ORDER : 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner against the order dated 18.9.2018 (Annexure P-1) passed by the 1st Civil Judge Class-I, Janjgir, in Civil Suit No.91A/17, whereby application preferred by the plaintiff/respondent No.1 under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC has been allowed and impleaded the petitioner/Tahsildar as defendant No.3. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on 03.11.2017 respondent No.1/plaintiff has filed a civil suit for declaration, injunction and damages to the tune of Rs.9,50,000/- against defendants No.1 and 2 alleging that the plaintiff is owner of the land bearing khasra No.3340/3 area 0.01 acre situated at village Janjgir and the said land was purchased by the plaintiff vide registered sale deed dated 13.12.1996. Defendant No.1-Geeta Bai filed an application under Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short 'Code') in the Court of Tahsildar, Janjgir, in which she has stated that the plaintiff/respondent No.1 has encroached upon the land area 0.0814 acre bearing khasra No.3441/1. On filing such application, a revenue case bearing No.13/A-70/2016-17 was registered and notice was issued to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed his reply on 10.7.2017 denying the allegation of encroachment. The petitioner/Tahsildar proceeded exparte against the plaintiff and passed an order on 16.7.2017 declaring that the plaintiff has encroached the land upon 36.5x40 feet and also issued warrant of dispossession on 16.10.2017. The plaintiff has filed an application under section 52 of the Code before the Tahsildar, Janjgir, which was rejected by the Tahsildar vide order dated 25.10.2017, against which, the plaintiff/respondent No.1 preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Janjgir and in which, stay order has been passed in favour of the plaintiff. On 26.10.2017 in spite of the stay order in favour of the plaintiff/respondent No.1, representatives of defendant No1/respondent No.2 forcibly entered the land and caused damage to the house of the plaintiff. Initially the petitioner was not made as a party, but subsequently an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC was filed by the plaintiff that the petitioner is also responsible for damages caused to the plaintiff and for the same, the plaintiff has served notice under Section 80 of the CPC to the State Government including the Tahsildar, Janjgir. By the impugned order, the petitioner has been arrayed as a party defendant. 3. By the impugned order, the petitioner has been arrayed as a party defendant. 3. Mr.Amratya Rajwade, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the petitioner has passed judicial order in the official capacity and as such, he should not have been impleaded as a party in his personal capacity. So, he prays to set aside the impugned order. 4. On the other hand, Mr.Bharat Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.1/plaintiff, would support the impugned order and submit that civil suit is already pending for consideration and this fact was brought to the notice of the petitioner/Tahsildar, but with an ulterior intention, the impugned order has been passed. 5. Mr.Avinash K. Mishra, learned State Counsel, would submit that Revenue Officers while discharging the duties and passing judicial orders acting as a Court, so the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 governed to them and as per Section 3 of the said Act, no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person for the Act in discharge of his official or judicial capacity or judicial duty or function. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also perused the records with utmost circumspection. 7. Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 reads as follows:- “3. Additional protection to Judges.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall debar or affect in any manner the power of the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High Court or any other authority under any law for the time being in force to take such action (whether by way of civil, criminal, or departmental proceedings or otherwise) against any person who is or was a Judge.” 8. In the matter of Anowar Hussain v. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee and others reported in 1965 SCC OnLine SC 1, the Supreme Court has observed as under: “10. In the matter of Anowar Hussain v. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee and others reported in 1965 SCC OnLine SC 1, the Supreme Court has observed as under: “10. The statute is clearly intended to grant protection to Judicial Officers against suits in respect of acts done or ordered to be done by them in discharge of their duties as such officers. The statute it must be noticed, protects a Judicial Officer only when he is acting in his judicial capacity and not in any other capacity. But within the limits of its operation it grants large protection to Judges and Magistrates acting in the discharge of their judicial duties. If the act done or ordered to be done in the discharge of judicial duties is within his jurisdiction, the protection is absolute and no enquiry will be entertained whether the act done or ordered was erroneously, irregularly or even illegally, or was done or ordered without believing in good faith, that he had jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of. If the act done or ordered is not within the limits of his jurisdiction, the Judicial Officer acting in the discharge of his judicial duties is still protected, if at the time of doing or ordering the act complained of, he in good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act. The expression "jurisdiction" does not mean the power to do or order the act impugned, but generally the authority of the Judicial Officer to act in the matter Tayen v. Ram Lal, ILR 12 All 115.” 9. In the matter of P.K. Gupta v. State of C.G. and others reported in (2020) 3 CGLJ 27 this Court has held that Tahsildar being a Revenue Officer under Section 11 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 conferred with quasi-judicial power under the said Code and a Revenue Officer is protected under Section 3 of the Judicial Officer's Protection Act, 1985 for the orders passed in discharge of his official duty and observed as under:- “11. By Section 31 of the Code, the revenue Court has been conferred with the status of the Court and a Revenue Officer while exercising the power under Section 31 shall be a Revenue Court. Section 31 of the Code states as under: "31. Conferral of status of Courts on Board and Revenue Officers. By Section 31 of the Code, the revenue Court has been conferred with the status of the Court and a Revenue Officer while exercising the power under Section 31 shall be a Revenue Court. Section 31 of the Code states as under: "31. Conferral of status of Courts on Board and Revenue Officers. The Board of a Revenue Officer, while exercising power under this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force to enquire into or to decide any question arising for determination between the State Government and any person or between parties to any proceedings, shall be a Revenue Court." 10. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court, it is not in dispute that at the time of passing the impugned order, the petitioner was working as Tehsildar and in the capacity of Tehsildar, he has passed the judicial order. So, this Court is of the considered opinion that the order was passed by the petitioner as a public servant and while working as a Judge, as defined in the Judges Protection Act, therefore, no civil or criminal proceeding can be initiated against him for an action or order passed by him as a public servant or Judge. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order whereby the application filed by the plaintiff has been allowed for impleadment of the petitioner as party defendant is not sustainable and bad in law and accordingly, it is set aside. 12. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. No cost(s).