JUDGMENT Jaspreet Singh, J. Heard Sri Anurag Shukla, learned counsel for the appellants. None has put in appearance on behalf of the claimant-respondent nos. 1 to 5, however, Sri Asit Srivastava, learned counsel has appeared on behalf of the respondent no. 6. 2. The instant appeal has been preferred under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 assailing the award dated 19.12.2003 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No. 4, Hardoi in Claim Petition No. 282 of 2002 whereby in a death case a sum of Rs. 1,53,250/- along with 6% interest has been awarded in favour of the claimants-respondents with a direction that the award would be satisfied by the Insurance Company who would have a right to recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the owner of the vehicle has preferred the instant appeal. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant has primarily disputed the involvement of his tractor in the alleged accident which is said to have occurred on 21.07.2002. The thrust of the submission is that the appellant had got a new Tractor Swaraj for agricultural purposes and that he was not utilizing the said Tractor for any other purposes except for agricultural activities. The appellant did not rent out his tractor for any hire purpose and moreover on the alleged date of the incident, the appellant had taken his tractor to the Mandi from where he had received a receipt indicating his presence there and the distance from the said Mandi to the place of accident is about 140 Kms. and it was not possible for the said tractor to have been at the Mandi unloaded the fodder dry straw (bhoosa) and thereafter be at the place where the accident occurred. 4. It is also urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the manner in which the accident is said to have occurred is most improbable, inasmuch as, it is stated that on the given date and time i.e. on 21.07.2002 at around 06:00 P.M. It is alleged that the appellant was driving the tractor and trolley which had a number of peoples seated who were returning from a cremation and at the given spot, the tractor upturned and fell in a canal. The trolley also upturned and the deceased got crushed under the trolley and expired. 5. The trolley also upturned and the deceased got crushed under the trolley and expired. 5. It is urged that it is the case of the claimants that apart from the deceased few other persons seated in the trolley also received injuries but none turned up as eye-witness to depose for the claimants. 6. It is further submitted that it is attempted to show that the tractor had fallen in a canal but the depositions of the two claimants-witnesses are at variance on the aforesaid point i.e. to say that they only talked about the trolley but none pointed out towards the tractor. 7. It is thus urged that even the First Information Report which was lodged was about after 2 hours by a passerby and yet there was no means of removing the tractor from the canal and had the accident actually happened then even the tractor would have been found at the given place but all such evidence is missing which clearly gives an indication that the tractor of the appellant has been falsely implicated and a specific plea had also been raised in the pleadings that there was enmity between the family of the claimants and the appellant due to which he has been implicated in the instant case and for all the aforesaid reasons the award could not have been passed against the appellant. 8. Alternatively, it has been further urged by learned counsel for the appellant that even if at all the award may sustain but since the tractor was duly insured with the respondent no. 6, accordingly, the Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the award. 9. It is also submitted that the Insurance Company has taken a feeble plea that the tractor did not have the requisite documents and in case if the plea of violation of policy condition is taken by the Insurance Company then the burden is on the Insurance Company to prove the same and having failed to do so, the liability cannot be fastened on the appellant and to that extent the right to recovery given to the respondent no. 6 is bad and the appeal deserves to be allowed. 10. 6 is bad and the appeal deserves to be allowed. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision in New India Assurance Company, Shimla v. Kamla and Others; 2001 (4) SCC 342 , United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Raveejbhai Karshanbhai Rathod, a decision of the Gujarat High Court; 2005 (3) TAC 186 , Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Bhaiga Pradhan and Others; a decision of the Orrissa High Court 2004 (2) ACC 685 and Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and others; (2018) 5 SCC 656 . 11. Per contra, Sri Asit Srivastava, Advocate controverting the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant has simply pointed out that the claim petition is to be decided on pre-ponderance of probabilities. As per the claim version, it was indicated that the tractor-trolley was driven by the appellant and a number of people were returning after the cremation and at the given date and time, the deceased who was also with them was crushed under the trolley, consequently, he expired. A First Information Report was lodged and in pursuance whereof the investigation was made and a charge sheet was filed implicating the appellant. 12. It has further been submitted that apparently the tractor at the given point of time was not being utilized for agricultural purposes and thus it was prima facie clear that the tractor was being utilized for any other purpose other than the agriculture. Even in the cross-examination, it was noticed by the Tribunal that the appellant has stated that he used to put out his tractor for hire which also indicates that he was violating the policy conditions. 13. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Tribunal has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the accident was duly substantiated and since the tractor was being utilized not in consonance with the policy conditions, hence, while passing the award and directing the Insurance Company to pay, it has granted the right to recover which is in sound exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal which requires no interference and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sushil Kumar Godara; (2021) 14 SCC 519 . 14. The Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the material on record. 15. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sushil Kumar Godara; (2021) 14 SCC 519 . 14. The Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the material on record. 15. The only issue for consideration before this Court is as to whether the appellant can be mad liable to indemnify the award when the tractor of the appellant has been falsely implicated and no liability would rest on the appellant. 16. In order to find an answer to the aforesaid issue, it would be worthwhile to take a glance at the facts leading to the instant appeal. 17. A claim petition bearing No. 282 of 2002 came to be filed by the claimants who are respondents no. 1 to 5 before this Court under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 18. It was alleged that Maiku son of Dhara Raidas who was 50 years of age and engaged in agricultural activities and used to sell milk was able to earn Rs. 3,000/- per month. It was further stated that on 21.07.2002 at around 06:00 PM, the deceased Maiku was returning home after attending the cremation ceremony (of daughter-in-law of Mangal of Baghar Village) on the tractor belonging to the appellant namely Ram Kumar Chaurasiya. While the tractor was on Sarehi Garhdaul Road between Diwari and Atuka, it was being driven rashly and negligently, as a result, the negligent driving of Ram Kumar, the tractor turned turtle and fell in a canal while the deceased who was on the tractor died on the spot while few other persons namely Chhote Lal, Vijay Pal Singh, Prem Chand and Kallu also received grievous injuries. A First Information Report was lodged at around 08:15 PM bearing Case Crime No. 191 of 2002 under Sections 279, 338, 304-A I.P.C. In view of the aforesaid, the claim petition was registered and upon notices being issued, the same was contested both by Raj Kumar as well as the Insurance Company. 19. In the written statement, it was pleaded by the appellant that he used his tractor only for agricultural purposes and he does not rent out his tractor for hire. 19. In the written statement, it was pleaded by the appellant that he used his tractor only for agricultural purposes and he does not rent out his tractor for hire. It was also stated that the tractor in question was duly insured with the Insurance Company and that he had a valid and a subsisting driving license. It was also stated that the appellant never permitted anyone on his tractor-trolley nor he used his tractor-trolley for the aforesaid purposes. A plea was also taken that the tractor has been falsely implicated on account of certain inimical relations between the claimants and the family of the appellant. 20. The Insurance Company also contested the petition on usual grounds that they would have no liability to pay unless the tractor had requisite papers and was being driven in compliance of the policy conditions and the parties led evidence and thereafter the Tribunal by means of order dated 19.12.2003 found that the accident was on account of rash and negligent driving by the appellant. It also noticed that the appellant was not driving the tractor in accordance with the policy conditions including the fact that at the time of the accident, it did not have the registration which was got done almost after a week from the date of the accident and since in the cross-examination as well as the manner in which the accident occurred indicates that it was being used for hire including for non-agricultural purposes which was in direct violation of the policy conditions, consequently, the awarded amount was directed to be paid by the Insurance Company who was also granted a right of recovery. 21. It is this award dated 19.12.2003 which is under challenge in the instant appeal on the aforesaid grounds as noticed hereinabove. 22. Having considered the rival submissions and from the perusal of the material on record, apparently, it is clear that the 2 claimants-witnesses who have been examined are not the eye-witnesses, however, from the manner in which they have deposed before the Tribunal, it indicates that the trolley was upturned and the deceased was crushed and had lost his life in the said accident. 23. From the perusal of the pleadings set-up by the appellant, it would be clear that he does not deny that the tractor in question belonged to him. 23. From the perusal of the pleadings set-up by the appellant, it would be clear that he does not deny that the tractor in question belonged to him. It is also not in dispute that the appellant does not have a trolley i.e. to say that it is not the case of the appellant that he only possess a tractor and not a trolley. Since in paragraph 12 of his written statement, he had clearly stated that he does not use his tractor-trolley for carrying passengers. 24. It is also not disputed by the appellant that in pursuance of the First Information Report relating to the accident in question, investigation was made wherein the appellant was charge sheeted. The incident apparently is of the year 2002 and till date the appellant is still under trial in the said criminal case as the learned counsel for the appellant could not indicate as to whether the appellant has been acquitted honorably. 25. Another aspect which needs to be considered is that a claim petition is to be decided on the basis of per-ponderance of probabilities and the Apex Court in Sunita & Others v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corproation & Anr., (2020) 13 SCC 486 has laid down certain criteria which will be worthwhile to be noticed and is being re-produced hereinafter:- "11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimant's predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a postmortem report vis-a-vis the averments made in a claim petition. 14. 14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the claimant's witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying the burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by Respondents 2 and 3. 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties." (emphasis supplied) The Court restated the legal position that the claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied by the Tribunal while dealing with the motor accident cases. Even in that case, the view taken by the High Court to reverse similar findings, recorded by the Tribunal was set aside. 23. Following the enunciation in Bimla Devi case, this Court in Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand (2011) 11 SCC 635 noted that when filing of the complaint was not disputed, the decision of the Tribunal ought not to have been reversed by the High Court on the ground that nobody came from the office of the SSP to prove the complaint. The Court appreciated 7 (2011) 11 SCC 635 , 21 the testimony of the eyewitnesses in paras 12 & 13 and observed thus: (Parmeshwari case, SCC p. 638) "12. The other ground on which the High Court dismissed the case was by way of disbelieving the testimony of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such disbelief of the High Court is totally conjectural. The other ground on which the High Court dismissed the case was by way of disbelieving the testimony of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such disbelief of the High Court is totally conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the appellant but as a good citizen, Umed Singh extended his help to the appellant by helping her to reach the doctor's chamber in order to ensure that an injured woman gets medical treatment. The evidence of Umed Singh cannot be disbelieved just because he did not file a complaint himself. We are constrained to repeat our observation that the total approach of the High Court, unfortunately, was not sensitised enough to appreciate the plight of the victim. 13. The other so-called reason in the High Court's order was that as the claim petition was filed after four months of the accident, the same is "a device to grab money from the insurance company". This finding in the absence of any material is certainly perverse. The High Court appears to be not cognizant of the principle that in a road accident claim, the strict principles of proof in a criminal case are not attracted. ..." 24. It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Ka rumai Ammal (1980) 3 SCC 457 , wherein it was contended by the vehicle owner that the criminal case in relation to the accident had ended in acquittal and for which reason the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act ought to be rejected. This Court negatived the said argument by observing that the nature of proof required to establish culpable rashness, punishable under IPC, is more stringent than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The observation made in para 3 of the judgment would throw some light as to what should be the approach of the Tribunal in motor accident cases. The same reads thus: (SCC pp. 458-59) "3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The same reads thus: (SCC pp. 458-59) "3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take 8 (1980) 3 SCC 457 special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasising this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their neighbour. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for State relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard." 25. In Dulcina Fernandes (2013) 10 SCC 646 , this Court examined similar situation where the evidence of claimant's eyewitness was discarded by the Tribunal and that the respondent in that case was acquitted in the criminal case concerning the accident. This Court, however, opined that it cannot be overlooked that upon investigation of the case registered against the respondent, prima facie, materials showing negligence were found to put him on trial. This Court, however, opined that it cannot be overlooked that upon investigation of the case registered against the respondent, prima facie, materials showing negligence were found to put him on trial. The Court restated the settled principle that the evidence of the claimants ought to be examined by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied as noted in Bimla Devi. In paras 8 & 9 of the reported decision, the dictum in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta (2011) 10 SCC 509 , has been adverted to as under: (Dulcina Fernandes case, SCC p. 650) "8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta while considering the nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three Judge Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which Propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted hereinbelow: (SCC p. 518, para 10) '10. (ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal. * * * (v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. ... (vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.' 9. The following further observation available in para 10 of the Report would require specific note: (Shila Datta case, SCC p. 519) '10. ... We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute.'" In para 10 of Dulcina Fernandes, the Court opined that nonexamination of witness per se cannot be treated as fatal to the claim set up before the Tribunal. In other words, the approach of the Tribunal should be holistic analysis of the entire pleadings and evidence by applying the principles of preponderance of probability." xxx------------xxx------------xxx------------xxx------------xxx "22. It is thus well settled that in motor accident claim cases, once the foundational fact, namely, the actual occurrence of the accident, has been established, then the Tribunal's role would be to calculate the quantum of just compensation if the accident had taken place by reason of negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle and, while doing so, the Tribunal would not be strictly bound by the pleadings of the parties. Notably, while deciding cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents, the standard of proof to be borne in mind must be of preponderance of probability and not the strict standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt which is followed in criminal cases. " 26. Having said that this Court is also cognizant of a recent decision of the Apex Court in Mathew Alexander v. Mohammad Shafi and Another; 2023 SCC Online SC 832 wherein the Apex Court has held as under:- 12. Insofar as the claim petition filed by the Appellant herein is concerned, alleged negligence on the part of the driver of the tanker lorry and pickup van in causing the accident has to be proved. That is a matter which has to be considered on the basis of preponderance of the possibilities and not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is left to the parties in the claim petitions filed by the Appellant herein or other claimants to let in their respective evidence and the burden is on them to prove negligence on the part of the driver of the Alto car, the tanker lorry or pickup van, as the case may be, in causing the accident. In such an event, the claim petition would be considered on its own merits. It is needless to observe that if the proof of negligence on the part of the drivers of the three vehicles is not established then, in that event, the claim petition will be disposed of accordingly. 13. In this context, we could refer to judgments of this Court in the case of N.K.V. Bros. It is needless to observe that if the proof of negligence on the part of the drivers of the three vehicles is not established then, in that event, the claim petition will be disposed of accordingly. 13. In this context, we could refer to judgments of this Court in the case of N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Anmal reported in (1980) 3 SCC 457 : AIR 1980 SC 1354 , wherein the plea that the criminal case had ended in acquittal and that, therefore, the civil suit must follow suit, was rejected. It was observed that culpable rashness under Section 304A of IPC is more drastic than negligence under the law of torts to create liability. Similarly, in (2009) 13 SCC 530 , in the case of Bimla Devi v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation ("Bimla Devi"), it was observed that in a claim petition filed under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Tribunal has to determine the amount of fair compensation to be granted in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of a driver of a motor vehicle. A holistic view of the evidence has to be taken into consideration by the Tribunal and strict proof of an accident caused by a particular vehicle in a particular manner need not be established by the claimants. The claimants have to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering the petition seeking compensation on account of death or injury in a road traffic accident. To the same effect is the observation made by this Court in Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 which has referred to the aforesaid judgment in Bimla Devi. 14. In that view of the matter, it is for the Appellant herein to establish negligence on the part of the driver of the tanker lorry in the petition filed by him seeking compensation on account of death of his son in the said accident. Thus, the opinion in the final report would not have a bearing on the claim petition for the aforesaid reasons. Thus, the opinion in the final report would not have a bearing on the claim petition for the aforesaid reasons. This is because the Appellant herein is seeking compensation for the death of his son in the accident which occurred on account of the negligence on the part of the driver of the tanker lorry, causing the accident on the said date. It is further observed that in the claim petitions filed by the dependents, in respect of the other passengers in the car who died in the accident, they have to similarly establish the negligence in accordance with law. 27. Taking note of the dictum of the Apex Court in the aforesaid two cases of Sunita (supra) and Alexander (supra), the inescapable conclusion that can be drawn is that the claim petition is not to be tried as a criminal trial that all facts have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 28. In the instant case, if the ratio of the aforesaid two cases of the Apex Court are applied, it would be found that the claimants-witnesses, who though, were not eye-witnesses but nevertheless have narrated the incident that the accident had occurred where the deceased had lost his life. Upon institution of the First Information Report, the investigation came into motion and prima facie the involvement of the tractor in question was found. Apart from the investigation, the appellant was charge sheeted and apparently it has not been indicated or brought on record that the appellant has been acquitted or the accident could not be proved or the appellant has been granted the benefit of any doubt. 29. Another fact that needs to be noticed is that the claimants in their claim petition have clearly stated that apart from the death of Maiku, certain other persons who were also travelling in the trolley namely Chhotey Lal, Vijay Pal Singh, Prem Chand and Kallu who had received injuries in the same accident, their claim petitions were also pending before the same Tribunal, which has decided the instant matter as shall be evident from the judgment impugned. 30. 30. It is quite surprising that though it has been observed by the Tribunal that other persons who were injured in the same whose claim petitions were still under trial yet nothing has been brought on record by the appellant to disprove the said statement or to show that the statement contained in the judgment impugned is incorrect. It has also not been indicated that what was the outcome of the aforesaid claim petitions filed by the injured persons. 31. It is also well settled that in the claim petition, pleadings are not to be strictly construed and the proceedings are of the summary nature. It is with the aforesaid backdrop if the texture of the statement of the claimant-witnesses is seen in juxtaposition to the statement of Ram Kumar, the appellant, it cannot be said that the appellant was successful in disputing the involvement of his tractor or that it was falsely implicated. To the aforesaid extent, the arguments which has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is in expectation of the Tribunal or this Court to see and scrutinize the evidence with a fine tooth comb and that the facts had to be proved beyond all reasonable doubts. 32. It is also stated that the alleged receipt issued by the Mandi where the appellant is said to have been there in the morning is not the clinching evidence to state that after having unloaded the fodder at the Mandi in the morning then it could not have been at the given site by 06:00 PM. It is alleged that the distance is about 140 Kms. but the fact remains that there were no such pleadings nor there was any such foundation in the evidence led by the appellant who was examined as D.W.1 in context with the alleged distance or the possibility of the tractor being there at the site of the accident. 33. Having taken a glance at the evidence of D.W. 1 i.e. the appellant, it does not indicate with certainty that the appellant was successful in disputing the involvement of his tractor especially in view of the fact that the appellant had already been charge sheeted and is facing criminal trial and even in his deposition there is no clear evidence regarding false implication. 34. 34. For the purposes of Claim Petition, once the foundational facts are established, the Tribunal in its inquiry is not required to dwell deep into the facts and evidence. 35. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds that the view taken by the Tribunal does not suffer from any palpable error which may persuade this Court to interfere. 36. It will also be relevant to notice that the fact the appellant used his tractor for non-agricultural purposes is evident and apparently is in violation of the policy conditions, hence, for the aforesaid reasons, this Court is not inclined to interfere nor it can be said that the Tribunal erred in granting the right of recovery to the respondent no.6-Insurance Company. 37. Having taken note of the decisions cited by learned counsel for the appellant in Kamla (supra), this Court finds that it relates to the rights and grounds of defence for an Insurance Company and it lays down the proposition that in case where a policy of insurance has been issued then the burden is on the Insurance Company to pay the third parties whether or not there has been any breach of violation if the policy condition and in case where there is a violation then the amount can be recovered from the insured. The facts of the case in Kamla (supra) do not support the case of the appellant in any manner as in the given circumstances, the tractor-trolley was being utilized for non-agricultural purposes and statement to the aforesaid effect is also contained in the cross-examination, accordingly, the case does not help the appellant. 38. The decision of the Gujarat High Court as well as the Orissa High Court cited are on a different set of facts and have no applicability in the present case. The decision of Mangla Ram (supra) also lays down that the proposition that the standard of proof is not very strict as required in the claim petitions and they are to be decided on the basis of pre-ponderance of probabilities and for the said reason the aforesaid decision also does not come to the aid of the appellant especially in light of the arguments which has been made by the appellant as noticed above. 39. On the contrary, the decision cited by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 39. On the contrary, the decision cited by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 6 in Sushil Kumar Godara (supra), wherein it has been held that in case if the vehicle in question is being utilized against the policy conditions then the Insurance Company would not be liable. 40. That in light of what has been discussed hereinabove, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Any amount deposited before this Court shall be remitted to the Tribunal to be released in favour of the claimants and in case if the claimants had been paid the entire amount then the same may be released in favour of the Insurance Company who has been granted the right of recovery by the Tribunal and has been affirmed by this Court. 41. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. The records shall be remitted to the Tribunal concerned.