JUDGMENT/ORDER 1. By this application, the Applicant (Defendant No. 2) is seeking judgment for dismissal of the suit on the basis of admissions. This application has been filed in peculiar facts and circumstances. In order to understand the background in which the present application has been filed, it would be appropriate to briefly refer to the facts of the present case. 2. The Plaintiff has filed the present suit under Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act (hereinafter refer to as the aforesaid Act) for restoration of possession of suit premises, which according to the Plaintiff, was forcibly and illegally taken from the Plaintiff by the Defendants. The Plaintiff has also sought ancillary reliefs, including interim reliefs, which were also separately pressed on the basis of Notice of Motion filed in the suit. 3. In the plaint, the Plaintiff has referred to and relied upon a Leave and License Agreement dtd. 7/10/2017, whereby the Plaintiff was inducted as a licensee from 21/3/2018 to 20/3/2023, it being referred to as the license period. The Plaintiff was inducted as licensee for running a restaurant and bar in the suit premises. It is the case of the Plaintiff that it spent about Rs.2.5 Crores in renovating the suit premises for the purposes of restaurant and bar and while it was in the process of completing the renovation work, it was wrongfully dispossessed, as the Defendants withheld the keys of the premises from the Plaintiff from 23/10/2018 onwards. The suit was admittedly filed within the period of limitation of six months and when the notice of motion for interim reliefs was pressed, an ad-interim order dtd. 15/11/2019 was passed restraining the Defendants from creating third party rights in the suit property. The said ad-interim order has remained in operation. 4. Although the suit filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act, is by its very nature is an urgent proceeding, which needs to be decided at the earliest possible, the record shows that the suit has remained pending. It is in this backdrop that the Defendant No. 2 has filed the present application. It is submitted that the pleadings in the plaint, which refer to and rely upon the Leave and License Agreement, show that the very period of the license itself expired on 20/3/2023. It is in this backdrop that the Defendant No. 2 has filed the present application. It is submitted that the pleadings in the plaint, which refer to and rely upon the Leave and License Agreement, show that the very period of the license itself expired on 20/3/2023. The relevant portions of the pleadings and the contents of the Leave and License Agreement have been quoted in the application and on that basis, it is submitted that the said pleadings amount to admission about the period of the Leave and License Agreement having expired on 20/3/2023. It is submitted that in these circumstances, once the Leave and License period itself is over, this Court exercising power under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act cannot possibly allow the suit for putting back the Plaintiff in possession. The prayers made in the present application are stoutly opposed and denied on behalf of the Plaintiff. 5. Mr. Simil Purohit, learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant (Defendant No. 2) in the present application, relied upon the statements made in the plaint and the contents of the Leave and License Agreement, to vehemently contend that the present suit deserves to be dismissed on the basis of such admissions in the plaint itself. It is submitted that this Court in the present suit filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act, can no longer consider the prayer of the Plaintiff to be put back in possession of the suit premises, for the simple reason that the Leave and License Agreement itself expired on 20/3/2023. It is submitted that if this Court were to give a direction to restore possession of the Plaintiff in the suit premises, it would amount to the Court creating a contract between the parties, which can never be countenanced. It is submitted that the status of the licensee is distinct from a lessee or a tenant and that therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case the suit deserves to be dismissed/rejected on admissions made in the plaint itself, although the Plaintiff may avail other remedies as permissible in law. It is submitted that in the frame of the present suit filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act, the possibility of granting relief of restoration of possession itself has been rendered an impossibility, in view of the fact that the license period has itself expired on 20/3/2023. It is submitted that in the frame of the present suit filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act, the possibility of granting relief of restoration of possession itself has been rendered an impossibility, in view of the fact that the license period has itself expired on 20/3/2023. It is submitted that in this situation, the Defendants cannot be made to face the rigmarole of trial and the ad-interim order granted against Defendants is unnecessarily preventing them from dealing with property in question, although admittedly the license period is already over. 6. The learned Counsel for the further submitted that after expiry of the period of license, the Plaintiff is nothing but a tresspasser and hence no relief can be granted in the present Suit. It was further submitted that the distinction between lease and license is well established and that the licensee merely has the facility of using the premises during the period of the license while the licensor continuous to be in juridical possession of the same. Such physical possession of the licensee beyond the period of license cannot be contemplated and therefore, there would no possibility in the present case for this Court to restore possession of the Plaintiff in the suit property, for the reason that the right to continue in possession of the Plaintiff as a licensee came to an end on the date of expiry of the period of license. In support of the aforementioned contentions, the learned Counsel appearing for the relied upon judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of D.H. Maniar and Ors. Vs. Waman Laxman Kudav ( AIR 1976 SC 2340 ), The Corporation of Calicut Vs. K. Sreenivasan ( AIR 2002 SC 2051 ) and judgments of the Delhi High Court in the case of Chandu Lal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi AIR (1978 Delhi 174), M/s Pradeep Oil Corporation Vs. Union of India (AIR 2012 Delhi 56) and DTTDC Vs. M/s D R Mehara and Sons (AIR 1996 Delhi 351) and judgment of this Court in the case of Concrete Developers Vs. Central Bank of India and Anr. (AIR Online 2022 Bom. 2659). 7. On the other hand, Mr. Union of India (AIR 2012 Delhi 56) and DTTDC Vs. M/s D R Mehara and Sons (AIR 1996 Delhi 351) and judgment of this Court in the case of Concrete Developers Vs. Central Bank of India and Anr. (AIR Online 2022 Bom. 2659). 7. On the other hand, Mr. Rajiv Narula, learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff submitted that the contentions raised on behalf of the are fundamentally flawed, because the present case being a suit under Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, does not concern the title of either party in the suit property. The limited inquiry warranted in such a suit is, as to whether the Plaintiff has been dispossessed without his consent from immovable property and otherwise than in due course of law. According to the Plaintiff, by moving the present application, the is wrongly placing emphasis on the Leave and License Agreement to claim that the license period being an admission on the part of the Plaintiff, upon expiry of the said period the suit must be dismissed. It was submitted that the said contention of the is based on an erroneous appreciation of the law pertaining to suits filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act. The Plaintiff being in settled possession and having been dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law, the inquiry in the present suit is limited to the said aspect of the matter. 8. It was further submitted that if the contentions of the were to be accepted, it would amount to placing premium on extra judicial use of force by the Applicant in throwing out the Plaintiff from the suit property in which the Plaintiff admittedly was in settled possession. According to the Plaintiff, this would encourage lawlessness and parties like the Applicant/ Defendant No. 2 would also be encouraged in taking the law in their own hands and becoming judges in their own cause. This could go against fundamental tenets of rule of law. It was further submitted that pendency of the suit due to extremely heavy docket of the Court cannot be a ground for relief being granted to the Applicant/ Defendant No. 2, as no act of the Court can be prejudicial to any party. This could go against fundamental tenets of rule of law. It was further submitted that pendency of the suit due to extremely heavy docket of the Court cannot be a ground for relief being granted to the Applicant/ Defendant No. 2, as no act of the Court can be prejudicial to any party. The learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff submitted that in such a suit filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act, at the interim stage itself, Courts do issue directions for appointment of Receiver, although in the present case only limited ad-interim relief was granted by order dtd. 15/11/2019, whereby the Defendants were restrained from inducting any third party in the suit property. 9. In support of the aforesaid contentions, the learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff relied upon judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Ram Mahale (Dead), by Lrs Vs. Shobha Venkat Rao ( AIR 1989 SC 2097 ), S.R. Ejaz Vs. T.N. Handloom Weavers' Cooperative Society Ltd. (2002) 3 SCC 137 ), Mohd. Mehtab Khan and Ors. Vs. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan and Ors. (2013)9 SCC 221 ), judgment of this Court in the case of Raju Deganna Shetti Vs. Dinkar Nilay Shetti and Ors. (2022 SCC OnLine Bom 9229) and judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in G. Silver Spoon Restaurant and Entertainments Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. (Judgment and order dtd. 24/3/2021 passed in Writ Petition No. 22510 of 2020). 10. Heard learned Counsel for rival parties and perused the material on record. The present application is filed primarily on the basis that the period of the Leave and License Agreement dtd. 7/10/2017, executed between the parties expired on 20/3/2023. According to the , upon expiry of the license period, there is not even a semblance of right in the Plaintiff for continuing in possession of the suit property and that therefore, no relief can be granted in the present suit, which is a suit seeking restoration of possession under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act. It is submitted that even if this Court were to hold in favour of the Plaintiff there is no possibility of granting restoration of possession, as it would amount to virtually the Court creating a contract between the parties, which is wholly impermissible in law. It is submitted that even if this Court were to hold in favour of the Plaintiff there is no possibility of granting restoration of possession, as it would amount to virtually the Court creating a contract between the parties, which is wholly impermissible in law. It is further the case of the that the ad-interim relief granted by this Court in favour of the Plaintiff by order dtd. 15/11/2019, restraining the Defendants from inducting any third party into the suit property, amounts to an onerous direction restraining the right of the Defendants in lawfully enjoying their property, particularly when the license period itself expired on 20/3/2023. The basis of such contentions raised on behalf of the Applicant/ Defendant No. 2 is that the right of the Plaintiff to claim possession and to continue in possession of the suit property is rooted in the aforesaid Leave and License Agreement dtd. 7/10/2017. 11. The crux of the matter is that the present suit filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act concerns the specific question as to whether the Plaintiff claiming to be in settled possession stood dispossessed without his consent and otherwise than in due course of law. This Court is of the opinion that the frame of the suit filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act, by its very nature, calls upon the Court to conduct an inquiry and answer the aforesaid issue specifically raised on behalf of the Plaintiff. The question that arises for consideration is, as to whether this Court is rendered powerless to enter upon such an inquiry and to render findings thereupon, due to the fact that the license period as per the aforesaid agreement expired on 20/3/2023. The answer has to be in the negative. This is for the reason that the jurisdiction of this Court in conducting the aforesaid inquiry and rendering findings under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act cannot be circumscribed by the aforesaid subsequent event of expiry of the license period. 12. The Plaintiff has referred to the Leave and License Agreement dtd. 7/10/2017, to indicate as to the manner in which it entered into possession of the suit property. It is not even the case of the Defendants that the Plaintiff was never inducted into the suit property or that the Leave and License Agreement was never executed between the parties. The Plaintiff has referred to the Leave and License Agreement dtd. 7/10/2017, to indicate as to the manner in which it entered into possession of the suit property. It is not even the case of the Defendants that the Plaintiff was never inducted into the suit property or that the Leave and License Agreement was never executed between the parties. In that sense, the Plaintiff has referred to the Leave and License Agreement to demonstrate that it was in settled possession when the Defendants allegedly forcibly and illegally dispossessed the Plaintiff on 23/10/2018. It cannot be said that because the suit has remained pending, due to no fault on the part of either party and in the meanwhile, the license period has expired, that the very jurisdiction of this Court to conduct the inquiry on the contentions raised by the Plaintiff is taken away and that this Court is rendered powerless to entertain the present suit any further. The contentions raised on behalf of the are based on a flawed interpretation of the law concerning the jurisdiction of the Court while entertaining and deciding such suits filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act. If the contentions raised on behalf of the are to be accepted, it would lead to a situation where mere pendency of the suits for a considerable period of time would inure to the benefit of the Defendant and it would take away the right of the Plaintiff in a suit filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid act for its contentions to be decided on merits. Such an interpretation would run counter to the rule of law, for the reason that it would give primacy to actions undertaken by a party of forcefully and illegally dispossessing another party, by taking the law in its own hands. It would encourage lawlessness, which cannot be permitted. 13. There is substance in the contention raised on behalf of the Plaintiff that pendency of the suit beyond the period of license cannot be a ground to hold in favour of the Defendants, as no act of the Court can be prejudicial to any party. Suits filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act are by their very nature urgent proceedings and summary in nature. This is evident from the fact that sub-sec. Suits filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act are by their very nature urgent proceedings and summary in nature. This is evident from the fact that sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 6 of the said Act provides that no appeal can lie against an Order or Decree passed in such a suit and no review of such an Order or Decree is permitted. Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 6 of the said Act specifically stipulates that nothing in the said Sec. can bar any person from suing to establish its title to the property and to recover possession thereof. These are significant aspects of the said provision, which go to the very root of the matter and indicate that the contentions raised on behalf of the cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 14. It is seen quite often in such cases, that when the Plaintiff has made out a strong prima facie case, the Court directs appointment of Receiver, during the pendency of the suit and the possession is taken by the Court Receiver subject to the result of the suit. In the present case, although in the pending notice of motion, the Plaintiff did pray, inter alia, for appointment of Court Receiver, by the aforesaid order dtd. 15/11/2019, this Court thought it fit to grant limited ad-interim relief restraining the Defendants from inducting third party into the suit property. It is only a reflection of the massive docket explosion and extremely heavy docket of the Court that even the notice of motion is yet to be finally disposed of. The suit was filed within six months of dispossession in the year 2019 and it is still pending at the preliminary stage. The Plaintiff cannot be made to suffer for such circumstances beyond its control and equally the Defendants cannot be allowed to take advantage of such a situation of pendency of the matter, which is not the creation of either party. 15. In this backdrop, the is not justified in jumping the gun and claiming that this Court by allowing the suit, if at all, would be creating a contract between the parties as the license period as per the agreement between the parties has admittedly expired on 20/3/2023. 15. In this backdrop, the is not justified in jumping the gun and claiming that this Court by allowing the suit, if at all, would be creating a contract between the parties as the license period as per the agreement between the parties has admittedly expired on 20/3/2023. The correct approach is to consider as to whether this Court, despite expiry of the license period, can enter into the inquiry regarding alleged forcible and illegal dispossession of the Plaintiff from settled possession in the suit property. This Court is of the opinion that expiry of the license period on 20/3/2023, cannot be an event that takes away the jurisdiction of this Court to conduct the aforesaid inquiry and to render findings thereon. As regards the hardship or inconvenience being suffered by the Defendants due to the ad-interim order, remedies are open to the Defendants and this Court is informed that an Appeal against the ad-interim order is already pending. The Defendants are at liberty to argue that in such a situation the notice of motion needs to be dismissed, but at this stage, this Court is not inclined to accept the contention of the Applicant/ Defendant No. 2 that due to expiry of the license period on 20/3/2023, the adinterim order ought to be vacated and the suit itself ought to be dismissed. 16. The learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff is justified in relying upon judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Ram Mahale (Dead), by Lrs. Vs. Shobha Venkat Rao, (supra) S.R. Ejaz Vs. T.N. Handloom Weavers' Cooperative Society Ltd., (supra) and Mohd. Mehtab Khan and Ors. Vs. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan and Ors. (supra), wherein it has been held that the proceedings under Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act are summary in nature, the object of which is to conduct an inquiry into the question as to whether the Plaintiff was illegally dispossessed, otherwise than in due course of law and for affording an immediate remedy of restoration of possession. It has been held in the said judgments that when a person is in settled possession of property, even if such a person no longer has right to remain on the property, such a person cannot be dispossessed except by recourse to law. It has been held in the said judgments that when a person is in settled possession of property, even if such a person no longer has right to remain on the property, such a person cannot be dispossessed except by recourse to law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has deprecated extra judicial use of force for dispossessing a party even after expiry or termination of lease period, while in the present case, the Plaintiff was admittedly in possession of the suit premises during the currency of the Leave and License Agreement, the reference to such an agreement being made only to demonstrate settled possession of the Plaintiff in the suit property. 17. Similarly reliance placed on behalf of the Plaintiff on judgment of this Court in the case of Raju Deganna Shetti Vs. Dinkar Nilay Shetti and Ors. (supra) is justified, for the reason that a party cannot be permitted to take the law in its own hands, so as to dispossess a person in settled possession, as it would amount to allowing such a party to become a judge in its own cause. Reliance placed on behalf of the Plaintiff on the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of G. Silver Spoon Restaurant and Entertainments Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. (supra), is justified to the extent that in the said judgment the Court has deliberated upon the aspect of due process of law, in the context of unlawful dispossession of a party, which is in settled possession of property. 18. On the other hand, reliance placed on behalf of the on judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of D.H. Maniar and Ors. Vs. Waman Laxman Kudav (supra), and The Corporation of Calicut Vs. K. Sreenivasan (supra), appears to be misplaced, for the reason that in the said judgments it has been observed that a person continuing in possession after termination/withdrawal or revocation of license, continues only as a tresspasser and that there is a clear distinction between the concept of lease and license. There can be no quarrel with the said proposition, for the reason that the distinction between lease and license is well established. In the judgment in the case of The Corporation of Calicut Vs. There can be no quarrel with the said proposition, for the reason that the distinction between lease and license is well established. In the judgment in the case of The Corporation of Calicut Vs. K. Sreenivasan (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself has observed that a licensee cannot be forcefully evicted by the granter without taking recourse to the provisions of law. The limited inquiry in the present suit under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act pertains to the question as to whether the Plaintiff was indeed forcibly and illegally dispossessed without recourse to law and jurisdiction of this Court to enter upon inquiry and render findings cannot be taken away due to expiry of the license period during the pendency of the suit. 19. Reliance placed on judgments of the Delhi High Court Chandu Lal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), M/s Pradeep Oil Corporation Vs. Union of India (supra) and DTTDC Vs. M/s D R Mehara and Sons (supra), cannot be of much assistance, for the reason that in the facts of those cases, the licensor was seeking possession of the properties upon expiry of the license period and in that context the Court held that the licensee was rendered a tresspasser after the license period expired, which is not relevant for the facts of the present case. The observations made in the aforesaid judgments of the Delhi High Court are in the context of facts of those cases, which are clearly distinguishable from the present suit filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act by the Plaintiff. 20. In the case of Concrete Developers Vs. Central Bank of India and Anr. (supra), this Court was dealing with a suit for eviction, wherein the lessee admitted that even the extended period of lease had expired. It was not a case of forcible dispossession of a party. Therefore, the said judgment can also not be of any assistance to the. 21. This Court is in agreement with the contention raised on behalf of the Plaintiff that allowing the present application and preventing inquiry into the conduct of the Defendants may amount to giving premium to alleged extra judicial actions of the Defendants and would thereby be detrimental to the rule of law. 21. This Court is in agreement with the contention raised on behalf of the Plaintiff that allowing the present application and preventing inquiry into the conduct of the Defendants may amount to giving premium to alleged extra judicial actions of the Defendants and would thereby be detrimental to the rule of law. This Court also finds substance in the contention raised on behalf of the Plaintiff that due to pendency of such a suit filed under Sec. 6 of the aforesaid Act, due to extremely heavy docket of the Court and in the interregnum the license period itself having expired, cannot inure to the benefit of the Defendants. This cannot be said to be a case fit for granting judgment/decree on admissions as claimed by the Defendants. 22. In the light of the above, this Court finds no merit in the present application and accordingly, Interim Application (Lodging) No. 15445 of 2023 is dismissed. 23. The suit is expedited and the pending applications/notices of motion shall now be listed at the earliest for further consideration and disposal.