment against LIC. Thus, the LIC was liable to make the payment in accordance with the said judgment and it could not be absolved from the obligation imposed by the said judgment. 51. This Court, while considering the binding effect of the judgment of this Court, in State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Mr. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd.) & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 693 , held: “There can be no dispute with respect to the settled legal proposition that a judgment of this Court is binding,…..It is also correct to state that, even if a particular issue has not been agitated earlier, or a particular argument was advanced, but was not considered, the said judgment does not lose its binding effect, provided that the point with reference to which an argument is subsequently advanced, has actually been decided. The decision therefore, would not lose its authority, "merely because it was badly argued, inadequately considered or fallaciously reasoned". (Vide: Smt. Somavanti & Ors. v. The State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 151 ; Ballabhdas Mathuradas Lakhani & Ors. v. Municipal Committee, Malkapur, AIR 1970 SC 1002 ; Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1762 ; and Director of Settlements, A.P. & Ors. v. M.R. Apparao & Anr., AIR 2002 SC 1598 ).” (emphasis by the Court) 32. Keeping in view the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy (supra) what is apparent is that in the earlier round of litigation the petitioner had been given the benefit of the circulars dated 20.07.2010, 26.07.2010 and 18.08.2010 rather the Bank having been required to consider the case of the petitioner in light of those circulars. As such, in the second round of litigation, the petitioner cannot now resile from the same and challenge the said circulars as clearly the principles of res-judicata would be applicable. Thus, the challenge to the aforesaid circulars is rejected. 33. So far as a challenge raised to the circular dated 08.03.2011 is concerned, as already observed above, it is the prerogative of the Bank, it being a commercial entity, to issue circulars for the purpose of absorption and recruitment of those employees whom it deems fit so that they would be able to carry out duties and responsibilities of the Bank and garner its business. Even otherwise, no grounds have been set forth in the petition as to why the circular dated 08.03.2011 has to be quashed apart from indicating that the business target had only been set for Marketing and Recovery Officers and not for other staff. Again this is the prerogative of the Bank to fix targets for any of its staff and it being a policy decision, this Court would be loath to interfere with the prerogative of the Bank. 34. In this regard, it would be apt to refer the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Gopinath Dash (supra) wherein the Apex Court has held as under:- "The policy decision must be left to the Government as it alone can adopt which policy should be adopted after considering all the points from different angles. 34. In this regard, it would be apt to refer the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Gopinath Dash (supra) wherein the Apex Court has held as under:- "The policy decision must be left to the Government as it alone can adopt which policy should be adopted after considering all the points from different angles. In matter of policy decisions or exercise of discretion by the Government so long as the infringement of fundamental right is not shown Courts will have no occasion to interfere and the Court will not and should not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the executive in such matters. In assessing the propriety of a decision of the Government the Court cannot interfere even if a second view is possible from that of the Government. The Court should constantly remind itself of what the Supreme Court of the United States said in Metropolis Theatre Company v. City of Chicago (1912) 57 L Ed 730: "The problems of Government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is the best is not always discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review." (emphasis by the Court) 35. Considering the aforesaid judgment in the case of Gopinath Dash (supra) this Court thus does not find any reason to interfere with the policy decision of the respondent Bank. 36. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, no case for interference is made out. The writ petition being misconceived is dismissed.